Download PDF | Korea: the Mongol invasions, By William E Henthorn (Author), Inglés, 2012.
276 Pages
PREFACE
Events of the past decade have once again placed the Korean peninsula in the position of a buffer state where the wars of greater powers are focused. Historians will recall that Korea has had this role thrust upon her many times before. In recent times the peninsula was the battleground for the Sino -Japanese War of 1894-1895 while the opening battle of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, a naval action, took place off the present port of Inch'6n. As a result, a number of studies of the various aspects of modern Korean society, particularly in its contacts with the West, have been undertaken but little attention has been given to the evolution of that society. Yet it is only when this is studied for each period in Korean history that studies of contemporary Korean society can be approached in other than a limited sense.
The Kory6 ^ )^ period (918-1392) during which the Mongol invasions occurred was a great formative period in the history of the development of Korean society. The period encompassing the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century and the subsequent establishment of Mongol military-administrative organs on the Korean peninsula was one of the important phases of transition in Korean history.
The development of any society is, of course, continuous, but for the purposes of study I have found it convenient to treat the subject at hand in two natural divisions. The Mongol invasions of Korea in the thirteenth century as a development in Korean history form the subject of the present study. It is my intention to treat, in a separate work, the full extension of Mongol control in Korea which followed the period of conquest and with which I have dealt only summarily if at all in these pages. For the period covered I have, however, considered the question of the form and nature of Mongol demands upon Koryd as well as the implementation of these demands as an illustration of Mongol methods of establishing control in and extracting wealth from conquered nations. The reciprocal of this was the Kory6 response to Mongol demands and pressures which was obviously limited and guided by her internal situation as well as hei external relations.
The Mongol conquest and subsequent occupation of KoryO represent but one phase in the development of the Mongol empire and in many respects the least known phase. The Mongols, initially, did not set out to conquer Koryo but were at the time fighting the Chin in North China. When a drive across South Manchuria led them into northern Koryo, they obtained KoryO's submission Avithout fighting a battle against Kory6 forces.
There were many factors which contributed to KoryO's initial peaceful submission but the key factor was that the Mongols represented, or appeared to represent, the new power in Manchuria, And KoryO had always been tributary to the power which held North China and Manchuria. When it became apparent that the Mongols were not at the time strong enough to hold South Manchuria, Koryo severed the relationship. This led to a period of sporadic warfare lasting almost thirty years. When KoryO finally submitted to the Mongols it was due more to internal events than as a result of the conflict. It has been one of the purposes of this study to examine these events and, if possible, to discover some of the reasons behind what were often apparently contradictory act ions by the Kory6 authorities. My approach has been primarily philological and in this respect I have, in general, endeavored to 'let the records speak for themselves'.
Unfortunately studies of pre-modern Korean history by Western scholars have been extremely limited to say the least, while studies by Korean, Chinese, and Japanese scholars are often difficult to obtain. In consideration thereof, I have divided the present study into two parts. The first part is in the form of a descriptive and chronological narrative; the second part deals primarily with considerations and consequences of events described in the first part and is more analytical in nature. Thus, a 'feed-back' methodology is projected. The narrative of events places them in perspective so that an analysis of component parts may be undertaken without distortion; the analysis of component parts in turn allows modification of the narrative of events.
Since Homer Hulbert's two volume History of Korea, first published in 1905 has recently been reprinted, a word should be said about earlier accounts of Korean history which include J.Ross* History of Corea, first printed in 1880, W.E.Griffis', Corea, the Hermit Nation, first printed in 1882, and J. S. Gale's, A History of the Korean People, which appeared serially in the Korean Mission Field in the years 1925-1927o It would be too easy to subject the pertinent sections of these works to criticism but since I can see no purpose which would be served by so doing, I have refrained from commenting on what I consider to have been valiant pioneer efforts.
For the convenience of the non-specialist, I have added an introductory chapter which provides a brief background and I have endeavored, particularly in the narrative, to relegate technical matters to footnotes. However, for convenience, whenever a reference consists merely of the abbreviated title of the work plus chUan and page numbers, I have simply placed such information in parentheses in the appropriate location.
In the romanization of Chinese (except for .^- which I have romanized ke) I have followed the Wade -Giles system with the usual modifications; for Japanese the Hepburn system, again with the usual modifications. In the romanization of Korean I have followed the McCune-Reischauer system with the following exceptions:
1) utilized names or terms commonly known in another form, e.g., Seoul, H j£ , etc.
2) spaced rather than linked both particles and auxiliary verbs; rendered S-j as ui in all cases; and omitted the diaeresis over e '^M when so called for by the MR system.
In the reconstruction of Mongolian names and terms, I have followed the works of Pelliot, Hambis, Shiratori, and Cleaves and, excluding the wellknown term daruyaci or resident commissioner, references have been provided in footnotes. Where no reference is provided the reconstruction is my own. Since my knowledge of thirteenth century Mongolian is very limited, I have left the majority of these names in Chinese transcription, providing orthographic variants when such were encountered, excluding variations resulting from the well-known Ch'ien-lung language reforms of the mideighteenth century.
When the name of a location differs from its current designation, I have endeavored to identify or locate it by placing in parentheses following it the modern name it is known by or the area in which it is located; more detailed references are given in footnotes.
All bibliographical abbreviations are in capital letters and may be found in the bibliography; non-bibliographical abbreviations are listed separately preceding the bibliography.
All dates are lunar except where the western name of the month is given in which case they are solar.
In indicating the reign dates of monarchs, I have commenced with the wdnny&n y\_,}^~ and ended with the year preceding the wwinydn of the next monarch; when a monarch reigned only during the year of his accession, I have accorded the monarch that year as his 'reign-year'. In indicating the birth dates of individuals when the age at death was known I have arrived at the birth date by subtracting the age plus two years since, as is well-known, in Korea like in China, a child is assumed to be one-year old upon his birth and adds one year to his age each successive (lunar) new year's day. It should be observed that even this method does not always produce the correct year of birth.
Translations of the titles of works in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese are provided in brackets following the title in the original language; when the author of such a work has himself supplied either a translation or an alternate title in a western language, it is so indicated by quotation marks.
A word of caution must be given regarding large numbers occurring in the text. The majority of figures of 10 000 or more should be viewed with some skepticism while the number three should always be suspect.
I gratefully acknowledge the aid given to me by The Rockefeller Foundation and The Ford Foundation whose generous assistance made it possible for me to work at Leiden which resulted in this study, the publication of which was aided by a grant from the Netherlands Ministerie van Onderwijs, Kunsten en Wetenschappen. Needless to say, the views expressed in this study are entirely my own. I wish particularly to thank Mr. and Mrs. Schepel-Verschoo'r of Leiden for their many kindnesses. Indeed, my indebtedness to all my Dutch friends can be only insufficiently expressed here; I owe a similar debt to Mr. Boyd Compton of New York City whose personal encouragement and warm friendship gave me the courage to continue. For their generous assistance in locating relevant materials I express my deep appreciation to Dr. Li Ogg (Yi Ok) J^ ^ of the University de Paris and Madame Meuvert of the Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes, Paris. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the cooperation and efforts of the firm of Brill & Co., Leiden, and Mr. F. B. Krips and Mr. J. F. Krips of Rijswijk (Z.H.) in the final printing and publication of this study.
To my wife T'aesun Henthorn, n^e Yi T'aesun :^ -^ ji]^ , more than to anyone else do I owe the undertaking and completion of this study. With gentle patience she endured endless toil leaving me free to continue this work, encouraged me through difficult periods when I would have given up, and set by her own efforts an example for perseverance which I have endeavored to follow. She typed the manuscript in all its drafts, offered me the guidance of her excellent knowledge of Korean, Sino-Korean, and Japanese, and it is, finally, her calligraphy which graces the pages of this work.
W.E. Henthorn Leiden, August, 1963
INTRODUCTION
The state of Korytt which rose upon the fragments of a shattered Silla (Late Period 668-918), was influenced by early contacts with China's Five Dynasties and became in its formative years a haven for thousands of refugees from the Manchurian state of P'ohai fji 3^ D (713-926) which had been crushed by the Ch'i-tan f^ \^y who swept across Manchuria on their way to establishing the Liao }^Dynasty (907-1125). Powerful conquerors continued to appear in the north as the cauldron of Manchuria repeatedly boiled over into Kory6 until the peninsula was innundated in a deluge of Mongol invasions in the first half of the thirteenth century. Kory6, its coastal areas favorite targets of Japanese freebooters since time immemorial, found its territories repeatedly invaded by the Ch'i-tan 2), the Jiircen ^ji masters of the Chin y^ Dynasty (1115-1234) '^\ and the Mongol founders of the Yiian ril-(in the extended sense ca. 1215-1368) empire. Acknowledged vassal 4) of the Sung ^^(960-1126), Liao, Chin, Yiian, and, finally, after a shifting initial relationship, of the Ming ll\] (1368-1644), Koryft received a steady stream of external pressures which altered and guided Korean society as it evolved.
The repeated invasions have led Yi PySngdo ^|^:^ , the dean of modern Korean historians, to write that "the history of the KoryS dynasty was, it may be said, chiefly a history of engagements with the peoples beyond the northern borders." 5) While neither foreign invasions, a highly developed maritime trade, nor the gradual Kory6 expansion northward into the upper reaches of the Yalu and the Tuman River valleys relate the entire history of KoryO, they did provide backdrop and stimulus for internal developments.
Within the limitations of such criteria, the history of the Kory5 dynasty may be divided into three broad periods:
1) from 918 to 1170, the power of the government remained fairly centralized in the person of the monarch;
2) from 1170 to 1270, Kory6 was under the control of the military government and the monarchs became figureheads;
3) from 1270 onward, power was restored to the monarch while events in Koryo tended to reflect, in pro- and anti -Mongol factions alike, the vicissitudes of the Yiian and the rise of the Ming until the end of the Kory6 Dynasty in 1392.
At the time of the Mongol invasions, Kory6 was under the firm control of a military government as indeed it had been for over fifty years. While there appears to have been no great socio-political and hence economic distinction between the civil and the military officials at the beginning of the Koryo Dynasty 6), by the reign of tJijong (r. 1147-1170) '^), a rigid class distinction existed between the civil and the military officials. The ranks of the literati, who held the government posts of importance, were closed to the military and their descendants and reserved for those of royal lineage or the descendants of the civil officials. It was not long before the dissipations of tJijong — if the records be believed — placed the actual control of the state in the hands of the literati and the eunuchs °) who then endeavored to further strengthen their own power by making the military as a group as weak as possible while abusing them individually 9). This eliminated in a coiip d'etat by Ch6ng Chxmgbu 10) i^ 1170, and the military then began to compete among themselves for power 11). Ch6ng deposed tJijong and placed Myongjong (r. 1171-1197) 12) on the throne after a wholesale purge of the civil officials. This was followed by many abortive attempts by members of Ch6ng's own followers to wrest power from him and there were also several unsuccessful attempts to topple Ch6ng by other military leaders 1^) until, finally, he was overthrown and killed by Generally) KySng TaeSung 15) in 1179 16). The competition for power among the military had given rise to strong house armies and so, when General Kyong died suddenly in 1183, Yi Uimin 1"^) became the new military ruler on the strength of his house army. Then in 1196, Ch'oe Ch'unghon ^ J^W\ established himself as the ruling power by assassinating Yi. In each case the house armies made up of household retainers were the deciding factor in the power struggle and it was on the strength of these private forces that power was retained 1^).
During the period of the military government the monarchs were largely in the position of figureheads. There were, of course, attempts by the monarchs to alter this situation which normally led to their removal and exile or, upon occasion, their murder 20). Kojong (r. 1214-1259) 21)^ the monarch during whose long reign many of the events related in the subsequent pages occurred, immersed himself in Buddhist devotions and activities. Ceremonial activities accounted for the remainder of his time while the practical affairs of government were handled by the various government bureaus which were modeled, to a large extent, after Chinese counterparts. Distinct from, yet in actual operational control of all government organs, were the various organs organized and developed by the military rulers. Through this latter structure the military rulers guided the affairs of state 22) .
KoryS's first recorded contact with the Mongols occurred in 1211, i.e., the seventh year of the reign of Kory6 Huijong (r. 1205-1211) 23) when a Koryo envoy to the Chin court was killed by Mongol soldiers (KS21. 25b). Although this was in time to prove a prophetic encounter, Koryo' s first contacts with Mongol forces on a large scale began upon a much different note. The 'Record of Yuan-Kory6 Affairs', Yuan Kao-li chi-shih <^ ^ ^ a^^' opens with a concise statement of the initial phase of Yuan-Kory6 relations:
"In the thirteenth year (1218) of T'ai-tsu J^;f^ (Cinggis, 1155 -1227), the troops of heaven (Mongol) reached Kory6. Their monarch submitted and [agreed to] the interchange of envoys and annual tribute. In the nineteenth year (1224) bandits killed our envoy and thereafter [envoys] did not come at all" {YKCld).
As succinct as these few lines are they underscore the salient features of Kory6's initial relations with the Mongols. To begin with, the Mongol offensive which swept across the Yalu in 1218, was directed against the Ch'i-tan and not against Kory6, nor was there any particular penetration of other than the northern border region. Second, Kory6 submitted to the extent of attempting to purchase autonomy by the submission of tribute. And, finally, relations were severed following the murder of a Mongol envoy in the first month of 1225 24)^ ^nd were not resumed until 1231, when they were forcefully reopened by Mongol arms.
There were in the years that followed, three major turning points in Mongol -Kory6 relations on the Kory6 side:
a. the Kory6 decision to transfer the seat of government from the central capital of Kaegy6ng |vf] jf^ (mod. Kaes6ng; see Chapter I note 43) to Kanghwa Island in 1232;
b. the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan in 1258, and
c. the deposition and subsequent restoration of the monarch W6njong (r. 12601274) 25) in 1269.
These may be briefly characterized as ushering in periods of resistance, begrudged cooperation, and active alliance.
On the Yiian side, the turning point began with the reign of Qubilai (Shihtsung \^ yP , r. 1260-1294) which can be described as the commencement of the organized enforcement of Mongol demands through the Mongol military administrative organs established in Kory6.
When the Mongols commenced their drive in 1209 against the Chin empire which held sway over North China and Manchuria, and to which Koryo was tributary, it produced some unsettling effects. There were the expected revolts among the Ch'i-tan who had been conquered by the Chin and there were also deserters among the Jiirien themselves. Two cases are of particular interest to us here.
In 1211, the Ch'i-tan prince Yeh-lii Liu-ke ^^ ^^ ^ ^ > who had been serving the Chin as chiliarch (i.e., Chief of One Thousand) ch'ien-hu
J^ , rebelled against the Chin and seized control of a portion of the
4
Liaotung area. The following year, he submitted to Mongol forces pressing eastward across Liaotung and, in 1213, he proclaimed himself ruler of the Liao. This, like the establishment of the Qara-Khitay state in Central Asia following the fall of the Liao Dynasty in 1125 26) ^ ^as an attempt to revive the old Liao empire. Liu-ke was soon ousted from power by a certain Yehssu-pu jfc^M ^ and he requested support from Cinggis against the usurper.
In 1214, the Chin moved their capital south to Feng-ching 3 T ^fv and appointed P'u-hsien Wan-nu Jt^ Mf^^j^t ^ Jiircen, to be Pacification Commissioner, hsien-fu-shih ^ ^MrW > ^^ ^^^ Hsien-p'ing-lu 27) area where the revolt centered. Wan-nu, with some forty thousand men under his command, was to check the rebellion initiated by Yeh-lii Liu-ke, but he was himself defeated in late 1214, and, using the opportunity provided by an attack directed against the Chin under the Mongol General Muqali 28) which resulted in the fall of Peking to the Mongol forces, Wan-nu rebelled against the Chin in the spring of 1215 {YS 1. 19a). Basing himself in the Chin Eastern Capital, Tung-ching # J^^ (Liaoyang), he established himself at the head of a state which he designated Ta-chen /vi£. or Great Jiircen.
In the spring of 1216, the Ch'i-tan rebels fled south from Hsien-p'ing j^ Y~ before a Chin army mustered against them and overran the southern borders of Wan-nu' s territory, seizing Teng-chou ^^jj\ • Yeh-ssu-pu was murdered at this time by one of his ministers, a certain Ch'i-nu ^-^/^ , who then assumed the leadership. At this point the Ch'i-tan rebels held the area from Teng-chou (mod, Hai-chou J-^ -jn ) to Poju yj^ jj\ (= tJiju^ jU ) just across the Yalu River. In the autumn and winter of 1216, Mongol forces had bepn engaged in the Liaotung ir'eninsula and, accompanied by Yeh-liiLiu-ke, had chased the Ch'i-tan rebels from Teng-chou to the Koryo borders. Then the Mongols lavinched an attack on the Ch'i-tan forces at Ta-fu-ying
^^ ;7\. r^ (located on an island in the lower course of the Yalu River, near mod. tliju). Hard-pressed, the Ch'i-tan requested land and supplies from Kory6 to continue the fight; when it was refused they crossed the Yalu with an estimated ninety thousand men and overran the Kory6 frontier region {YS 154. la; IC 9A. 6b).
P'u-hsien Wan-nu had endeavored to retain his independence but was defeated by the Mongol forces pressing eastward and, submitting to Muqali, he sent his son T'ieh-ke )j]J -^* as a hostage {YS 1. 19a). When the Mongol forces withdrew following the defeat of the Ch'i-tan rebels late in 1216, Wan-nu took his own forces further east toward the Yalu and, in early 1217, redesignated his nation the Tung-hsia ^ ^ or Eastern Hsia in 1217 (YS 1, 19a-b). The name of this state is probably better known as Tung-chen (-kuo) or (Land of) the Eastern JiirCen and for simplicity I will refer to them simniv as the Eastern JiirCen 29).
The Ch'i-tan rebels had spent the year 1217 pillaging southward down the Korean peninsula, menacing the Kory6 capital. Then, after a long drive to the southeast culminated in several defeats, they turned toward the land of the Eastern Jiircen in the northeast.
The Chin, in the meantime, had attempted to strengthen their hold on the Liaotung area where they still had strong garrisons and, at this time, controlled the P'o-su-lu ^ i^j^^ administrative area which lay just west of the lower reaches of the Yalu. P'u-hsien Wan-nu, pressed by these Chin forces in Liaotung, moved further eastward into the Chin Ho-lan-lu y^j m^jS >^ administrative area and based himself along the lower reaches of the Tuman River. It was into this area that the Ch'i-tan rebels had fled from Koryo in the autumn of 1217, and here they were able to recruit reinforcements. The Ch'i-tan resumed their attack on Kory6 in a drive directed toward Koryo' s vVe stern Capital, Sdgydng ^ P^ (mod. P'y6ngyang), which overran Kory6's Northeast Frontier-District but fell short of the objective at the near-by walled-city of Kangdong ^J^ -^ 30) Kory6 forces managed to contain them in this area and were slowly gaining the upper hand when, in the winter of 1218, unexpected allies appeared. * Teke
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