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Download PDF | Dror Ze'evi - An Ottoman Century_ The District of Jerusalem in the 1600s (S U N Y Series in Medieval Middle East History)- (1996).

Download PDF | Dror Ze'evi - An Ottoman Century_ The District of Jerusalem in the 1600s (S U N Y Series in Medieval Middle East History)- (1996).

324 Pages 



Preface 

Research for this book was done in several locations. The archivesin Istanbul, Paris, Marseilles and London yielded important material. So did libraries at London, Jerusalem, Paris and Princeton. The most important source for this work, however, was the shari'a court in Jerusalem. Working there was a unique experience. Crammed into one small room we sat together—our guide and mentor, Sheikh As'ad al­husayni, three scribes, and two or three historians working on their research. We worked there for months, often holding the heavy volumes on our knees and doing our best to copy records into notebooks perched on the edge of a clerk's desk.



 At times we would all break into heated discussions of the politicalsituation, or joke about the awkward conditions. Sheikh As'ad, a fountain of knowledge on questions of language, history and Islamic law, would lend a hand in decoding some of the more difficult texts. But the most peculiar feature of working at the shari'a court, was the fact that it was not an archive. We were working inside a functioning court of law. As we lifted our eyesfrom the ancient volumes, we could sometimessee similar cases unfolding before us. Couples came in to sign a marriage contract, a house owner would request a document of ownership, and sometimes a small delegation would come to solve a dispute. 



Though it belongs in another era, and I am aware of the differences, this experience has taught me more about my research than much of the material meticulously gathered there. I would like to thank all the qadis and officials at the Jerusalem shari'a court who helped us so much, and above all Sheikh As'ad al­Imamal­husayni, and the director, Mr. Zayn al­Din al­'Alami. My principal debt of gratitude is to Ehud Toledano, my advisor for the dissertation, who read the manuscript and provided a great deal of insight. His help and guidance were invaluable. I would also like to thank Amnon Cohen, who introduced me to the world of the sijill and helped me break the code; Halil Bey Inalcik, who discussed many subjects with me, read parts of the manuscript, and showed me where I got it wrong; and Michael Cook, who read several chapters and made me look at things more closely. 



It is a pity that I cannot convey my thanks to Albert Hourani, a special person who devoted his time to guide and encourage me throughout my research. Albert also read the manuscript and offered many of his shrewd and observant insights. Many friends contributed of their thoughts and knowledge. For their helpful remarksthanks are due to Iris Agmon, a constant intellectual stimulus; to Amy Singer and Itzik Reiter, my brothers­in­pen at court; to Nimrod Hurvitz, who had many sharp observations; and to Israel Gershoni and Haggay Erlich who saw me through the darker moments. I wish to thank the staff of the Basbakanlik Arsivi in Istanbul and the staff of the American Research Institute in Turkey, as well as my colleague there, Fariba Zarinebaf­Shahr, for their help and hospitality. The production staff of SUNY Press at Albany has invested much time and effort into publishing this book.



 I would like to thank them all for their wonderful work, and especially Christine Worden and Cathleen Collins, for their assistance and persistence in guiding me through the variousstages of production. I owe a debt of love and gratitude to my wife, Amira, and to my family, forced to follow me to London and Princeton, and to suffer my tribulations and long periods of absence visiting faraway archives. I am especially indebted to my son, David, who grew up to be my computer adviser, and saved me in those hours of panic, when the text suddenly disappeared somewhere in the bowels of the machine. This work would not have been possible without the generousfinanacial help ofseveral institutions. I would like to thank my parents and my parents­in­law, the Rothschild foundation, the Yigal Alon fund, Tel­Aviv University, and BenGurion University, for their help in variousstages of thisresearch. My sincere thanks to the staff of the department for Near East Studies at Princeton University for their assistance during my year of postdoctorate studies there. 

BEER­SHEVA DORO ZE'EVI FEBRUARY 1995 



Introduction 

In 1512 a young new sultan arrived at the throne in Istanbul. Selim I, otherwise known as Selim the grim, reoriented the Ottoman empire to its eastern front, and challenged histwo formidable rivals, the Safavid shah Isma'il, and the Mamluk sultan Qansuh al­Ghawri. Immediately following his accession to the throne Selim began to plan his campaign against the Safavids, and two years later, in early 1514, he left Istanbul at the head of his army, on his way to the eastern front. In August of that year the two armies met in the valley of Chaldiran (Çaldiran), north of Tabriz, the Safavid capital. the battle was won by Selim's army, but the approaching winter and the pressures of the janissaries forced the sultan to order a withdrawal to winter quarters in Anatolia. Confrontation with the Safavids brought the Ottomans closer to the Mamluks. 



A defence treaty was signed between the Safavids and the Mamluks, and now it was only a question of time before Ottomans and Mamluks, contendersfor leadership in Sunni Islam, would meet on the battlefield. Two yearslater, in 1516, Selim made preparationsfor yet another campaign in the East. It is not clear whether hisinitial plan wasto return to his unfinished business with the Safavids, or to surprise the unsuspecting Mamluks, but as his army approached Syria, the Mamluk sultan, Qansuh, hastily arranged his army and marched north. Information about the advancing Mamluk army reached Selim, and a series of failed diplomatic contacts and half­hearted overtures turned down by both sides escalated the conflict until war was declared. On 24 August 1516, the Ottomans and the Mamluks faced each other on the plain of Marj Dabiq near Aleppo. The Mamluksfought valiantly, but their old fashioned bows and arrows were no match for state­of­the­art Ottoman firearms. Waves of Mamluk cavalry attacks crashed against efficient Ottoman fire and at a critical moment an entire Mamluk flank, headed by the governor of Aleppo, Kha'ir (Hayir) Bey, crossed over to the Ottoman side. The battle ended in a crushing defeat for the Mamluks. The sultan, Qansuh, was killed, and the remains of his army retreated south. As Selim entered Damascus, delegations from all provinces of the sultanate came to pledge allegiance and to plead for amnesty and protection. 1 



The historian Ibn Tulfun, who recorded the events of the conquest, describes the Ottoman army's trip south to Egypt as short and uneventful, apart from short battles in the Jordan valley and at the village of Khan Yunus, near Gaza. Small­scale uprisingsin Safad, Ramla and Gaza were quickly and efficiently crushed, and on January 1517 the Ottoman army crossed the Sinai desert and prepared for another confrontation with the Mamluks. The ensuing battle, which took place in the field of Raydaniyya near Cairo, was an overwhelming defeat for the Mamluks, and the remains of the Mamluk army dispersed. 



The Ottomans had completed their conquest of the sultanate, and could now declare themselves uncontested leaders of the Islamic world, and keepers of its holy sanctuaries in Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem. Efficient bureaucrats set out to prepare the ground for establishing Ottoman order in the new territories.2 In the century following the Ottoman conquest, the district ofJerusalem still retained many characteristics of the vanquished Mamluk sultanate. Old social institutions, laws, cultural norms, and even surviving members of the ruling elite itself, were part of the new scene, and served as constant reminders of this slowly fading past. Not until the end of the sixteenth century did Ottoman rule emerge as a distinct type of Muslim government, leaving itsspecial mark on culture and society. In general termsthe Ottomans accepted Mamluk administrative divisions, which saw Palestine as part of the Syrian province, but internally the partition of the area was changed. The province of Damascus (eyalet or vilayet in Turkish, wilaya in Arabic), was divided into new districts (sancak in Turkish, sanjaq or liwa' in Arabic) and subdistricts (nahiye in Turkish, nahiya in Arabic), but forseveral decadesthe new division retained Mamluk imprints such as the special status accorded to Safad and Gaza as the more important districtsin the Palestinian provinces. 



Gaza wasruled by a governor with chances of promotion to the position of province governor (vali, wali). The district ofJerusalem retained its Mamluk subdivision into three nahiyas (Jerusalem, Hebron and Banu 'Amr) but in the course of the century the third subdistrict was abolished and only the first two remained.3 At the base of this new Ottoman administrative division stood the timar system. Timars were landed fiefs of differentsize and income, distributed by the sultan to soldiers and officials, most of them officers of the famous sipahi cavalry units. An officer who was entrusted to a timar would receive his income from part of the fief's tax revenues, and in return would be required to keep the peace in his timar, and to arm and train several retainers for war. A district governor would in most cases be the commanding officer of a sipahi regiment, and the vali, the province governor, would also be commander­in­chief of all district governors. Along with timars, which officially remained part of the sultan'sland, and in which cultivators had certain rights,systems of land tenure included waqf (Turkish: vakif ) land, dedicated by its ownersto public welfare, religious purposes or private beneficiaries. In the district of Jerusalem waqf lands constituted a large part, perhaps even the largest category of cultivated land, estimated by some at around 60 percent. 



The Ottomans left Mamluk waqf institutionsintact, and added many of their own during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Beside timars and waqfs there was some private land, mostly in and around towns and villages. Improved security in towns and villages and for caravans on the road, a tighter system of administrative control, a more efficient bureaucracy and a pragmatic system of taxation which led to economic expansion, have all contributed to rapid population growth at the beginning of the sixteenth century. According to some researchers, the country's population at the time is estimated at two hundred thousand, most of them in villages. The population in each of the three biggest cities, Gaza, Safad and Jerusalem, was estimated at five to six thousand, and these numbers grew steadily until mid­century. Growth was also fueled by a renewal of maritime and regional trade, and by renewed settlement ofJews expelled from Spain, who found refuge in the Ottoman Empire. This trend was reversed later in the century, and the population continued to decline in the seventeenth century. 4 Asin many of their other conquests, the Ottomansleft taxation principles more or less intact in the first decades of their rule. Taxes in Jerusalem, therefore, were collected according to a differentsystem altogether than that prevailing in the Balkans or in Anatolia. But in their meticulous way the Ottomans carried out surveys of the conquered territories to determine production capacities and to define new rates of taxation. 



In the course of the century, taxes seem to have increased and revenues accruing from the province rose, even when the population began to decrease.5 Ottoman economic policy tended to compartmentalize the populace, and keep an eye over changes in occupation or status, but a flexible approach to applying laws and customs made it possible for people in the region to adapt to changing circumstances, and to initiate an economic boom in the sixteenth century. This same pragmatism had led the Ottomans to play down their control of local economy in the seventeenth century, and to allow the province and the district to conduct their own economic affairs.Jewish and Christian communitiesin Jerusalem, asin other districts of the empire, were integrated into the economic fabric. Ottoman attitudesto these minorities did not differ much from itstreatment of Muslim.



populations. One indication isthe degree of trust in which Christians and Jews held the new local shari'a court, and their willingnessto apply forstate justice even when they were not obliged to. 6 Inside Jerusalem the conquest brought with it a change of emphasis. The Ottomansrecognized the religiousimportance ofJerusalem, astheir willingness to invest heavily in the city and itssurroundings bearstestimony. Instead of carrying on the Mamluk proclivity to invest in religiousinstitutions, however, the new rulers chose to cut down spending on madrasas and mosques, of which the city already had its fair share, and to direct the flow of budget allocations, contributions and alms, to improving security, to providing water, to erecting a new covered market, and to enhancing the welfare of Jerusalem's population. Reconstruction of the city wall and the castle, some twenty years after the conquest, gave the inhabitants a sense ofsecurity which waslacking forso many years. Repairing and enlarging the watersystems, including the building of a pipeline from the village of Artassouth of Bethlehem to Jerusalem, helped provide water for the rapidly growing town. 


Rebuilding and renovating the markets, along with the establishment of a large size waqf—al­Khasikiyya, or Haseki Sultan—for the welfare of the inhabitants, gave a serious boost to the economy and to the city'sstandard of living. The awareness of social justice and proper administration brought by the Ottomans was enhanced by the establishment of a shari'a court, headed by a qadi appointed by decree from Istanbul to provide a counterweight to the governor and hisretinue. It took several decades, until the second half of the sixteenth century, for Ottoman patterns of administration and economy to set in. It took even longer for Ottoman culture and the new outlook of a world empire to become part of people's worldview. A mere century later, however, in the early 1700s, Palestine witnessed the beginning of Western encroachment on its economy and politics, and the rise to power of local potentates who defied Ottoman rule and rebelled against it. Intensive trade with Europe, mainly with France, brought with it glimpses of Western influence on local economic patterns, and at the same time helped alleviate some of the suspicion felt by inhabitants of this region toward the Christian West and its representatives. Through these chinks in the armor, some of Europe's culture found its way in. It is therefore just as difficult to discern in thislater period which strands of local history are uniquely Ottoman, and which were the result of local power struggles or of outside influences.7 The truly Ottoman period in Jerusalem and in the other Arab provinces, therefore, is the one in between. The second century of Ottoman rule, forming the time frame for thisstudy, is perhapsthe clearest manifestationin thisregion of ''the Ottoman way"—the distinct set of norms and methods that representsthe empire'srule in all realms of life. In Jerusalem the seventeenth century culminated in open rebellion in 1703, known as the naqib al­ashraf revolt. Records of this event depict a society in turmoil, and cast a shadow over the whole period leading up to the rebellion. 


The book describes the district of Jerusalem in the century preceding these dramatic events, and analyzestheir causes and circumstances. At the outset of the book the stage is set, upon which the events of the century unfolded. Its first part portraysthe countryside, agriculture and villages, as seen by contemporary Western travelers and pilgrims. Their reports are then contrasted with accounts from Arabic and Turkish sources, out of which other symbol­laden depictions of reality emerge. From the surrounding villagesthe description moves on to the city itself. In light of debates about the nature of citiesin the Islamic world, one of the questions posed here is the extent of Jerusalem's urban character. Was there a municipal authority? Did the city's inhabitantsfeel a common bond uniting them as a community? Wasit a clearly defined entity set apart from surrounding villages? Although Jerusalem, an ancient city, and the site of numerous conquests and cultures, cannot be taken as a model for all Islamic urban communitiesin the Ottoman period, its structure and function suggest the existence of a well­developed, typically Ottoman urban authority. The city and the district are then examined in their political and social contexts. At the end of the sixteenth century, tensions were already apparent between local governors—sons and slaves of formersenior officials, or Bedouin shaykhsin the area—and their colleagues appointed by the Ottoman government. Thisrivalry intensified during the seventeenth century aslocal governorsformed governing households while strengthening their hold on the districts of Palestine. New source material found in Muslim court archives shedslight on the peculiar history and the down­fall of these households. For several decadeslocal governing families managed to resist the center's pressuresto appoint governors other than their own. Simultaneously, through intermarriage, businesstransactions and joint military ventures, they merged into one extended family, controlling most of Western Palestine. 


In the second half of the century, however, the imperial center retrieved some of itsformer power, and through a combination of covert action and politicalshrewdness succeeded in breaking the hold of these households. These were now replaced by other governors, appointed from Istanbul or from the provincial capital of Damascus. Chapter 2 traces the formation of local households, their consolidation aslocal ruling dynasties, the slow process of amalgamation into one combined force, and their dissolution at the end of the century. First to notice these changing circumstances later in the century were the notables of Jerusalem. Following a period of readjustment in the wake of the Ottoman conquest, ulema ('ulama'), members of distinguished families, and wealthy merchants, gradually regained and reinforced their formerstatus. 


Joining the same Sufi brotherhoods, participating in the same mystic ceremonies, the localizing governing elite and the emerging notable elite soon found common ground and created a basis for cooperation to the benefit of both sides. These ties enabled notables to acquire tax­free land and other assets, thereby strengthening their economic and social status. Later in the seventeenth century, having amassed considerable fortunesin city and village alike, notable families became aware of their cohesion as a group and of their social position, and strove to complement it with a measure of political power. The third chapter examines these processes and their tragic denouement in the 1703 revolt. A main target of the revolt wasthe local military force. This establishment and in particular the very special role played by the bedouin in military affairs are not well known. Received wisdom describes the bedouin as diehard enemies of Ottoman rule and as a perennial menace to local governors. In the period surveyed in thisstudy, however, bedouin tribes played a different role altogether. Following the decline of elite Ottoman troops—the sipahis and the janissaries—bedouin warriors emerged as the main force capable of replacing them on the localscene. Governors hired them as militia forcesin theirservice and employed them in a variety ofsecurity tasks. The unique formation of sedentary­nomad relations observed in this period, and the meaning these relations took on for the culture and economy of the district, were an early indication of bedouin involvement in Palestinian districts, which had become more widespread in later centuries. 



Local economic life was dependent to a great extent on agriculture and systems of land tenure. Agrarian relationsin the district were complex and tense. Here the lethargy of the center was evident. As the landbased cavalry and infantry became inefficient in the late sixteenth century, old mechanismsfor distributing and managing fiefslost their raison d'être and fell into disuse. Timar holders in the district of Jerusalem and its environs often preferred to lease their fiefs to the highest bidder in order to avoid the painstaking process of exacting taxes and overseeing the villagers. Local leasing of fiefs, later to become comprehensive government policy, caused considerable damage to the agriculture, and weakened rural areas. The imperial center chose to ignore these harmful tendencies, but other results, more beneficial for the local population, were equally ignored. 



Periodic land surveys, an Ottoman bureaucratic practice used to register all land, population and expected yield, fell into disuse at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Replaced by a relatively lenientset of agrarian legal norms, it permitted peasants and other land holders to regard state land as freehold for all practical purposes, while upholding the principle of the sultan's ultimate ownership. Among those who stood to gain most from the government'sleniency were once again the local notables. They managed to buy or rent large tracts of land and to increase their private holdings, using their high social profile and their government patrons as a shield against heavy taxation. The century also witnessed rapid developmentsin the monetary and fiscal system, in local industry, and in internal and external commerce. In the sixteenth century, the economy wastightly controlled and centrally directed. Tax revenues were assessed through meticulous land surveys, the qadi's court published detailed price lists for basic commoditiesseveral times a year, and export of certain products and items to Europe was strictly forbidden. Beginning at the end of the century, these control mechanisms disappeared altogether. 



The fiscalsystem lost its guiding principles and the burden of arbitrary taxes became heavier. Local governors adopted a "laissez faire" attitude in internal trade, and external trade was also allowed to go on unhampered. Weaker central control and a disoriented tax system had immediate effects on local economic life, and on the integration of the area into the world economy. Examining the place of women in the socialsystem allows usto view such social and economic processes from a different perspective. Here, too, accepted stereotypes, originating in Western literature and projected backwards from later periods, are critically reevaluated. Local sources show clearly that women in Jerusalem lived and acted in a social and economic system separate to some extent from the dominant male establishment.


 Islamic law and local custom gave women a certain leeway in the realm of marriage and personal status, as well as in business and property rights. Many business transactions in the district were conducted by women who represented their own interests. What can all thistell us about discrimination of women, about their life in a male­dominated society, and about systems of social control? It is my hope that examining all these perspectivestogether in such a small area over a period of time may afford us a more lucid understanding ofJerusalem as an Ottoman district in the seventeenth century, and perhaps shed some more light on the history of other Ottoman provinces and districts during the same period. 





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