Download PDF | (Essential Histories) John Haldon - Byzantium At War, Ad 600-1453-Routledge (2002).
93 Pages
Introduction
The Byzantine empire was not called by that name in its own time, and indeed the term ‘Byzantine’ was used only to describe inhabitants of Constantinople, ancient Byzantion on the Bosphorus. The subjects of the emperor at Constantinople referred to themselves as Rhomaioi, Romans, because as far as they were concerned Constantinople, the city of Constantine I, the first Christian ruler of the Roman empire, had become the capital of the Roman empire once Rome had lost its own pre-eminent position, and it was the Christian Roman empire that carried on the traditions of Roman civilisation.
In turn, the latter was identified with civilised society as such, and Orthodox Christianity was both the guiding religious and spiritual force which defended and protected that world, but was also the guarantor of God’s continuing support. Orthodoxy means, literally, correct belief, and this was what the Byzantines believed was essential to their own survival. hus, from the modern historian’s perspective, ‘Byzantine’ might be paraphrased by the more long-winded ‘medieval eastern Roman’ empire, for that is, in historical terms, what ‘Byzantium’ really meant.
In its long history, from the later Sth century, when the last vestiges of the western half of the Roman empire were absorbed into barbarian successor kingdoms, until the fall in battle of the last eastern Roman emperor, Constantine XI (1448-53), the empire was almost constantly at war. Its strategic situation in the southern Balkans and Asia Minor made this inevitable. It was constantly challenged by its more or its less powerful neighbours — at first, the Persian empire in the east, later the various Islamic powers that arose in that region — and by its northern neighbours, the Slavs, the Avars (a Turkic people) in the 6th and 7th centuries, the Bulgars from the end of the 7th to early 11th centuries and, in the later 11th and 12th centuries, the Hungarians, later the Serbs and finally, after their conquests in Greece and the southern Balkans, the Ottoman Turks.
Relations with the western powers which arose from what remained of the western Roman empire during the 5th century were complicated and tense, not least because of the political competition between the papacy and the Constantinopolitan patriarchate, the two major sees — Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem were far less powerful after the 7th century Islamic conquests — in the Christian world. Byzantium survived so long partly because internally it was well-organised, with an efficient fiscal and military system; and partly because these advantages, rooted in its late Roman past, lasted well into the 11th century. But as its western and northern neighbours grew in resources and political stability they were able to challenge the empire for pre-eminence, reducing it by the early 13th century to a second- or even third-rate rump of its former self, subordinated to the politics of the west and the commercial interests of Venice, Pisa and Genoa, among others, the greatest of the Italian merchant republics. In this book, we will look at some of the ways in which the medieval east Roman empire secured its long existence.
The Byzantine lands
The Byzantine, or medieval eastern Roman, empire was restricted for most of its existence to the southern Balkans and Asia Minor — very roughly modern Greece and modern Turkey. In the middle of the 6th century, after the success of the emperor Justinian’s reconquests in the west, the empire had been much more extensive, including all of the north African coastal regions from the Atlantic to Egypt, along with south-eastern Spain, Italy and the Balkans up to the Danube. But by the later 6th century the Italian lands were already contested by the Lombards, while the Visigoths of Spain soon expelled the imperial administration from their lands.
The near eastern provinces in Syria, Iraq and the Transjordan region along with Egypt were all lost to Islam by the early 640s, and north Africa followed suit by the 690s, In a half century of warfare, therefore, the empire lost some of its wealthiest regions and much of the revenue to support the government, the ruling elite and vital needs such as the army. Much of the territory that remained to the empire was mountainous or arid, so that the exploitable zones were really quite limited in extent. Nevertheless, an efficient (for medieval times) fiscal administration and tax regime extracted the maximum in manpower and agricultural resources, while a heavy reliance on well-planned diplomacy, an extensive network of ambassadors, emissaries and spies, a willingness to play off neighbours and enemies against one another, and to spend substantial sums on ‘subsidies’
to ward off attack, all contributed to the longevity of the state. And these measures were essential to its survival, for although Constantinople was itself well defended and strategically well placed to resist attack, the empire was surrounded on all sides by enemies, real or potential, and was generally at war on two, if not three, fronts at once throughout much of its long history. The 10th-century Italian diplomat Liutprand of Cremona expressed this situation well when he described the empire as being surrounded by the fiercest of barbarians — Hungarians, Pechenegs, Khazars, Rus’ and so forth.
Asia Minor was the focus of much of the empire's military activity from the 7th until the 13th century. There are three separate climatic and geographical zones, consisting of the coastal plains, the central plateau regions, and the mountains which separate them. While hot, dry summers and extreme cold in winter characterise the central plateau, and where, except for some sheltered river valleys, the economy was mainly pastoral — sheep, cattle and horses — the coastlands, where most productive agricultural activity and the highest density of settlement was located, offered a friendlier, ‘Mediterranean’ type climate, and were also the most important source of revenues for the government.
The pattern of settlement was similarly strongly differentiated — most towns and cities were concentrated in the coastal regions, while the mountains and plateaux were much more sparsely settled. Similar considerations applied to the Balkans, too, and in both cases this geography affected road systems and communications. The empire needed to take these factors into account in strategic planning and campaign organisation, of course, for logistical considerations — the sources of manpower, food and shelter, livestock and weapons, how to move these around, and how they were consumed — played a key role in the empire’s ability to survive in the difficult strategic situation in which it found itself.
Armies, whether large or small, and whether Byzantine or hostile forces, faced many problems when campaigning in or across Asia Minor, in particular the long stretches of road through relatively waterless and exposed country, and the rough mountainous terrain separating coastal regions from central plateaux. The complex Roman and Hellenistic road system was partly retained during the Byzantine period, but the empire after the 6th century developed a range of military routes together with a series of fortified posts and military bases — for these same routes also served as means of access and egress for Arab forces. Strategic needs changed, of course, and so did the road system, with routes falling in and out of use.
The Balkans present a rugged and fragmented landscape falling broadly into two zones: the coastal and riverine plains (of rhrace, of Thessaly and of the south Danubian area), which are productive and fairly densely occupied; and the mountain ranges that dominate the whole region and represent about two-thirds of its area — the Dinaric Alps in the west, stretching from north-east to south-west; the southerly Pindus range with which they merge, and which together dominate western and central Greece; and the Balkan chain itself,stretching from the Morava river as far as the Black Sea coast, with the Rhodope range forming an arc to the south, through Macedonia towards the plain of Thrace. The fragmented terrain has given rise to a series of distinct geopolitical units separated by ridges of highlands, fanning out along river valleys towards the coastal areas.
A number of major routes served from ancient times to give access to the interior of the Balkan region or to pass through it from north to south or west to east. The Balkans are characterised by relatively narrow and often quite high, easily controlled passes, and this terrain was ideally suited to guerrilla strategy — tough campaigning conditions, and difficult access to some regions during the winter. The structure of communications and the effectiveness of Byzantine political authority demonstrate this, for there were no obvious focal points in the ancient and medieval period in the south Balkan region apart from Thessaloniki and Constantinople, both on the edge of the peninsula and its fragmented landscape.
Geography affected land use in the Balkans as it did in Asia Minor. The uplands and mountains, dominated by forest and woodland, and the lower foothills by woodland, scrub and rough pasturage, were suited to pastoral activity only. Agriculture was limited to the plains, river valleys and coastlands of Thessaly, Macedonia and the Danube. The sea played an important role, since it surrounds the Balkan peninsula apart from along the northern boundary, and acted, as it still does today, as an efficient means of communication along the heavily indented coastline and with more distant regions. The disadvantage of relatively easy seaborne access, however, was that it opened up the southern Balkan peninsula to invasion.
One of the factors that made the Roman army so successful and efficient was the military road system, established for the most part between the end of the 2nd century BC and the middle of the 2nd century AD. The network also facilitated commerce, civilian traffic and the movement of information. But in the later 4th and Sth centuries the roads went into decline —a reflection of economic and social changes across the empire and the consequences of these for local governors and town councils. One result was a decline in the use of wheeled vehicles, which could not use roads that were not properly maintained, and a corresponding increase in dependence on beasts of burden.
After the 6th century a limited number of key routes was kept up by means of compulsory burdens imposed on local communities. The fast post, consisting of pack-animals, relay horses and light carts, and the slow post, which provided ox-carts and heavy vehicles, were amalgamated into a single system in the 6th or 7th century, and continued to operate until the last years of the empire.
The imperial road systems in both the Balkans and Anatolia were less extensive than hitherto, but remained nevertheless effective. But the costs of maintenance and the problem of supervising upkeep meant that many routes were hardly more than tracks or paths usable only by pack-animals, with paved or hard surfaces only near towns and fortresses. Travel and transport by water was usually faster and much cheaper. This was especially so in the case of the long-distance movement of bulk goods, such as grain, for example.
The expense of feeding draught-oxen, drovers and carters, paying tolls, together with the slow rate of movement of ox-carts, added very considerably to the price of the goods being transported, generally well beyond the price of ordinary subjects of the emperors. It was really only the government and the army, and to a certain extent the Church and a few wealthy individuals, who could pay for this. In contrast, shipping was much more cost effective, since large quantities of goods could be transported in a single vessel, handled by a small crew, relatively inexpensively, once the capital investment in vessel and cargo had been made.
This was the physical world of the later Roman and medieval eastern Roman, or Byzantine, empire, and this was the context within which the politics, diplomacy, warfare and social evolution of Byzantine culture are to be understood. Geography and physical context were not the only factors: cultural assumptions — the ‘thought world’ of Byzantium, also partly determined the complex network of causes and effects, the results of which we call ‘history’. But means of communication, speed of movement of people and information were key aspects on which the effectiveness of armies or the availability of resources to support a campaign might depend. Geography affected how the government worked, the amount of agricultural wealth that it could make available for specific purposes, the distribution and well-being of the population, rates of production and consumption, the availability of livestock, and so forth. And geographical factors were, of course, fundamental to warfare and the strategic organisation of the empire.
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