الأحد، 12 مارس 2023

Download PDF | Byzantine Naval Forces 1261-1461 The Roman Empire’s Last Marines by Raffaele D’Amato, Peter Dennis Igor Dzis, Osprey Publishing, 2016.

Download PDF | Byzantine Naval Forces 1261-1461 The Roman Empire’s Last Marines by Raffaele D’Amato, Peter Dennis Igor Dzis, Osprey Publishing, 2016.

 50 Pages 





INTRODUCTION

The last two centuries of the Byzantine Empire were characterized by the continuous efforts of the central authority — hampered by chaotic civil wars, and the centrifugal tendencies of the last Roman elites — to organize and maintain their military resources to face the constant menace of ‘Latins’ (Franks and Italians), Serbs, Bulgars, and (finally, and most dangerously) the Ottoman Turks.!

























Despite the Roman Empire’s unrivalled maritime heritage, the navy of Byzantium was in decline from the second half of the 12th century, and this contributed to the fall of Constantinople to the army of the Fourth Crusade and the Venetians in 1204. After his reconquest of the City in 1261 the Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos (r. 1259-82) rebuilt a naval force.’ Initially led by Alexios Philanthropenos, this force was manned partly with newly created regiments: the Gasmouloi, the marine Tzakones, and the Prosalenta. The resurrected fleet would first show its quality in the campaigns of 1262-63 against islands held by the Franks and Venetians (sources Pachymeris, 1835, I, 164 and 209, 5-12; 1984, pp.221ff, 279ff; Gregoras, 1829, I, 98, 13-17; 1973, pp.112-113); 20 years later it proved capable of withstanding an expedition by Charles d’Anjou, and it would reduce Byzantium’s dependence on its Genoese collaborators in the face of Venetian naval strength. 
























The empire restored by the Palaiologos dynasty was surrounded by hostile neighbours, and would also be torn by internal power struggles. Although its military power was only a pale shadow of its former strength, in the initial period the new marine regiments were among the elite units that proved their effectiveness in confronting external enemies. In the 14th century, while the Empire’s enemies tightened nooses around the City and its few remaining overseas possessions, the marines were recorded as participants in palace coups and internecine wars.


























HISTORY OF THE NAVAL FORCES

The history of Byzantium’s last navy was always connected closely with that of the rival Italian maritime republics of Genoa and Venice, which vied for power throughout the Central and Eastern Mediterranean world.






















Believing that he could not hope to reconquer Constantinople without a navy, Michael VIII Palaiologos negotiated the Treaty of Nympheion with Genoa in March 1261. In exchange for trade concessions Genoa agreed to provide Michael with a fleet of 50 ships, whose crews he was responsible for paying, and after the signature of the treaty 16 galleys were immediately despatched to him. Although the City itself was in fact taken by the Palaiologans without this aid, the brothers Benettin Zacaria Misero and Manuel Misero, with a flotilla of galleys and a powerful warship named the Vartarin, inflicted heavy losses on the Latin fleet (Sanudo, p.146).





















Ships

Apart from the growing evidence revealed by underwater archaeology, we have some iconography for the ships of the Eastern Mediterranean in the 13th—15th centuries. Frescoes and graffiti surviving in religious and secular buildings give us enough material to attempt reconstructions, and it is also becoming evident that naval battle scenes offer important details which can help us to understand the structure of the galleys of late Roman fleets.
































A wonderful painting from the second half of the 13th century has been found on Naxos in the Church of Our Lady at the village of Arion. It represents a Roman dhroémon warship, painted in red, and surmounted by naval flags of a triangular shape (flamoula), one of them bearing a cross. Visible features include the stern with a turret for troops and a tiller for steering, the row of oars, the tall mast rising from the keel to support lateen-rigged sails, ropes and pulleys, and a lookout at the bow.






















Archaeologists associate this ship with the fleet of Alexios Philanthropeénos, engaged in operations against the Venetians during the reconquest of Naxos in 1263.

Documentary sources of the 13th and 14th centuries (e.g. Kantakouzenos, 1831, I, 70-75) often mention teres, 1.e. a galley with three oar-levels, and moneres, i.e. a ship with a single level, which are illustrated in period miniatures. During the 13th century Imperial vessels had already passed from the old style of having oars evenly spaced, usually at two levels, to grouping the oars on a single level supported by an outrigger. The ireres was sometimes very large, complete with turret superstructures for heavy armoured infantry. The fleet described by Kantakouzenos being prepared against the Genoese of Galata in 1348 presented a powerful spectacle: we read that the tmerai were ready for battle, richly ornamented, and in no way inferior to the warships of the ancient Romans for splendour, armament and number of embarked troops. They were followed by monirai, lemboi and actuaria (akatia) transporting heavily armoured kataphraktoi (Kantakouzenos, III, 75).






































The warships of the Empire of ‘Trebizond that are mentioned in the sources were of the type called katergon or bucca, a large vessel of probably 400-600 tons, with two lateen-rigged masts and sometimes oars, capable of transporting 300-600 men. Terms used for other types of vessel were barka or karavion, i.e. the cog, a single-masted sailing ship; the galea or galley; and assorted small fishing and rowing boats called griparion, paraskalmion and xylarion. As many as 40 xylaria are recorded as having accompanied the major warships in the fleet of Trebizond in 1372.

























Central and provincial fleets

The main fleet based at Constantinople was organized like the Imperial Guard regiments, and anchored in the harbours of the Propontis district. After the reconquest of 1261 the Imperial arsenals left the Golden Horn for reasons of security (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 365; 1984, pp.468ff) and were re-established in the Propontis, especially at Kontoskalion, where Michael VIII raised important maritime buildings. The nearby harbour of Heftaskalion was employed by the Co-Emperor John Kantakouzenos (r. 1347-54) for the arming of his new fleet (Kantakouzenos, III, 72, 74 and 76), and this maritime centre of Pissa or Kosmidion was active in shipbuilding throughout that century.

























The provincial fleets were still organized like the old themata. The provincial governors enjoyed a high degree of independence from the central authorities, and built their ships at local arsenals such as those of Tenedos, Lemnos and Thessaloniki. The Danube was often visited by Roman warships sent by Constantinople, and still had maritime installations of sufficient importance to be defended by garrisons. As well as guaranteeing the maintenance of war fleets they built the small vessels of the river navies, called arklia and naukelia.































The Despotate of the Morea (the Peloponnese) also had a modest fleet, established by Manuel Kantakouzenos after his appointment as despot in the mid-14th century. Genoese and Venetian flotillas established in Trebizond and elsewhere on the Black Sea coasts occasionally acted on behalf of the Empire.





















Fleet of the Trebizond Empire

Roman naval power in the Black Sea faced fewer challenges, and the independent Empire of Trebizond made great efforts to stop the Anatolian Turks from reaching the coast. Once the Turks managed to do so, however, their captains found rich pickings on the trade route linking Trebizond with Crimea.

These sea lanes were vital to the Trapezuntine Empire, which maintained a permanent navy. The arsenals of Trebizond, Kérasous, Pérateia, Sougdaia, and Matrarcha built both merchant and military vessels, but the navy was of only modest size. It usually comprised only two or three major warships, plus smaller vessels which were requisitioned from civilian owners as required. For example, in 1355 the fleet counted only one warship and 11 smaller vessels, and in 1379 just two of each class. However, there is an interesting mention by Ludovico da Bologna of a fleet of 30 ships, and in 1402 Tamerlane demanded that the Emperor Manuel HI Komnenos provide the service of 20 galleys against the Ottomans.

Manning the fleet

In the 1260s the Emperor Michael VIII was unwilling to rely exclusively upon the maritime power of his allies the Genoese, arch-rivals of the Venetians, and so he set out to rebuild a Roman national navy. Given the anti-Western feelings that understandably motivated the Byzantine people after the Latin occupation, this last Roman fleet had to be commanded by Romans and manned by Roman sailors and marines. The Imperial Fleet, a new Vaszlikos Stolos, was described by Gregoras and Pachymeris; it was placed under the command of the Protostrator Alexios Philanthropenos (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 209; 1884, p.277), with stations in the provinces commanded by regional dukes.

The emperor created, among others, three military units to serve with the fleet: the Gasmouloi and the marine Tzakones, and the oarsmen of the Prosalentai (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 188, 2-8 and 309, 2-5; 1984, pp.252-253, 400-402). The Gasmouloi and the Tzakones were employed as embarked troops and light infantry; although other lightly armoured 7zakones were posted to defend the City walls (Pachymeris, I, 187, 1-3 and 188, 2-4; 1984, p.252 and n.3), Gregoras specifically calls them ‘a maritime armed force’ (1829, I, 98; 1973, pp.112-113).

Operations, 1260s-1290s

The effectiveness of the new units was soon demonstrated: in 1263, when Philanthropenos successfully led a Genoese-Roman fleet against a number of islands held or dominated by the Venetians (Paros, Naxos, Kos, and the Euboean baronies of Karystos and Oreos), Michael’s new naval troops were the kernel of the fleet. “The Gasmoulot were bold in battle... while those called Proselontes were assigned to rowing only. In addition, there were the Lakonians [ 7zakones| whom the ruler had transplanted from the Peloponnese’ (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 309; 1984, IV, 26, p.401). In the same year, operations were also carried out in Crete to help the local population in their rebellion against the Venetians (Pachymeris, I, 205-209). In 1268 a new expedition sailed to the Morea to seize Peloponnesian coastal territory, and the Tzakones and Gasmouloi were once again the key fighting element on board.

In 1273, during the great expedition against the Epirot ruler, the Despot John I Doukas of Thessaly, a fleet of about 73 ships manned at least in part by Tzakones and Gasmouloi, and once again under the command of Philanthropeéenos, attacked the Latin lords of Greece who supported John I (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 324; 1984, pp.419ff; Gregoras, 1829, I, 117; 1983, pp.122ff). The sources claim a total strength of 40,000 men for this expedition; nevertheless, its siege of Neopatras ended in decisive defeat, and the troops fell back to the coast. The Latin lords sent a mainly Venetian fleet from Crete and from Euboea (then called the Triarchy of Negroponte) to attack the Imperial fleet anchored at Demetrias on the Gulf of Volos. At the beginning of the battle the Romans seemed destined for defeat, but the arrival of reinforcements led by the emperor’s younger brother, the Despot John Palaiologos, turned the tide; the Latin fleet was completely routed, and its leaders captured (see also pages 41-42).























This victory at Demetrias went a long way toward mitigating the disaster of Neopatras, and marked the beginning of a sustained Roman offensive across the Aegean. By 1278 the emperor’s Genoese commander Licario (or Likarios) had subdued all of Euboea except for its capital, Chalkis, and by 1280, as grand admiral (Megas Dukas) of the Imperial fleet, he had retaken most of the Aegean islands for the Empire. Licario’s forces included Sicilian and German mercenaries, and also Catalans; this was the Catalans’ first recorded appearance in Greece, and it is noteworthy that they were employed as embarked troops.

Disbandments, and aftermath

By 1283 the reconstituted navy comprised 80 ships, but soon afterwards, following a truce with Venice signed in 1285, the Emperor Michael’s son Andronikos II (r. 1282-1328) disbanded it and dismissed the Gasmouloi and 7zakones in an attempt to reduce costs. He chose instead to rely entirely on Genoese vessels, of which 50-60 had already been hired by 1291. The Prosalentai were not much affected by this decision, because the lands granted to them by Michael VIII in exchange for their military service were already in their hands; they carried on their duties in Constantinople until at least 1296, and probably into the early 14th century.

The 7zakones received some grants of land and cash at the time of their discharge, and they did survive in the provinces. They were settled in many areas of the Empire, including Pontus and Thrace, and still carried out garrison duties in fortresses. A letter of the Patriarch Gregory of Cyprus refers to impoverished “Dorians and Peloponnesians’ settled at Herakleia in Thrace. Bartusis suggests that, with time, the 7zakones remaining in Constantinople probably lost their separate ethnicity (see below, “The Regiments’), and seem to have become amalgamated into the Gasmouloi.

The latter were the most affected by Andronikos’s measures. Gregoras explicitly mentions their impoverishment and the decimation of their redundant ranks. The ultimate consequence was that many of them passed into the service of Frankish Crusader states, and Turkish beylzks on the Aegean coast. By 1300 some of them are already to be found in Venetian service in Crete (Carbone, 8 n.4). Again, ‘for these reasons the warlike soldiers of the Fleet, neglected by all and deprived of their salary, partially turned to labouring work in order to survive... and partially deserted to the enemies, so that together with them they ravaged Roman territory in the manner of pirates’ (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 71; 1999, p.82). Others, on the other hand, “became hirelings of those renowned Romans distinguished by wealth, others [still] gave up their arms and turned to farming’ (Gregoras, 1829, I, 175; 1973, p.153). We read in 1340 of the Gasmoulot of Kallipolis, who served the Ottoman sultans after their dismissal by John VI Kantakouzenos because they represented a threat to his security (Doukas, Hist., 1834, XXIV, 140; 1975, pp.136-137).

Some of them, however, continued to serve in the fleet, playing an active role both in military actions and in Constantinople’s disorders. Marco Minoto, a Venetian bazlli of Byzantium, writes in March 1320 that ‘in Constantinople Venetians, both Christians and Jews, are being despoiled by Gasmouloi, Greeks and officials of the Emperor’ (Bowman, 1985, 247-248, doc. 41).

Consequences

Andronikos II would soon have reason to review his maritime policy. In 1305, following the murder at the orders of the Co-Emperor Michael IX of Roger de Flor, leader of the mercenary Catalan “Grand Company’, a Catalan fleet appeared before Constantinople. The emperor tried to reorganize his navy, restoring the few remaining ships (Gregoras, 1829, I, 227-228; 1973, p.181), but particularly appealing to the Genoese, who regarded the Catalans as a menace to their own commercial interests. The Genoese fleet, with no more than 12 small Byzantine vessels in company, tried to control the Hellespont to stop the Catalan ships carrying Turkish troops into Thrace. These operations soon partly degenerated into piracy, however, and some of the Genoese attacked the important Roman base of Tenedos.




















Gregoras writes that, in about 1320, Andronikos planned to fund the revival of a permanent fleet by raising new taxes to build 20 galleys, but civil wars, the devastation of Thrace and Macedonia by the Turks, and the menace of the Serbians and Bulgarians prevented this. The emperor’s plans were implemented by his grandson Andronikos III (r. 1328-41), who also re-employed Gasmouloi and probably Prosalentai as well. The Gasmouloi provided a nucleus for the crews of a reconstituted fleet of 70 vessels to face the Turkish threat. Subsequently they also seem have played an active role in the civil wars of the 1340s (Gregoras, 1829, XIV, 10, II, 736-740; 1988, pp.139-141) between the Empress Anna and John VI Kantakouzenos, during which they were loyal to the latter’s opponent Alexios Apokaukos:

After this speech, when it was clear that Apokaukos would be given the supremacy of Byzantium and of the islands with all their taxes, an Imperial letter was written by which he was appointed commander of the Fleet against the Persians [1.e. the Turks] and was ordered to draw from the public treasury 100,000 gold coins, so that from this and from his own means, as he had promised, he would fit out triremes and provide the maintenance of their mercenary soldiers. (Kantakouzenos, 1831, Vol. I, Book II, 540; 1986, p.149)

Their presence in the fleet in this period is also attested in Gallipoli (Doukas, 1834, XXIV, 140; 1975, pp.136-137), in Enos (Marco Minoto, AD 1320, Mon. Stor. V, p.167), in the islands, in the Peloponnese and at Thessaloniki (Kantakouzenos, 1831, H, 575). Beside these elite troops the Imperial fleets were manned during the turbulent 14th century by men from southern Greece, Greek-speaking people from areas under Latin control, Russian, Spanish, Catalan and Italian naval mercenaries. Our sources confirm that the Prosalentai still existed as an institution until the second half of the century, though sometimes the word means simply ‘rowers’ or ‘rowing’ (Pachymeris, 1835, II, 237-238, 240; 1999, pp.262ff). However, despite all these efforts, the Empire was never again able to achieve its former greatness at sea.

There is no evidence that later emperors attempted to recruit Prosalentai, Gasmoulot and Tzakones to replace or reinforce the existing contingents. Nevertheless, men bearing these titles are still encountered inside the Empire as late as 1361, for the Prosalentaz; 1422, in the case of the Gasmouloi; and 1429, for the Tzakones (Sphrantzes IV, 17, col. 975976). According to the latter, and to Constantine Porphyrogenitos (De Ceremoniis, 1, 695-696), the Tzakones had had a great reputation as defenders of fortresses since the 8th century AD. As early as AD 746, Monemvasia was considered an Imperial maritime centre of fundamental importance, garrisoned by 7zakones who spoke the Doric dialect, and this was still the case nearly 700 years later in 1429, when the Empire had been reduced to enclaves around Constantinople and Thessaloniki, in the Peloponnese and the northern Aegean. In that year the inhabitants of Monemvasia considered themselves loyal allies of the Empire (Simmachoi Monemvasiotai), but as free as their Spartan forefathers had been. They enjoyed a great reputation as infantry and cavalry but also, according to Sphrantzés, as seafarers.

















THE REGIMENTS

The Gasmouloi

According to Pachymeris, in the 1260s Michael VIII's fleet ‘was indeed great, being composed of many ships full of warlike young men, hungry for booty’ (1835, I, 309; 1984, p.400).

The first contingent of soldiers for his new fleet was obtained by Michael VIII from the ferocious Gasmouloi, who originated from the region surrounding Byzantium and lived in and around the City, especially in the Propontis — a district where the cohabitation of Latins and Greeks had begun long before the fall of Constantinople to the Latins in 1204, and continued long afterwards. The emperor is also said to have resettled some of them from the Peloponnese in the 1260s. It is significant that these people were born of or descended from Italian fathers and Byzantine mothers (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 309; 1984, p.400; Gregoras, 1829, I, 98, 8-10; 1973, p.113). According to Kambourouglou, the term Vasmoulos/ Gasmoulos (Du Cange, Gloss., col. 181-182, 238) carried the meaning of ‘bastard’. Despite the implication in the sources that they were not true-born Rhomaior, their loyalty was clearly to the Byzantine Roman state, for which they formed the military contingent called Gasmoulitkon. Pachymeris set out the commonly held opinion of them as having the best qualities of both Romans and Latins (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 188, 8-13 and 309, 14-15; 1984, pp.253, 400; Gregoras, 1829, IV, 5, I, p.98; 1973, p.113): ‘the contingent of the Gasmouloi, who being of mixed race could speak the Latin language — for they were born of both Romans and Latins... had forethought in war and prudence from the Romans, [and] audacity and stubbornness from the Latins’. This being their description by a Roman source, it is intriguing to compare it with that left in about 1330 by the Latin author of the Directortum ad faciendum passagium transmarinum (‘Advice for an Overseas Passage’, 7, 7, 100-101):

They are called Gasmouli, who were begotten on their father’s side by a Greek and on their mother’s side by a Latin, or on their father’s side by a Latin and on their mother’s side by a Greek. In faith they are fickle, in promise deceitful, in word mendacious, adroit in evil, ignorant of good, impudent to their betters, prone to discord, accustomed to plundering, inclined to savagery, adverse to piety, hungry for carnage and death, restless in everything, given to drink, incontinent without restraint, slaves to greed, gluttony and intemperance, loving no one beside themselves... They present themselves as Greeks to Greeks and Latins to Latins, being all things to all men, not to make a profit... but to destroy.

It should be borne in mind that this Western author, perhaps a certain Guilherme Adam, was urging King Philip VI of France (1. 1328-50), to undertake a crusade. However, while the Gasmouloi usually thought of themselves as Roman and fought on the Roman side, it is true that this was not always the case. At the beginning of the 14th century the Gasmouloi in Thessaloniki, who represented one-third of that city’s population, did not hesitate to pass themselves off as Latins if it suited their interests.

We have no information about the number of the Gasmouloi in Byzantium, but it must have been considerable, considering that mixed marriages between resident Latins from Italy and Byzantines were already common as early as the 11th century. Michael VIII’s tolerance of the Latin population left in Constantinople after 1261 was probably motivated by a desire to nurture the loyalty of these valuable troops. Assigned to the fleet as mercenary soldiers, they seem to have made up the marines of the fleet stationed in Constantinople (along with Tzakones), and also served as oarsmen (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 164, 15-16 and 188, 8-11; 1984, pp.222-223, 252; Gregoras, 1829, I, 98, 6-8; 1973, p.113). This first nucleus of the reconstituted marines also crewed the Vasiliké Holkas (the flotilla of the Imperial house) stationed at the Blachernai Palace (Gregoras, 1829, I, 135; 1973, pp.132-133; Pachymeris, 1835, I, 423; 1984, pp.538-539).

On one occasion at least the emperor used them to punish an insult to his authority. In 1275 or spring 1276, two Genoese galleys cruising in the Black Sea seized a Genoese ship owned by the Zaccaria brothers, who had an Imperial monopoly for the alum trade. Perhaps more seriously, they also sailed past the Blachernai Palace without making the proper salute required by the Treaty of Nympheion. The emperor sent a force of Gasmouloi after them under the command of Alexios Alyattes, the Imperial Vestzarios. When they overtook the Genoese the emperor ordered that the latter should be blinded, a task that his fearsome marines promptly carried out (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 423-425; 1984, pp.534ff; Gregoras, 1829, I, 133ff; 1973, pp.131ff).

As already mentioned, the Gasmouloi formed the marines of the fleet commanded by Apokaukos in the 1340s. They took an active part in the internecine fighting against John VI Kantakouzenos, and were the protagonists of the bloody events that troubled the capital shortly before he took power. Obviously Kantakouzenos could not rely upon them, and he dismissed them — whereupon these expert naval troops provided a nucleus for crews of the first great Ottoman fleets. However, according to Ahrweiler, Gasmouloi of Constantinople continued to be employed in the Byzantine fleet until the end of the Empire.

The marine Tzakones

The need for troops soon obliged Michael VIII to look elsewhere. Following a defeat at Pelagonia (1259), the Frankish ruler of the Duchy of Achaia in the south-eastern Peloponnese was forced to give up territory and fortresses in ancient Lakonia, including Mistra (Mystras) near the old Spartan capital, Nauplion, Epidauros, and Monemvasia on the southeastern coast. It was in this area that Michael sought manpower in 1261-62, investing large sums in transporting families of Tzakones to Byzantium. The term Tzakones had both a geographical derivation (from Lakonia) and, by an association of ideas, a functional one, referring to the type of troops recruited from that region, who were famous for their skills in garrisoning castles. He assigned them particular quarters around the City, and enlisted some of them into his new fleet (Gregoras, 1829, I, 98; 1973, p.113). Pachymeris writes that Michael ‘had great need to settle in the City lightly armed soldiers, and so he called [on] many Lakones who arrived from the Morea, and he settled them as natives, distributing places near the City. Bestowing yearly pay, he also supplied them with many other rights, and used them for many [duties] inside and outside [the City], for they displayed worthy behaviour in the wars’ (1835, I, 188, 2-8; also 164, 10-14 and 309, 16-19; 1984, pp.222, 252, 400-401).

These Peloponnesians became prominent in the garrison of the City, and soon supplied a body of Imperial Guards (Pseudo-Kodinos, 180), assigned to defend the sea walls (Pachymeris, 1835, II, 33; UI, 9, pp.187, 1-3 and 188, 1-4; 1984, pp.250-252). Pachymeris states that there was no need for soldiers serving on the walls to be heavily armoured, since for sorties against possible besiegers the defenders could rely upon the heavy armoured cavalry from the Imperial headquarters. Their naval qualities were also known from as early as the time of St Nikon the Metanoite in the 11th century: ‘the sons of the Lakones... consider as their own the biremes and the triremes of the State, and made [manned] the Imperial fleet which sailed the seas’ (178). It was therefore logical that units from this new contingent supplemented the Gasmouloz in providing the bulk of the marine troops for the reconstituted Imperial fleet.

Their presence and origin is specifically noted during two naval campaigns, in 1262 and 1273: ‘many others were from the Lakones, [a name] that the people have corrupted to “T7zakones”, whom the ruler transplanted with their wives and children to Constantinople from the Morea and other western regions, and who were numerous and warlike’ (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 309; 1984, pp.400-401); and ‘Joining [the Gasmouloi] were the Lakones, that in the common spoken language are called Tzakones, constituting a maritime armed force, who came to the Emperor from the Peloponnese’ (Gregoras, 1829, I, 98, 4-5; 1973, p.113). Unlike the Gasmouloi they were considered by the Romans to be fellow Greeks (Hellenes), descended from the ancient Lakonians and still speaking a Doric dialect.

Michael issued his generals with blank letters of appointment to be given to Tzakones, who, in exchange for military service, often received the title of Sebastos. The profession was hereditary, rewarded not only with a Salary but also with topoi or land holdings near Byzantium (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 188, 5; 1984, p.252). Bartusis has suggested that although such grants were probably too small for substantial farming they nevertheless provided a home, in order to ensure the continued service of the heirs of the original recruits: ‘such an Imperial policy would ensure a constant supply of resident mercenaries, and further, since conditional possession of however modest a property would deter many mercenaries from leaving their jobs to seek employment elsewhere, it would have put the Emperor in an advantageous position when negotiating pay rises’ (Bartusis, p.47).

The presence or activity of Lakonians far from the capital, in Asia Minor and in Pontus, is indicated by place names containing the root of the word 7zakones, e.g. Tsakonos (Ano Matsouka in Pontus), ‘Tsakonochori (in Anatolian Thrace), and Tsachnochori (in Roumelia). This diaspora around the Empire’s territories was mainly due to their activity as marines all around ‘Romania’, but probably also to the changes in the stationing of the fleet determined by the policy of Andronikos II.

The Prosalentai

The third group enlisted by Michael VIII for his new fleet was composed of native Romans, free peasant smallholders called Prosalentai. In contrast to the first two categories they were, in principle, oarsmen or remiges, while the other two regiments were mainly employed as fighting troops. According to Pachymeris, the emperor ‘fitted out and built a fleet and assigned more than a thousand rowers from the lands’. The words Proselontes or Prosalentat were used — according to Pachymeris — as the official designation for the Imperial rowers of Michael VIII (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 164, 15ff, 209, 9-10 and 425, 14; 1984, pp.222, 276, 542). The expression used means that they did not come from Byzantium itself but from other areas of the Empire. Bartusis suggests that these rowers were recruited amongst the peasants of lands now abandoned by their Frankish masters. According to Pachymeris, ‘giving service to them [the 7zakones and Gasmouloi| as rowers were the Proselontes, to most of whom, especially to those who were the best, the ruler assigned lands everywhere close to the coast’ (Pachymeris, 1835, IV, 26, 309; 1984, p.400). The offer of lands in exchange for service in the fleet must have been an attractive proposition, and they received modest holdings in specifically designated settlements close to the harbours where their galleys were stationed, thus being easy to muster in time of need.

The recruitment of these oarsmen represented a further attempt by the emperor to increase the population of the reconquered capital, because many of the land grants assigned to them were inside and around Byzantium. However, the sources also mention lands on the islands — e.g. on Lemnos, where a group of Prosalentai held land for at least 80 years between 1284 and 1361. The institution itself was remarkably stable and probably hereditary; around 1330, on the Kassandreia peninsula of the Halkidiki, the Prosalentai were free landowners with properties of at least several acres. Oarsmen also had lands on the Longos peninsula, near Kassandreia, and in the area east of the mouth of the Strymon river. Some of the land grants were large enough to encompass an entire village or even a small town. Their profession was never very remunerative, however, and some sources also indicate that they might be reduced to the class of dependent peasants. Since they held their lands on condition of continued service as rowers for the fleet, no doubt regulations developed regarding the frequency with which service could be demanded, and the status of a holding that could not provide a man fit to row. Probably some kind of system was established whereby settlements were jointly responsible for providing a fixed number of oarsmen.

The Prosalentai featured in one incident with the Genoese residents of Galata, the foreign merchants’ northern quarter facing Constantinople proper from across the Golden Horn. After an argument during a drinking session an oarsman of this class struck a Genoese who had taunted him by saying that Constantinople would soon be Latin again. The Genoese slew the man with his sword, and his killing enraged the emperor so much that Michael called out troops from outside and inside the City, determined to expel all the Genoese from Galata. The emperor’s rage only subsided after the Genoese authorities agreed to pay a hefty indemnity (Pachymeris, 1835, I, 425; 1984, p.542).

FLEET ORGANIZATION & STRENGTH

Command

The commander-in-chief of the Imperial Fleet was the Megas Dukas or Great Admiral. Alexios Philanthropenos, and Likarios (Licario), were the main architects of the naval victories of Michael VHI’s reign. After the death of Likarios we read that the rank of Admiraglo was held by Giovanni de Lo Cavo, a Genoese former pirate (Sanudo, p.132), although in other sources he is mentioned only as Comes (Count) undeciom lignorum armatorum, 1.e. a subordinate commander of 11 warships in the fleet. In the 14th century the most famous Megas Dukas was Alexios Apokaukos, who was involved in the civil war between the Palaiologans and Kantakouzenos. The last remembered Megas Dukas was probably Demetrios Laskaris Leontares (Leontarios), the victor at the Echinades Islands in 1427.

Their subordinate officers in the Roman navy, at least for the period recorded by Pseudo-Kodinos (De Off, III, 15-28), were the Megas Drongarios of the Fleet; the Admiral; the Protokomes, the Drongarioi, and the Comites or Komitas. The Megas Drongarios, a sort of vice-admiral or state under-secretary of the navy, belonged to the category of the Imperial Stratarches, and his rank relative to the Megas Dukas was the same as that of the Megas Drongarios of the Vighla, a regiment of the Guard, relative to the Megas Domestikos.

The Admiral (Apnpodtoc) was the praefectus classis (commander of the fleet) under the direct command of the Megas Dukas. The military operations around the Hellespont at the time of Andronikos II, in concert with the Genoese fleet, were performed by naval officers called amirales, together with the Megas Drongarios of the Ploimon (Pachymeris, 1835, II, pp.529, 573 and 593). It is interesting to note that on this occasion another Imperial officer is also mentioned, the Vestiarios (Pachymeris, 1835, II, 556), who was already dealing with the organization and armament of the fleet in the time of the 9th-l1lth century Macedonian dynasty. On another occasion, in 1349, command of the war fleet was divided between another court officer, the Protostrator Fakeolatos, and the Megas Dukas Tzamplakon.

The Drongarioi of the fleet corresponded, more and less, to our ranks of vice-admirals, commodores and ships’ captains. Strategou commanders of ships are also mentioned by Kantakouzenos. When Michael VII reorganized the fleet in 1261, he assigned the new military units he created to the navy and organized them into a number of groups or divisions, placed under the command of lochagoi, tagmatarchai, kometés and navarchoi, corresponding approximately to ships’ captains, regimental commanders, commanders of naval squadrons, and admirals.

The Gasmouloi also had their own ranks. In Thessaloniki, at the time of the rise of Kantakouzenos, they were under the command of a particular authority, the Idzazousa arché nautikou. Both heavy and light infantry were usually embarked; the former are called by Kantakouzenos oplitai, while the simple sailors or rowers are called nautai (Kantakouzenos, 1831, III, 74).

Later strengths

The numbers of ships varied considerably, but in the mid-14th century the permanent Imperial navy was a shadow of that reconstituted by Michael VHI in the 1260s—70s. According to Gregoras, of 100 ships raised in 1348—49 for the war against the Genoese only nine were state warships, while the rest were equipped and armed at the expense of wealthy citizens and crewed by ‘labourers’ (little wonder that most of the fleet was abandoned to the enemy without a fight).

According to Kantakouzenos, in the later 14th century the total naval resources were increased to some 200 vessels including both requisitioned merchantmen and warships, but it is not clear if all the war galleys were really flying the Imperial flag, since the emperor provided only nine or ten warships to an allied Catalan-Venetian fleet in 1352. It is also notable that on most occasions the sources mention no more than ten galleys in Imperial service at any given time, e.g. during the negotiations between Sigismund of Hungary and the Emperor Manuel II in 1396, prior to the Nicopolis crusade.

The last fleet of the Roman Empire, in the final siege of 1453, included ten Imperial Roman galleys out of a fleet of 26-39 vessels, as follows: the ten largest (5 Genoese, 3 Cretan, 1 Anconitan and 1 Roman), drawn up along the boom between the Porta Horaea and Galata; 17 squarerigged ships; 3 merchant armed galleys from the Venetian colony of Tana; 2 light Venetian galleys and 5 unarmed Roman galleys, drawn up in the Golden Horn; 1 Catalan galley, and 1 Provencal galley. Thus, the balance of vessels were mainly Italian. Some other ships, presumably including the four remaining Roman galleys, were disarmed and scuttled. These figures are given by Barbaro and other minor sources; Giacomo Tetaldi mentions a total of 39 ships, of which 5 were Venetian galleys, 3 Imperial, and 1 belonging to the commander Giovanni Giustiniani. To these ships were added later an Imperial transport accompanied by 3 hired Genoese galleys from Chios, which broke through the Turkish blockade and whose crews, under Alvise Diedo and Trevisan, participated in the defence of the City.

The Trebizond navy of the 13th and 14th centuries remained a small but effective force under a Grand Admiral (Megadukas), who commanded a navy of katerga (war galleys) well into the 15th century. In 1396 the last known Megadukas was also called the amyriales (admiral). The navy of Trebizond was often supported by the fleet of the neighbouring Kingdom of Georgia, on the far south-eastern shore of the Black Sea. From the 13th century this was formed of galleys known by their original Turkish name of katharga.

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Ships’ armament ‘Greek Fire’ was the most famous weapon of the Byzantine arsenals. Although its exact composition and method of use are still unclear despite all the efforts of historians and experimental archaeologists, there is no doubt that it was a flammable liquid projected towards the target through a tube.

Unlike before 1204, Greek Fire seems to have been rarely used during the period under consideration here, and then mainly at sea, where it was very effective despite its short range. However, the sources no longer speak of its being projected by means of ‘siphons’ (clearly some kind of pump), so incendiary projectiles were now probably fire-pots thrown by means of catapults and mangonels, and hand grenades used at the closest range. Their components included sulphur, tar, resin, naphtha and other flammable materials.

Unfortunately, the evidence for the use of incendiary weapons by the Romans during the last three centuries of the Empire is sparse and ambiguous. There may be a hint of the use of Greek Fire in some verses dedicated to a Roman

‘Nectanebo uses magic to sink the ships of the attacking barbarians’: folio 3r from the 14th-century Trebizond manuscript The Romance of Alexander, Codex Gr 5. The embarked soldiers wear chapelsde-fer over mail hoods; the drawing of their body armour might represent either scale or quilted fabric. (Original in Biblioteca dell’Istituto Ellenico di San Giorgio dei Greci, Venice; facsimile edition, author’s collection)

Crossbow bolts, and a hand grenade for ‘liquid fire‘, from the equipment of a ship of the 12th-14th centuries - see Plate B. (Author’s photo, courtesy Athens Historical Museum) naval operation in the late 13th century (MavovnA Pid‘, p.104. 27-31), where the author speaks clearly of dpaotiKoc mupeKBOAovc, ‘efficient flame-throwers’. The Chronica Venetiarum (p.200) may describe Venetian forces in 1296 burning with Greek Fire a large Imperial ship before the walls of Constantinople, but the passage is unclear. We know that during a battle in 1349 some Roman galleys burned a Genoese cargo ship: ‘advancing against the cargo ship, two Imperial triremes sailed by night from Neorion, together with the same number of moneres: and although the crew put up fierce resistance, the triremes burned it with the fire’ (Kantakouzenos, 74, 18-21). This episode was linked to the Emperor John Kantakouzenos’s war against the Genoese colonists of Galata, in which Genoese galleys had just previously attacked the harbours of Byzantium, burning three war galleys (ireres) under construction, together with Byzantine cargo ships and houses outside the walls. The 14th-century /izad of Constantine Hermoniakos mentions the use of a ‘machine’ for the burning of the Greek ships, but the 14th-century translation of the Alexiad of Anna Comnena — one of the most important sources regarding liquid fire — does not update the original text’s passages relating to the use of siphons to project it.

Gunpowder artillery

The use of firearms by the Imperial army began only at the end of the 14th century. We know that the Italian ships at the final siege of Constantinople in 1453 were equipped with artillery, and probably also the Imperial ones; according to Pseudo-Sphrantzés the crews of the ships along the boom ‘daily challenged the Turkish fleet with trumpets, drums, and countless calls; there was exchange of artillery fire every day, but no major action’. The Venetian Barbaro also mentions guns mounted on the defenders’ ships.

Character and social status of naval personnel

When not in service under arms the marines and sailors of 13th and 14th-century Byzantium, especially in Constantinople and Thessaloniki, were considered part of the common people, the ‘particulars’ (timta1). However, unlike other lower social groups, they formed associations or guilds to defend their interests; for instance, in 14th-century Thessaloniki the guild of marines was the most powerful of all. Unlike the military navy neglected by Andronikos I (Pachymeris, 1835, I, IV, 23, p.323), in the 14th century the merchant fleet of the Empire was quite active in transporting merchandise, especially between Thessaloniki and Constantinople. The ports of these cities bustled with crowds of local and foreign merchants, customs officials, interpreters, warehousemen, marines and sailors. Notwithstanding an unsavoury reputation, due to the fact that members were sometimes hired as professional assassins, the seafarers’ associations played a significant role in the political life of the City. For example, the guild of marines supported the revolt of the Zealot religious movement in Thessaloniki, and contributed to the expulsion of the nobility. In such situations the leaders of these guilds might be very powerful men, such as Andreas Palaiologos (Kantakouzenos, 1831, II, 94).























The associations were mainly concerned with controlling the employment of seamen and marines, and settling conflicts that arose between them and the merchant shipowners or ships’ captains. Many ex-marines of the Imperial fleet who were employed by commercial interests received contracts for either a fixed salary (amotaKtapys), or a share in the final profits of a voyage (uspitnc). In either case disputes often arose with the captain (naukléros), and, since obtaining justice was often a matter of bribery, the marines and sailors needed to form associations to defend their interests. We know that in this period most of the laws regulating navigation and life at sea were still the Rhodian Laws (Lex Rodiae), but other codes might conflict with their application, such as the Roman military laws that regulated the lives of the marines of the Imperial navy. Belonging to an association was especially desirable given the rigour of the laws to which seafarers were subject: for instance, a sailor who broke his contract and left the ship before the end of the agreed period was liable to the punishment of ‘fustigation’ — 70 blows with a cudgel.

Very often, during the 14th and 15th centuries, Roman former sailors and marines of the fleet took to piracy, imitating the Latins and the Turks. In such cases the division of the booty followed the rules of the civil law: the captain received 1% times the common sailor’s share, as did the master carpenter, the cook, the helmsman, and the karabites (quartermaster or purser). We do not know if sailors and ex-marines living near the harbour in Thessaloniki were particularly given to piracy, but a document of 1278 attests that they certainly inspired fear among the population; they went armed, and often provoked bloody brawls (Kantakouzenos, 1831, II, 575-577). The streets were violent places, and the indigenous Roman inhabitants were favoured by the authorities over resident Latins. We read, for instance, that in about 1320 the Venetians were often mistreated by both the civilian population and seafarers as well as being harassed by government officials, without recourse to justice (Minoto, p.164).












































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