Download PDF | Yaacov Lev - Saladin in Egypt (Medieval Mediterranean) (1999).
234 Pages
INTRODUCTION
a) Questions and the Sources
The main aim of this book is to discuss the waning of the Fatimid state and to examine Saladin's policies in Egypt, which created a new political and social order. At the beginning, it seemed a simple and straightforward matter, the sources abundant and freely avail- able. However, progress was hampered by problems with the source material. It became clear that most of our data on Saladin's ad- ministrative, fiscal, military and naval policies in Egypt are derived from a single source: the lost contemporary chronicle by Qadi al- Fadil. Only Saladin's religious policies are well attested to by a variety of the sources due to the rich late medieval biographical literature. Other sources contemporary with Saladin do provide information on his internal policies, but the data are beset by immense contradictions.
The difficulties with the sources are not a new problem. A number of scholars have devoted great effort in the attempt to understand and clarify these problems, and my own work relies much on their findings." The content of the book is shaped by the need to re-examine the sources and events that led to Saladin's rise to power in Egypt. It must be said that re-examination of the sources is frustrating and occasionally quite futile. Saladin is portrayed in diametrically opposed ways by his admirers and some of his critics, notably Ibn al-Athir. Our ability to penetrate beyond these contradictory ac- counts is seriously hampered by our limited understanding of the system of political and moral values that guided the men of the twelfth century.
Therefore, our ability to discern the hidden motives behind the conflicting presentations of Saladin is restricted. Chapter One reflects and deals with these difficulties. But the situation is not altogether hopeless. The obvious way out of such difficulties with conflicting and contradictory data is to employ sources which do not belong to the two opposing his torical traditions: of Saladin's admirers and his critics. Indeed, on some occasions, such independent fragments do exist and pro- vide an important corrective to sources biased one way or the other to Saladin. Most surprisingly some original documents cited in full in the literary sources remain neglected. A careful reading of them sheds much fresh light on the events under discussion.
These types of sources are utilized in Chapter Two. However, it is not only a question of sources but also of perspective. The second chapter is written from the point of view of Fatimid history. The years 1169-1171 constitute a chapter in Fatimid history as much as they offer a history of Saladin's rise to power. When the events of these years are also approached from the point of view of Fatimid realities a clearer picture of Saladin's intentions and policies emerges. The need to examine and re-examine the sources also looms large when Saladin's internal policies are examined (see Chapter Three). Frequently these policies are presented so as to accord with Saladin's image as a pious and just ruler and devoted war- rior of the Holy War. We must always be aware of the fact that Saladin's very real achievements-the victory at Hittin and the conquest of Jerusalem-had already been formed into a myth during his lifetime and this obliterated Saladin's personality and deeds. Only on rare occasions is the non-mythical Saladin dis cernable.
b) The Outlines of Political History, 1169-1174
The aim of this subsection is to provide a short account of the political history of the period 1169-1174 which will serve as an unifying term of reference for the whole book. The main events that took place in those years are referred to constantly in subse- quent chapters. During the 1060's Egypt became a battle ground between Fatimid military leaders, who fought with the help of foreign armies for the post of the vizier. Two regional powers became involved in the internal affairs of Egypt: Nur al-Din of Damascus and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem.
From 1162, Fatimid politics were overshadowed by Shawar's bid for power. In that year, Shawar, the governor of Upper Egypt, established himself in Cairo and became the strong man behind the throne. But his triumph was short-lived; he was driven away from the capital by another con- tender for power, Dirgham. Shawar found refuge in Damascus at the court of Nur al-Din whom he persuaded to give military back- ing to his attempt to regain power in Egypt.
In April 1164, Shawar, supported by Nur al-Din's expeditionary force commanded by Shirkuh, moved to Egypt. Shawar's bid for power was crowned with success: with Shirkuh's help he re-established himself as vizier, however, he had no intention of keeping his promises to Nur al- Din. In order to oust Shirkuh from Egypt, Shawar enlisted the support of Amalric, the King of Jerusalem. Shawar's gamble proved to be correct beyond all expectations: the Franks and Shirkuh clashed indecisively on Egyptian soil and eventually both parties agreed to leave Egypt (October 1164). For a short period of time, Shawar could enjoy the success of his divisive policies. In 1167, Amalric and Shirkuh at the head of their forces were again in Egypt. This round of fighting was rich in event. On 19 March 1167, the Franks and Shirkuh fought a major but incon- clusive battle known as the Battle of Babayn. In its wake, Shirkuh left Saladin to defend Alexandria while he himself overran Up- per Egypt. For three months, Saladin was besieged in Alexandria by Shawar and the Franks. The siege brought great misery to the beleaguered town and its inhabitants, but Saladin's firm stand created a military stalemate which convinced the Franks and Shirkuh to agree to the withdrawal from Egypt of both the Cru- saders and Nur al-Din's forces (Spring 1167).
By 1168, the weakness of Egypt also attracted the attention of Byzantium. The two Christians powers of the Eastern Mediterra- nean-Byzantium and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem- negotiated to combine forces in a joint military expedition against Egypt. It was an attractive alliance; Byzantium had an important asset to offer-her naval forces. Nonetheless, Amalric launched his new offensive against Egypt alone. In October 1168, Shawar alone, with no help from Damascus, was confronted by the third Frankish invasion of Egypt.
The Crusaders stormed and conquered the town of Bilbays, and moved against the capital which com- prised the two cities of Fustat and Cairo. On 12 November, Shawar set Fustat on fire and offered vast sums of money to buy off Amalric. Appeals for help from Shawar, or al-'Adid, the Fatimid Imam himself, reached Damascus. Nur al-Din watched the Frankish invasion of Egypt with great concern and prepared, on his own initiative, a large force to be dispatched to Egypt. Shirkuh and Saladin found themselves once again campaigning in Egypt.
Their very arrival to Egypt caused Amalric to retreat (January 1169. Following the departure of Amalric, Shawar found himself in a precarious position; he now had to face the victorious Syrian expeditionary force. This proved to be a task beyond his ability. On 18 January, he was killed by Shirkuh's men. The climination of Shawar paved the way for Shirkuh's appointment as the Fatimid vizier. However, his term of office was a very short one: he died on 23 March 1169.
Three days later, Shirkuh was succeeded in the post by his nephew, Saladin. From 26 March, 1169 till 11 September 1171, Saladin served as Fatimid vizier. He used his post to strengthen his position vis-à-vis al-'Adid. The most important event in the shift of power from al-'Adid to Saladin was the de- struction of the corps of black Fatimid infantry, which comprised the backbone of the army and served as the main buttress of the regime (August 1169). Nonetheless, the final overthrow of the Fatimid regime did not follow immediately. Wars with the Crusaders and the defence of the Egyptian Medi- terranean coast absorbed much of Saladin's time and energy. Eventually, the alliance between Byzantium and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem took concrete form and the two powers launched a combined attack on Damietta, which was beaten off by Saladin's forces (25 October-13 December, 1169).
In Decem ber 1170, Saladin conducted a futile campaign in southern Pales- tine, but was more successful in Ayla (modern 'Aqaba), conquer- ing a Frankish fort on a tiny off-shore island. In 1170, Saladin's position in Egypt greatly improved following the pacification of Upper Egypt, and his sense of personal security strengthened with the arrival from Damascus of his extended family; father and brothers. During the period that Saladin served as Fatimid vizier, he pursued a policy which aimed at undermining the Isma'ili character of the Fatimid state.
In Muharram and Shaban 566/ September 1170 and May 1171, three madrasas, law colleges for teaching Sunni schools of law, were established in Fustat and Cairo, and a Sunni cadi was nominated in the capital. At the beginning of Muharram 567/September 1171, the name of al-Adid was omitted from the Friday sermons delivered at the congregational mosques in the capital. The omission of the name of the Fatimid ruler heralded a shift in political allegiance in favor of the Abbasids and the official return of Egypt to the Sunni fold.
On 10 Muharram/ 11 September, al-'Adid died and with him was extinguished the Fatimid state. Until the death of Nur al-Din in May 1174. Saladin's relations with his formal overlord were strained. In October 1171, a coor- dinated attack planned by Nur al-Din and Saladin on the Frank- ish forts of Karak and Shawbak came to naught due to Saladin's failure to meet Nur al-Din. A year later, Saladin's independent foray against these strongholds failed to restore trust to the rela- tions between the two leaders. But difficulties in the relations between Saladin and Nur al-Din did not prevent Saladin from ruling Egypt as he saw fit.
His position in Egypt was firmly secured. A plot discovered in 1174 was of minor significance, posing no real threat to his rule. From Egypt, Saladin conducted an expansion- istic policy in three directions: Nubia, the Mediterranean coast of North Africa and Yemen. Egypt itself was successfully defended against another Christian Mediterranean power-the Normans of Sicily. Their attack on Alexandria was repelled after much fight- ing (August 1174).
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