Download PDF | Tudor Sălăgean - Transylvania in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century_ The Rise of the Congregational System-Brill, 2016.

Download PDF | Tudor Sălăgean - Transylvania in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century_ The Rise of the Congregational System-Brill, 2016.

301 Pages 

Introduction

In the late 13th century, a number of sources refer to Transylvania as a regnum, apparently different from the regnum Hungariae, but nonetheless part of its political system. The historical approach we propose hereby comes from the necessity to explain the real meaning of this concept, hitherto regarded either as a territorial, state-like entity (primarily by Romanian historians) or as an “oligarchic” regime introduced by the voivodes Roland Borsa and Ladislas Kan in the late 13th and early 14th century (an interpretation favored by Hungarian historians). 

While Romanian and Hungarian historians agree on the actual meaning of the word regnum, they disagree on its interpretation. Romanian historians have long insisted on the continuity of the voivodal institution and the ensuing state traditions, the origin of which is believed to go back to the “dark ages” of the gth and 1oth centuries. By contrast, Hungarian historians approach this issue as the result of the circumstances surrounding the crisis of royal authority in the late 13th century, when the Arpadian dynasty came to an end. In their views, Ladislas Kan was no different from Matthew Csak, Henrik Készegi or Amadé Aba, all “oligarchs” or “kinglets” emerging one by one as as ephemeral political actors, who disappeared as soon as Charles Robert of Anjou managed to secure his power over the kingdom of Hungary.

Once nationalist pre- or misconceptions are removed, however, and the historical sources are examined in their own right, one is faced with fewer difficulties in the interpretation of the meaning regnum Transilvanum had for the people at that time. To be sure, regnum nostrum Transsilvanum, as mentioned in a document of duke Stephen (1266), obviously refers to a distinct political unit subordinated to the Transylvanian voivode. Anticipating one of the conclusions of this book, it is worth pointing out that, for reasons spelled out in one of the following chapters, all other refereces to regnum Transilvanum which could be dated firmly between 1288 and 1291 have certainly nothing to do with the voivode Roland Borsa and his territorial authority. 

The documents containing those references were issued not by the voivodal chancery, but by the Transylvanian noblemen’s congregation, an institution that came into being at that same time. Even the king used that phrase in reference to the ownership of the noble title and its associated benefices or privileges (1291). As a consequence, it appears that the Transylvanian nobility ascribed a new meaning to the term regnum: namely that of a “legal country”, legal community with its own privileges and autonomy. The remarkable development of the Transylvanian nobility beginning with the second half of the 13th century and its rise to the status of a provincial political group, the study of which is one of the topics of this book, entailed the bold assertion of a separate, Transylvanian identity. 

The recognition of such claims led to a distinction most people at that time, including the kings of Hungary, drew between Hungary and Transylvania. There are several examples of how in the late 13th and early 14th century, the Transylvanian nobility opposed any unwanted interference in local affairs of court aristocrats or landlords from outside Transylvania. It is therefore no surprise that the local nobility’s concern with maintaining control over land resources in the province resulted in a specifically Transylvanian way to deal with such issues, which were apparently different from the procedural customs in the kingdom (consuetudo regni). Claims over local land resources are undeniably linked to the political vocation of the provincial elite, which manifested itself in constant efforts to assume decision-making positions. Such aspirations came into being less than a decade after the imposition in Transylvania of the congregational regime. In fact, the policies introduced after 1301 by Ladislas Kan were largely due to the fulfillment of those aspirations. The corporate identity of the Transylvanian nobility, which finds its illustration in the status of “legal country’, was associated to the specific laws, which were different from those applying to the rest of the kingdom of Hungary, exceptions to which were consistently linked to Transylvania. Those were in fact fundamental features of the congregational system, which emerged shortly before and after 1300.

The chronological span of this historical reconstruction goes to a certain extent beyond the limits announced in the title. The Mongol invasion of 1241 is commonly viewed as the watershed for the fundamental changes taking place in the Kingdom of Hungary during the second half of the 13th century, and this is definitely true for the history of the province and of its nobility. Ladislas Kan’s term as voivode of Transylvania, in itself the climax of the congregational regime, needs to be examined in its entirety, namely until 1315, long after the consolidation of the Angevine power.

One can hardly study the rise of a social elite in its pursuit of full political control without understanding the political context in which such developments took place. A considerable part of this book is thus dedicated to an event-by-event reconstruction of political history, important for the understanding of the circumstances in which the Transylvanian nobility assumed a corporate identity. In paying attention to such details, I strove to offer a comprehensive view of several developments taking place at the same time and therefore shaping in different ways the historical process. For that, I have relied on the meritorious work of a few historians, who have meticulously studied the period and contributed greatly to the reconstruction of historical events.

The relative historiographic obscurity of the topic is in fact due primarily to the difficult task of disentangling the complicated web of political developments. My own attempt to do that is based on the idea of integrating the historical phenomenon under study within the general history of Transylvania and of the kingdom of Hungary in the second half of the 13th century.

The Mongol Invasion and Its Aftermath

For a number of good reasons, the great Mongol invasion of 1241-1242 represented an exceptional event in the history of medieval Transylvania. The invasion sounded the death knell for the previous military and administrative structures of the kingdom of Hungary, which were based on royal fortresses operating as county centers. During the second half of the 13th century, the Transylvanian institutions underwent profound changes. The responsibilities of royal officials, who lived off the exploitation of royal domains, were now largely taken over by the provincial nobility, which, from this moment onwards, became the main military force of the kingdom. In Transylvania, the institutional changes were accompanied by a drastic social reconfiguration, the key feature of which was the growing importance of the lesser nobility. Equally significant was the redefinition of ethnic relations within the province, as Romanians began working together with official institutions and providing military participation in the royal army. At the same time, the great Mongol invasion radically changed the external position of Transylvania, as it cut short the crusading movement in Southeastern Europe, for which throughout the first half of the 13th century Hungary had relied on the cooperation with Latin Empire of Constantinople. The place of Transylvania in this expansion of Latin Christendom into the southeastern region of the European continent is yet insufficiently studied, but from what we know so far it appears that the province was targeted by the Mongols precisely because it was perceived as an advanced bastion of the Hungarian kingdom. Conversely, the 1241 invasion effectively stopped the eastward advance of Western Christianity beyond the Carpathian Mountains. In other words, the Mongols put an end to a century of colonization and crusading.

1.1 Prerequisites 1d One of the most trustworthy sources depicting the obstacles the Mongols had

to overcome to conquer Transylvania, emanating from within the Mongolian world, is Diamiot-Tevarikh (“TheSum’ or“The Complete Collection of Histories”), the monumental work of the Persian scholar Rashid od-Din.! Although written half-a-century after the events, namely around 1307, this work is invaluable for having relied for the period prior to the reign of Méngke (1251-1259) not only on Juvaini,? but also on several other sources, which have meanwhile been lost. One of those sources appears to have supplied him with detailed information about the military operations of the Mongols in Transylvania and the neighboring territories outside the Carpathian Mountains. What is the remarkable about this account? is that, according to Rashid od-Din, the Mongol corps led by Kadan, Biiri and Bééek, which operated on the southern flank of the great invading army, engaged in no less than five battles, three against the “Sasans,”* one against the “Ulaghs,”> and another against MiSelav.® By contrast, the northern corps under Baydar and Ordu engaged in only one battle, namely that against the German and Polish armies led by duke Henry 11 of Silesia, which took place on April 9, 1241 at Legnica. Judging by Rashid od-Din’s testimony, the borders of Transylvania were better defended than those of Silesia. There are few reasons to suspect Rashid od-Din for bias or distortion. He may not have had complete information on the defensive system of Transylvania, and thus may have collapsed a series of otherwise disjointed events. Be as it may, the information in his work is still remarkable, for it confirms the fact that the Mongols approached Transylvania with greater difficulty than the southern regions of Poland.

The sheer numbers of troops on the southern flank of the invading army bespeak the Mongol awareness of the defense system in and around Transylvania. There is no doubt that out of seven armies deployed for the campaign of 1241, the Mongols reserved no less than three armies to operate on their western flank.” The invasion forces may have thus consisted of between 120,000 and 140,000 men,® including the auxiliary forces recruited from the conquered territories.? How were these forces organized? Given the Mongols’ use of a military structure based on the decimal system,!° each of the noyons in the Genghis-Khan’s family may have relied on up to 10,000 warriors. Of some ten tiimens, one for each of the commanders mentioned in the written sources"! the greatest was led directly by Batu and Subutai, the core force of the Mongol invasion. This army was estimated at over 50,000 men.!? The army operating in southern Poland under the command of Baydar, Ordu, and Kaidu must have had between 30,000 and 40,000 men. After joining the other armies just in time, these troops managed to defeat at Legnica the army of duke Henry 11 of Silesia, which is estimated at some 30,000 warriors (before the arrival of the support troops sent by the king of Bohemia). Thus, the three commanders operating on the southern flank may have had some 30,000 warriors on horseback, of which 10,000 followed the Danube upstreams (seemingly under the command of B6éek), and 20,000 moved against Transylvania.!? No matter how cautiously one may need to treat those figures,'* it seems hard to question that the forces on the southern flank represented about a quarter of the invading army, or three eighths of the total forces that engaged in the battle against Hungary. At any rate, the military force on the southern flank appears disproportionately large, given that on the other two directions, where the Mongol armies were expected to encounter military forces larger than theirs.

Moreover, the commanders of the three armies on the southern flank enjoyed a well-consolidated military prestige and at the same time held important positions in the empire’s political hierarchy. Kadan, one of the sons of the Great Khan Ogédei, had earned his excellent military reputation as the commander of one of the three armies which had invaded the Song Empire in 1235—1236.5 He had also participated in the great European campaign of Batu and Subutai, particularly in the conquest of Riazan’ in 12376 and the decisive battle at Chernigov.!” He then joined Méngke in the expedition against the Circassians on the Kuban River (1238).!® Together with Berke, Kadan may have also participated on the annihilation, in 1239-1240, of the Cuman resistance in DeSt-i Kipéak, while Batu was busy besieging Kiev. This might explain Batu and Subutai’s decision to entrust him with the command of the western flank during the attack on Hungary, the goal of which was to eliminate any resistance Transylvania and to plunder the areas settled by Cumans in Hungary. The Cuman settlements were mainly on the western side of the lands between the Danube and the Tisza rivers, as well as along the rivers Cris, lower Mures and Timis.!° During the winter of 1241/1242, Kadan broke the defensive line set up along the Danube by Paul Geregye, the count of Alba, thus opening the way for the second Mongol attack, which stretched all the way to the Austrian border and the Dalmatian coast. In addition, during the Mongol withdrawal of 1242, Kadan did not miss the chance of forcing Serbia and Bulgaria into submission.

Biiri was also part of the great family of Genghis Khan, for he was the son of Chagatai. Becoming one of Batu’s main adversaries, together with Giiyiik, he had a key role in the inner strife for power within the imperial family, and he was eventually killed in the process. He earned his military reputation during the campaign against Rus’, largely because of tight cooperation with Kadan. In almost every major occasion, the two warlords appear together.”° Finally, Bééek, Tului’s seventh son, had distinguished himself in the campaigns against Volga Bulgaria, the Alans, the Rus’ and especially the Cumans.*! The mission assigned to him during the 1241 campaign was of strategical importance: namely to move around the Carpathian Arc and to enter from the southeast via the Banat region, thus cutting off any possibility for the Cumans of Kuthen to withdraw into the Balkans.

Despite such an impressive display of force, the Mongols manage to break through the fortified frontier of Transylvania at a date later than their victories on other fronts. The northern corps had begun the attack on Poland in February 1241,27 when the towns of Lublin and Sandomierz were taken (February, 13).23 On March 18, Baydar won the battle of Chmielnik,?* followed ten days later by that of Krakow.?5 In late March and early April, Baydar and Kaidu’s troops joined in at Wroclaw and wiped out duke Henry 1’s army at Legnica on April 9.26 Meanwhile, on the central front, the army commanded by Batu had forced its way through the Veretsky Pass on March 10, and two days later smashed the troops led by the Count Palatine Dionysius Tomaj, who had attemped to block their entry into the plains.2” On March 15, Batu’s scouts were already spotted near the town of Pest,?8 while two days later the army corps under the command of Saiban reached the Danube near the town of Vac.?9 Over the next few days, Mongol troops pillaged a number of settlements on the left bank of the Danube, with records of the clashes with Ugrinus Csak, the Archbishop of Kalocsa, duke Frederick of Austria, and Bishop Benedict of Oradea.®° Eventually, in early April, after confrontations around Pest, Batu started his simulated retreat to the east, orchestrating the huge diversion that lured the royal army into the ambush at Mohi (April 1, 1241).3!

Throughout all this time, the attackers on the southern flank have not accomplished much. The breach through the Carpathian passes was only accomplished on March 31,7? at a time when major victories had been already won on other fronts. By the time Batu made his appearance before the city of Buda and Baydar set Krakow on fire, no Mongol horseman had yet entered Transylvania. On the day of the decisive defeat of the Hungarian army at Mohi, Kadan and Biiri’s troops had only reached Cluj and Sibiu. Most historians seem to have been oblivious to the implications of that delay. Why were the Mongols so slow on the southern front? With nothing to suggest that Kadan, Biiri and Bocek have started their campaign at a later date, the key to finding a solution lies in the above-quoted account of Rashid od-Din. The only possible explanation for which the Mongols were able to cross the Carpathian Mountains only on March 31 is that they had encountered stiff resistance in the lands outside those mountains, and were bogged in mopping operations before entering Transylvania. At the same time, the southern troops seem to have been farther away from Hungary proper than the armies on the northern and central flanks. There is therefore sufficient evidence to suggest that Transylvania was one of the main targets of the great invasion of 1241, and that the resistance the invaders encountered on their way justified the careful planning of the campaign, the purpose of which was the annihilation of the military potential of Transylvania.

1.1.2 After the battle at Kalka (1223),3 the vast, albeit unstable “empire” of the Cumans underwent a rapid disintegration. That military confrontation shed light both on the winners’ military superiority and on the serious crisis undermining the Cuman political system. In addition, the solution adopted by Kuthen, one of the most important Cuman chieftains—an alliance with the Rus’ princes—had proved ineffectual. Not only did the Rus’ alliance, despite its consistency,** fail to save the day; later developments, marked by increasing Rus’-Cuman disparities, clearly proved that a permanent alliance was impossible. Under such circumstances, only one power with interests in the region could lend a helping hand to both Cumans and Rus’, and that power was Hungary. The interest of the Hungarian kings in the Cuman steppe was of a rather recent date, and represented one aspect of papal policy of spreading Western Christianity to the East, especially after the creation of the Latin Empire of Constantinople in the aftermath of the Fourth Crusade. That is why the efforts of the Hungarian kings in that direction were supported by two orders, the Teutonic Knights, who were settled by King Andrew 11 in the Barsa region of southeastern Transylvania (1211),35 and a missionary order, the order of the Preaching Brothers, established by St. Dominic of Guzman, who were engaged in converting the Cumans to Christianity.3® The Teutonic Knights began by building an impressive system of fortifications in eastern Transylvania, making it impenetrable to the then seemingly powerful Cuman attacks. Despite unfavorable, if not altogether hostile conditions, the knights started their offensive by expanding their authority over territories outside the Carpathian Arc, to an extent yet difficult to assess.3” Shortly after Kalka, however, the Grand Master Hermann von Salza put under the direct jurisdiction of the pope the Teutonic domain in the Barsa and the adjacent lands on the other side of the mountains.°® He thus effectively cancelled all allegiance to the king of Hungary, while opening the gate for further expansion eastward. This led to King Andrew’s swift reaction of 1225, when the Teutonic Knights were forced to leave the country. They left behind a legally complicated, yet militarily solid legacy, which enabled the Hungarian king to contemplate for the first time the possibility of expansion outside the Carpathian Mountains to the east, deep into the Cuman steppe.

After 1225, Prince Béla (future King Béla Iv) became a key player in this borderland, as he was appointed by his father “young king” and duke of Transylvania,®° a title seemingly created for the occasion. Sharing power with King Andrew 11,79 Béla had control not only over the military system in Transylvania, which until then had had no unified command, but also over the kingdom’s entire eastern policy. That control became exclusive when, following the conflict between Pope Gregory 1x and King Andrew 11, Béla became one of the pope’s most trusted collaborators, for Gregory wanted to make him what Béla’s father, in the pope’s eyes, had never been: a true crusader, at least in relation to the Balkan and eastern parts of the European continent. Indeed, soon after that, Prince Béla’s political initiatives in the east were secured with the papal protection, as well as with the cooperation of the Preaching Brothers, shortly after the Dominicans became one of the most important instruments of papal policies in Eastern Europe.

Given the disarray in the Cuman world in the aftermath of Kalka, the results of the fruitful combination of Hungarian (Transylvanian) military pressure and Dominican missionary propaganda did not take too long to appear. In 1227, Bortz or Burch, the chieftain of a Cuman tribe most likely located in the western lands of the Cuman steppe, next to Transylvania, decided to convert to Christianity under the spiritual guidance of the pope and the military protection of Hungary. In order to maximize the opportunities thus offered for the conversion of the region to Christianity, a Cuman bishopric was established as the foundation of a very ambitious political program.*! Entrusted to the Dominicans, the bishop of the new diocese became the administrator of a territory which, following the 1224 charter for the Teutonic Knights was a part of the lands they had placed under the jurisdiction of the pope (terra Sancti Petri). As the papal jurists did not regard as closed the conflict between Hungary and Teutonic Knights, Prince Béla could neither assume the title of King of Cumania, nor appoint Hungarian officials in the lands of the Cuman bishopric, even though he was its military protector.

That the conversion of Bortz and his tribe had serious repercussions in the Cuman world results from Khan Kuthen’s reaction. He refused Béla’s offer of alliance and preferred to remain on the side of the Rus’ princes until the eve of the great Mongol invasion of Eastern Europe. In 1230, when Béla campaigned against Daniil of Halych-Volhynia and his ally Kuthen, he relied on assistance from another Cuman warlord, Begovars,?? an indication of the growing Hungarian influence in the steppe lands. Daniil and Kuthen remained close allies throughout the entire period between 1227 and 1233.7° After 1235, however, as the Mongols resumed their offensive, they completely changed their strategy. Since 1229, the Mongols had been a common presence on the left bank of the Volga River, and two Cuman tribes (of Durut and Toksoba) had accepted their hegemony.* In an attempt to keep the Mongols as far away as possible from their own borders, the Hungarians had established contact with the lands known as Magna Hungaria on the Volga, by means of a Dominican mission. However, such contacts proved inconsequential. Friar Ricardus learned in 1236 in Suzdal, that Magna Hungaria had already submitted to the Mongols. The great invasion of Europe had started.

1.1.3 The effort of the Hungarian kings to expand their influence in the Cuman steppe and beyond, culminating with Dominican mission to the Volga, could not have escaped the attention of the Mongol warlords. The great kuriltai of 1235, at which the decision was taken to attack the Cuman steppe, had explicitly defined Hungary as one of the potential opponents. The account of Friar Julian, one of the Dominicans Béla sent to Magna Hungaria, is evidence of the Mongols’ preoccupation with the realm of the Arpadian kings.*° The same is true for Batu’s attempt to establish diplomatic contacts with the King Béla at the beginning of the military operations on the Volga.*” Batu’s contacts with Béla are also mentioned in the chronicle of Matthew of Paris.*® Batu’s insistence undoubtedly concealed a more menacing approach, but also shows that the Mongols were open to negotiations,*9 their primary objective being to eliminate (by diplomatic means, if possible) any Hungarian competition in the Cuman steppe.

King Béla’s refusal can only be interpreted as accepting the challenge. In reality, the great Mongol offensive had itself opened the gates of the East, for even Kuthen, Béla’s old enemy, as well as some of the Rus’ princes asked for the king’s help and accepted his alliance and protection.5° This newly-acquired influence, after almost two decades of unfruitful attempts, could not be preserved however only by means of political and missionary activities. Béla’s new eastern allies were all awaiting for his serious involvement in fighting the invaders.

In this context, under the year 1239 the chronicle of the Cistercian monk Alberic of Trois-Fontaines mentions a Hungarian attack against the Mongols run by a certain “count of Transylvania” (comes Ultrasilvanus). After some initial success, in a battle “near the Meotid marshes” (the name given since Antiquity to the Sea of Azov),5! the commander of the Hungarian expedition into the steppe lands was killed.5? This bit of information is corroborated by the Dominican chronicler Nicholas Trivet, who wrote in the early 14th century and who mentions an attack on the Mongols led by “one of the Polish or Hungarian princes.” Apparently, the attack caused great distress among the Mongols in regards to their relations to the realm of the Arpadian kings, but their “idols” shared the internal contradictions which also divided the Hungarian society.>? Nicholas Trivet’s “prince” is most likely the “count of Transylvania” in Alberic’s account. Who was this character? A count (comes) of Transylvania, also appears in a papal letter of 1238,54 and he may have been a deputy of the voivode’s in charge with the troops on the frontier or even beyond it, within the lands outside the Carpathian Arc and within the Cuman bishopric.

The Transylvanian expedition of 1239 must have undoubtedly been associated with the clashes between the Mongols and Kuthen, the latter on the verge of giving up on the resistance that looked initially so promising.>> His decisive defeat in that same year sealed the fate of the entire steppe corridor north of the Black Sea. Kuthen was forced to flee to Hungary together with his Cumans.°® After that, King Béla’s efforts concentrated exclusively on the defense of his own kingdom. He therefore refused to provide assistance to the Kievans besieged by Batu, despite the request of the Grand Prince Mikhail Vsevolodovich.5” Nonetheless, Béla did not hesitate to offer asylum to both Mikhail and, later, Daniil Romanovich, the only Rus’ prince known to have sent troops to Kiev.

The reasons for the Mongol attack on Hungary are thus obvious, and so are those that made them hesitate to do so earlier. The asylum Béla offered to anyone asking for it and the enlisting of Cuman refugees turned Hungary into a potential contender to recent Mongol conquests. At the same time, the military campaign of the Transylvanian “count” was not just an intolerable offense, but also a proof that Hungary had the means to put its expansionist plans into the steppe lands in practice. This irrefutable evidence warned Batu and Subutai that, unless the Hungarian menace was removed, the conquest of the Cuman steppe could never be complete. Tackling the Hungarian issue made it necessary to deal a most severe blow on Transylvania, at that time Hungary’s advanced bastion to the east.

1.2 The Organization of Transylvania’s Defense

1.2.1 Prompted by the settlement of the Saxon colonists (hospites), the military network of Transylvania has been revived in the second half of the 12th century.

During the first decade of the 13th century, given Hungary’s contribution to the crusade in Southeastern Europe, which resulted in the creation of the Latin Empire of Constantinople, the defense network in Transylvania was reorganized into an even more remarkable offensive structure. This was most likely the period when it was separated from the military organization at the county level and was placed under the command of the count of Sibiu. In addition to an elite force recruited from among German settlers, and the Szeklers troops, the new military organization now harnessed the military abilities of two frontier populations, namely the Romanians and the Pechenegs. An army with exactly that composition is said to have intervened in Bulgaria in 1210, under the leadership of count Joachim (Iwachinus) Tiirje of Sibiu, in order to provide military assistance to the pro-Hungarian emperor Boril.58 The Pechenegs had already in the 12th century joined the Szeklers in the defense of the eastern frontier of the kingdom, which was at that time placed under the command of the count of Alba. In the early 13th century, they seem to have been in the process of being assimilated.59 Their role was now taken by the older inhabitants of the province, the Romanians, with whom the Pechenegs appear to have cooperated in the past. That Romanians were now included in the military organization of Transylvania suggests that neither the Saxons (German settlers), nor the Szeklers were numerous.®° It was under those circumstances that a royal charter of 12226! acknowledged the existence of a “country of the Romanians” (terra Blachorum), which apparently enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in sharp contrast to the encroachments of the previous decades.®? Another new element appearing in the border area of southern Transylvania, probably again in response to the lack of manpower, was the introduction of the royal servientes.®° The charter King Andrew II granted to Johannes Latinus in 1204 is in fact the first piece of firm evidence pertaining to the institution of servientes in the kingdom of Hungary.

The influence and authority of the count of Sibiu, which initially seem to have covered the whole of Transylvania, was soon diminished by the settlement of the Teutonic Knights in the Barsa region in 121, and the creation of the Banate of Severin in 1232/1233. That various elements in the military organization were supposed to work together results from the right granted in 1224 to the Saxons to use “the forest of the Romanians and the Pechenegs” (silva Blacorum et Bissenorum),® as well as from the exemption in 1222 of the Teutonic Knights from paying customs duties when crossing terra Blachorum and terra Siculorum.® The three entities—the Barsa now in the hands of the Teutonic Knights, “the country of the Blachs/Romanians” and “the country of the Szeklers’—were obviously components of one and the same military system. The fragmentation of the frontier defense, as well as the coordination between the royal troops and the Saxons of the “province” of Sibiu,®” may explain why, shortly after expelling the Teutonic Knights from the Barsa (1225), King Andrew 11 established the new title of “duke of Transylvania.’ The incumbent—no other than the heir apparent, Béla—had authority over all military structures, which considerably increased their efficiency. As its influence expanded in the Lower Danube in the aftermath of the war with Bulgaria, the military organization of Transylvania came to include also a number of Romanian polities on the other side of the Carpathian Mountains (Transylvanian Alps) along the valleys of the rivers Jiu and Arges valleys. Béla, on the other hand, promptly placed the Cuman bishopric—including a number of smaller Romanian polities—under his military authority, thus effectively extending the “Duchy of Transylvania” to the southeast across the Carpathian Mountains as well.6* His subsequent coronation as king in 1235 put an end to the “Duchy of Transylvania,” which triggered a conflict between the voivode and the count of Sibiu over authority in the lands from which the Teutonic Knights had been expelled. Along with the efforts the voivode initiated in 1235 to establish his authority in the Barsa and the eastern area of the Country of Fagaras, the bishop of Alba Iulia also strove to include those lands in his diocese. The conflict appears to have been still going on at the time of the Mongol invasion of 1241, which no doubt had serious consequences for the organization of the frontier defense.

1.2.2 Many new fortifications were built in the early 13th century, and old ones were repaired and extended. On the eastern border of Latin Christendom, Transylvania probably had the most fortified frontier. The lance head of this defensive system was the heavily fortified Barsa region, in which the Teutonic Knights erected five fortresses between 121 and 1225. After their departure, additional fortifications were erected at the order of the Hungarian crown. The royal donation diploma of 1211 granted the Knights the right to build only timber (-and-earth) fortifications.®? However, eleven years later, when renewing his initial grant, the king had to allow the Knights the right to build stone fortifications, a right, however, which they seem to have already assumed.”° According to Pope Gregory 1x’s bulls issued between 1231 and 1234 to endorse the knights’ demands for restitution, there were no less than five fortifications. Moroever, another fortress, built ultra montes nivium, have been erected at a later date.”! The identification of those fortresses (the number given in the papal bulls may be treated with suspicion, given that the purpose of those documents was to obtain restitution) has been one of the greatest challenges of historians dealing with the medieval history of Transylvania. Without getting into the details of that controversial issue, suffice to say that, with the exception of Marienburg—the location of which in Feldioara seems to be accepted by everyone—no other fortress said to have been erected by the Knights has so far been identified on the ground. According to recent opinions, pos of Brasov (Tampa, Sprenghi or another, yet unidentified location),’”? Halchiu (Heldenburg),’4 Rasnov,”> Rucar,’6 Teliu (Cruceburg, Cetatea Crucii),”” Racogul de Jos (“Mihalyvara’, in the Varpatak valley),”° and Comana de Jos.’? Besides strongholds in the Barsa area, the Teutonic Knights are known to have built another strong fortification (castrum munitissimum) somewhere beyond the mountains, but it is not clear whether or not that fortification is Cruceburg.®° That particular fortress seems to have been bone of contention in the dispute between the Knights and King Andrew u1, who had not given his approval for its erection. The fortress was eventually taken by force by the royal troops even before the Knights were expelled from Barsa in the summer of 1225.°!

Pending further archaeological information on the Teutonic fortresses, one document can however assist our approach. In two charters issued on March 17 and March 21, 1240,°? King Béla Iv granted to the Cistercian monks a number of four churches in Barsa, which had been persistently claimed also by the bishop of Transylvania. For reasons that remain unknown, the monks did not immediately obtain the grant, and the king saw it fit to compensate them for the delay. The four churches donated in 1238—1240°? were located in Feldioara (Castrum Sactae Marye), Sanpetru (Mons Sancti Petri), Harman (Mons Mellis) and Prejmer (Tartilleu/Tartilleri),?4—all located within the lands granted to the Teutonic Knights in 12. Judging by the situation in Feldioara, which appears on the list, those churches may have all been located within fortresses. By means of this compromise, King Béla may have attempted to placate the pope, who has aggressively campaigned in favor of the Knights in the previous years. Even if the churches in question were not in fact restituted to the Knights, they were given now to another monastic order with outstanding contributions to the crusading cause. The papacy seems to have been pleased with the arrangement, which effectively put an end to complaints from Hermann von Salza and his successors. That the king was in a position to transfer immediately the churches in question to the Cistercians may have been the result of his conflict with the Knights.85 The delay must have been caused by the preparations the voivode Pousa made to prevent the Mongol invasion, which in turn would imply that the churches granted to the Cistercians were inside, or at least next to strongholds.%®

Despite the fact that the exact location of the five Teutonic fortresses remains unknown, there can be no doubt that the defensive potential of fortresses in the Barsa area grew considerably during the decade separating the departure of the Knights from Transylvania from the Mongol invasion. According to Thomas Nagler, the Teutonic Knights started out with the building of more than five fortresses, but did not have the time to finish the job.” Their efforts, though, were brought to fruition by duke Béla (1225-1235) and, after his coronation, by voivode Pousa. Shortly before the 1241 invasion, Transylvania received a significant number of fortifications, which are also mentioned in Alberic’s chronicle.®®

Inside Transylvania, and behind the line fortified by the Knights, there were several royal fortresses that had been erected well before 121. Two of these fortresses were Ungra®® and Halmeag,°° both mentioned together with “indagines Nicolai” from the Miclosoara area, in the royal donation of 1211.9! Also, some of the other fortresses listed by Schullerus as border fortresses (for instance, Crihalma or Sdcadate)** might have undergone some remodeling.

On the other hand, most of the fortresses located on the western slopes of the Eastern Carpathians were either reinforced with earthen palisades and wooden poles, or border fence lines (indagines)9? which, according to Albericus, blocked the mountain paths.°+ Moreover, there is the possibility that at least two stone fortresses predate the Mongolian assault: Odorhei and Varsag.9° On the eastern side of the Carpathians the Hungarian crown commanded the border fortress of Bétca Doamnei (Piatra Neamt),°° which controlled the access to the Bistrita valley, in Moldavia.

Even though there is no recent evaluation available regarding the state of the fortifications located around 1241 on the Olt Gorge, it is well known that the strategic importance of this region had increased considerably in the first decades of the 13th century.9” In order to secure this mountain pass, the Hungarian crown imposed its direct authority on the western most part of the Country of Fagaras.9° Besides having the Saxons colonize the region,?9 they erected the earthen fortress of Avrig.!°° In addition, the fortresses of  Orlat'© and perhaps Lotru!°? may have been constructed within the same time span. Also, during the reign of Andrew 11, Sibiu, the county seat of Sibiu, was expanded and received a stone wall.!03

1.2.3 Flaws inthe System

In spite of the strongholds and the natural advantages that made Transylvania’s military frontier an impenetrable barrier to less persistant invaders, such as the Cumans, certain weakness left it vulnerable to a massive invasion.

First and foremost, Transylvania’s defensive capabilities were restricted to the border itself.1* For the Hungarian crown, the consolidation of the military frontier eliminated any threat to the hinterland and no longer required the military reformation of the counties. Such a measure would have inherently entailed a complete overhaul of the administrative system, for which King Bela was anything but ready. Starting with the end of the 12th century, the state’s resources were channeled mainly towards the frontier areas, neglecting almost completely the bigger inland fortresses.!95 Thus, should an invader succeed in breaching the frontier, almost no resistance would oppose its advance towards the center of the kingdom.

Secondly, the army defending the frontier was not prepared to deal with a massive onslaught; they could only hold back the invaders until the royal army’s arrival. Thus, it is no wonder that in 1241, when the royal army was busy fighting with an invasion in central Hungary, the stiff resistance mounted by the Transylvanians proved to be insufficient. Moreover, the general assembly ordered by king Bela rv in early March deprived the Transylvanian frontier of a great number of potential defenders. It is also known that the king called for all high ecclesiastic officials to spare none of their material resources and to hire and equip new military units to serve under his command.!°6 Among those who responded to the king’ summon were Bishops Benedict of Oradea, Bulchu of Cenad, the Provost of Arad and Bishop Raynaldus of Transylvania. The latter became one of the martyrs of the battle of Mohi, which also claimed the life of Provost Nicholas of Sibiu.!°’ The Bishop of Oradea, succeded in gathering “a great army”,!8 that was subsequently defeated under his command in the attempt to liberate the town of Agria (Eger), shortly after it was occupied by the Mongols.!°9 On its way to Buda, the army led by the Bishop of Cenad was engaged in a series of clashes with the Cumans who were plundering their way out of Hungary.!° Not just the church officials unanimously honored the king’s request, but also the leaders of the counties neighboring Transylvania. Rogerius recounts that count Boch (Both) of Bihor led his men to fight alongside Bishop Benedict in the battle of Agria, but he fails to inform his reader whether he survived it or not.!" On the other hand, the Solnoc county troops, placed under the command of the Count Palatine Dionysius Tomaj, might have been crushed, together with the palatine army, by the Mongols shortly after crossing the Verecke Pass (March 10th, 1241). In one way or another, all these forces, that at least in teory could have pulled a good oar to the defense of Transylvania or at least raise a new defensive line at its western border, were used to defend the core of the kingdom itself. In this context, the forces gathered by voivode Pousa against the Mongols in Burzenland were hardly a match for the invaders.

In conclusion, even though Transylvania had a considerable number of strong fortifications they were unevenly distributed along the frontier. Although a great number of them were located in the Carpathian area, a number of potential passes were insufficiently defended. One of these—near Rodna—was in fact the route taken by Kadan’s army. The defensive system set up in the years prior to the invasion failed to make up for the gaps, which allowed the Mongols to succeed in outflanking it.

1.3 The Campaign

1.3.1

Despite the lack of sufficient evidence, most historians assumed that the entire Mongol forces employed in the offensive against Central Europe were camped during the winter of 1240-1241 in an area confined around Halych. This hypothesis is not confirmed by any known source. On the contrary, Rogerius accounts that the troops marching through the Gate of Russia under Batu’s leadership were merely a part of the invading army." Furthermore, this assumption goes against existing evidence placing the entire Mongol army in the Hungarian plain during the winter of 1241-1242. This placed a huge burden on the area’s food resources which eventually forced the Mongols out of the Arpadian kingdom." Even though the geographical conditions of Halych were a lot less favorable for camping an army of nomadic riders compared to those of the Hungarian plain, there are no mentions of a similar food shortage. In addition, the strategic assembly of all Mongol effectives in the Hungarian plain was only the result of the military necessities of 1241-1242. Such a strategy is not recorded in any other episode of the massive European military campaigns started in 1236.

Considering the aspects mentioned above, it is more likely that the extensive effectives of the invading army were spread over a vast area alongside the frontiers of the states targeted by these campaigns. The troops led by Baydar and Ordu, the initiators of the attack against Poland (February 1241), were concentrated somewhere around Vladimir, that is, more than one hundred kilometers away from the area where Batu’s troops camped for the winter. The fact that the northern flank of the Mongol offensive was the first to start the military operations was undoubtedly due to the absence of any natural obstacles to hinder their advance.

Considering the significant time gap between Batu’s breach of the Verecke pass (March 1oth) and the time Kadan and Biiri’s troops entered Transylvania (March gist), the southern flank could not have joined the offensive from the Halych area. If we are to believe that the southern flank did start the campaign from Halych, then Kadan’s delay to join in remains unaccountable. Starting from the Halych area around the same date as Batu’s offensive, Kadan should have reached the mountains around March 1oth and, should have been able to cross them in three days, as indicates Rogerius,"* they should have reached Rodna around March 15th at the latest, which surely did not happen. Hence, we must consider the existence of an additional concentration area on the southern Mongol flank, which was likely located somewhere on the Lower or Middle Dniester. This hypothesis is also supported by the analysis of the attack directions of the Mongol troops on Transylvania. Thus, the conquest and subsequent destruction of the fortress at Batca Doamnei (Piatra Neamt) provides a valuable clues regarding the route taken by Kadan’s army.!5 The march took him up the Moldavian Bistrita Valley until he reached the Dorna Valley. He then must have followed down the Ilva River, making a surprise appearance in front of Rodna on March 30th, 1241. According to Epternach’s account, Biiri made his entrance into Burzenland around the same date (March gist)"!6 which indicates not only a perfect coordination of these military operations, but also the fact that the two armies seem to have divided themselves shortly before the crossing of the Carpathians, probably somewhere near the junction of Bistrita and Siret Rivers. The mission of the troops led by Bochetor/Bééek, as opposed to that of Kadan—Biiri’s army, was to keep under surveillance the movements of the Cuman refugees located in the Balkan Peninsula and to forestall any regrouping attempt on their part. Consequently, this army might have wintered somewhere close to the Danube River, most likely in the Budjak Steppe.

1.3.2

In the winter of 1240-1241, the Mongol troops camped in these regions carried out preliminary military operations similar to those performed by Batu’s troops in the Halych area. In fact, they were familiar with the Cuman steppe from previous years. Back then, Bé¢ek managed to stand out against the Cuman leader Baéman,"” and afterwards to participate, alongside Biiri in the conquest of Crimea.!'8 The Cumans last centers of resistance were most likely 

annihilated shortly before the offensive in Hungary." The fact that the Cuman bishop managed to raise a local army, composed mostly of Wallachians— Rashid od-Din’s Ulaghs—ready to engage in an open combat with the invading Mongol forces is a strong evidence of the political and military structures already existing in the region. While Bécek’s victorious troops headed towards a new confrontation with the Wallachians (kara-ulagh) led by Miselav, and then set foot into Hungary via Severin,!2° Kadan and Biri attacked the fortified line of the Carpathians. We can not know for sure whether the division of Kadan and Biiri’s forces was part of the initial offensive plan, or it was only the result of the first and least successful confrontation with the defenders of the Carpathian passes.

While the route followed by Kadan to reach Rodna seems rather clear, there is still doubt regarding the mountain pass chosen by Biiri in order to reach Burzenland, most of the historians favoring the Oituz pass.!2! Once they left behind the mountain passes fortified by the locals with palisades,!2? the two invading armies were faced with even more difficulties. Kadan succeeded in conquering Rodna—a mining town with no fortifications—after two attacks, and a faked retreat to weaken the town’s defenses.!*3 After the conquest of Rodna, guided by the newly acquired 600 hostages, among which the Saxon judge Aristaldus, Kadan headed towards Bistrita, which he conquered on April 2nd.!*4 The conquest of Bistrita marked the end of the resistance in the Saxon colonized northeastern Transylvania. The path towards the heart of the province appeared now to be secured. Still, Kadan’s advance went a lot slower than anticipated. He undoubtedly destroyed the salt mines located around Dej and conquered the royal fortress from Dabaca.!5 He then attacked the royal castle of Cluj, which he conquered!”° on April uth and massacred the population. Next, Kadan continued his westward advance and reached Oradea on April 16th or April 17th—which he conquered after a siege of several days during which he made use of seven war machines.!27

On March 31, 1241, after crossing the mountains, the troops led by Biiri crushed the army of voivode Pousa. The defeated voivode perished on the battlefield.!2° The town of Kumelburch, which Biri conquered on April 4th, could not have been Cetatea de Balta due to the considerable distance between the fortress and the eastern Transylvanian frontier (impossible to be covered by the invaders in such a short time span). Even though the identification suggested by Aurelian Sacerdoteanu!? is uncertain, the position of this town must be searched in the same area of the military frontier, mostly somewhere between Burzenland and Transylvania.

Once Biiri’s troops went beyond the heavily fortified Burzenland they seem to have divided into two groups. One of them continued advancing towards the center of Transylvania, conquering Cetatea de Balta,!8° Alba Tulia!®! and presumably Turda. The other army, operating close to the military frontier, went downstream the Olt River Valley, towards Sibiu. This second army was responsible for devastating the Catholic settlements located between the Olt River and the Pergani Mountains,!°? and following their way to Fagaras,!°3 for destroying the Cistercian monastery of Carta.!34+ The Mongols then laid siege on Sibiu, conquered on April 1 at the end of a fierce resistance.'8> The two army groups reunited devastated Miercurea, Sebes and Orastie.!3° They continued by marching down the Mureg Valley, conquering Hunedoara!®’” and the settlements located on the lower Mures River, and finally reached Cenad sometime around April 25th, several days after Kadan took Oradea.

As for Bééek, he entered Hungary via Severin and continued the offensive along the Danube line, conquering and destroying the Hungarian border fortresses of Keve and Horom.!88 Afterwards, he crossed the Tisza River and camped in the southern part of Pannonia, but did not engage in any other military operations in Banat (present-day southwestern Romania). The conquest and devastation of the Cistercian abbey of Igris—after an all-out siege in which the Mongols used war machines!*°—as well as of other monasteries on the lower Mures River, many of them (Bulci,!#° Kenezmonostor, Geled, Chelmac/ Eperjes, Rohonczamonostor etc.'*!\—severely damaged or even destroyed beyond reconstruction, were all attributed to Biiri, who led his troops into the lower Mures River area during his Transylvanian campaign.

Kadan and Biiri’s advance through Transylvania was much slower compared to that of the Mongol armies operating in Hungary and Poland. Even though the fortresses failed to stop the Mongol offensive, they at least delayed it. Thus, while Batu’s army crossed the distance between the Verecke pass and Pest at an astounding speed of over 50 km/day, Kadan and Biiri’s troops crossed Transylvania, starting from Rodna and Burzenland all the way to the Cluj-Sibiu line, at a speed of only 20 km/day. Also, they most likely did not manage to travel any faster over during their subsequent advance.

Thus, neither Kadan nor Biiri arrived in time to participate in the decisive battle of Mohi, which gave king Bela the chance to fight an evenly numerical battle. In the end he was not able to capitalize on this chance. Also, it seems to had been the battle of Mohi that brought Batu and Biiri in conflict, as accounted in the Secret History of the Mongols.!4? During the Aurultai initiated after the first stage of the campaign against Hungary, Batu seems to have claimed additional distinctions and behaved accordingly. In fact, it was he who had defeated king Bela, while Biiri reached his final target, the by now deserted area colonized by the Cumans, more than a month after Batu’s arrival in front of Buda. The Mongols seem to have failed in assessing the difficulties they would face in the process of invading Transylvania. Thus, they left behind them a considerable number of unconquered fortresses!*#3 and were not able to establish a permanent occupation in the area due to their insufficient troops and because of the fierce local opposition.

1.4 The Tartar Retreat: The Second Devastation of Transylvania

Mongols’ retreat from Hungary, in the spring of 1242, must have come as a surprise to contemporaries, at least as much as their devastating invasion. As a matter of fact, the reasons behind the retreat continued to intrigue historians from much later periods. The attempts to clarify these issues have engendered until now at least four different theories:!** 1) the “political” theory—still the most widely accepted!*°—links the Mongols’ retreat to the death of the great khan Ogédei and the beginning of the struggle for succession; 2) the “geographical” theory*6 considers the cause of the retreat to be the incapacity of the Pannonian plain’s to provide enough grazing space for the Mongol horses; 3) the theory of the “military weakness’,*’ argues that the Mongols relinquished their invading plans due to the heavy losses suffered on the Russian, Polish and Hungarian battlefronts; 4) last, those favouring the “gradual conquest” theory"*® consider the 1241 expedition a first stage of the assault on Europe, during which the Mongols only intended to prepare the ground for a decisive campaign—which in the end never happened. In spite of their shortcomings and proven lack of persistance,!*9 each of these theories sheds light on some of the aspects of the Mongol retreat. Furthermore, we must ask whether combining the information offered by these theories, could not in fact bring us closer to a better understanding Batu’s long-disputed decision.!°° In this context, one must mention Victor Spinei’s thesis, which succeeds in combining the essential parts of the first three theories!®! (given its inconsistent argumentation, the fourth is rather hard to take into consideration).

In his remarkable work on the Black Sea policy of the Mongol Empire, Virgil Ciocaéltan provides the basics of yet another hypothesis worth considering. His rigorous analysis of the political and economic tendencies of the Golden Horde maintains that Batu had very little interest in the Black Sea and the rest of Europe, as his main interests focused on the Trans-Caucasus and Asia Minor, on the Silk Road and the Fertile Crescent and, last but not least, on the political developments at the Great Khan’s court.!5* Under these circumstances, we should ask ourselves whether Batu ever intended to settle in Central Europe. Even though various literary works written by frightened Europeans ascribed the Mongols the desire to conquer various regions of Christendom or even the whole world, we must not forget that according to the Mongol sources the main objective of the military campaign started in 1236 was the conquest of the Cuman Steppe. The Mongol plan to dominate the surrounding territories starting from the Cuman Steppe must not be interpreted as a will to settle in Central Europe. In fact, due to the Mongol way of life settling in Europe would not have appealed to them.

Under these circumstances, the 1241 invasion seems to have been justified by the need to protect the Cuman steppe from Hungarian intervention in the region. Thus; the objective of the campaign was to annihilate the offensive capabilities of the Arpadian kingdom and to force its withdrawal from the race to dominate Eastern Europe. The Hungarian nobility seems to have anticipated their intentions and this much can be deduced from their refusal to allow Kuthen’s Cumans to settle in Hungary, lest they antagonize the Mongols. Similar reasons might have led to a decrease in the influence exerted by the pontifical political instruments in this part of the world, in the years that followed the invasion. Both the Dominican order, very active in Eastern Europe and, quite surprisingly, the Templars, despite their dedication and sacrifice in the battle of Mohi, lost their popularity on the territory of Hungary. The destruction of the Hungarian strongholds located outside the Carpathians, the weakening of the Transylvanian military power and driving the Cumans and of Russian princes (strong opponents of the Mongol domination in Eastern Europe) out of Hungary, were actions taken by the Mongol in order to ensure their success. Once these objectives were achieved, the Mongol presence in Hungary was no longer necessary. More so, a permanent stay would have been implied a high cost for the Mongols. The Hungarian plain could not have sustained the large number of Mongol riders. An army of approximately 120,000140,000 soldiers occupying its territory for a year would have led to a complete depletion of its resources. In despite of the impressive shock of the invasion and the decisive victories in open field, the losses had been considerably high and the conquest of Hungary was far from being complete. The unexpected resistance faced by the Mongols during their raids in Bohemia and Austria pointed to the necessity of reassessing a prospective invasion further west. During these raids, the Mongols were met only by the local forces, but to fight the imperial army of Frederick 11, or a crusading army prepared against them, would have brought upon them a completely different scale of warfare. Under the circumstances, the Mongols realized that it was not possible to maintain their hold on Hungary with an army of only 6,000 soldiers (as they would do in Kiev).!53 In fact, communication would have been difficult given the huge distance between the Arpadian kingdom and the political centers of the Empire. Therefore, an occupation army needed considerable numbers in order to ensure a complete operational autonomy in case of confrontations with the European kingdoms. Thus, in order to settle a considerable army in Hungary, Batu would have been forced to remain on the Danube banks, unable to participate in the political developments within the Empire and to take advantage of the profitable commercial routes of Central Asia. It is likely that the Mongol commanders were satisfied with attaining their initial strategical objective in Central Europe: of discouraging Hungary from venturing beyond the line of the Eastern Carpathians for the entire century that followed the 1241 invasion.

The fact that during their retreat, in the spring-summer of 1242, the Mongols devastated Transylvania in a much more systematic manner compared to the previous year might also indicate that the Mongols intent was mainly to secure their conquests in DeSt-i Kip¢ak. Transylvania put up a fierce resistance in March-April 1241, and crossing its territory turned out to be an arduous enterprise. Taking advantage of the fact that the Mongols did not leave behind an army, the Transylvanians erected new fortresses and regrouped in case of another invasion.!4 Given the fact that Transylvania was, among the territories of the Arpadian kingdom, the closest province to the Cuman steppe, where the 1239 offensive had started, the fighting abilities of the locals were surely known by the Mongols. On the other hand, we must take into account the fact that the troops retreating through Transylvania!®> were not part of the two armies led by Kadan that continued their offensive west of the Danube at the beginning of 1242, and returned to the Steppe North of the Black Sea through Serbia and Bulgaria. The soldiers crossing Transylvania had spent the previous months in the Hungarian plain. They were low on provisions and plundering Transylvania was their last chance to increase their booty. Thus, taking full advantage of the opportunity, the withdrawing Mongol troops devastated Transylvania systematically, causing, according to Rogerius and Thomas of Spalato, a severe depopulation of the region.!°® Rogerius crossed the region as a Mongol prisoner, which makes him an eye witness of the events. He managed to escape after crossing the mountains, somewhere on Cuman territory, and he retuned by foot to Alba Iulia. His testimony is impressive. He recounts crossing deserted villages, feeding on roots and vegetables from deserted gardens, and finding his way back guided by the burnt church steeples. During eight days of walking from the Cuman border to Alba Iulia, Rogerius did not meet one living soul.!57

15 The Aftermath of the Invasion

1.5.1 Immediate Consequences

1.5.1.1 Starvation, Depopulation, and Destruction

The immediate consequences of the Mongol invasion impacted mostly the territories that were formerly under their direct control. Due to the military operations and the thorough plundering, the entire agricultural production of 1241 and 1242 was compromised.!°* The massive depopulation and the presence of invading troops slowed down production, and the small crops resulted in these circumstances together with the rest of provisions were consumed by the marauders. They also showed a particular interest in collecting the local livestock, which constituted valuable war spoil for a nomadic people. The result was a great hunger that took its toll on the contemporaries. The Lvov anonymous chronicle describes the 1242 famine that struck Hungary as “horrible and never before heard of”. According to the same chronicle starvation brought more death than the invasion itself!59 and this information was reproduced in the 14th century Hungarian chronicles.!©° The survivors had no choice but to feed on dogs and cats, while human flesh was sold in local markets.!®! The settlements were under constant menace from hungry wolves, for fear of which no person left their house unarmed.'®? On top of everything else, a dreadful locust invasion destroyed all crops in the summer of 1242,16 making the upcoming Christmas in the kingdom of Hungary the scene of “the greatest misfortune and misery ever seen”!6+ No human being could be found “within a 15 days’ walk in any direction from a spot”.!®> This vast and scorched land is the territory lying between the Danube and the Tisza plain, were the Mongols settled in the 1241-1242 winter, devoured its food resources, destroyed a great number of existing settlements and turned their wheat fields into grazing grounds. In the first months of 1243, count Paul Geregye, “before any other noblemen of the kingdom’, dared to cross the Danube and venture inland, and he could only find wilderness, a place where law and order were a distant memory. His deed was considered an extreme act of courage.!®6 While the Danube was the western limit of the empoverished area, the eastern border was very close to the frontiers of Transylvania. As an eye witness, Rogerius wrote that the Mongols carried out systematic operations in the area, attempting to destroy even the shelters located in the mountains, as testified by the great number of settlements abandoned after the 1241-1242 invasion.

On the other hand, Transylvania’s situation was completely different than that of Hungary. Even though the two successive invasions (March 1241 and the spring of 1242) left severe marks on Transylvania, it was never fully and permanently subdued. The amplitude of the devastation was significant but it did not come close to the proportions reached in Pannonia and the Tisza plain. Even though after his escape from the Mongols, in the spring of 1242, Rogerius described the province as completely depopulated, he also recounted that he was saved from starvation by locals who had taken refuge in the mountains. The great number of refugees that Rogerius encountered at Frata were well organized and supplied. Rogerius also indicated that numerous fortifications were erected in Transylvania during the interval between the two invasions, and some were left unconquered by invaders even after the 1242 attack.16” Moreover, the number of communities hidden in the mountains, forests or improvised fortifications, such as Frata or Tamasda,!©* the latter destroyed by the Mongols, was without any doubt greater.

The written sources provide a great deal of information regarding the consequences of the Mongol invasion. On May 6th, 1246, bishop Gallus of Transylvania was granted the privilege to colonize six bishopric estates (Alba Iulia, Herina, Bileag, Gilau, Zalau, Tagnad) that were very low on population.!®° Similar references are made to the Sancel estate (Zonchel)—‘“which included and fed three villages in happier times” (1252)!”°—and Zek estate (1252).!71 Also, a document by “young king” Stephen v, dated 1263, contains a list of four settlements, located in the Tarnava area, which were “deprived of their rightful inhabitants”.!”* Furthermore, the act given by the aforementioned king to the Cistercian abbey of Carta (1264) describes its state as “completely deserted after the fury of the Mongol plunder”!”3 The scarcity of documents makes a purely quantitative evaluation of the destructions impossible. However, they do shed light on the discrepancy between the northern and the southern part of Transylvania. While some localities on the Somes valley were mentioned as depopulated as late as 1246, the references for southern Transylvania go as late as 1263-1264.!"4 The same area must be the territory Rogerius crossed in 1242 it was the scene of the most important battles!” and the bloodiest massacres. Furthermore, scholars agree that these areas were the most severely depopulated.!”6

If indeed southern Transylvania suffered more destruction than the northern part, the explanation must be sought in the different impact of the military confrontations taking place in these regions during the 1241 campaign. In regards to the 1242 retreat, we can only assume that the Mongols hesitated to use the path through Rodna, less frequented at that time, and poured through the mountain passes into southern Transylvania, which would explain the massive devastation therein.

1.5.1.2 Migration

As suggested above, the real depopulation of Transylvania was due to the massacres or the enslaving of its inhabitants as well as to the food shortage, a consequence of the systematic Mongol plunders. But there was also a second type of depopulation that was only apparent since it was the result of a massive migration from areas exposed to Mongol attacks to safer areas, usually natural shelters. These migrations mostly affected incipient urban centers (like the bishopric of Alba Iulia, all the other county centers, and the salt exploitation settlements), causing a slowdown or even a halt in their development. The archeological data gathered in Alba Iulia indicate that the city reached the demographic level of 1241 only in the 15th century.!”" The city of Cluj was only revitalized in the time of Stephen v,!’8 while Dabaca, which had been an important center, faced an irreversible decline. Among the first measures taken by count Paul Geregye after the royal administration was reinstated in Transylvania was against the effects of depopulation, “gathering the population scattered anywhere’, helping them to reestablish their households to a state that permitted economic growth.!”9 These measures ensured the resuming of some important economic objectives (salt mines, royal estates or those pertaining to the bishopric of Transylvania'®°) by new relocations meant to fill in the population gaps resulted from the invasion. Same actions were taken by local nobility eager to repopulate their estates.

As for the economic centers in the Saxon colonized areas, despite being a frequent target for the invaders, the information we have indicates that the locals overcame the post-invasion crisis faster compared to other regions. The revival was not due to a new inflow of colonists, but to the regrouping of the survivors inside the emerging urban centers. Thus, settlements like Rodna, Bistrita and Sibiu could resume their development, while settlements located close to the periphery of the province were temporarily deserted.1®! In this case, the Saxon deep sense of community seems to have boosted urban development in the aftermath of the 1241 invasion.

The population also headed towards safer regions in western Hungary. These migrations continued after 1242 at a slower pace, and consisted mostly in representatives of the high social strata.!®2

1.5.1.3 Banditry and Insecurity. Institutional Crisis

These phenomena were amplified by the Mongol occupation (wherever direct occupation took place), the famine ravages and the massive relocations. The delay in the return of the royal clerks to Transylvania and neighboring regions—as late as the spring of 1243—amplified the crisis and brought even more havoc. Thus, according to the information received from Hungary in the summer of 1243 by Pope Innocent rv: “during the Mongol occupation and even after their withdrawal, some rushed in great enmity against the kingdom itself, setting fire to the goods of many, laying waste and destruction, in overt unlawfulness against the Crucified One”!®3 The information was most certainly related to the situation in the eastern regions of the kingdom as the Roman pontiff received it through the envoy sent by bishop Benedict of Oradea soliciting his transfer to the Gyér bishopric.!*+ Other testimonies mention: “the time of the Mongol invasion, when people could no longer guard themselves the way they would have wanted” ®° Also: the “rights of the fortresses ... alienated and mingled during the Mongols’,!8* somewhat adding to the image of calamitous times. There were also those who stood against this crisis like count Paul Geregye of Solnoc: “as he came on the other side of the Danube before other noblemen of the kingdom, to destroy the plunderers and the marauders thriving in these parts as well as in Transylvania, putting them to fairjudgment. ..”;!87 and all the other dignitaries assigned by king Bela Iv to reestablish order.

1.5.2 Long-term Consequences

The great invasion of 1241-1242 had numerous consequences which gave a different direction to Transylvania’s development, fundamentally changing its social and administrative structure.

1.5.2.1

The royal fortresses were strategically important for the invaders. As a consequence, the amplitude of the destruction was considerable. With no exception, the county seats of Transylvania (Alba-Iulia, Dabaca, Cluj, Turda, Cetatea de Balta, and Hunedoara) were conquered and burned down while their fleeing population was massacred. The same fate was shared by Sibiu, the county seat of the Saxon colony located in southern Transylvania, and many other royal fortresses from neighboring regions. Furthermore, Cetatea de Balta was completely destroyed and later rebuilt on a different site. The key element of this fortress was a dungeon made of stone and brick and surrounded by a moat enclosing a surface of merely 100 sqm around it. To the exterior, this rather modest fortification also had an earthen palisade probably reinforced with wood.!88 The old fortress of Hunedoara (the fortification located on the Sampetru Hill) shared the fate of Cetatea de Balta and some of its functions were taken over by a small stone fortress built in the vicinity.!89 Due to the abandonment of the royal fortress, Hunedoara lost its status of county seat to the new royal fortress of Deva. No less severe was the devastation of Cluj, rehabilitated after a few decades by King Stephen v who colonized the area with German settlers.!%° The fortress could not be rebuilt on its previous location, which was now in the possession of the Benedictine monastery of ClujManastur.!*! After the invasion, the strong fortress of Dabdca entered a phase of fast decline, but with some mending and consolidation the fortress still kept its military function.!% In this case the Mongol invasion seems to have primarily affected the civilian settlement and but the scale of the destruction was too large for the fortress to preserve its former position. Thus, only decades after the invasion, Dabaca lost its function of royal fortress and county seat, becoming a simple stronghold owned by one of the branches of the KékényesRadnot!*3 kindred. The royalty also gave the same kindred the old fortress of Turda, located in the vicinity of the former locality Sanmiclaus, on the banks of Aries River.!94 Due to its status, the bishopric of Alba-Julia alone was the exception to this general rule. The reconstruction of Alba-Iulia started shortly after the Mongol invasion, most likely when bishop Gallus took office (1246), and benefited from direct support from the royal and the voivodal institutions. Nonetheless, its reconstruction took place at a slow pace. For almost a century, the former fortified wall of the fortress could not be used.!%5 Also, archaeological research has shown that a part of the old town was in ruins for a long time, and the repopulation of the settlement to its 1241 level did not occur until the 15thc.!96 At the same time, the inclusion of the town of Alba Iulia within the direct possessions of the Diocese of Transylvania!%” marks the disappearance of its former military and administrative functions.

The decay of the former royal fortresses was the direct consequence of the destruction caused by the Mongols, but also that of the crown’s failure to provide the means for reconstruction. The Mongol invasion made the contemporary face the bitter truth that such fortifications had grown obsolete, and the large scale of devastation hindered the reconstruction of an efficient fortification system within a reasonable amount of time. Their main vulnerability before the Mongols cannot be explained only by the materials used in the building process, although there is no doubt that earthen and wooden fortifications were already considered outdated at the time. However, it is noteworthy that some fortresses like Alba-Iulia, Dabaca, and Sibiu were surrounded by fortified stone walls, which yet failed to boost their resistance capacity.

Even so, the more serious deficiencies were related to the function and size of these royal fortifications, as well as to the human factor in charge with their protection. Their size was undoubtedly exaggerated compared to the number and military potential of the defenders. Thus, the Hunedoara fortress was 220 x 70 meters and had a surface of almost two hectares,!%8 only a little smaller than the significantly better populated royal fortification of Cluj-Manastur (220 x 98 meters). As for the royal castle Dabaca, the fortified wall was over 250 meters in length, and due to the triangular shape of the terrace on top of which it was built, its width ranged between 50 and 250 meters.!99 The medieval fortress of Alba Iulia maintained the initial shape of the former Roman fortress, in this case a rectangle of 430 x 415 meters.?°° Even though we lack this kind of data regarding the fortresses from Turda and Cetatea de Balta, existing analogies enable us to assume that the fortifications bore the same features.

At the same time, the former royal fortresses were inhabited, housing both the administrative headquarters of the counties, as well as those of the main ecclesiastical institutions (in most cases arch-dioceses, but also the Bishopric of Alba-Iulia, and the Benedictine monastery from Cluj-Manastur). In addition, these were also economic centers, concentrating the main economic activity of the county—manufacturing, exchange and consumption of goods.?°! Besides the permanent population, these fortifications also sheltered the population from the neighboring areas, retreating in panic from the Mongol threat. As centers of administrative power wealth, the royal fortresses represented extremely attractive targets for potential invaders. Through their conquest, the invaders could wipe out with a single blow the entire political, administrative, religious, and economic structure—which indeed happened during the dramatic events of 1241.

Consequently, the reformation of the defensive system of the Hungarian Kingdom had to include first of all a clear separation between the military headquarters and the civilian settlements, and also an efficient decentralization of the counties’ defensive system. The conditions of the time compelled the crown to abandon its obligations towards providing immediate protection to religious institutions and civilian population to church authorities, landlords and the community. The new royal fortresses, erected in the second half of the 13th century had an exclusive military function, benefited from better defensive systems, and were attended by garrisons made of professional soldiers. In times of need, they could shelter a handful of officials and a small number of noblemen and their families, but not the local civilians. Cetatea de Balta represents and example of the first stage of transition towards this new system. As additions to the renovated and reconsolidated fortresses from the frontier, the following decades would witness the rise of stronger fortresses, well equipped to defend themselves against long lasting sieges (Deva, Ciceu, and Hunedoara etc.). As a reaction to a papal directive requiring local church leaders to build adequate refuges for Christians?°* and the same suggestions accompanied by donations from the state authorities, the ecclesiastical institutions would make their responsibility to fend for themselves. Thus, the town Alba Iulia became a possession of the Diocese of Transylvania?°3 which, being reluctant to engage in projects that demanded more than the resources in hand afforded restrain the inhabited area to the southwestern corner of the former royal fortification, enclosing it with an earthen wall and a palisade.24 On the other hand, the Benedictine monastery from Cluj-Manastur remained the sole owner of the former precinct of the royal fortress devastated in 1241 and tightened its own defense with a stone precinct in the second half of the 13th century.2°5 This category of fortified ecclesiastical institutions also includes the Carta Monastery and the St. Michael Church from Cisnadioara, both erected in the second half of the 13th century.?°

Asa part of the new defensive structure, an important function was bestowed by the royalty on the fortresses held by noblemen. In the aftermath of the invasion, Bela Iv was obliged to reconsider his defenses and therefore made extensive donations of estates to noblemen in his trust, who were bound to use some of their revenues to consolidate the kingdom’s fortification system.2° The importance of building a defensive system was clearly stated in a series of royal diplomas. One of them referred to the donation of “estates suitable for erecting fortifications to those of our subjects who know how and are capable of building them”.*°8 This policy seems to have become more popular between 1246 and 1248 when, confronted with the imminence of a second Mongol invasion, king Bela found himself with insufficient fortifications. It was probably within this time span that the count of Solnoc, Paul Geregye, started the construction of the two fortresses: Adrian (Adorjan) and Piatra Soimului (Sdlyomk6). Ariesul de Campie fortress (Aranyos, Cheud commune), attested in 1246 as part of Paul Gutkeled’s estate in the Solnoc county, was constructed around the same time period.2°° During the following decades, fortresses owned by the nobility multiplied significantly in Transylvania. In 1268, a count Rotho sold a property in Bistrita, with a “stone tower and a wooden house near the tower, and a fortified yard all around’.#!° An unknown number of private fortresses located on the Somes Valley, were conquered and destroyed by the army of the bishop of Transylvania around 1282.7" These fortifications, which belonged to a rather turbulent and anarchic nobility, known for hijacking travelers and salesmen who crossed their lands, have yet to be identified. Even though the location of some of the fortresses has been identified, further research did not offer any conclusive information regarding their chronology. The Calnic fortress is one of the very few fortresses of this type for which there is a remarkably precise chronology established (between 1270 and 12727!?). A significant number of the fortresses owned by noblemen in Transylvania seem to have been erected within this time period.

According to Rogerius, local communities were the first to participate in this construction effort, which started in the interval between the 1241 invasion and the 1242 withdrawal. Refuge fortifications constructed in the surrounding areas were probably consolidated in the subsequent period, all depending on local resources. In most cases, their very nature makes proper identification impossible. Comana de Jos is one such fortress, dating back to the second half of the 13th century, unable to hold an active military duty due to its modest size and rudimentary defenses.?!3 This category might also include the fortresses from Sibiel,?"4 Sasciori, Vurpar,?" Tiligca,?!6 Orlat,2!” Rasinari, Cisnadie, and Avrig?!®

all built, maintained and ruled by the members of the community.?!9 A special, but not unique case was that of the settlement from Garbova (Alba county), where two fortifications were erected during the same period: a fortress in the center of the settlement, and a fortified refuge for the village community, in the neighboring mountains.22°

The new system of fortifications was flexible and dispersed. Each one of its components was able to put up with long sieges from potential invaders while not being in itself an attractive target to justify the time and human losses to conquer it. Largely reinforced over the next decades, the system would hold back the Mongol’s second attempt of invading Transylvania in 1285.

1522

The disappearance of royal military bases also marked the end of the military system based on the services of fortress serfs (iobagiones castri). In time this system became obsolete and contemporaries were aware of its limitations. This explains why the new system of military frontier, established in the early 13th century, renounced the use of fortress serfs, in favor of the newly established royal serfs and the military services offered by the free communities. The military service of the serfs, hereditarily bonded to county centers, became unsatisfactory in time. Undoubtedly, at the origins of the family history of all royal serfs appeared an ancestor with certain military skills. Their offspring inherited the status of royal serfs assuming both the obligations and the privileges conferred by this status. In times of need the royal authorities were compelled to appealt to their services even though we can assume that some of them lacked the military skills of their ancestors. In addition, since the status applied to their entire lifespan, we can assume a good number of them were unfit for military service due to old age. Such an army did not hold much military value and made the presence of serfs within the armed forces of the 13th century an exception rather than a rule.

Like any state-based system, employing royal serfs to perform military duties presented numerous disadvantages. The maintenance of royal fortresses, one of the main attributions of castrensi, was oriented towards conservation rather than improvement. Thus, in the first half of the 13th century, the county seats of Transylvania presented outdated defensive systems. At the same time, despite royal reluctance, a new and much stronger type of fortification was developing in the area of the military frontier. King Andrew 11’s own doubts expressed through an act of donation from 121 in which he tried to impose on the Teutonic Knights a reconstruction plan with an old-fashioned fortification system,?*! were founded on the state of the royal fortresses from inner Transylvania.

In addition, royal serfs, together with other county officials, represented an excessive, cumbersome administrative apparatus, with almost exclusive control over the royal estate. Being in charge with maintaining order on the royal estates, the fortress serfs saw to the preservation of the patrimony—which empowered them to commit abuses against free land owners.??? Tax collection also enabled them to get rich quickly through illegal actions.?29 Their judiciary attributes, as well as their power over any estate transactions throughout the county were no less important.?24 Such privileges soon turned them into a parasitic social class, numerically exceeding their useful purpose and consuming most of the revenues gathered from the royal estates they administered. By mid-13th century, their distinct legal status, which allowed them to possess personal properties (hereditary), acquire lands and amass fortunes became the guaranty of a wealthy life rather than the expression of military servitude. Their income, largely acquired by participating in county affairs, must have been generous enough since their financial position was similar with that of provincial middle nobility. For example, in 1268, a Turda castle serf sold the inherited estate of Luncani (Gerend);?25 in 1275, the former estates of two Solnoc castle serfs who perished without heirs, were given by the king to the Kata kindred;?*° in 1291, a serf of Cluj castle sold the Lomb estate for 20 silver marks;2?’ in the same year, the estate of an Alba castle serf was legally recorded;?28 in 1292, Ladislas Borsa bought the Pintic estate from the joint ownership of a Solnoc castle serf and two noblemen.??9 Hence, dropping the services of the royal serfs, useless in the new military system, was the expected thing to do. Bela Iv remained rather reticent in renouncing the costly services of the serfs, considering them a warranty for the well-functioning of the centralized system. In the end it was King Stephen v who decisively encouraged the process. The aforementioned examples, indicating serfs as estate sellers and never buyers, stand as evidence that the office of royal serfs was already collapsing in the last three decades of the 13th century. In addition, the administrative attributions of royal serfs, the support of their social status, decreased considerably in importance and eventually disappeared completely. The Royal Decree of 1261, annulling the judicial duties of serfs over the town of Dej, was the last written source in Transylvania in which their judicial attributions were explicitly mentioned.?° Also for the last time, in 1265, five serfs from Dabaca castle were called to confirm the legitimacy of a property sale.?3! Furthermore, a document from 1266 mentions the last Transylvanian castle serf who, as the king’s man, assisted together with a nobleman to the taking into possession of an estate.5? Starting with the second half of the 13th century, castle serfs would look for ways to rid themselves of their duties and to gain the statute of nobles. This status change was possible at the time only as a consequence of military service.23 Those who failed to adapt would come across increasing difficulties in preserving their hybrid status, semi-dependent and semi-privileged. After the middle of the 14th century, the new royal castle serfs represented a new category, assimilated into the dependent, unprivileged social layer. The differences in position and responsibilities, compared to those of their ancestors from 1200, were considerable.

1.5.2.3 Given the almost total disappearance of the former administrative and judicial system, the crisis of the property system affected primarily the property of the free people. If royal domains, and to a lesser extent church estates, enjoyed protection from the central authority, the private estate was left at the mercy of local officials. Their activity added to the general unlawful seizure of estates and rights, which was favored by the disappearance or refuge of a large number of land owners, and by the destruction or loss of property documents during the Mongol onslaught. Paul Geregye remains the most notorious case. On January 21st, 1249, the king confirmed his possession of no less than 16 estates in the counties of Bihor, Solnoc and Crasna,?3* some of them listed as royal property.235 These estates, accumulated within the five years span (1243-1248) in which Paul Geregye held official duties in the region, were only the part that came into sight of a much larger estate system, which included a series of possessions seized from aristocratic families and noblemen: Chanad—who recovered their Birtin customs service and other estates from Bihor only after appealing the king in 1256;236 Gutkeled—who retook possession of their several estates within the same county, “estranged during the Mongols” and seized by the Geregye kindred only in 1278;28” and Borsa, whose estates, appropriated by one of the Geregye kindred’s friends, were only retrieved through the decision of the 1279 regional congregation.?° This later repossessions were not encountered only in Bihor county. In Transylvania, a certain Nicholas, son of Tywan of Vargand recovered in 1304 his property of Ungurei (Gregorfalva in Alba county), lost “in the times of the ancient Mongols”. He was able to do so only after tiresome juridical endeavors and after spending 50 silver marks,?39 which, if real, could not amount to much less than the market value of the estate itself.

There is enough information available in sources to conclude that at least in certain geographical areas old structures and ownership rights were literally obliterated. This also accounts for the changes suffered by the social elite. These forced takeovers were reversed by the use of the same methods, when it was possible (the Gutkeled and Borsa cases), or by costly and time-consuming judicial efforts. We must also assume that families lacking military force, influence at the king’s court or at least the financial resources needed for the expenses of the intricate judicial system of the time could never recover their estates.

All these changes ultimately brought about a radical transformation in the social structure of the province. Within this structure, the nobility, with its military capabilities substantially improved after the “natural selection” during the invasion and the ensuing years, became the kingdom's most important military power. They also took over the control of the administrative functions of the county. On this basis and soon to become a vector for economic development, the Transylvanian nobility defined its own identity in comparison with the non-indigenous aristocracy which would continue to keep almost exclusive grasp over decisional functions. Therefore, once this basis took shape, claiming a more important role within the political system was just a matter of time.

Link 

Press Here