Download PDF | Helen Nicholson - God’s Warriors_ ’’Crusaders, Saracens and the battle for Jerusalem’’-Osprey Publishing, 2005.
224 Pages
HATTIN 1187
INTRODUCTION
The Crusades seemed to erupt into the late 11th-century Middle East without warning. Yet in reality they were the culmination of a century during which Catholic Western Europe had been changing at an increasing rate, not least in its attitudes towards war and religion. The 11th century had also seen considerable economic and population growth and, although there were ups and downs, it would be wrong to see the First Crusade as a product of poverty, despair and religious hysteria. Hysteria there may have been, but this did not create the Crusades. In early Christian times warfare had been seen as, at best, an unfortunate necessity. Now, however, the concept of Holy War spread, along with such phenomena as the Holy Banner given by the Church to a military leader, and of the Militia Christi or Warrior of Christ, and the growing cult of warrior saints.
It was also increasingly accepted that men who fell fighting for the Church now died as martyrs. Whether these ideas owed anything to the Islamic concept of 'lesser' jihad - widely mistranslated as Holy War - is hotly debated, as is the influence of early Byzantine concepts of religiously justified warfare upon the idea of military jihad in the first place. What is clear is that, in Christian Western Europe, co-existence with Islam was increasingly denied. Christ's supposed enemies must be defeated and destroyed - 'truth' was to be proved by the sword. During the 12th century, four so-called Crusader States were established in the Middle East, in and around the Holy Land of Christianity but also in the heartland of Islamic civilization.
Furthermore 'Frankish' or Western European Latin or Catholic Christians now occupied Jerusalem, a city that was sacred to all three monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In fact, the First Crusaders had expelled the Muslim and Jewish inhabitants of the Holy City with great slaughter. The First Crusade had indeed been a resounding, and even today astonishing, success from the Westerners' point of view. By the 1180s the realms carved out following the First Crusade were no longer real 'Crusader States', because the descendants of the First Crusaders were no longer striving to expand. Instead they were struggling to survive and to protect the Holy reconquered by the Muslims, the Principality of Antioch had fallen under Byzantine influence and even the small County of Tripoli now resisted Jerusalem's suzerainty. In the early 1180s the Kingdom of Jerusalem had 400,000 to 500,0000 inhabitants, no more than 120,000 of whom were Latins (Christians of Western European origin).
The rest consisted of indigenous 'Oriental' Christians, Muslims, Jews and Samaritans. The balance of power between feudal lords and ruler in late 12th-century Jerusalem is not entirely clear, but in general it seems that the king and lesser aristocracy were losing out while the leading barons grabbed ever more control. Meanwhile the Military Orders (Templars and Hospitallers) were growing in power, being given more castles which only they seemed able to garrison effectively. The defence of the Kingdom of Jerusalem was theoretically the responsibility of all Western European Christians, yet in reality the Latin States had to rely on themselves after the fiasco of the Second Crusade in 1148.
What its leaders now wanted were professional soldiers and financial support - not hordes of belligerent Crusaders who stirred up trouble then went home. Meanwhile the catastrophic Byzantine defeat by the Saljuq Turks at Myriokephalon in 1176, and a massacre of Latins in Constantinople eight years later, meant that help from the Byzantine Empire was an illusion. The Kingdom of Jerusalem also faced problems within its borders. Few Armenians settled in Palestine and the warlike Maronite Christians of the mountains lived away from the main centres of power while the majority of Syriac-Jacobite Christians remained deeply suspicious of the Latins.
The Latins' adoption of some eastern habits of dress and cleanliness was superficial and the cultural gulf between Latins and locals remained unbridged until the end. Relations between the Latin States and neighbouring Muslim states remained rooted in war, lasting peace probably being impossible as each side clung to ideologies that could not accept the other's existence. Attitudes based on the easy victories of the First Crusade meant that the military elite of the Latin States was still hugely overconfident. This did wonders for their morale but would soon lead to military disaster. Yet elements of doubt were already creeping in, and the second half of the 12th century saw the building of many defensive castles. The eastern frontier of the Kingdom of Jerusalem actually consisted of distinct sectors. In the north (the Litani valley) were some impressive castles.
The central sector from Mount Hermon (Jabal al Shaykh) along the Golan Heights to the Yarmuk valley was supposedly shared with the rulers of Damascus. The Muslims thought this zone should have extended as far as the Balqa hills around Amman but in fact the Latins dominated a fertile plateau between the River Yarmuk and the Ajlun hills. Southward again lay the Latin territory of Oultrejordain, lying between the River Jordan, Dead Sea and Wadi Araba in the west, and the strategic road from Amman to Aqabah. From Oultrejordain the Latins had levied tolls on Muslim traffic between Syria and Egypt, even on Muslim Haj or pilgrim caravans travelling south to Mecca and Medina. Then, in the early 1170s, Saladin's reconquest of territory south of Montreal (Shawbak) had a profound psychological impact, 'liberating the Haj Road' so that pilgrims, at least from Egypt, no longer paid humiliating tolls to the infidel.
The most striking development on the Muslim side of the frontier had been Saladin's unification of Islamic territory neighbouring the Latin States. Only in the far north did the Latins now have any neighbour other than Saladin, and that was the fellow Christian state of Cilician Armenia. Yet there had been other equally important changes in the Muslim Middle East. The concept of jihad as war against the infidel, long dormant, was revived by 12th-century Sunni Muslim scholars. ]ihads became organized campaigns to recover the Holy Land, just as Crusades had been to conquer it. They were not, however, intended to convert the enemy by the sword since Islam has always frowned on forcible conversion. Nevertheless the 12th century did see a hardening of religious attitudes, greater intolerance and increased pressure on indigenous Oriental Christians.
This Sunni Muslim revival was also directed against the Shi'a Muslim minority. The loss ofJerusalem to the Crusaders had actually increased the city's importance to Muslims, being followed by an outpouring of fada'il or 'praise literature' about the Holy City. The responsibilities of rulers were also described in a number of books known as 'Mirrors for Princes', and one of the most interesting was written by an anonymous Syrian living near the Crusader frontier a year or so after Saladin's death. It went into great detail about jihad and although the best jihad was still against evil in one's own heart, fighting the unbeliever came a good second. In fact the inhabitants of Syria's cities, particularly Aleppo in the north, had long traditions of scientific siege warfare and the 12th century saw the building of many new fortifications in Muslim Syria, just as it did in the Latin States.
Meanwhile the Arab bedouin of the desert fringes remained strong but, having lost political dominance to the invading Turks, now generally preferred to be left alone. The people of Egypt, on the other hand, largely left warfare to their rulers, yet even here fundamental changes were taking place. The Arabization of the country really started under the Fatimids who had ruled Egypt from AD 969, and the Arab bedouin of Egypt continued to prosper after Saladin seized control in 1171.
Islam's relations with Europe, rather than just the Latin States in Syria, were also changing. By the 12th century Islamic naval power in the Mediterranean was in steep decline while Italian merchant republics such as Pisa, Genoa and Venice controlled the sea lanes. Saladin would, in fact, be the last ruler of medieval Egypt to attempt a serious revival of Egyptian naval power - an attempt that ultimately failed. In the Red Sea, however, Egypt remained dominant, defeating Latin Crusader raids and piracy with relative ease. Saladin's unification of so much of the Middle East took decades of war and diplomacy. From his power base in Egypt he and his family, the Ayyubids, won control of Yemen (1173), Damascus (1174) and Aleppo (1183). By 1186 Saladin also imposed his suzerainty over the Jazira (eastern Syria, south-eastern Turkey and northern Iraq), a rich region which provided a reservoir of military manpower.
Overconfident the leaders of the Latin States may have been, but they watched the growth of Saladin's power with alarm and sent embassies to various parts of Europe seeking support. King Henry 11 of England had long been sympathetic, though his help took the form of cash rather than troops. A special tax in aid of Jerusalem had already been levied and in 1172, as part of his penance for the murder of Becket, Henry promised to support 200 knights for one year in Jerusalem. Five years later he sent a chest of money to Jerusalem and in 1185 promised yet more. In fact these donations may have totalled 30,000 marks, a huge sum for those days and one that would play a crucial role in the forthcoming Hattin campaign. Within the Latin States a census was conducted to discover their real military potential, while taxes were raised and castles strengthened. The strategic importance of Oultrejordain also increased now that Saladin controlled both Egypt and Syria. Here Reynald of Chatillon, who ran an effective intelligence service among the bedouin, planned to smash the Muslim ring surrounding the Latin States and perhaps even break into the Indian Ocean with its fabulous wealth of trade. In 1181-82 Reynald raided the Hijaz and the support he got from some local tribes clearly worried Saladin. Reynald's spectacular but disastrous naval expedition into the Red Sea the following year sent shock waves throughout the Islamic world and dented Saladin's status as Protector of the Muslim Holy Places in Mecca and Madina. The Sultan struck back immediately, and then again in 1183. In response the Christians fielded the largest army so far raised by the Latin States, but adopted a defensive stance by refusing to meet Saladin in a set-piece battle. This strategy was effective and the Muslims withdrew. Yet the invasion caused great damage and many people blamed Count Raymond, on whose advice the passive strategy had been adopted, for missing a chance to destroy Saladin.
Iron mines were almost as important as water sources and the ]abal Ajlun to the north of Oultrejordain had such mines. These hills had come under Saladin's control by 1184 and the Sultan sent Izz al Din Usamah, previously governor of the iron-rich mountains near Beirut, to build a new castle overlooking Ajlun itself. But although the Muslims were nibbling away at the Kingdom of Jerusalem, Saladin faced problems away in the east. A severe drought also struck Palestine in 1185 and so it was with some relief that both sides agreed to a four-year truce. This did not mean peace on all fronts, of course. In 1186 the Principality of Antioch raided its Christian neighbours in Cilicia while in south-eastern Anatolia a bloody struggle broke out between Kurds and Turcomans (nomadic Turks), both of whom were vital sources of military manpower for Saladin's armies. The Byzantine Empire was also wracked by dissention. Two leading noblemen, Isaac and Alexius Angelus, had sought refuge at Saladin's court but in 1185 Isaac Angelus returned to Constantinople and overthrew the Emperor Andronicus to become Byzantine Emperor himself. The following year his brother Alexius was imprisoned in the Latin States as he made his way home. There were similar tensions on Saladin's eastern border. In 1180 the new caliph Al Nasir had succeeded to the throne of Baghdad and under his energetic rule the once mighty Abbasid dynasty saw a final burst of glory. Yet Al Nasir's ambitions clashed with Saladin's plans in northern Iraq and relations between the two Muslim leaders were cool. In Jerusalem the leper king, Baldwin IV, died in 1185 and in August 1186 his child successor Baldwin V also died, throwing the Kingdom into a major crisis. The regent, Count Raymond of Tripoli, was ousted in a coup by a belligerent 'Court Party' who wanted a tougher policy towards the Muslims. They had Sibylla, sister of Baldwin IV, crowned queen and thus her husband, a French nobleman named Guy de Lusignan, became king. For months many Jerusalem nobles refused to recognize the coup - though in the end only Count Raymond continued to deny homage to King Guy. Instead Raymond retired to Tiberius, capital of the seigneurie of Galilee, which he held through his wife Eschiva of Galilee. Naturally Saladin watched this crisis with interest. He released some of Raymond's knights who had been prisoners of war and sent his own troops to support Raymond in Tiberius and for a while it looked as if King Guy would attack Raymond. Beyond Jerusalem Prince Raymond III of Antioch also refused to recognize Guy, though he would do so after war broke out with Saladin.
THE OPPOSING LEADERS THE MUSLIM COMMANDERS Saladin has traditionally been seen in Europe as a paragon of virtue and a hero. Recently, however, a critical view has portrayed him as an ambitious, ruthless and devious politician, and less brilliant as a commander than once thought. As usual the truth probably lies between these extremes, though all agree that Sultan Saladin was the greatest man in the history of the 12th-century Middle East. Saladin's family, the Ayyubids, was of Kurdish origin and had served Nur al Din, the Turkish ruler of Syria and northern Iraq. Saladin himself was educated and given military training in the cultivated surroundings of a Turkish court in Arabian Syria, though it was in Egypt that he rose to power. As a ruler he listened to advice, particularly on political matters, and made use of existing military structures as well as new ideas. Contemporary Muslim biographers tend to idealize his character, emphasizing his humanity, his forgiving nature, piety, love of justice, generosity, courage. They may have exaggerated but there is no doubt that Saladin made a profound impact on those around him. Even his Christian foes trusted Saladin's honour. Contrary to some romantic views, the Sultan was no military 'innocent' thrust into warfare against his will. He had had considerable experience as a staff officer under Nur al Din and fought in several battles before taking over as vizier (chief minister) of Egypt in 1169. Saladin did not become official ruler of that country until 1171, and even then Egypt theoretically remained part of Nur al Din's realm until the latter's death in 1173. As a commander Saladin was willing to take considerable risks and he had a clear understanding of broad strategy. On the other hand he made mistakes, for example allowing Latin resistance to crystalize at Tyre (Sur) after his overwhelming victory at Hattin. Nevertheless Saladin remained the noble and tragic - though 'pagan' - hero of various European tales. His greatness was such that the Latins seemed unable to accept that he was a 'mere Saracen'. So legends grew up claiming that Saladin was the grandson of a beautiful French princess forced to marry a valiant Turk named Malakin. He, it was said: .. .lived long and tenderly with his wife. Neither were they childless, for of this lady, who was called the Fair Captive, was born the mother of that courteous Turk, the Sultan Saladin, an honourable, a wise and a conquering lord. Saladin had great respect for his nephew Taqi al Din who, like so many Islamic leaders of this period, was described by contemporary Muslim writers as deeply religious and very generous. This may have been true, but what comes across most clearly was his physical courage and preference for leading troops in person. Taqi al Din had demonstrated his initiative long before Hattin, his prompt action saving the day at the battle of Hama (against the troops of Muslim Aleppo and Mosul) in 1175. Now Saladin gave him the toughest military tasks, often placing him in command of the right wing which, in the traditional tactics of the Middle East, usually took an offensive role while the left wing acted defensively. In addition to being an outstanding commander, Taqi al Din was impetuous and obstinate. His political ambitions aimed at a power base larger than the central Syrian province of Hama which he had governed since 1178. Saladin was fully aware of the tempestuous Taqi al Din's desire for independence - perhaps seeing him as a kindred spirit - but the Sultan still made him governor of Egypt while he himself was away. Taqi al Din next dreamed of carving out a state in North Africa, but Saladin feared .
that he would take away too many valuable troops. Dismissed as governor of Egypt, he almost rebelled against Saladin and quarrelled openly with Saladin's son Al Afdal. Yet Saladin was soon reconciled with his warlike nephew, adding the mountainous frontier region around Mayyafariqin in Anatolia to Taqi al Din's existing Syrian fief of Hama. Here the young warrior had a chance to expand his territory without clashing with other members of the family. Even so Taqi al Din virtually deserted Saladin during the crisis of the Third Crusade, only to die suddenly a bare 17 months before the great Sultan himself. Muzaffar al Din Gokbori was one of Saladin's leading amirs or military commanders. Like all such amirs he governed large provinces from which he drew revenues to pay his troops. Gokbori, which means 'Blue Wolf' in Turkish, was a son of the governor of Irbil. His father had been a loyal follower of the great Zangi whose conquest of Edessa in 1144 was the first step in rolling back the Crusades. Gokbori himself served Zangi's son Nur al Din and became governor of Harran in what had been the Latin County of Edessa. In 1175 he led the right wing of a combined Aleppo-Mosul army against Saladin at the Horns of Hama, but after Nur al Din's death Zangi's dynasty was falling apart and a new Muslim hero arose - Saladin. Gokbori's defection to Saladin was a major factor in the Sultan's success. Yet it was also a dangerous move because if Saladin failed, Gokb6ri would lose everything. In the event Saladin defeated the remaining Zangids and added the cities of Edessa (Urfa) and Samsat to Gokb6ri's governorate. He also gave one of his sisters, Al Sitt Rabia Khatun, to the 'Blue Wolf' in marriage. Gokbori's military skills were widely recognized, Saladin's secretary, the chronicler Al Isfahani, describing him as '...the audacious, the hero of well thought out projects, the lion who heads straight for the target, the most reliable and firmest chief'. He remained a leading amir after the Hattin campaign and though he had to give his original fiefs to Taqi al Din, he was compensated with his father's old governorate around Irbil. This he ruled until dying at the age of 81. In Syria Gokbori was remembered as a great warrior, but in Irbil in what is now Iraqi Kurdistan the old Turk was remembered as a patron of scholars such as the historian Ibn Khallikan. He built colleges, hospitals, almshouses and hostels for pilgrims and merchants. Gokbori was also the first ruler to patronize the previously unofficial Mawlid al Nabi (Birthday of the Prophet Mohammed) festival, perhaps in imitation of a large Christian community which then lived in Irbil. Only five years after his death the Mongols arrived, destroying G6kbori's cultural works, and all that seems to remain is the beautifully decorated brick minaret of Irbil's Old Mosque. Little is known about the Hajib Husam al Din Lu'lu's background. He was almost certainly a mamluk as the name Lu'lu, meaning 'Pearl', was usually given to slaves. He may also have been of Armenian origin. Even his title of Hajib (chamberlain) does not say much. Under the previous Fatimid rulers of Egypt, when Lu'lu may already have been a courtier, the Hajib was an important court official though not a military one. Under the Saljuqs of Iran the Hajib was a court official who could also lead armies.
According to one chronicler, Husam al Din Lu'lu was a shaykh or man of religion. But it was as commander of Saladin's fleet that he earned fame, defeating Reynald of Chatillon's audacious raid into the Red Sea in 1183 and personally leading marines in a naval battle which led to the capture of Gibelet (Jubayl) four years later. After taking a relief fleet to Acre in 1189 Lu'lu seems to disappear from the records. Was he among 2,700 men of Acre's garrison slaughtered on Richard the Lionheart's orders in 1191? A senior officer named Husam al Din was still in Al Adil's service in 1194, but there is no certainty that he was the same man. Whether or not Lu'lu died at Acre, retired after the destruction of the Egyptian Mediterranean fleet at Acre, or went on to serve Al Adil, he had already won enough fame to be included alongside Saladin in a panegyric by the poet Ibn al Dharawil. Saladin's secretary Al Isfahani was also full of praise for Lu'lu, whose courage was well known to the infidels, whose violence against the enemy was extolled. He was without equal when it came to raids with which none but he were associated... happy in all he undertook, agreeable in character. Ibn al Athir, a less flowery chronicler, simply described Husam al Din Lu'lu as '...an emir known for his bravery, prudence and good humour' and as '... a brave and energetic man, a naval and military expert full of useful initiative'. THE CHRISTIAN COMMANDERS Most of the original sources are unsympathetic to Guy, King ofJerusalem (1186-92), as the ruler who lost Jerusalem to the Muslims. Guy and his French knights were also disliked by the local Latin aristocracy. He was clearly handsome and won the heart of Queen Sibylla of Jerusalem, but whether he was as weak and frivolous as most chroniclers suggest is less certain. He emerges as a far more decisive character after Hattin than before it. Traditional historians still describe Guy as an ineffective bailli (regent) during the crisis of 1183 and as being tight with money even before he became king. The late R.e. Smail, however, gives Guy some credit for forcing Saladin's withdrawal in 1183. On the other hand he does appear to have been easily influenced by friends who offered conflicting and not always sound advice. As a result King Guy tended to change his mind at crucial moments.
Of course the basis of Guy's authority was weak, as the laws of the Kingdom of Jerusalem reflected a European ideal of 'constitutional' feudal monarchy rather than the reality of conditions in the Latin States. Even Guy's command of the army was rather theoretical and he constantly had to consult his barons and other men before issuing an order. Confusion, resentment, jealousy and insubordination were rife throughout the Kingdom and Guy could rarely impose effective discipline. On the other hand his final decisions and the tactics he adopted, even at Hattin, were fully in line with the accepted strategy of the time - a strategy which had served the Latin States well in the past. In many ways Count Raymond III of Tripoli was the most tragic figure in the whole Hattin saga. Perhaps the most intelligent of Latin leaders, he often tried to achieve peaceful, co-existence with neighbouring Muslim rulers. He also emerged as the best tactician among the Kingdom of Jerusalem's military leaders. Yet in the end Raymond was branded a traitor, as the man responsible for Christian defeat by Saladin, and he retired to die a broken man within a few months of that catastrophe. Raymond became count of Tripoli at the age of only 12, after his father was killed by Isma'ili 'Assassins'. By 1175 his ability and experience had made him leader of the local barons and he was later the natural choice to be regent, ruling the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the name of the dying leper King Baldwin IV. In this role Raymond showed himself patient, careful and ingenious in dealing with various factions in the Kingdom and with its neighbours. The calculating Count Raymond was also capable of adapting to a changing situation, an adaptability rare among his hidebound contemporaries in Jerusalem. Eight years as a prisoner in Aleppo had made him fluent in Arabic and given him considerable knowledge of Islam, plus a certain admiration rather than hatred for his captors. Unlike newly arrived Crusaders, Raymond no longer saw the Muslims merely as foes but as neighbours - though rivals - with a shared interest in the harvest, the uncertain rainfall and in trade. For their part the Muslims regarded Raymond III of Tripoli as the bravest as well as the shrewdest of Latin leaders. But when the final crisis came he fought as hard as any to save the Kingdom and if Guy had followed Raymond's advice the battle of Hattin might have been avoided or even won. Of all the leading characters in the story of the loss of Jerusalem, none is more colourful than Reynald. The traditional view portrays him as a recklessly brave, handsome but undisciplined adventurer who came to the Latin States in 1153 without wealth or followers yet won the hand of the young Princess Constance of Antioch. Unscrupulous and brutal he may have been, but Reynald had an astonishing grasp of geopolitical strategy. Unfortunately for the Kingdom of Jerusalem, his vision far outstripped the military or economic capabilities of the Latin States. Unlike Raymond of Tripoli, who had also spent years as a prisoner among the Muslims, Reynald's captivity in Aleppo (1161-75) had left him with a burning hatred for Islam - though also a great knowledge of its geography. He emerged as a fanatical Crusader. The Muslims in turn well knew that 'Arnat', as they called him, was their most dedicated foe. By the time of Reynald's release, his wife Constance had died and so, without delay, Reynald married the heiress to Krak (Karak) and thus became master of the great seigneurie of Oultrejordain. Here he gradually built up a state-within-a-state, perhaps one day hoping to make it an independent lordship like the County of Tripoli or the Principality of Antioch. Balian, the Lord of Rama (Ramlah), came from the most famous feudal family in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Yet this d'Ibelin family had humble origins, being part of a 'new aristocracy' which rose from the rank-and-file of knights who carved out the Kingdom in the early 12th century. By the 1180s Balian d'Ibelin had become one of the most respected local barons and enjoyed semi-autonomous authority in the south of Palestine. Trusted by all sides, he had acted as an intermediary in negotiations between King Guy and Count Raymond of Tripoli. Balian was also well known as a negotiator among the Muslims and was counted a personal friend by Saladin himself. Nevertheless Balian remained a convinced Christian and a dedicated defender of the Kingdom. Released by Saladin after Hattin, he swore never again to take arms against the Sultan. Yet Balian d'Ibelin allowed himself to be absolved from this oath by the Patriarch of Jerusalem and took command of the Holy City's defences where he showed enormous courage and determination. It says a great deal for the respect between Balian and Saladin, qualities that bridged the religious divide, that the Sultan could understand Balian's oath-breaking and forgive him when Jerusalem finally fell on 2 October 1187.
THE OPPOSING ARMIES
SALADIN'S FORCES
Medieval Muslim armies were highly organized compared to their Crusader enemies and some aspects of their structure, tactics and traditions went back to the ancient Romano-Byzantine or Persian empires. Warfare was largely left to professional soldiers although religious volunteers did play a role against the invading Crusaders. Possession of a horse also gave status in medieval Islamic society, as it did in Europe. On the other hand the elite of the Muslim countries had lived in towns since at least the 9th century, rather than in scattered castles like the feudal aristocracy of the West. Regular soldiers also dwelt within the city walls, though irregulars camped outside. The Turks and Kurds who formed the bulk of such professionals were rough compared to the cultured Arab amirs of the old Fatimid regime, while the sophisticated urban populations regarded them as a barbarous but necessary addition to their streets. Such men often came from long-standing military families in which young warriors acquired experience of leadership and tactics fighting alongside their relatives. Unlike the fully professional mamluks of slave origin, such free-born warriors often had other activities including trades to keep them busy in time of peace. Among those who rose high in Muslim armies were men of humble birth, but in Saladin's day most leaders were drawn from free-born soldiers rather than the slave-recruited mamluks.
The proportion of various ethnic groups within 12th-century Islamic armies is not easy to judge, as the origins of leaders did not necessarily reflect the men they led. Saladin's armies grew out of those of his Zangid predecessors and, like all the states which emerged from the fragmentation of the Great Saljuq empire in the early 12th century, the Zangids were highly militarized and looked east for cultural, political and military inspiration. The force which Nur al Din sent to Egypt in 1169, in which Saladin served as a staff officer, consisted of 6,000 Turcomans, 2,000 Kurds and a tiny elite of 500 mamluks. It was around this force that Saladin built his own army when he took over Egypt a few years later. At first he also used some of the old Fatimid regiments but most of these were disbanded within a short while.
In Syria and the Jazira region Saladin made a policy of trying to recruit the troops of defeated Muslim rivals. The loyalty of those who did join him was strengthened by flattering their sense of 'asabiyah (family pride) and Saladin's armies soon proved that they had greater experience as well as better discipline than Muslim forces from eastern Anatolia or Persia. As Saladin's authority spread, so regional armies grew up under various provincial governors. Their recruitment often differed from that of the Sultan's own forces. Aleppo relied primarily on Turcoman tribes such as the Yiiriik, Damascus recruiting Arab tribesmen from central Syria, and Kurds playing a prominent role around Mosul. Nevertheless, the core of most such forces remained slave-recruited mamluks. Fiercely loyal to the man who had bought, educated and then freed them, such warriors had formed the bodyguards of Abbasid caliphs for centuries. Now Saladin combined the old Abbasid and newer Fatimid practices, mostly buying slaves of pagan Turkish origin from Asia. This elite joined the Sultan's guard which also looked after the main arsenals, garrisoned important fortifications and were stationed in the centre of Saladin's army in battle. The largest ethnic group in the army was that of the Turks who had been the dominant military element in Syria since the early 12th century. Some tribes had migrated into northern Syria in the 1120s but the majority of Turkish troops were still recruited from Turcoman tribes in the Diyarbakr region. Second in numerical importance were the Kurds who fought as cavalry and archers, though apparently they were not using the horse-archery tactics of their Turkish rivals. Saladin recruited them either as individuals or as whole units from various tribes, such tribal units generally fighting as one block in battle. A third important ethnic element was the Arabs. There had been a resurgence of nomadism in northern Syria following aByzantine military revival of the 11th century. But although these Arab nomads were rich in horses they had few archers, fighting instead with spear or sword. Nevertheless the bedouin continued to supply vital auxiliary cavalry to the rulers of 12th-century Syria - though they were deeply mistrusted by the settled Arab peasantry and city dwellers. Such bedouin featured in Saladin's army as qu(l, infantry raiders who specialized in harassing an enemy's communications, and as lisus, cavalry infiltrators whose role was to interrupt enemy supplies. The mutatawi'ah or religious volunteers often served for very short periods, but they could be quite effective, particularly when harassing enemy stragglers. Unlike the ahdath (urban militias), the true religious volunteers were difficult for a government to control. Meanwhile the ahdath tended to be recruited from the poorer sections of city populations. By the 12th century its main duty was to police a city or town, though it could also fight alongside the regular army in an emergency. Under Fatimid rule the ahdath of Palestinian towns may have included Jews as well as Muslims, but whether this was true of Saladin's ahdath is not known. Other local troops included the often despised rajjalah infantry. Specialist infantry would have been professionals, even if part-time, and the wealthy city of Aleppo was famous for warriors who also seem to have had a well-developed sense of humour. Back in 1071, when the Saljuq Turks were attacking Aleppo, the defenders wrapped a bale of silk around their strongest tower and sent a message to the enemy saying that the Turks' stone-throwing machines had given it a headache! Aleppo was still famous for its miners and siege engineers in Saladin's day, while the garrison of Aleppo's citadel were also looked after by a professional government-paid doctor. Engineers from far-away Khurasan may have served Saladin, and the Sultan was certainly delighted to get a squad of specialist fire-troops from the Abbasid caliph of Baghdad. Meanwhile North Africa played its part by supplying naval crews, of which Saladin was always short, the Maghribis (North Africans) being regarded as the best sailors in the Muslim world. Organization of Saladin's Forces Saladin's army was subdivided into units of various sizes, though the terms used often overlapped. The smallest were the jarida (70 men) and the tulb (70-200 men) with their own flag and trumpeter. The jama'a was probably a tactical formation consisting of three jaridas. The sariya was an ad hoc band of about 20 cavalry, often used in ambushes, while the saqa was a small advance guard or reconnaissance party. Unlike their Latin foes the Muslims also had specific amir (officer) ranks, ranging from an isfahsalar (army leader) down through the ustadh al dar and hajib (chamberlain) senior commanders, to the amir hajib, amir jandar, khazindar (governor of an important citadel), amir kabir (great officer) and ordinary amir. Ara'is headed the ahdath militia while the shihna was chief of police. Regular soldiers were paid regular jamakiyah (salaries) or held iqta' (land-grants), which had features in common with European feudal fiefs. The pay structure was controlled by a Diwan al ]aysh (Army Ministry). This Diwan al ]aysh also listed the troops' names and where they were stationed, and held reviews to check training and equipment. Registered soldiers received weapons from government arsenals free, but if they lost this equipment the cost was deducted from their pay. Any changes of rank, status or unit were also noted on the registers.
The iqta' or fief was vital to this military system. It was really a system of tax-farming in which the holder took a proportion of revenues in return for ensuring that taxes were collected. One vital characteristic that distinguished an iqta' from a European feudal fief was that the land could be taken back at any time. In return for an iqta' the muqta (land-holder) also maintained and equipped a specified number of troops. Some iqta's were huge estates given to members of the ruling family. Others were governorships of towns, castles and strategic districts bestowed on senior officers. Then there were villages and smaller estates given to lesser amirs. Salaries or pensions drawn from government properties could also be iqta's. The value of land-grants varied considerably, even within a single region. Only a generation after Saladin's death a survey showed iqta's ranging from one maintaining 250 horsemen, to another that included the towns of Nablus and Jinin supporting 120 horseman, to a small iqta' maintaining 70 horsemen. Inferior land went as iqta's to ajnad militia or bedouin auxiliaries. Yet the muqtas only lived on these estates if they had fallen from political favour. Among various categories of troops the slave-recruited mamluks generally formed a ruler's elite 'askar bodyguard. Fiercely disciplined and proud of its status, an 'askar also looked after siege engines, arsenals and other vital facilities. The halqa seems to have been a larger formation, perhaps comparable to a household regiment. The tawashiya included, by Saladin's day, both mamluks and freely recruited cavalrymen, each with his own horse, page or mamluk follower, about ten animals to carry baggage, and a salary to purchase equipment. Organized into first-rate regiments which remained close to the ruler on campaign, each tawashi was expected to serve in the army for a certain number of months every year. Men of the ajnad or territorial army had lower status but were still properly equipped cavalry, though few seem to have been trained horse-archers. The infantry had even lower status, despite their essential role in siege warfare. Most were archers, crossbowmen, or fought with spear and shield. The janib may have operated as mobile mounted infantry, sometimes riding mules, but the only real elite among foot soldiers were the nafatin (fire-troops). All professional foot soldiers were paid salaries, at least while on campaign. The same was probably true of siege engineers such as the naqqabun (miners or engineers), hajjarun (masons) and najjarun (carpenters). It was the support services, however, that really set this army apart from its Latin enemies. Considerable emphasis was put on good communications: a government barid (postal service) used carrier pigeons and couriers, while beacons could carry warnings from the frontiers at extraordinary speed. Equally important was the distribution of weapons. Most cities had arms bazaars and many, like Aleppo, Damascus, Cairo and Mosul, had their own weapons-manufacturing quarters. Arms were issued to the troops from the zardkhanah (arsenal) at the start of a campaign. On the march, however, armour and most weaponry would remain in the thuql (baggage train). This made the troops light and fast moving but could be disastrous if intelligence failed and there was a surprise attack. Consequently the thuql was commanded by an experienced and reliable amir. The thuql also incorporated fire-troops, blacksmiths to repair weapons, siege equipment with engineers and surveyors. Non-combatants in the thuql included servants, horse handlers, mule and donkey drivers, cameleers, scribes, religious functionaries, doctors and surgeons. The sophisticated medical services formed, in fact, a mobile hospital. The division of booty had always been carefully regulated in Muslim armies, one-fifth going to the government and the rest being distributed among the troops. Much would then be sold to the merchants of the suq al-'askar (soldiers' bazaar) which formed part of the baggage train. This suq al- 'askar also supplied additional weaponry and other military supplies when needed.
Physical appearance, costume and a rudimentary form of heraldry distinguished individuals and groups within Saladin's military. While the Ayyubid family and the Turks wore their hair long, the Arabs with the possible exception of the bedouin shaved their heads. Almost all Muslim men had beards or moustaches, Saladin's sailors having to shave in order to pass themselves off as Crusaders when slipping through a Latin blockade. A tall yellow cap called a kalawta was used by the Ayyubids while Central Asian Turkish forms of wrap-around tunic also became popular in the ruling class. A hiyasa (belt) made of linked metal plates actually distinguished the elite while officers wore the sharbush, a stiff fur-trimmed cap with a raised front. A band of richly embroidered tiraz fabric bearing an inscription had long been given by rulers to their followers as a mark of allegiance. Inscriptions also appeared on shields in the 11th century and would become more common later. Other devices and colours indicated Iranian influence, perhaps via the widely popular Shahnamah (epic poem), but there would be no real system of Islamic heraldry until the Mamluk dynasty of the mid-13th century onwards. Devices remained personal, not hereditary, and there was never a governing body to regularize 'heraldry' as in Europe. Taqi al Din's personal flag was described by a Crusader witness as looking like a pair of trousers, but what the ignorant European probably saw was either a doubled 'windsock' banner such as had been used by Turks and Persians for hundreds of years, or a flag bearing the double-bladed 'Sword of Ali' or a Turkish tribal tamga device. Taqi al Din's troops certainly marched beneath a yellow banner, yellow being the Ayyubids' favoured colour. It was not, however, one of the normal colours of Islamic symbolism (green, white, black, red), having been regarded with some disfavour in earlier years. While Arabs and Kurds used various types of flag, the Turks also held tuq or horsetail standards aloft. Tactics of the Muslim Forces Saladin continued to use the age-old razzia raiding tactics of the Arab Middle East though there had been a change in the way these were carried out. The old mixed infantry and cavalry armies now gave way to smaller elites of mamluk horse-archers supported by auxiliary cavalry using Turkish tactics of rapid manoeuvre, dispersal and harassment. Military manuals from the Islamic Middle Ages may reflect theory rather than reality, but the organizing of a battle array, an encampment, line of march, siege or counter-siege were very similar in works from the Fatimid, Ayyubid or even Mamluk periods. Saladin's siege tactics were almost entirely the same as those of his Fatimid predecessors, while his cavalry tactics were far more flexible than those of the Crusaders. Saladin's horsemen would even, if the situation were suitable, stand against a full-scale charge by the enemy's knights. Considerable skills were, in fact, demanded of a late 12th-century cavalryman. Literary sources give primacy to the spear, which could be wielded with one or both hands and thrust at the foe's arms or legs as well as his body. Once lances were broken horsemen drew their swords. Only in specifically Turkish sources are bows given much prominence.
Cavalry manuals dating from a generation or so later deal with the initiating and maintaining of an attack, feigning retreat, wheeling around in battle, evading the enemy and renewing an attack. Horse-archers are instructed how to control their mounts and how to shoot. The advantages of various forms of bow and arrow, as well as the use of thumb-rings for long-distance shooting, are all discussed. So is the use of the javelin from horseback. The training of foot soldiers received less attention, but manuals did give advice for infantry archers, describing the skills they needed to fight in the open. A little later military experts were suggesting that infantry must be able to march long distances, recognize dangerous enemy formations that indicated an impending attack, know how to take cover, check and chase cavalry, and how to scatter or scare an enemy's horses. Once in enemy territory any force should always keep its escape route open. This was particularly true of lightly equipped raiding parties whose function was to sow confusion and fear among the enemy. Arab bedouin auxiliaries excelled in setting ambushes, particularly if they were natives of the area. If a raid were to be made at night, cloudy, windy and rainy weather was best. If the enemy were strong, it was advisable to attack him just before dawn while he was still confused and sleepy. Set-piece battles were generally avoided but when they did take place it is difficult to tell how far the tactics of Saladin's day really followed the theories. The jandariyah guard remained with the ruler and though Saladin normally placed his best halqa regiments in the centre, halqa troops also operated as independent formations. Heavy cavalry were certainly used in the charge, operating much like Latin knights, and, like knights, were divided into small tulb squadrons. Yet horse-archery remained the cavalry's most effective tactic. At long distance it could disrupt enemy formations by wounding horses and infantry. At close range the Muslims' composite bow could penetrate most 12th-century armour. Islamic infantry may have declined in importance after the 11th century but they still appeared in major set-piece battles as well as siege warfare. Although infantry were dismissed by many Muslim chroniclers as harafisha (rabble), Saladin's tactics often relied on separating an enemy's infantry from his cavalry even when fighting fellow Muslims. Terrain would be used to full advantage. Shirkuh lured Latin cavalry into an impossible charge up a slope of soft sand in 1167 and Saladin used a tal (artificial hill of debris from long habitation, typical of the Middle East) to hide his reserves. But such sophisticated battlefield tactics demanded reliable battlefield communications and here the Muslims were well served by musical instruments, flags and jawush or munadi (criers). Siege warfare was the main purpose of large expeditions. Lightly armed troops would be the first to reach and invest an enemy castle. The attackers would then protect their position with palisades before digging entrenchments. Siege towers might be built and miners would start undermining the enemy's walls. Mining operations, which demanded skilled personnel and careful direction, were in fact used by the Muslims more than by the Crusaders. In addition to battering rams the Muslims had a variety of stone-throwing engines, some of which were large enough to damage a wall or at least the battlements which gave cover to the defenders. The numerous smaller engines were essentially anti-personnel weapons designed to clear defenders from their positions prior to a general assault. One of the attackers' most important tasks was to protect their wooden siege engines and mines from defenders who might make a sortie. Once a breach had been made or a wall undermined, the garrison would be given an opportunity to surrender. If this were refused assault parties would be organized under the best available officers. When these managed to seize the breach they might again stop while the enemy was offered a final chance to surrender. Sieges could go on for months and in such cases the besiegers' camp could turn into a temporary town. Outside Acre in 1190 Saladin's position had 7,000 shops including 140 farriers, all controlled by a police force. Several markets included those for clothing and weaponry old or new, plus an estimated 1,000 small bath-houses mostly managed by North Africans. The contrast with the stinking disease-ridden camps of the Crusaders could hardly be more striking. Muslim armies were just as sophisticated in defence of fortifications, most of which were based on long-established designs going back to the pre-Islamic period. The burj or tower was basic to Islamic military architecture. Covered galleries along the top of a wall were also widespread while city walls tended to be high rather than thick. Major architectural changes appeared early in the 13th century as a result of the invention of the counterweight mangonel, but these had. not appeared by Saladin's time. Garrisons included masons, sappers, crossbow-men, javelin-throwers, fire-troops and operators of stone-throwing machines. If an attack were imminent troops should pollute all the neighbouring water sources, and even attempt to spread disease downstream with the aid of carcasses. If possible the attackers should themselves be attacked by the garrison before they could establish their camp. Once the siege had begun the defenders must make night sorties to burn the enemy's machines, but if a sortie were attempted in daylight it could be in a strictly disciplined square formation. Many of these ideas were used in naval warfare. Nevertheless the main role of Saladin's fleet was to transport troops rapidly from Egypt to Syria, and to hamper traffic between the Latin States and Europe. Marines would sail aboard larger merchant ships as well as fighting galleys and could include archers, fire-troops and operators of stone-throwing machines as well as boarders. When faced with an enemy fleet Muslim galleys made use of crescent-shaped or compacted formations, feigned retreat and used coastal features for cover. Although Muslim naval power had been in decline for more than a century, a naval manual of the 13th century could still claim that the Muslims were superior to Byzantines in naval warfare - but made no comparison with the now dominant Italian fleets. Saladin's ships were essentially the same as those of his enemies. A shini was the standard fighting galley, but many cargo vessels were also powered by oars. Others, of course, relied on sails and it is now known that three-masted ships were built by Muslim Mediterranean shipwrights more than a century before they reappeared in Christian fleets. As early as AD 955 one great ship was 95 metres long and almost 40 metres broad. The warships built in sections in Egypt and then transported across Sinai on camel-back to the Gulf of Aqabah in 1170 must, however, have been small. Other Indian Ocean vessels could be astonishingly large. Here there was less use of oars, partly because of reliable monsoon winds but more importantly because water sources were scarce and so smaller crews were an advantage. The hinged stern rudder, a Chinese invention, was also known to eastern Arabian sailors by at least the early 12th century. Muslim Weapons Saladin rose to power in the central regions of the Muslim world which were acutely short of iron and of fuel for working metals. The nearest important source of iron ore was eastern Anatolia, but otherwise Saladin's empire had to rely on imported ingots plus small mines in the mountains near Beirut and around Ajlun - both of which virtually straddled the frontier with the Latin States. Not surprisingly long-distance trade in pig-iron and refined steel, much of it from India, was vital for Saladin's armies. Despite such difficulties Egypt already had three state arsenals under the Fatimids, one employing 3,000 craftsmen, which Saladin inherited. In addition to sword making in Damascus, Mosul had an arms market as did neighbouring Baghdad. Saladin was criticized for seizing horses and weaponry from Nur al Din's arsenals when the latter died, yet it was clearly important for an ambitious ruler to get his hands on as much scarce military materiel as possible. The value of such equipment made the capture of enemy stores worth recording and when a Latin garrison surrendered, it invariably had to leave its arms behind. The Muslims could also demand tribute in weapons even including horse armours from the Latin States, while in January 1188 a Byzantine embassy, as a mark of friendship, gave Saladin 400 mail hauberks, 4,000 lances and 5,000 swords captured from an Italo-Norman army. Swords were also imported commercially from both Byzantium and Europe - the latter in direct contravention of a papal ban. But an extended campaign could pose huge problems of supply. The weapons used in Saladin's armies included spears, swords, maces, axes, javelins, composite bows, crossbows and occasionally lassos, the main protection being shields, lamellar cuirasses, mail hauberks including the padded cloth-covered kazaghand, and helmets. The popular image of lightly armed Saracens wielding equally light sabres is far from reality. Many if not most Islamic swords were still straight though the curved sabre, long known in Turkish Central Asia, had appeared in Persia by the 9th or 10th centuries. The composite bow had long been the main missile weapon of the Middle East but one notable change during the Crusading era was from the angled, so-called 'Hun' bow to the smoothly recurved 'Turkish' type (see page 132). Sources indicating the ineffectiveness of Islamic archery against Crusader armour are widely misunderstood, referring as they do to long-range harassment intended to injure unprotected horses rather than to kill men. Tests have, in fact, shown th~t mail offered little resistance to arrows. On the other hand the shock-absorbing lamellar armours of the Turks would almost certainly have given greater protection.
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