Download PDF | (Middle Ages Series) Mark Charles Bartusis - The Late Byzantine Army_ Arms and Society, 1204-1453-University of Pennsylvania Press (1992).
237 Pages
Acknowledgments
The research and writing of this book were conducted over a ten-year riod, during which time I was the recipient of material support from several institutions and organizations, and of advice and assistance from numerous individuals, to whom I wish to express my gratitude. A Gennadcion Fellowship in Post-Classical Studies at the American School of “Jassical Studies at Athens, an International Research and Exchanges Board Fellowship to the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Belgrade, and Dumbarton Oaks Junior and Summer Fellowships afforded me the opportunity to utilize research facilities, which otherwise would have been impossible, The hospitality of the American Research Institute in Turkey and release time from Northern State University were appreciated. In addition, the librarians of Dumbarton Oaks, the Gennadeion Library in Athens and Northern State University were most helpful in facilitating my work.
A number of individuals have read parts of the book while it was in draft and/or provided valuable advice during the course of my work: Professors Alexander Kazhdan, Bozidar Ferjanti¢é, Stephen Reinert, and Khalifa Bennasser. To these I offer my thanks. Dr. Mirjana Zivojinovié of the Byzantine Institute of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts deserves special mention for introducing me to the Slavic sources and for providing counsel generously and enthusiastically during my stay in Belgrade.
A Note on Transliteration, Pronunciation, and Dates
Byzantine Greek is a nightmare to transliterate. In the interest of standardization, I have transliterated almost all Greek (as well as Slavic and Turkish) technical terms and names of people and places according to the form in which they appear in the Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium (1991), the editors of which have adopted a system for Greek that uses a modified letter-forletter approach (“a” for alpha, “b” for beta) but employs common English forms wherever they are well established (“Constantine” rather than “Kon_ stantinos”). Nevertheless, there are a few cases in which I depart from their schema. For example, I use kavallarios (as it was pronounced) instead of the ODB’s kaballarios.
Even though Byzantine Greek sounded much like modern Greek, scholars sometimes pronounce it as if it were ancient Greek or some mixture of ancient and modern. The ODB system of transliteration, while it has the virtue of simplicity and is rather faithful to the spelling of Greek, is quite misleading in regard to pronunciation. Consequently, and with no claim to be doing justice to the complexities of the medieval Greek language, I provide a few general rules here to help the reader approximate the late Byzantine pronunciations of the strange names and terms that appear in this book.
Introduction: The Setting, the Questions, and the Sources
In the year 330, acknowledging that the Roman Empire’s center of gravity had long since shifted eastward, that the frontiers of the western half of the Empire were shaky and its economy even shakier, the emperor Constantine founded a new capital on the site of the ancient Greek town of Byzantion, a city that would be named after him, the City of Constantine, or Constantinople. For over a thousand years it would be a Christian city, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, the Christian Roman Empire. That a Roman emperor established a Christian capital in the Greek-speaking part of the Empire meant that the civilization of Byzantium would be heir to the three great cultural traditions of the ancient world: Christian religion and morality, Greek language and culture, and Roman law and administration. The synthesis of these traditions led to a dynamism and creativity that goes far to explain both the survival of the Roman imperial idea and the flowering of a new civilization. At the crossroads of East and West, Byzantium became the bulwark of Christendom against the Arabs, the Christianizer of the Slavs, the preserver of ancient Greek culture, and up through the eleventh century the only European state worthy of the name.
The expression “Byzantine Empire” is a modern creation. The Byzantines called their polity the “Empire of the Romans” and themselves “Romans,” in Greek Rhomaioi. Roman influence was so great that there are scholars today who eschew the word “Byzantine” entirely and speak merely of the “East Roman Empire.” Indeed the centuries immediately following Constantine’s reign justifiably are called both “late Roman” and “early Byzantine,” for it took several centuries, as the Christian Empire centered at Constantinople adapted to and overcame a series of internal and external crises, to acquire a character distinct from that of its ancient Roman predecessor.
The great Roman Empire of Augustus and his successors was an unwieldy political unit, difficult to administer and even harder to defend. As early as the end of the third century the emperor Diocletian (284-305) saw the utility of establishing regional administrative centers under Augusti and Caesars, each with a share of the imperial power. By the end of the fourth century the partition of the Empire into western and eastern halves had become permanent, and the loss. of the western half to the Goths, Vandals, and other Germanic invaders in the course of the fifth century left the eastern half alone and weakened, but nevertheless intact. Although later emperors, for centuries, would feel it their duty to restore the lost western provinces to Roman authority, the dazzling but costly successes of Justinian I (527-65) in recovering a large fraction of the West would not be repeated, Renewed pressure from the great Persian Empire, along with the appearance of new enemies threatening the eastern provinces, the Slavs, the Avars, and in the seventh century the Arabs, focused attention toward saving the East, and plans for restoration, though never entirely abandoned, were put on the back burner.
In order to respond to these threats the army underwent first a retrenchment and later a major reorganization during the seventh and eighth centuries which fundamentally altered its composition. By the fourth century the legions and auxiliaries of the early Roman Empire had been supplanted by frontier troops (Jimitanei) who were given property in return for hereditary military service. Through the reforms of Diocletian and Constantine the mobile cavalry called comitatenses, originally a bodyguard, eventually became the heart of the army. The later Roman Empire was characterized by the increasing use of foreign troops, especially Germans. In the fourth century Goths were employed as allied troops called foederati who served under their own officers. They were autonomous, their pay was exempt from taxation, and overall they grew in political influence.
Later Germans were recruited individually as mercenaries, and these long remained the most important part of the army.
The reorganization of the army that began in the seventh century divided the Empire into a number of large military districts called “themes,” first in Asia Minor and later throughout the Empire, each commanded by a
Introduction 3
governor (strategos, literally “general”) who combined civil and military functions. The system of themes furnished a native army that drew its livelihood from the land where it was stationed. These military reforms have often been attributed to the emperor Herakleios (610-41), though according to many scholars elements of these reforms existed before his reign, and indeed their ultimate fruition did not occur until the tenth century.
Whereas a great deal is known about the tactics, equipment, and field organization of the army through the tenth century, the issue of how soldiers were recruited remains hotly contested. Although we know that during a mobilization the army administration called up the men it wanted from a list of soldiers who bore a military obligation, it is still unclear who exactly bore such an obligation. One school contends that the majority of soldiers in the eighth through tenth centuries held relatively small landholdings located in the themes of the armies in which they served in time of war. According to this view, these soldiers were both farmers and soldiers, and though their legal and fiscal status, reflecting their obligation of military service, was slightly different from the rest of the population, in standard of living and ordinary pursuits they were indistinguishable from simple peasants. This view, evoking the romantic notion of a peasant army as the backbone of the Byzantine army, has proved very seductive because of its simplicity, if not its logic. Critics have argued, for example, that an effectively functioning army of part-time farmers, part-time soldiers is inconceivable and could scarcely have been responsible for the army’s dazzling successes against the Arabs in the tenth century. Nevertheless, this view has been difficult to disprove.
Another school of thought maintains that the situation was much more complicated than this, that those who performed the military service and those who worked the land that provided the soldiers’ livelihood were two distinct groups of men. Since there are no records of outlining the mechanisms whereby the soldiers were maintained by the peasant farmers, the arrangements between the two groups of men would have to have been either customary or private. Given that the available source material has been subjected to some of the most intensive examination of any Byzantine sources, it is becoming increasingly doubtful, barring the discovery of new material, that these questions will ever be resolved to the satisfaction of most researchers.
In any event this new system successfully held back the Arabs, dealt with a new threat from the Bulgars, and eventually restored the Balkans to Byzantine control. The southern Mediterranean and Palestine, however,
were lost. Internally, the crises of the seventh and eighth centuries transformed the rural economy of the Empire. The large estates of the late Roman period cultivated by the dependent peasants known as colons broke up, and this led to the emergence of an agrarian system characterized by the village community composed of free, tax-paying peasants. The restoration of central authority to Greece in the ninth century and the strengthening of central government in the tenth century were accompanied by a full attack on the village community by large landowners. By the eleventh century it seemed a foregone conclusion that the bulk of the peasantry could no longer be considered free taxpayers but paroikoi, peasants in one way or another dependent on a large landowner, lay or religious, or on the state itself as the largest landowner of all. ;
By the end of the ninth century, the army was divided into the provincial thematic troops headed by the strategoi and the Tagmata commanded by domestikoi. The Tagmata were created by Constantine V (741-75) as a reorganized central army stationed around Constantinople to serve as garrison, rapid response, and bodyguard troops. In the tenth century various measures were taken to ensure the economic basis of the thematic armies whose existence, no less than that of the peasant community, was threatened by the acquisition of property by large landowners. Around 967 an emperor ordered that the minimum value of a military holding be tripled, a measure probably connected with the innovation of heavy cavalry. By the end of the century the state increasingly found itself unable to prevent military holdings, technically inalienable, from passing into the hands of monasteries and other large landowners. Nevertheless, the tenth century was an age of expansion. The victories of the army under Nikephoros II Phokas (963~69) and John I Tzimiskes (969-76) can be attributed to the support given to these campaigns by the land-hungry aristocracy. Basil II (976-1025) secured the conquests of his predecessors in Syria, and during his reign the Russians were converted, the Bulgars were defeated, and the Empire was at its largest expanse since the reign of Justinian.
The eleventh century was characterized by a decline of the army. The imperial government, under the control of the civil aristocracy of the capital, emasculated the military out of fear of the provincial magnates who dominated the officer corps. Further, the government assumed that cuts in the military budget were one of the dividends earned through the triumphs of the previous era. But the appearance of new enemies, the Normans in Sicily threatening the western frontiers, the Seljuk Turks replacing the Arabs to the east, and the Pechenegs invading from the north, proved them wrong.
The central government distrusted the provinces, and its desire to curb the power of provincial magnates was assisted by a gradual process whereby the holders of the old military estates no longer were required to maintain local troops or serve themselves but instead paid a direct tax to the fisc. With the decline of the armies of the themes, the new tax receipts were used to hire foreign mercenaries. But the inadequacy of foreign mercenaries was demonstrated in 1071 at Mantzikert near Lake Van in eastern Anatolia when an undisciplined and heterogeneous army, though numerically superior, was annihilated by the Seljuk Turks. In the same year at the other end of the Empire the Byzantines lost the last of their Italian possessions to the Normans.
The central government’s hostility toward the military led toa series of military revolts culminating in the coup of Alexios I Komnenos (1081-118). Although Alexios attempted to renovate provincial military organization, the old thematic organization was dead. During his reign and probably during the first half of that of his son and successor, John II, the process was brought to completion whereby the obligations burdening the old military estates were transformed into simple taxes. Alexios responded in a makeshift fashion to new threats from the Normans to the west and ftom the Pechenegs to the north. He hired foreign mercenaries of every ethnic stripe but instituted no real reform of the army. His army was made up of an imperial guard and elite troops, who were often foreigners; smallholding foreign peoples settled within the Empire and with an obligation to perform military service; permanent and temporary mercenaries, usually foreigners; troops of allied or client states; and finally some ethnically Byzantine troops organized into troop divisions bearing the name of their place of origin (Thracians, Thessalians). The numerous appeals he made to the West for military aid were a small clement in the origin of the First Crusade (1096-99). The extreme reliance on foreign troops before and after the First Crusade had the effect of introducing both Turkish and Western European military practices, equipment, and tactics into the army.
It was John I Komnenos (1118-43) who probably was responsible for emphasizing once again the link between military recruitment, military financing, and land. Defeated Pechenegs and Serbs were settled in Asia Minor as soldiers. He and his son Manuel I (1143-80) may have tried to rebuild a national army, on a certain scale at least, by supplementing the army of mercenaries and settled foreign prisoners with new troops attached.
(literally, “providence” or “solicitude”) was a kind of grant of a source of revenue by the emperor to an individual or group of individuals. Some scholars claim that the popularity of the army as an occupation increased through Manuel I Komnenos’ widespread utilization of pronoia.! Others
question this view. In many parts of the Empire, such as the area around °
Smyrna in Asia Minor, in Epiros and even perhaps in the Morea, the real expansion of pronoia as a military institution seems to have started only after 1204, when it also became an important social and economic institution. ;
The military reforms of Manuel Komnenos were adequate for neither his ambitions nor his needs. An ill-fated expedition to Italy drained the Empire financially, and the thorough defeat of his army at the hands of the Seljuks at Myriokephalon in 1176 underscored the fundamental weakness of his policies. ‘The last decades of the twelfth century constituted an era of court intrigue in the capital and disaffection if not open rebellion in the provinces. The Bulgarian brothers Peter and Asen launched a revolt against Byzantine rule, an independent Bulgaria was organized under Kalojan, and an independent Serbia emerged under Stefan Nemanja. On the military front, the late twelfth-century Jewish traveler Benjamin of Tudela commented on the Byzantine use of mercenaries: “They hire from amongst all nations warriors called Loazim [barbarians] to fight with the Sultan Masud, King of the Togarmim [Seljuks], who are called Turks; for their natures are not warlike, but are as women who have no strength to fight”?
The Fourth Crusade (1199-1204), culminating in the sack of Constantinople and the conquest of most of the territory of the Empire, is a textbook example of a noble plan gone awry. Initiated by Pope Innocent III, the original intention of the crusade was to attack the Turkish Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt, but along the way financial and other considerations diverted the French and Venetian crusaders to Constantinople, where they restored the deposed emperor Isaac IL Angelos (1185-95, 1203-04) to power.
According to an earlier agreement, Isaac was to provide the crusaders with military and financial aid to continue the crusade, but since fiscal problems within the Empire made this impossible, the crusaders had no choice but to camp outside the city and wait. As time passed anti-Latin sentiment within the city grew and resulted in a palace coup which overthrew Isaac and his son Alexios. The crusaders then seized the city and the Empire itself, dividing Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly, the Morea, Attica, and Thebes among themselves. In the sense that the Fourth Crusade and the subsequent Latin Conquest intensified the anarchy that already existed within the provinces, it was merely the grace blow to an Empire which because of the enormous financial and political problems of the later twelfth century had become increasingly fragmented to the point of disintegration.
The history of late Byzantium, from 1204 to 1453, is in many ways a rather gloomy story. The Fourth Crusade had killed the spirit of the medieval Roman Empire. In time the Byzantine successor states in Asia Minor and in the mountains of western Greece, around which resistance to the Latin occupation centered, did manage to recover a large measure of Byzantine territory, and eventually Michael VIII Palaiologos (1259-82) was able to recover Constantinople. But the restored Empire of the Palaiologan dynasty was a second-rate state surrounded by hostile neighbors as strong or stronger than it was. A modest recovery during the thirteenth century was overshadowed by the rise of medieval Serbia to a position of prominence within the Balkans and, to an even greater extent, by the rise of the Ottoman Turks, both developments leading to a steady diminution of the Empire’s size, It would be no great exaggeration to say that by the middle of the fourteenth century, most informed Byzantines knew their world was coming to an end, that recovery was impossible. By the fifteenth century the end was expected at any moment.
Internally the last centuries were as paradoxical as any age can be. Despite the gravity of external threats, unity eluded the Byzantines. The government was racked by civil wars, palace coups, and religious controversies. The smaller the stakes, the more earnest were the quarrels. With government control over the provinces continuing its progressive decentralization and fragmentation, this was the age of the great landowner. As early as the twelfth century the great estate had replaced the village as the basis of rural social organization. This process, interposing a new layer of authority between the state and the subject, has been termed the “feudalization” of Byzantium. By the fourteenth century the village community had. disappeared as a barrier separating the peasant family from the state and the large landowner, and almost all peasants paid their taxes to a landlord rather than to the state. Nevertheless, while the society was in its death throes, desperately trying to adapt to change without sacrificing its traditions, this was also the golden age of Byzantine monasticism, and the art and literature of the period were among the finest the Byzantine world produced.
It has been said that the history of Rome is the history of its army. If true for Rome, then in no small measure it must also be true for its heir Byzantium. The successes and failures of the Byzantine army determined the size, longevity, and even the tone of life within the Empire. And as an institution it reflected the problems and possibilities inherent within Byzantine society. This book examines these twin aspects of the army during Byzantium’s final centuries. On the one hand, it deals with the army’s organization and administration, the kinds of soldiers who were in it, how many there were, and how they were paid. On the other hand, it considers the effects of imperial policies on soldiers, the relationship between military, provincial, and imperial administration, the institutions, events, and policies that affected soldiers, and the impact of the army on the economy, finances, and agrarian relations of the Empire. :
To explore these issues, two approaches are employed. Part One focuses on the army’s development over time as an instrument of imperial policy. It offers a chronological treatment stressing change and adaptation, and describes the modification and restructuring of the army over the years as it accommodated varying political goals, opportunities, and circumstances. Yet, while change was certainly a characteristic of the late Byzantine army, too great an emphasis on its dynamic aspects can misrepresent its nature and the nature of late Byzantine society. There were indeed many aspects of military organization—the means of paying soldiers, of launching campaigns, of guarding territory—that were subject to much less change over time. Part Two, therefore, is a topical treatment of the army and of the social and economic foundations of soldiers, emphasizing the element of continuity within the military. Because the sources reveal so little about the mundane processes that underpinned the army’s structure, this approach, in contrast to that of Part One, adopts the small fiction, common in institutional histories, that the army can be studied as a static institution and that information gathered from almost any sub-period within the late Byzantine era can be collated to produce generalizations more or less universally applicable. Although neither of these approaches is satisfactory in itself, together they provide some sense of the general character and complexity of the army and society of late Byzantium.
‘The expression “late Byzantium” implies chronological, geographical and political bounds. Following the convention in Byzantine studies, the termini for starting and ending the investigation are the traditional dates 1204. and 1453, the year of the fall of Constantinople to the Latins of the Fourth Crusade and the year of the fall of the city to the Ottoman Turks. In terms of dramatic institutional or social changes the earlier date is the less defensible. Certainly the loss of Constantinople, the dispersion of the imperial court, and the formation of Byzantine rump states in western Asia Minor, in Epiros, and in Trebizond on the Pontus were traumatic developments, but the events of 1204 caused less disruption in the institutions of Byzantine life than one might think. Socially, culturally, and economically, the numerically inferior Latins left little imprint on most of the areas they conquered. It was for the most part a colonial occupation. Trade in the Aegean remained in the hands of Venice and other Italian cities, but the political position of the Latins was always tenuous. While fiefs were parceled.out and the conquerors tried to blanket Byzantium with their feudal legal and social institutions, the native peasant remained a paroikos, the Greek landlord came to terms with his new foreign overlord and kept his property, and the population remained Orthodox. Nevertheless, the events of 1204 profoundly altered the orientation of political history, and to the extent that the army was an instrument of politics, this is a good date to begin. . On occasion it is useful to refer to the periods before 1204 and after 1453, particularly in order to trace the development of an institution that arose before 1204 or continued after 1453, or when, for purposes of illustration, material is available from an earlier or later age. Moreover, due to the nature of the sources, there is no way to avoid placing the greatest emphasis on the century from around 1260 to around 1350, the age of the early Palaiologoi, from the restoration of the Empire under Michael VIU Palaiologos (1259-82) through the last phases of the civil wars involving John VI Kantakouzenos (1347-54).
Geographically, the scope of inquiry is limited to the areas of western Asia Minor, Thrace, Macedonia, central Greece, including Thessaly and Epiros, the Morea, and the Aegean, in other words, to the areas where Byzantine soldiers fought. The Empire of Trebizond, the separatist state on the Pontus, though arguably Byzantine, as well as Crete and Cyprus, both in Latin hands, are generally excluded from discussion due to their relative isolation and independent development throughout the period. Further, within this time period and geographical area, I am concerned only with the soldiers and armies of Byzantium. Since I have chosen to focus my attention on internal history, the tiny navy, intimately connected as it was to the policies of the Italian city-states, will only be mentioned in passing. Moreover, “Byzantium” is defined rather broadly to include not only the restored Empire centered in Constantinople from 1261 but also the Byzantine states of the Nicaean era—the Empire of Nicaea and the so-called Despotate of Epiros—as well as the Despotate of the Morea which came to prominence during the fourteenth century. In addition, evidence relating. to the soldiers who fought for the smaller, semi-autonomous Greekspeaking political units that existed within the defined geographical area is also useful. These smaller principalities, products of the Latin Conquest, of the Serbian invasion of the mid-fourteenth century and of general political fragmentation, were firmly within the sphere of traditional Byzantine institutional and administrative practices.
Finally, since this is intended to be a social and administrative history, and not a military history, matters relating to tactics, strategy, and the course of individual campaigns have been virtually ignored except when they can provide information about the type, quality, or size of troop contingents. Although a major investigation of late Byzantine military tactics is possible and doubtless would prove fruitful, it is a subject that must remain outside the scope of this book.
Nearly all the sources for late Byzantine history provide information about soldiers. These include Greek narrative histories, documents, letters, saints? lives, inscriptions, lead seals, and treatises on politics and even theology. In addition, there are a variety of Serbian, Bulgarian, Western European, and Turkish chronicles, documents, and legal sources. The information contained in these sources can be divided into two categories: general data about the structure and deeds of the army as an institution and about the policies and developments affecting the soldiers as a social class (the Macrocosm), and specific data about the deeds and characteristics of smaller groups of soldiers and individual soldiers (the Microcosm).
The most valuable sources for the study of the army up through the eleventh century are the military manuals, or aktika. There is evidence that these were written during the late period (the poet Manuel Philes once notes that the general Michael Doukas Glabas Tarchaneiotes wrote a book “on various military topics”), but unfortunately none are extant. A single idiosyncratic exception is a treatise written in 1326 on the art of governing and military affairs by the marquis of Montferrat Theodore Palaiologos (1291-1338) entitled Instructions and Prescriptions for a Lord Who Has Wars to Wage and Governing to Do. Theodore was Emperor Andronikos I’s second son by Yolande-Irene of Montferrat. When Irene’s brother died in 1305, she inherited the marquisate of Montferrat, located to the west and southwest of Turin. Not wishing to return to Montferrat herself, she arranged that it be conferred upon Theodore, who in 1306, at the age of fifteen, headed west to govern his domain. The original work, written in Greek during one of his two return visits to Byzantium (totaling less than five years), is lost, as is a Latin translation of the work Theodore himself made. We know the treatise only through a fourteenth-century French translation based on Theodore’s Latin translation. Since he lived almost all of his adult life in the West, where he acquired all of his firsthand military experience, his Instructions are much more a product of the Western European than the Byzantine cultural sphere. And while we might regard Theodore as a man at home in both East and West, and whose writing should display a cosmopolitan familiarity with the entire southern Mediterranean scene, I have thought it unwise to use the Instructions as evidence of Byzantine military practices, except where Theodore makes specific reference to eastern affairs and to armor and weapons.3 Without contemporary military manuals, a large part of our knowl-
edge of the army must be deduced from the narrative histories. While these are primarily concerned with military affairs in terms of battles, sieges, and troop movements, events which in themselves are of little interest to this study, the information J have sought in them is more the occasional indication of the composition of an army, the parenthetical note on practical military administration, the digression on military policy, or the rare comment on the difference between traditional and contemporary military practices. For the study of the army, the most important of these are the memoirs of John VI Kantakouzenos (ca.1295—1383) who, as a general and an emperor, probably had the best knowledge of military affairs of any late Byzantine writer. His work, which covers the period from 1320 to 1356, is a detailed account of the era of the civil wars, and while he tends to present his own actions during this turbulent period in the best possible light, his comments on the organization and administration of the army and on fiscal policies have made it possible to write the present study.
' After Kantakouzenos, the historian I have used the most is George Pachymeres (1242~ca.1310), a scholar and close friend of Andronikos IT, whose history spans the period from 1255 to 1308. Pachymeres is our chief source for the reign of Michael VIII and the early part of Andronikos IT’s reign. Since his theme is the fortunes of the Empire as a whole, and since he is quite critical of the policies of Michael VIII, he provides much valuable information regarding the institutions and evolution of the military. Supplementing the works of Pachymeres and Kantakouzenos is the history of the polymath Nikephoros Gregoras (1290/1-1360), which deals with the years from 1204 to 1359 but is most useful for the fourteenth century. While Gregoras, like Pachymeres, had no firsthand experience of military matters, and while his history prefers to focus on the Empire’s religious quarrels in which he was a leading participant, his antipathy toward Kantakouzenos provides a valuable counter to the biases of the latter.*
On a second tier is the history of George Akropolites (1217-82), covering the period from the fall of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade to its reconquest by Michael VIII (1203-61). Although Akropolites is a reliable historian who had experience as a diplomat, an associate of Theodore II Laskaris, and a military commander, albeit an unsuccessful one, his history lacks the details and digressions that make the works of Kantakouzenos and Pachymeres so important. For the army of the thirteenth century mention must also be made of the Greek version of the Chronicle of the Morea, a long narrative in verse concerned primarily with the crusader states of Greece in the period from 1204 to 1292. A product of the fourteenth century, it also exists in French, Italian, and Aragonese versions. The Greek version was written by a Hellenized Frank in the second half of the fourteenth century and was based on either a Greek or a French prototype from the early fourteenth century. While the work is often inaccurate and certainly tends to exaggerate troop strengths, it is nevertheless quite valuable for military terminology and for the course of Byzantine campaigns in the Morea and elsewhere in Greece.5
After the middle of the fourteenth century the usefulness of the narrative historians declines markedly. No Byzantine who lived through the second half of the fourteenth century wrote a contemporary history. Those historians who do deal with this period all wrote their histories after 1453, and though their histories provide occasionally valuable information on the army as an institution, they are generally not very useful. George Sphrantzes (1401-78), a high official and close associate of the last emperors, wrote a partially autobiographical account of the years from 1413 to 1477. While he displays a great familiarity with court life and diplomatic relations between Byzantium and the Ottomans, and even though he fought in the Morea by the side of the future emperor Constantine Palaiologos and was present at the fall of Constantinople, he says relatively little of military affairs. For the purposes of the present study the utility of the extended version of Sphrantzes’ history, fabricated by Makarios Melissourgos in the sixteenth century, is restricted almost entirely to the (not always reliable) information it provides on the fall of Constantinople.
The other fifteenth-century historians focus on the rise of the Ottomans and speak of little but troop movements and conquests, ignoring or ignorant of Byzantine internal and institutional history. Doukas (ca.1400— 70), a Greek from Asia Minor, wrote a history of the years from 1341 to 1462, with real detail beginning only with the accession of Sultan Bayezid in 1389. The history of the Ottomans written by the Athenian Laonikos Chalkokondyles (1423-90) spans the period from 1298 to 1464. Even though he spent years at the Byzantine court at Mistra in the Morea, his account of events there is of little use to this study. Kritoboulos of Imbros (b.ca.140s), an aristocratic Greek who wrote a history of the conquests of the Turkish sultan Mehmet II from 1451 to 1467, is an important source for the fall of Constantinople with details on Mehmet’s conquest of the Morea.®
In addition to the accounts of the fall of Constantinople provided by Sphrantzes (the only eyewitness of this group), Doukas, Chalkokondyles, and Kritoboulos, there are a number of Western accounts of the events of 1453. The most important of these include the firsthand reports of the archbishop of Mytilene Leonard of Chios (d.1459), the Venetian Nicolo Barbaro, and the Florentine Giacomo Tedaldi.7
To round out this survey of Greek literary sources, mention may be made of collections of correspondence, a rich source of information for the late Byzantine period, as well as of saints’ lives which occasionally furnish useful details.
The one Byzantine source most nearly resembling certain aspects of a military treatise or taktikon is the treatise by the so-called Pseudo-Kodinos, an anonymous unofficial discourse on court ceremonies written around 1355 that offers priceless information about the palace guard divisions, the military officers who belonged to the court hierarchy, and military administration. There has been a tendency in the scholarship to accept PseudoKodinos’ testimony at face value, but in fact he is not always reliable. One example will suffice to demonstrate the caution with which we need to approach the treatise. At one point, he writes of an official called the megas hetaireiarches who, he says, was responsible for receiving visitors at the imperial court. Whatever function may have been attached to this title in the fourteenth century, we know from earlier sources that by origin the hetaireiarchai were connected to the division of palace guards called the Hetaireiai. Yet Pseudo-Kodinos explains that the megas hetaireiarches was so named “because he receives companions [Aetairoi], that is, friends.”8 This kind of error has serious implications because it suggests that PseudoKodinos was not adverse to reporting unsubstantiated or erroneous material or, worse, to fabricating information. This does not mean that we must dismiss Pseudo-Kodinos as a source, but we do need to seek corroborating evidence before accepting his testimony. This I have sought to do. When no corroborating evidence is forthcoming, I will note that the sole source is the Pseudo-Kodinos treatise, and this may be regarded as an appropriate caveat.
Information about individual soldiers and small groups of soldiers has been drawn for the most part from late Byzantine documents, most of which are found in monastic archives. Providing the most fertile ground for social and economic research, documents were issued by emperors, patriarchs, lay and religious officials, and private individuals.? They include imperial grants of privileges for monasteries, towns, and individuals, land sales, wills, inventories of the landholdings of monasteries and of a few laymen, rulings involving disputes over land, land surveys, and various other types of acts. As the list indicates, most documents deal with land, so if it is possible to determine anything at all about the economic status of a particular soldier mentioned in the documents, it is because the soldier had some economic attachment to land, either as a landowner or as a landlord. Conversely, if the documents ever do mention soldiers who were mercenaries, we cannot identify them as such because, by definition, mercenaries per se have no economic attachment to land.
However, the documentary sources do provide nearly all the evidence about the poorer types of soldiers and the paramilitary guards. Further, through careful analysis of the exemption formulas found in imperial grants and other documents, which exempt monasteries, towns, or individuals from various fiscal burdens, it is often possible to trace the evolution of the taxes and obligations that were used for military purposes and to reconstruct the military practices they reflected. In this regard, contemporary Serbian documents complement the data of the Byzantine sources. Particular mention should be made of the Law Code (Zakonik) of Stefan Duan (1331-55), king and, from 1345, emperor of Serbia, which was compiled in the late 134.08 after his conquest of Byzantine territory in Thessaly, Epiros, and almost all of Macedonia. Since his Empire was strongly influenced by Byzantine institutions and since there are no late Byzantine legal compilations accurately reflecting current legal practices, the information DuSan’s Law Code provides about the law and the soldier helps fill an important gap.
Among other non-Greek sources, the accounts of Western travelers and documentary materials issued by the Italian city-states, particularly Venice, occasionally provide useful, if superficial, information. Finally, with few exceptions, Turkish sources, which in any event are not very abundant, have little to contribute to the study of Byzantine internal history.
Only one major work has ever been written on the late Byzantine army. This is Petur Mutaftiev’s richly documented study of the economic basis of late Byzantine soldiers, which successfully distinguishes the three basic types—pronoia soldiers, smallholding soldiers, and mercenaries—and provides an outline of military administration. and. policies that is still useful today.10 The present study has been influenced greatly by Mutaftiev’s work. Some of my most fundamental conclusions, though drawn from a fresh and thorough reexamination of the sources (many of which Mutaftiev had no
access to), can do little more than amplify those he himself reached. Nevertheless, there are some serious problems with Mutaftiev’s work. Conceptually, Mutaftiev saw a great deal of continuity between the military practices of the middle and late Byzantine periods. This led him to associate, incorrectly, the middle Byzantine “peasant soldier” who held “military lands” (stratiotika ktemata) with the late Byzantine soldier (stratiotes) who held a grant of pronoia. Such misinterpretations arose because of MutafCiev’s methodology, which relied excessively on middle Byzantine legal texts and terminology. :
For example, when analyzing the alienation, bequeathal, and legal status of “military lands,” Mutaftiev turned to Constantine Harmenopoulos’ Hexabiblos, an unofficial fourteenth-century compilation of laws. To elucidate Harmenopoulos, Mutaftiev referred to the laws of the emperors Constantine Porphyrogennetos (913-59) and Nikephoros Phokas (963—69), as well as other middle Byzantine legal texts, while overlooking the fact that Harmenopoulos’ work, the only one of its kind from the late period, does not contain a single law issued after the tenth century. The Hexabiblos is an unofficial work of an antiquarian and is based entirely on the very middle Byzantine texts that Mutaftiev cited for corroborating evidence. Since the Hexabiblos testimony cannot be confirmed by other late Byzantine sources, its value for the study of late Byzantine legal practices becomes very questionable and, consequently, it is necessary to challenge all of Mutafiev’s conclusions that are based on the Hexabiblos and middle Byzantine legal texts.
Aside from Mutaftiev, all other works either focus on particular aspects of the army or deal with the army and soldiers in passing. The foremost work of the former type is George Ostrogorsky’s landmark study of the institution of pronoia which, because it has been translated into a Western European language, has had an impact on Western scholarship far beyond that of Mutaftiev’s “Vojni8ki zemi.”}2 This is significant because Ostrogorsky viewed pronoia as an essentially military institution and the key feature of a “feudalized” late Byzantine army, whereas Mutaftiev thought that the institution of pronoia had a strong nonmilitary component.as well and that pronoia was just one of many ways by which soldiers were financed.13 As research on pronoia continues, it has become increasingly clear that some revision of Ostrogorsky’s thesis is necessary, not always in the direction of Mutafciev’s conceptualization and methodology, but in the direction of his conclusions. The most important contribution along these lines, in relation to a study of the army, is a relatively recent article by Nicolas Oikonomidés which suggests that pronoia, as one of several ways to remunerate soldiers, was more a fiscal tool that could be adapted to accommodate soldiers of various social and economic levels than a grant, as Ostrogorsky wrote, that always made a man a “feudal” aristocrat.14 Finally, among the works that deal with soldiers in passing are studies of late Byzantine administration, works that examine the social and economic foundations of late Byzantine society and thereby illuminate the status of soldiers, and more general historical surveys that provide background material on the military policies of the emperors.
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