Download PDF | Łukasz Różycki - Battlefield Emotions in Late Antiquity_ A Study of Fear and Motivation in Roman Military Treatises-BRILL (2021).
342 Pages
Acknowledgements
No academic work is created in a vacuum. Science requires that a scholar engages in consultations, discussions, and sometimes even disputes. This forces us to re-examine our own ideas, which otherwise would lose a lot of their merit. This book is the result of years of thinking about and studying military treatises. I would like to thank all the academics that I have encountered in my professional career. It was during numerous conferences and symposia that some of my theses were verified and discussed, at times making me amend my stance. I owe enormous thanks to the readers of the Polish version, Professors Teresa Wolińska, Krzysztof Królczyk, Ireneusz Łuć and Anna Kotłowska. Their insights allowed me to avoid many errors. I would be remiss in my duties if I did not give proper credit to an anonymous reviewer assigned by the publishing house, whose tireless efforts had a big impact on the final shape of this book. I cannot possibly forget my friend and translator, Krzysztof Chorzewski, who likely knows this book even better than I do, and whose notes saved me from a number of additional mistakes. For any fallacies that remain herein, I am solely to blame. A separate acknowledgement should go to my mentor, Prof. Dr. Hab. Kazimierz Ilski, who always supported me in my research endeavors and showed me that history does not need to be a restricted field of study. My final word of thanks goes to my loved ones, my wife Estera and my children Aurelia and Leon – you are my whole world!
Introduction
Fear1 has been a driving force for humanity since the beginning of time and served as one of the main motivators for change.2 Fear of hunger makes us gather food; fear of our neighbors makes us fortify our homes and surround them with defensive walls; fear of poverty makes us work beyond our limits; fear of “the other” makes us close our doors. Humankind is in many ways governed by fear, one that we often cannot explain in any reasonable manner. We are ashamed of this fact, and we attempt to hide it. When afraid, a person acts on instinct, sheds the mask of a civilized creature and reverts to atavistic behaviors.3 Fear can bring out the worst of our characteristics that are normally hidden behind the carefully crafted veil of humanity. It is often the catalyst for other instincts, conformity4 in a panicked crowd.5 In such cases, we may talk about contagious fear that completely overwhelms a group. A mob gripped by panic stops acting rationally, while someone who is afraid seeks safety in numbers, putting his life above anything else. A soldier fleeing from a cavalry charge may be subconsciously aware that such behavior spells certain death, but he will nevertheless act according to his instincts. In short, fear is one of the most crucial primal emotions related to survival and has accompanied our species from the very beginning. Fear makes us take certain actions,6 but it also prevents us from acting rashly.7 Mastering one’s fear was, and remains to this day, a source of great power.8 Its effects, in the context of this study, can be summed up by the words of Józef Pieter, one of Poland’s earliest researchers of fear: Physiologically speaking, fear results in mobilizing all of the body’s strength, and then externalizing it in order to protect oneself.9 Of all the different types of fear, one of the strongest is the fear of death.10 This feeling is so overwhelming, that it often paralyzes individuals and triggers primal responses. Therefore the presence of fear on the battlefield is both understandable and – to anyone with military experience – natural.11 It was, is and will likely remain the dominant feeling experienced by all parties in any military conflict.12 Throughout the ages, men attempted to suppress it by various means – using alcohol,13 drugs,14 rage15 – or to replace it with a different kind of fear. However, eliminating this state of mind is difficult, and to this day no one has managed to do so completely. A soldier devoid of instincts becomes nothing more than a simple tool, and although fear can cripple a man, it can also force people to act, and as such may be seen as a positive factor. It was frequently used as a weapon by canny commanders, in order to strike at the enemy’s morale. It is a soldier’s constant companion, regardless of the historical period. We must take it into account, no matter what the surviving historical sources say, and no matter what methods for understanding the human psyche were used at the time. An ancient soldier gripping his sword and raising his shield would be faced with a terrifying16 – at times culturally alien17 – adversary, who wanted his death. In the case of any other soldier standing against a mortal enemy on a field of battle, the man-at-arms would experience fear, and instincts would tell him to react in two possible ways – to drop the weapon and flee from danger as far away as possible,18 or to kill. In terms of mastering the dread of one’s soldiers, the Romans turned it into an art which is used with good results to this day.19 Military training, at least after Augustus established a standing army,20 was designed to minimize the effects of fear, instill a sense of duty in soldiers, and make certain reactions automatic.21 On the battlefield, a soldier will always show more courage when he believes in himself and the military training he has received. He will be motivated to engage in the fighting by promises of rewards, faith in the legitimacy of a conflict, hatred of the enemy, and his religion, as well as fear of punishment for fleeing the battlefield, or fighting hand in hand with friends ready to give their lives for a common cause. A soldier’s motivation is also affected by the sight of his brothers in arms overcoming their fear and thus setting a good example.22 However, even with a functioning system of suppressing fear through training and motivation, soldiers would still at times flee from the battlefield. The Romans tried to prevent that through, ironically, a different type of fear, since any unit that fled was later decimated.23 In this case the use of collective responsibility was supposed to create a mechanism of internal group control, and the inevitability of punishment additionally motivated the legionnaires to stop the mentally weakest members of a unit from running away.24 Another tool of completely blocking or at least suppressing fear25 was the military training aimed at blunting the instinctive responses of soldiers26 that would normally make them protect their lives at all costs. The Roman army was the first to use, most likely unintentionally, the idea of “balance of fear”, which is normally used to describe global relations during the Cold War,27 but can also be applicable on a smaller scale. The Roman war machine consisted of many such elements, like the carefully crafted sense of camaraderie, fear of certain punishment for breaking military discipline,28 fear of senior officers, the motivating power of possible advancement through the ranks, etc. Taken as a whole, these aspects were supposed to achieve a single goal – that when a Roman soldier faced an enemy, he would choose to risk his life in battle rather than flee. Late Roman law is full of provisions that specify very strict punishment for soldiers who left their unit without official leave, especially in the face of an enemy force. The high count of provisions dealing with deserters indicates that our image of the Roman army is idealized,29 and that the terror of war affected even the well-oiled Roman war machine, and its component parts – the legionnaires.30 Soldiers were incentivized in various ways to fight.31 We need to bear in mind that in an army motivation is not always overt and that the goal of the soldiers, i.e. usually to survive a clash, is not consistent with the goal of the commander, who aims to win the battle32 even at the cost of his subordinates’ lives. This material difference largely affects the whole process of leading people in war33 and necessitates seeking non-standard solutions. One factor that has proven to be an effective motivator in similar situations is reward.34 The prospect of reward could modify the goals of a soldier, bringing them more in line with the goals of the commander, making it a powerful tool for controlling behavior.35 The reward in question might be promotion, the promise of rich spoils, favorable treatment from the commander, and so on. Another strong motivator was shame, particularly before one’s comrades. Brotherly relations in an army brought a unit closer together, motivating the soldiers to risk their lives out of a sense of honor and duty towards their friends, who were themselves in a similar situation. It was the role of the commander to bring these feelings to the front and reinforce them to achieve the best possible result in a coming battle. The Romans deliberately heightened the sense of brotherhood among soldiers, who sometimes lived their entire military lives as part of a single contubernium. A sense of brotherhood in arms36 and responsibility before comrades were of paramount importance in the process of boosting morale. The rules included in Praecepta militaria are an excellent example of attention paid to brotherhood in arms; in the description of each formation, the author made the point that soldiers in a contubernium should be organized as in a battle formation and bonded by friendship.37 This is an indication that the structure of the contubernium was intended to cultivate friendship among soldiers and ensure that they fought next to each other during battle.38 As a result, a commander could expect bonded soldiers to be better motivated, less prone to fear of the enemy and less likely to flee.39 Brotherly relations between soldiers were also used in a systemic way, for example in the internal control mechanisms described further in this book, stimulated externally by the rules of military law. For centuries, in the Roman army, esprit de corps played an important role just like in any professional military force, providing additional ways of influencing the soldiers. The above introduction can be summed up in the following manner. Every soldier standing face to face with an enemy is afraid of death. This is true for any army, regardless of morale40 or mental preparation. Less resolute soldiers choose flight rather than fight, somewhat unrealistically evaluating their chances of survival as higher in that scenario. Irrespective of the level of training, the means of motivation, the use of draconian punishments, or the strength of social relations among soldiers, every military force nears its breaking point during battle. The side whose soldiers are able to resist their instincts for longer, will usually win. Most battles in history resulted in one side retreating, and examples of a defeated force that chose death instead of running away are the stuff of legends to this day.41 The Roman army, contrary to popular belief, was not invincible, and the legionnaires serving in its ranks were ordinary people. Their main advantages were the excellent training (for the time), the high level of material culture, and the conscious use of stratagems and tricks that increased their chances of victory in battle.
1 The Purpose of the Work and the Current State of Research The title Battlefield Emotions in Late Antiquity. A Study of Fear and Motivation in Roman Military Treatises already specifies that the study will deal with both the methods of suppressing as well as instilling fear, and with various methods of motivating soldiers, often closely linked to fear.42 The purpose of this monograph is to take a fresh look at Late Roman warcraft through the lens of the theatre of war. In short, to analyze all non-combat means employed by Roman commanders that were supposed to increase their chances of victory, either by affecting their own soldiers, or the enemy’s. Until some decades ago our perception of a Roman legionnaire or an Early Byzantine43 soldier was the same as for fighters from any other period in history, and the human factor on the field of battle was either ignored or marginalized. Among the first representatives of this trend in modern historiography was Hans Delbrück, an illustrious German military historian44 whose studies centered on the social and demographic aspects of war.45 The soldier was seen as simply a single cog in a grand and infallible military machine, whose functioning was determined by top-down factors, such as strategy, tactics, training and discipline. The same factors could be analyzed when studying any army, from any historical period, with the same results. This was a close-minded thought pattern, where the soldier was presented as some sort of finished product – a combination of training, discipline and military law. The product/ soldier would only change if there were any changes to army organization or technology, and was considered to not be affected by cultural or psychological factors. This dehumanizing presentation of fighting men as nothing more than parts in the military machine is nowadays referred to as the universal soldier idea. A similar attitude was adopted when studying battles – it was not the soldiers who won or lost the engagement, but rather the commanding officers, who employed tactics superior to those of their defeated enemies. War was reduced to a strategic tabletop game between heads of state and army commanders, and battles – to orderly tactical diagrams drawn up on maps. Nowadays we know that reality was infinitely more complicated. The pattern of thought described above was first rejected by John Keegan in his book entitled The Face of Battle.46 Keegan was one of the most influential scholars of the army, who rejected the classic approach to military history. The purpose of the works of this exceptional British academic was to try and look at the chaos of war from the point of view of individual soldiers and to tell the story of these soldiers by employing the widest possible array of research tools.47 The publication of The Face of Battle in 1976 caused this new research approach to spread into general academic circles where its potential was recognized. It was later adopted, e.g. by John A. Lynn, who in his most prominent work: Battle: A History of Combat and Culture48 dared to ask bold and innovative questions: to what extent was the soldier, and consequently – the soldier’s behavior, dependent on cultural factors.49 The results of studies by J. Keegan and his followers (who include, among others, Charles Carlton,50 Aislinn Melchior51 and Richard Holmes52) have led to the emergence of socalled new military history. In this book, studies focusing on military history overlap with research into the history of emotions53 which is only natural when studying fear and motivation.54 Research into the history of emotions started simultaneously with pioneering works by Peter and Carol Stearn,55 Barbara H. Rosenwein56 and William Reddy57 who introduced emotions into history as a factor impacting human decisions and relations.58 They have demonstrated that this human phenomenon, which is subject to cross-cultural variability, can also be historicized.59 Consequently, they started a new branch of research in the humanities, closely related to sociology, psychology60 and even psychiatry. New military history introduced research into soldiers’ emotions on the battlefield earlier, and therefore developed independently from contemporary emotionology.
Studies of ancient and medieval Roman battlefields in the context of new military history have yielded a number of excellent works, whose authors were heavily influenced by the experiences and conclusions of early practitioners of this new approach. On the subject of ancient military history, we have pieces by such authors as Adrian Keith Goldsworthy,61 Brian Campbell,62 Ross Cowan,63 Kate Gilliver64 and several others.65 In Poland, the trend of studying Antiquity using the new military history approach is represented by several excellent historians specializing in Antiquity and the Byzantine Empire.66 Many scholars adopting this new attitude have modelled their studies after J.A. Lynn, focusing on the social and cultural factors that affect army men and, going further – have applied this methodology to armies in times of peace, using mostly historiographic, epigraphic and, increasingly frequently, prescriptive sources. We should also point out that Polish scholars have achieved much in the study of battlefield stress and, more generally, social psychology. Already in communist times the Ministry of National Defence commissioned Stanisław Konieczny to prepare two papers on the subject of wartime panic, which were first published in the 1960s. In a way this was a response to The American Soldier: Adjustment During Army Life,67 published in 1949. The Polish translation of this pivotal work appeared on the market only ten years later. Since I personally do not have a degree in psychology, certain sections of my work will be largely based on the published results of studies. One of the Polish scholars whose research I will often be referring to is the illustrious psychologist Józef Pieter, the author of Strach i Odwaga [Fear and Courage].68 In his analysis of fear and courage Pieter did not deal with war, but his observations about the physiological aspects of terror and typical human behavior in many instances help to explain in a straightforward fashion the suggestions put forward by the authors of Roman military treatises. The purpose of this work is to take a multi-perspective look at the Late Roman army, in times of peace as well as war, through the prism of military treatises, while employing the research methods of new military history. The notion of Late Antiquity in the title of the book sets some broad chronological limits. The research will center on the 6th century, which is when the Strategikon – the most frequently quoted military treatise – was written, together with two excellent narrative sources: works by Procopius of Caesarea and Theophylact Simocatta, sometimes referred to by contemporary historians as the last period of the power of the Roman Empire.69 Still, the narration will frequently go back to the time of writing of Vegetius’ work and the revival of Roman military literature during the reign of the Macedonian dynasty. The focus of the analysis will shift from social and cultural aspects to battlefield psychology and social psychology. These avenues of study are very promising in the context of the Roman battlefield, and there have already been attempts in global literature to synthesize the results of similar research projects.70 Despite these attempts, which dealt with ancient military history,71 there have as yet been no serious studies of Late Antiquity in the context of new military history making use of battlefield psychology.72
2 Chronological Framework and Structure of the Work The notion of Late Antiquity used in the title of the book is a key which offers interpretational opportunities. While the major sources go back to the 6th century, the very broad notion of Late Antiquity introduced by Peter Brown,73 and set by him between 250 and 800 AD, allows us to extend the source basis considerably include other extremely important military treatises supplementing the subject. Despite the fact that military treatises were read throughout the time of the Eastern Roman Empire,74 the changes to military solutions which took place in the 11th century put an end to the traditional form of literature as we know it from ancient times.75 Therefore, Late Antiquity as interpreted for the purpose of this book and set in military literature by the existence of the form of military treatises76 should be defined as the period from the creation of Vegetius’ work until the 11th century, i.e. Psellos’ antiquarian work and that of Kekaumenos.77 Three treatises comprise this book’s primary sources: De Re Militari by Vegetius, Strategikon written in the late 6th or in the early 7th century,78 and a work whose date of origin has stimulated heated discussions,79 namely De Re Strategica by Syrianus Magister.80
The work is broken down into eight chapters, with an introduction and concluding section. The first chapter specifies the categories of sources studied and their characteristics, especially with regard to literary topoi and anachronisms. Then, it briefly describes the three primary sources of the study: De Re Militari, De Re Strategica, Strategikon and, in short, supplementary military treatises. The second chapter, serving as introduction to the subject of study, illustrates different Roman approaches to warfare as presented in military treatises. The next section, being the first analytical one, deals with the subject of fighting fear. It lists various methods of suppressing fear used by Roman commanders in different situations (fear of the enemy, or of the unknown). Chapter 4 (Weaponizing fear) is devoted entirely to methods of using terror as an effective tool of war. Some of the analyzed stratagems and suggestions can also be applied to protecting one’s own troops from terror, and including these in this section instead of the previous one was simply a matter of the author’s preference. What it covers is methods of using scouts, intimidating the enemy with battle cries or silence, and also making use of deserters, traitors, spies and envoys. The next chapter is about the role of the commander in handling fear and motivating soldiers as shown in Roman military treatises. It delves deeper into military law, manipulation of available information and speeches given before the ranks. The last analytical chapter deals with what happens immediately after the fighting ends. All possible outcomes were taken into account – victory, defeat, and stalemate. It comprises several sub-chapters, each of which analyzes the instructions given by authors of military treatises on manipulating and incentivizing soldiers, who are mentally and physically exhausted after a clash. The final sections of the work consist of the concluding chapter followed by the bibliography.
Early Medieval battlefields.82 Their authors were usually closely tied to the army; they were often actual field commanders, who happened to put their thoughts and experiences down on paper. This presents us with a unique opportunity to identify the “human factor” on ancient battlefields;83 to understand the mechanisms that made soldiers want to run away, or just the opposite – charge ahead without regard for their life. Of course, these treatises are mostly instructions for commanding officers on how to control people, their behavior and anxieties, in order to achieve victory over the enemy. Although this approach somewhat colors the image of the common soldier that we intend to study, it still allows us to illustrate the traits of soldiers as a community.84 In order to achieve success in the field, each commander from Antiquity had first and foremost to shape the attitudes of his men, which was a complicated, multi-stage endeavor. The main area of study of scholars from the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, i.e. tactics and strategy, as presented by colored arrows moved around a map, only constitutes a marginal portion of the whole of Late Ancient warcraft. Contemporary humanist beliefs rightly teach us to reject violence in any form, but this aversion to war among today’s historians has led to the complete eradication of the human factor from our deliberations. We have stopped seeing individuals, and instead focused on grand goals, peace treaties, defeats and statistics while works by war theoreticians offer much more than information on tactics and armament, with the human factor playing a pivotal role. Some instructions were simple ruses, but many of them required extensive knowledge of human nature. Consequently, modern researchers who are equipped with contemporary interdisciplinary research methods, have the opportunity to achieve a deeper understanding of the chaos of war.85 For the purposes of this study, I believe there is some value in also looking at narrative sources written by military men or people closely tied to the army – treating these sources as comparative material. Even if many descriptions of battles in classical historical works were simply invented by ancient authors for literary or patriotic purposes86 or copied from earlier works, several works from Late Antiquity may serve as supplementary sources whose authors at least tried to depict the battlefield reality.87 Throughout the history of the Eastern Roman Empire, within the specified chronological framework, such sources are few and far between. One notable author is Ammianus Marcellinus,88 an experienced soldier and keen observer of military life, whose opus magnum remains an endless repository of knowledge about the Roman army. Another item worth mentioning is the work of Procopius of Caesarea,89 especially since it was written in the 6th century, during a renaissance of theoretical military literature. Other available sources include historical works written by members of the clergy or by Constantinople officials, particularly the work of Theophylact Simocatta; and for the Middle Byzantine Era – the works by Leo the Deacon and John Skylitzes. But it should be emphasized that narrative and prescriptive sources will only serve as supplementary subjects of study;90 the focus of analysis will be on treatises on warfare from Late Antiquity. For the research to be comprehensive, I will also re-examine the equipment of Late Roman soldiers, seeing as the authors of military treatises on numerous occasions emphasized its non-military significance. Armor was to make soldiers feel better and more secure; long plumes on helmets were to make them appear taller; decorations on horse harnesses added splendor to selected units; and banners served as rallying points and evoked a feeling of community.91 The look of Roman equipment and weapons was also designed to affect the enemy soldiers, to make them feel afraid and inferior to the imperial army. In times of economic crisis, military treatises also gave instructions on how to deploy poorly equipped soldiers, so that to the enemy they seemed better armed than in reality. Understanding the non-military importance of military equipment gave Roman commanders the ability to employ a wide array of stratagems raising the morale of own troops and lowering that of the enemy. In short, what we will demonstrate here will be the deliberate use of elements of psychological warfare. Military treatises offer us numerous insights: a look into the methods of intimidating an opposing force, blocking the fear of one’s own soldiers, motivating your men, suppressing individuality or a look into the functioning of social control mechanisms; but they also grant us the opportunity to understand the whole oppressive system that turned regular people into warriors. With this type of research, we should reject the classic image of the soldier as simply an element in the Roman military machine. Any Roman legionary standing in the ranks about to face an enemy charge was simply a human being; granted, it was a human being that had undergone rigorous training aimed at automating reactions, blocking fear and specific conformist instincts, but a regular human being nonetheless. Commanding officers knew the implications of this fact, and in order to achieve victory had to manage the behavior of their subordinates so that each soldier was willing to risk his life, convinced of his superiority over the enemy – if not physical, then at least mental, moral or religious. Military treatises supplemented with narrative sources can bring us closer to understanding the mechanisms of army operations developed by the Romans; but they can also shed light on the figure of the soldier on the battlefield. Adopting the research methodology of new military history, particularly that of social psychology, in the study of the battlefield and the army yields excellent results. It enables us to identify the mechanisms that govern the behavior of soldiers and, what is more, to pinpoint which of these were deliberately used by commanders to ensure better results. I believe this is the only way to gain an in-depth look into the situation of the soldier of Antiquity on the field of battle. This will be done through an analysis of sources, supported by comparative analysis. Elements of new military history, mainly social psychology, will also play an auxiliary role. Since the author of this book is a Polish academic, the bibliography will include items in official congress languages, as well as works by Polish scholars, especially pieces related to battlefield psychology and social psychology. The achievements of Polish academics in these fields are quite significant, but often overlooked in broader academic discussion, due to the language barrier. This work is a history book, which means it is based on an analysis of sources in their original languages. For the reader’s convenience the main text will include translations, with the original version found in the footnotes. All translations from Greek and Latin were made by myself. The preparation of new translations was necessary due to the nature of this work, which focuses on completely novel subjects of study. One concept will be referred to frequently throughout the work – the concept of the stressor, introduced and measured by two notable scholars of the subject: Thomas Holmes and Richard Rahe.92 Although their research and conclusions cannot be directly translated to the period and subject of our 92 Thomas Holmes and Richard Rahe, “The Social Readjustment Rating Scale,” Journal study, by the use of analogy and, later, more detailed studies on stressors, we can make great gains in our quest to understand the Roman soldier on the battlefield. Obviously, any conclusions derived from such studies should be treated with caution, due to the high risk of revisionism, i.e. uncritically transposing today’s knowledge and experiences to ancient times. This is particularly dangerous for our specified period of study, since we do not have suitable narrative sources that would allow us to carry out more detailed analyses, much less so comparative analyses.93 4 Issues of Methodology and Interpretation Are we able to follow the mechanism of motivating an army and arousing terror? Did the enemy consciously try to scare Roman legionnaires, and if so, in what ways? Did ancient commanders94 attempt to harness the feeling of fear, which in skilled hands could become a powerful tool of war and a motivating factor? And if they did, was that deliberate or were they simply following their own intuitive, automatic responses? And finally, in this grand puzzle, what was the importance of the intricate spectacle of war, where the commander was the main actor, and his soldiers and opponents served as the audience? These are some of the questions asked by new military history, which thanks to modern research methods we may now attempt to answer. Every scholar of the past is aware that zeroing in on the thoughts and feelings of people living in Antiquity is difficult, and often simply impossible Moreover, in the absence of really explicit sources the historian must resort to critical speculation. By using analogy, we can surmise what was felt by a legionnaire facing terrifying barbarian hordes with sword in hand95 and his companions from the contubernium by his side; but all this will be merely speculation. It is hard to account for all the cultural or religious factors. Also, overly trusting analogies is equally inaccurate, too often leading to false conclusions and revisionism.96 But thanks to social psychology, new military history and many other fields of study we can attempt to understand the factors that determined specific soldier behavior. For example, let us consider mêlée combat, which was one of the most terrifying experiences for any soldier. The history of man is filled with descriptions of grand duels97 – Achilles versus Hector, or David versus Goliath – but it is rather Homer’s description of the death of Alcathous, whose dying, twitching body shook the shaft of the spear embedded in his breastplate, that actually captures the horror of close combat.98 At close quarters, a soldier has to stand face to face with the enemy, endure the mental and physical pressure, and survive by killing his opponent. The feelings associated with this process can not have changed much, especially considering the course of many battles of Late Antiquity, which frequently ended with one side panicking and fleeing once its morale had been broken.99 But, to return to the main point – any person in a close combat situation, regardless of historical period, would have only one thing on their mind – to kill the enemy, or face being killed in turn.100 Some people, confronted with the extreme conditions of combat, react according to their natural defense mechanisms, either hiding behind their shield or using other available opportunities to avoid actual fighting.101 In the 20th century, the author of a manual on bayonet combat had this to say about hand-to-hand fighting: The bayonet has been and will remain the last, but in mental terms the most effective weapon of an infantryman in close-quarters … a soldier is expected to get close to the enemy and break his resistance with bayonet or skill in hand to hand combat.102 History includes numerous examples of bayonet charges103 that allowed the charging side to break the spirit of numerically superior defenders and force them to retreat.104 It is worth noting that the attackers would normally attempt to enhance the terrifying effect of the charge through war cries,105 music106 and the unwavering demeanor of the officers leading the attack.107 It would be inappropriate to dismiss such stratagems as simple battlefield theatrics, because very often it really was the shouting and the belligerent attitude of the enemy that caused one of the sides to retreat without a fight.108 We should also remember that close combat did not usually result in heavy casualties.109 It was only in the final stages of each battle, i.e. during the pursuit of fleeing forces, that the losing side would be massacred. This can be explained in several ways. First of all, fleeing soldiers lose any interest in fighting or even defending themselves. All heavy pieces of equipment, such as shields, were normally discarded, so as not to slow the men down.110 A panicking mob111 is much more dangerous than an individual – innate human conformity and the instinct for self-preservation lead people to focus solely on getting as far away from danger as possible, without regard for their surroundings or brothers in arms. The result is that often even the units that were determined to continue fighting would be disrupted or swept away by the wave of retreating men,112 and fleeing soldiers would lose their lives by drowning or falling off heights. These are instinctive herd-like behaviors. The accounts of ancient chroniclers are filled with mentions of routed troops who died while crossing rivers or swamps113 or chose to jump off a cliff.114 It is completely illogical from the point of view of a single human being, but based on the observations of social psychologists,115 mob logic is different from that of the individual and is governed by conformity and fear. This makes terror an immensely effective weapon of war,116 scattering or even destroying an enemy force. All one needs is to make them afraid and wait for the inevitable result – panic. Roman legionnaires did not write memoirs, and all the great historians, rather than focusing on fear, were more interested in glorious victories, disheartening defeats and their principal architects.117 This is not to say that we have no means of delving into the psyche of ancient soldiers, but it does mean that the process is both complicated and very risky.118 Any scholar seeking to at least partially understand these soldiers’ attitudes to battlefield terrors must look for information beyond the monumental works of ancient historiography.119 Military treatises comprise a group of sources that may prove very useful in this regard, as they were often written by practitioners with field experience120 and quite extensive theoretical knowledge,121 which was the result of many centuries of evolution of warcraft in the Greco-Roman world. This gives us a category of sources on the basis of which we may attempt to build a more comprehensive narrative. But we must at all times bear in mind that such studies carry a high risk of putting too much emphasis on analogies. This is why the source material should be the focus of critical study, and any analogies and new research methods should only be employed to paint a fuller picture. 5 Sources 5.1 Military Treatises as a Separate Category of Sources The development of tactics and technological advances in Antiquity forced commanders to study the achievements of their predecessors. Changes were mostly related to tactics and the doctrines of using the available weaponry, with some ideas often becoming viable once again after hundreds of years.122 Rome never developed a unified system of training for its commanding officers. In the early republican period, every aristocrat worth his salt, before assuming command over a military unit, would have already had practical experience derived from their years of service in cavalry formations,123 but this changed before the establishment of the Principate.124 Some future military leaders also received careful theoretical tutelage at home,125 or during tirocinium militiae. Young officers were rarely given their own command immediately; prior to that they would serve an auxiliary role in military staffs, or as members of military councils (consilium). This allowed them to learn through observation. However, this system was not always sufficient, and the element of selfimprovement was an important factor, especially in Late Antiquity, where armies would sometimes be led by people without extensive military experience, but rather with the proper connections at the imperial court.126 Due to the lack of a unified military education system and the difficulties in acquiring practical military knowledge, a new solution had to be found. This led to the emergence of military treatises.127 Army commanders and keen observers of the realities of warfare decided to write down their experiences and observations for future generations of leaders. This was pro-state writing, and most authors were aware of this fact, both in Antiquity as well as in the Middle Ages.128 But such literature does have certain crucial limitations.129 The majority of authors would employ the same schematic descriptions, bordering on the use of literary topoi. This was due to the very slow evolution in army tactics and equipment, which made it necessary for a large section of any treatise to present a state of warfare that had remained unchanged for centuries.130 Another thing to bear in mind was the authority of the great leaders of the past, which the authors of later military treatises would gladly share in.131
Any commander compiling his own manual would include the wisdom of past generations of army leaders, who had led forces on countless battlefields. Usually based on their own experience, the authors added a number of new stratagems that they had devised themselves, and the rest of the work was a recapitulation of the accepted truths of waging war. It was natural to copy fragments of previous works, especially if their authors were universally respected.132 Compiling a section of a theoretical piece written by an established strategos was not something frowned upon – on the contrary, referring back to the authority of a valued commander elevated the rest of the work in the eyes of the readers. The process of writing a treatise, which was supposed to be a utilitarian piece, demanded that the author have vast knowledge, both theoretical and practical. As a rule, authors would use those sections of past works that were still relevant, and supplement these with their own ideas, strategems, ruses and ruminations. The finished treatise would thus be highly applicable, although most of its contents did not stem from the experience of the author, but rather previous generations of tacticians and strategoi.133 However, the greatest strength of military treatises, that is preserving and sharing the experiences of countless past commanders, could just as well have become the greatest threat to military literature as a whole. It was easy to lose the sense of proportions of the text, meaning that content copied from past works could easily fill a whole treatise. The piece could still be relevant, but was devoid of the author’s input, making him merely a compiler. The situation was different still when a text was prepared by someone without military knowledge – in such case the work ceased to be applicable and became nothing more than a period piece, often without much practical use for the reader. Another thing that had a bearing on the contents was the use of literary topoi, which were employed both by authors with actual military experience, as well as by those who did not have any.134 It is rather ironic that most of the military treatises that are available today are compilations of the works of great leaders,135 which themselves have not survived in their original forms.136 The readers of treatises naturally included various echelons of military commanders, intellectuals dealing with the theory of war and sometimes emperors heading their armies, fighting with the enemies of the state.137 It should also be noted that the readership of military treatises could include civilians, for whom it was an excellent source of information on the army and, in the opinion of Conor Whately, entertainment as well.138 Scholars have been trying to categorize the genre of military treatises for a while now. The most successful attempt was made by Eric McGeer, who suggested the following breakdown: works focusing on tactics and technical jargon (taktika), strategy and command (strategika), siegecraft (poliorketika), naval battles (naumachiai), rhetoric (paraggelmata) and strategems (strategemata).139 A similar division can also be found in Sullivan’s work.140 Unfortunately, these sub-genres often overlap, which makes precise categorization impossible. But it is a fact that the authors of Antiquity were aware of specialist roles in the army, which is confirmed by the existence of different sub-types of military treatises. We only need to mention two of these: poliorketika and naumachika, as they were dedicated to a very narrow group of readers, that is combat engineers and naval commanders. In the case of treatises on siegecraft, the knowledge they contained was mostly about the technical aspects necessary for the actual builders of siege machines, but irrelevant to the commander, who only had to know how to use siege engines, not construct them. This is why poliorketika include minute details about the construction of engines of war, settings, tension values, even suggestions about what materials to use;141 whereas strategika rather contain knowledge about how to use the finished product in combat. Some authors, both from modern times142 and those from Antiquity, identified war machines as a separate field of study. For example, Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos, who in an appendix to De Ceremoniis143 listed books on leadership (βιβλία στρατηγικά), books on war machines (βιβλία μηχανικά) and works on artillery (βελοποιϊκά). A similar confirmation can be found in the 10th-century De Re Militari,144 where the author refers his readers to works on siegecraft as a separate category. The primary category of sources analyzed herein will comprise late Roman military treatises dedicated to army commanders (στρατηγικά).145 This is a unique genre of Roman literature, with its own set of rules, often difficult to interpret, riddled with literary topoi and anachronistic, antiquarian terms.146 The principal theoretical works used in Late Antiquity were the works of Aelianus Tacticus on terminology and tactics, Heron’s on siegecraft, Frontinus’s on military stratagems and the work of Onasander on leadership.147 This makes military treatises difficult to analyze as a source, and the interpretation of any knowledge found within is always partially an antiquarian effort. Despite these shortcomings, this is the only category of sources that will allow us to achieve the designated research goals. No other source can provide an in-depth look into how commanders treated their soldiers or grant insight into the usually inaccessible elements of the theatre of war. Military treatises were frequently written by army men for the benefit of other army men, which gives us the opportunity to study the theory of command from the perspective of actual field commanders.148 In many cases, the applicability of these suggestions and stratagems remains an open question, although it is not one that will be answered in this book.149 5.2 De Re Militari The work of Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, De Re Militari or Epitoma rei militaris, is one of the best-researched military treatises, and its influence on the warcraft of Middle Ages150 and even modern times was tremendous.151 It was written in the Latin-speaking West, and its author was Christian. Terminus post quem for the work is determined by the following statement of the author: Ab urbe enim condita usque ad tempus divi Gratiani et catafractis et galeis muniebatur pedestris exercitus.152 This means that Vegetius must have composed the treatise after the death of Emperor Gratian in 383, as evidenced by the phrase divi Gratiani. The first edition of De Re Militari was probably published around 390 during the reign of Theodosius I, but we do know that the work was revised and republished in the times of Valentinian III (425–455). The treatise lacks any clues that would allow us to unequivocally determine terminus ante quem, so scholars are still discussing the date of creation of the work.153 On the subject of the author, we cannot say anything beyond what Vegetius reveals about himself in De Re Militari. We know that he was not a member of the army – which means that most of his knowledge was derived from reading previous works on the theory of warfare, supplemented with own observations and insights. De Re Militari contains many sections that can be seen as period pieces, copied from other theoretical works, including lost military treatises from the period of the late Roman republic. This makes it difficult to interpret the piece and forces any scholar attempting this to verify if selected fragments are not outdated when applied to the state of the army in the 6th century. The treatise by Vegetius was partially moralistic;154 the author advocated a return to Roman virtues and restoring the previously prominent role of heavy legionary infantry.155 Although the moral angle is one of the distinctive features of military treatises as a genre, in the case of Vegetius it unfortunately led to certain important elements of the army being wilfully understated, or at times evidently ignored by the author.156 Despite the above, De Re Militari is a valuable source considering the subject of my work. Vegetius frequently focused on aspects of the theatre of war and methods of suppressing fear that are relevant to this study, whereas tactics, strategy and equipment were to a certain extent treated as secondary in importance. This was likely due to his limited military experience. But thanks to this attitude any anachronistic passages in Vegetius’s work will not present an issue for this analysis. De Re Militari was most likely not read by Syrianus;157 however, the author of Strategikon did know of it and did use it in his own treatise. This is particularly notable in the case of the military maxims which are repeated in both works.158 5.3 De Re Strategica De Re Strategica (Περὶ Στρατηγικῆς) by Syrianus Magister, until recently considered to be an anonymous source, is less popular than Vegetius’ work or Strategikon. Syrianus Magister authored three military treatises which have survived until our times. In this analysis, De Re Strategica will be of greatest importance, although the work about war at sea (Naumachiai)159 will also be mentioned together with a short treatise about speeches delivered by commanders.160 For a long time, De Re Strategica was believed to be an anonymous treatise, yet Constantine Zuckerman161 established that the author was Syrianus Magister. Syrianus,162 similarly to Vegetius, probably did not have practical military experience, learning from observation and by reading. De Re Strategica was extensively researched by Vladimir Vasilevich Kuchma.163 This Russian historian strongly emphasized the antiquarian passages in Syrianus’s work, and the author’s frequent calls to restore the greatness of the army based on the experiences of Greek poleis of Classical Antiquity.164 Another, also partial analysis was conducted by Franziska E. Shlosser, focusing solely on the characteristics of an ideal commander.165 The study by Shlosser, although interesting and useful, was based on a classical and heavily idealized image of a strategos in the context of Late Antiquity. The work of Syrianus Magister was further analyzed and used in Late Antiquity for its insights on tactics and strategy of Roman forces by numerous scholars writing comprehensive studies on this multifaceted topic.166 Notably, Syrianus Magister was praised by Constantine Porphyrogennetos who recommended keeping a compendium of the author’s work on hand during military campaigns.167 As the treatise by Syrianus Magister is among the key sources used in this book, the date of its origin needs to be mentioned. Many scholars still consider De Re Strategica a source from the 6th century,168 but the latest studies have shed new light on the work and its likely origins.169 The treatise has been attributed to the time of Justinian170 because of the considerable importance of archery in De Re Strategica, coupled with mentions of Belisarius, one of the most eminent commanders in the first half of the 6th century. The author references the figure of Belisarius, stating that “this is what Belisarius used to do” (του̃το δ’ ἐποίει καὶ Βελισάριος).171 While Philip Rance is right that Syrianus did not refer to his time but rather an event from the past,172 the fact remains that Belisarius, a commander from Justinian’s times, is one of the few historical figures referred to by Syrianus.173 Interestingly, while Belisarius was a prominent figure in the 6th century, there were not many references to the famous commander’s achievements in the 10th. While dating the work based on a mention of Belisarius is dubious, the treatise cannot be dated by reference to its mention of Arabs, because Syrianus could have meant the Arabs from before Islam.174 This is also the case with the author’s use of the term kataphraktoi175 in reference to heavy cavalry, which Lee and Shepard regarded as a clear reference to the 10th century, when the term was more generally used.176 Studies of the part of the treatise dedicated to ruling a country, undertaken by Immacolata Eramo, look promising177 because they may shift the treatise’s dating again to the 6th or 7th century. Very convincing studies on the size of infantry shields and the placement of camps carried out by Philip Rance178 are arguments in favor of the Middle Byzantine period, although in the summary, the author states that the data of the compendium remains uncertain.179 Douglas Lee and Jonathan Shepard argue that chapters 33–47 could have been composed at a later date, around the 10th century but the main text was written in the 6th century.180 John Haldon suggested an elegant solution; in his opinion, large parts of the text come from earlier times, but were compiled in the 9th century and the reality of that time is reflected in the work.181 Therefore, a large portion of the treatise may come from a source written during the reign of Justinian the Great, which has not survived to our time, and was later compiled by Syrianus.182 While the dating of De Re Strategica has been questioned, an exact date for the treatise is not of that great importance to the considerations of fear and motivation in Late Antiquity. On the subject of motivation, morale, as well as the commander’s attitude towards his soldiers or the ways of manipulating the enemy, Syrianus Magister is much closer to Vegetius’ narration and the content of Strategikon. This may of course stem from the compilation of classical treatises; nevertheless, Syrianus’ work proves very useful and is slightly closer to the tradition of Late Antiquity. To a large extent De Re Strategica has not been analyzed sufficiently, due to its contents, which in many aspects, particularly with regard to cavalry and infantry tactics, are simply copies of what classic Greek military treatises had to say on the subject. Because of its heavily antiquarian section on the deployment of troops and their equipment, the treatise was not seen as a viable source by scholars. Despite this fact, De Re Strategica is an insightful piece, especially with regard to the subject of this study, i.e. the overlapping area between warfare and psychology, providing an intriguing perspective on the theatre of the battlefield. Syrianus Magister must have been a keen observer of reality; this is evidenced in the section of his work devoted to the treatment of soldiers183 – in several instances he not only supplements the knowledge found in the work of Vegetius and in Strategikon, but even goes as far as to consciously suggest new, more complicated and more mature solutions. As such, De Re Strategica is a unique treatise offering extraordinary research opportunities. The edition of the work that I’m using here is the one prepared by G.T. Dennis in Three Byzantine Military Treatises; back then it was still known as The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy.184 The latest translation was prepared by the aforementioned V.V. Kuchma.185 5.4 Strategikon The final primary source from Late Antiquity is the anonymous work entitled Strategikon (Στρατηγικόν). It was written at the end of the 6th or at the beginning of the 7th century.186 The treatise was most likely compiled in the course of fighting against the Slavs and Avars in the Balkans during the reign of Emperor Maurice (582–602), or during the usurpation of Phokas (602–610). It is difficult to treat the Avar-Antes war of 602 as the limit for dating the treatise, because it did not result in the complete destruction of the Antes tribe.187 So, the terminus ante quem for the complete work is the invasion of the Arabs, as there is no mention of them anywhere in the treatise. The author of the treatise was most likely not Emperor Maurice, as some scholars believe,188 although we cannot exclude the possibility that it was compiled at the emperor’s request by someone from among the prominent commanders of the time. In his unpublished dissertation, John Wiita supports the idea that the author of the treatise was strategos Philippicus, who, according to information found in the work of Theophylact Simocatta, supposedly had an interest in ancient warfare.189 This is an interesting alternative to the more popular claim of Maurice’s authorship, but it needs to be analyzed with due care. Theophylact, on whose work Witta based his whole hypothesis, mentions that Scipio Africanus was supposedly Philippicus’ role model,190 but Strategikon lacks any references to that famous Roman general.191 Interestingly enough, following the usurpation of power by Phokas in 602, Philippicus survived the resulting purge in the capital and retired from politics to a monastery, so he certainly would have had the time to write down his military experiences. As such, this theory should not be discarded immediately, especially as Philippicus had the opportunity to fight against the Persians, as well as the Slavs and Avars, i.e. the peoples that are given the most attention in the treatise.192
Although Strategikon was probably written by a practitioner,193 it, like other military treatises, contains a number of antiquarian passages and sections copied from other works.194 In the case of certain fragments of text, we can pretty accurately identify the previous works that either inspired the author or were simply copied. A large part of military proverbs (γνωμικά) are translations of the Latin regulae belorum generales which come from Vegetius’ book, although it is hard to establish whether both authors used the same source or if the author of Strategikon compiled and translated a fragment of Vegetius’ work.195 It is possible that Book XI, devoted to the neighbors of the Empire, was based on official reports of Byzantine diplomats collected in imperial archives, which the author of the treatise had access to. In the past, similar reports prepared by military personnel were used by the already mentioned Theophylact Simocatta when describing the Roman campaign along the Danube196 limes.197 The practice, then, was nothing new, and assuming that the author of Strategikon had close ties to the court in Constantinople,198 it would be no trouble for him to make use of such sources. The whole of Book XIIB was probably copied from another work describing infantry operations in the first half of the 6th century, which is evident from the anachronistic terms used for Roman equipment and certain linguistic aspects.199 Which is not to say that the fragment was copied mindlessly. The author of Strategikon used it as a basis, which he then supplemented with practical information clearly originating from the second half of the 6th century. On the other hand, comments on commanding the cavalry must have been taken from the Avar period, i.e. post 581, which is evidenced by the large amount of Avar equipment that had been imported into Roman cavalry gear200 and by the partial adoption of nomad tactics.201 The author, being an experienced soldier, also incorporated a piece of information into a section on cavalry that is a veritable treasure trove for scholars – Latin commands, written in Greek font, that were used by officers during exercises.202 As I have mentioned before, Strategikon was likely the work of someone with practical military experience, which makes this a unique source on the history of the Roman army in the second half of the 6th century. The language of the treatise is easily approachable Greek, with numerous Latinisms203 and occasional instances of more obscure military jargon. It was likely primarily aimed at fresh commanders,204 who required introduction into the tactics, equipment and organizational structure of the imperial armies. This, in and of itself makes the work immensely valuable, as the author set out to give a comprehensive rundown of Roman warcraft during the reign of Emperor Maurice (582–602). The author must have believed that in war a military leader should possess vast knowledge about the enemy, extending beyond the military aspects, and also including the customs205 and internal politics. Strategikon also served as a starting point for many authors of successive military treatises, making its mark on the whole genre all the way to the 10th century.206 The author devotes similar attention to the theatre of war, analyzing and listing basic ruses and stratagems known since ancient times. An invaluable addition by the author of Strategikon was supplementing this classic list with significantly more advanced methods not known from other sources. The person who wrote the treatise was also acutely aware of the importance of psychology on the battlefield, which he makes clear in numerous passages. For over a hundred years, Strategikon has been the subject of intensive studies conducted by historians, as well as classical philologists and archaeologists. Particular attention was always given to the Slavs and Avars, as in the study by the Czech scholar of the Balkans and early Byzantine Empire, Bohumila Zástĕrova, whose work on the Slavs and Avars was published in French in 1971.207 Shortly afterwards, i.e. in 1977, J. Wiita defended his dissertation about the ethnic groups mentioned in Strategikon at the University of Minnesota. Another important work on the subject, by Gerard Labuda, was published in 1954 and dealt with the chronology of Roman-Barbarian Wars at the end of the 6th century.208 Interest in studying Strategikon rose once again in the second half of the 1980s, which saw the publication of a translation of the treatise by Ernst Gamillscheg with an edited version of the Greek text by George T. Dennis;209 who soon afterwards translated the treatise into English.210 It is worth noting that, prior to that, Romanian211 and Russian212 translations were already available, and that most recently the work was also translated into Spanish213 and Modern Greek.214 Ever since the publication of the first modern translation, Strategikon has remained a frequent subject of study. Looking at the most recent studies, one must give credit to the significant analytical contributions of Philip Rance,215 who for some years now has been working on a revised edition of the treatise, which is to include a comprehensive critical apparatus. Strategikon has been referred to in numerous works of literature, and it is used as an excellent supplementary source by linguists, archaeologists, as well as historians and epigraphists. For any scholar writing about the period between the second half of the 6th century and the first half of the 7th, the treatise is simply a mandatory source.216 Examples that confirm this trend include the monograph by Florin Curta,217 the great work by Walter Pohl,218 the recent works written by Georgios Kardaras219 or the less stellar summary of the reign of Maurice by Franziska Schlosser.220 I have analyzed the issues of military psychology and the theatre of the battlefield in the context of Strategikon in several articles,221 which to a large degree form the core ideas of this book. The author of Strategikon, as has already been mentioned, was familiar with the work of Vegetius and referred to it when listing military maxims (γνωμικά). Other sections of De Re Militari influenced the creation of Strategikon to a much lesser extent. In terms of references to the treatise by Syrianus Magister, the situation is a bit more complicated. An analysis of the content reveals no direct correlation between the text of De Re Strategica and Strategikon.222 However, specific elements in the description of tactics point to the fact that Syrianus wrote his treatise before the creation of Strategikon.223 In my book, I will be referring to the established edition of the Greek treatise prepared by G.T. Dennis.224 For the purpose of my studies, the source materials are of crucial importance, and a large portion of this book should be considered source commentary. The footnotes will always include the original Latin or Greek version of any translated passage. Despite the existence of excellent translations into English and other modern languages, I have decided to prepare my own, for each fragment of any work from Antiquity that will be referenced. This is due to the character of this study, i.e. focusing on battlefield psychology, which means that I will be interested in subjects that might have been generalized by other translators, particularly with regard to terminology. In many instances, I have also decided to retain original names and military titles, as it is my belief that modern military ranks do not always accurately reflect the specific character and structure of the Roman army. 5.5 Supplementary Sources Classical works on the art of war will be of some comparative importance to my studies. The section on the ideal commander will require references to Onasander’s work entitled Στρατηγικός.225 I will also refer to a piece by Aelianus Tacticus, who had a large impact on the author of Strategikon,226 as well as the writings of Lucius Flavius Arrianus227 and the classical work by Aeneas Tacticus on defending fortifications.228 Two treatises by Polyaenus229
and Frontinus230 are other excellent supplementary sources, which will help to verify the usefulness of suggested Late Antiquity stratagems. Beside De Re Strategica by Syrianus Magister, a treatise that could have been written in the Middle Byzantine period, I will also make use of works written in the Middle Byzantine period. The Tactica,231 from the reign of Leo VI the Wise232 (866–912), is of comparative significance; its author drew on the rich tradition of ancient military treatises. Another important source will be Sylloge Tacticorum233 written most probably in the first half of the 10th century.234 The revival of Roman military art is reflected in three other treatises:235 Nikephoros Ouranos’s236 Taktika,237 the Praecepta Militaria238 and De velitatione bellica239 written in the 10th century in the Phokas family240 plus an anonymous treatise Byzantini liber De Re Militari.241 Interestingly, in this book, the sources from the Middle Byzantine period supplement the three major treatises.
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