Download PDF | Jean-Claude Cheynet - The Byzantine Aristocracy and its Military Function (Variorum Collected Studies)-Routledge (2006).
380 Pages
INTRODUCTION
During the Middle Ages (seventh to fifteenth centuries) the aristocracy formed the social framework of the Byzantine Empire. Its history is closely associated with that of the State. Defining the concept is difficult however, and this is confirmed by the absence of precise vocabulary, except in its highest sphere where the emperor was almost systematically chosen from within its ranks. On the other hand the lowest ranks of aristocrats can barely be distinguished from the humbler echelons of the civil service in Constantinople or from wealthy merchants in the various cities.
The Byzantine aristocracy can best be defined by services rendered to the State, yet in the Komnenian period the higher ranks were more than ever accessible by birth. For all these centuries, however, it would be unwise to formulate too strict an opposition between obtaining a position through capability or because of one's birth. Birth is a factor since the State needed officials who were thoroughly fitted for the task. The influence of parents, together with the availability of education in the capital, enabled their offspring to seek positions which opened the doors of the aristocracy for them, thus creating a de facto heredity. The aristocracy however was not a closed caste, and newcomers who showed military or intellectual talent ended up in positions which thereby made them members of the Senate.
Since the primordial duty of the State was to defend the chosen people of God, the army was the main ladder for social ascent. Even if the officer corps, as well as other groups in the service of the basileus, was first and foremost drawn from the families of the generals (strategoi) in post, and hence were of 'good family', novi homines - new men - could to various degrees gain access to the officer class. Episodes of fierce conflict often helped fresh aristocratic families to emerge.
This can clearly be seen in Asia Minor from the eighth to the ninth centuries and, at the turning point of the tenth and eleventh centuries, in the Balkans. The most significant advances in research have come from a more systematic exploitation of sigillographic evidence. More Byzantine seals, dated with greater accuracy, have been published, although their full impact will only be measured with the publication of the Byzantine prosopography for the years 867—1261. The chapters selected for this volume can conveniently be divided into two groups, one dealing with the general characteristics of the aristocracy, the other with its military role.
In order to secure a permanent place for one's family in the higher reaches of the aristocracy, it was necessary to glorify one's genos or descent, which between the eighth and the eleventh centuries often meant allowing it to be identified by a name which could be handed down from one generation to the next. Maintaining one's rank also presupposed the transmission of property and the cultivation of useful contacts. The wealth of the elites, in the provinces as well as in the capital, came from vast landed estates, part of which had been received as gifts from the emperor. These properties however were divided equally between children, without damaging the interests of daughters it seems. Byzantine inheritance law was not based on primogeniture.
Thus in each generation it was necessary to compensate a weakening of personal estate and to trust in imperial generosity. The sovereign had thus at his disposition the means of controlling these powerful aristocrats (chapters IV and V). To obtain his favour the most effective method was to present a family member at court, and if possible have him accepted in the inner circle of the emperor's advisors. Even if such positions were seldom stable, they were the means of appropriating part of the State's resources, granted as rogai linked to offices or ranks conferred by the basileus. When, in the eleventh century, increasing monetary devaluation accelerated to the point where it was perceptible to all concerned, it brought about the corresponding devaluation of rogai. The recipients of these state benefits made up for their loss by claiming and progressively receiving higher state offices, thereby safeguarding their 'purchasing power' (chapter VI). Aristocratic power above all showed itself in the army, but in several different ways.
Alongside the natural authority of officers over their men, we find the social pre-eminence of the the major landowners, as the officers usually were, in relation to their peasants, from among whom the rank and file soldiers were recruited (chapter VII). At times the emperor himself felt threatened by their overweaning power and Basil II, after repulsing two formidable rebellions led by Skleros and Phocas, did his utmost to recover control of Asia Minor, as much with a foreign policy aim of curbing the appetites of his eastern neighbours, who had profited from the internal dissensions of the Empire to extend their authority, as on the domestic front, when he confiscated the possessions of the Maleinos and the Phocas families (chapter VIII). At the end of the twelfth century, the provincial aristocracy, profiting from the general economic upsurge and the concentration of wealth in the cities, was tempted by local insurrections, particularly at Philadelphia, notwithstanding the presence there of the military headquarters of the dux of the Thrakesioi (chapter IX).
The Empire's military policy derives from the great soldier emperors, the last of whom, Basil II, was an inhibiting reference for his successors (chapter X). By then the army in the tagmata had definitely won the day over that of the themes (chapter XI). Scholars still discuss the numerical strength of the Byzantine army, since consideration of the theoretical number of units, if they are estimated as being in any way complete, leads to an inflated calculation of the military forces in the field. Attentive reading of the narrative sources and remarks drawn from the taktika invite a contrary assessment, which is doubtless the correct interpretation (chapter XII).
The failure of this army when facing the Turks has led writers to stress its mediocre fighting skills, as a result supposedly of the lack of interest shown towards it by rulers between 1025 and 1078, who are abusively described as civilians. Analysis of the battle engaged by Romanos IV Diogenes at Manzikert suggests that this weakening of military qualities, even allowing for some indiscipline in the ranks and the poor equipment of some regiments, is not the real reason for the emperor's failure nor an explanation for the spectacular advance of the Turks, who benefited from the intense civil unrest after Romanos IV was freed by the Sultan (chapter XIII). Furthermore the rapidity of the Turkish hordes, in itself undeniable, has surely been overestimated, since traces of Byzantine presence can be found in western Asia Minor in the first decade of Alexos Komnenos' reign (chapter XIV).
JEAN-CLAUDE CHEYNET
Paris January 2006
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