Download PDF | The Mongol Conquests The Military Operations Of Genghis Khan And Sübe’etei By Carl Fredrik Sverdrup, Helion and Company 2017.
394 Pages
Preface
My study of the Mongols and their military operations has over the years gone through several stages. I started reading Western, mainly English, hooks on the subject. Dupuy & Dupuy’s Encyclopaedia of Military History provided the first introduction. In their overview of the history of warfare from 3,500 BC to the present, they included a substantial section on the Mongols. They ranked Genghis Khan as one of 12 ‘Great Captains’ of military history and lauded the Mongols for their military brilliance.
The books of Liddell Hart, Harold Lamb, Michael Prawdin, James Chambers, Leo de Hartog, and Stephen Turnbull added to this beginning. With this base, the next level of my Mongol ‘journey’ was to understand the sources these authors had relied on. Most European and Near Eastern primary sources are readily available in English, German, or Erench and so is the Mongolian Secret History. The Chinese sources, notably the dynastic histories, presented a bigger challenge. De MaiUa (1730), Gaubil (1739), and de Harlez (1887) made translations of the dynastic histories long ago.
These are, however, condensed accounts and the translations of titles and names are often difficult to follow. Eurther, the translations are not supplemented with extensive commentary as is now standard in such works. Some limited parts of the Yuanshi and the first part of Shengwujinzhenglu have been properly translated. However, with these few exceptions, the rest of the Chinese source material is unavailable to Western readers.
The task in the third and final stage of my Mongol research was to work my way through the ‘raw’ Chinese dynastic histories with the help of Abel Yu, an experienced Chinese translator. Supplemented by the scholarly articles as well as Desmond Martin’s book The Rise of Chingis Khan And His Conquest Of North China, I was able to develop a better understanding of the Mongol military campaigns.
My Mongol studies were driven by a desire to know what really happened. It was only afterwards that I considered using the research for other purposes. I have published two articles on the Mongols in academic journals. The first looked at the numbers of the Mongol armies at different times, while the second, at the recommendation of Igor de Rachewiltz, dealt with Siibe’etei. This book is a more ambitious step, a full military history of the Mongols.
The eminent Norman Baynes wrote an article called The Military Operations of the Emperor Heraclios more than a century ago. I read this wanting to understand how Heraclios operated against the Sasanians from 622 to 628. The article was a brilliant start for the subject, even if the reconstruction of the campaigns I now consider correct is very different from the version of Baynes. The format and approach of his study was, however, very good and hoping to match his spirit I have given the hook the sub¬ title The Military Operations of Genghis Khan and Siibe’etei.
A specialised or selective study can look at the subject in depth, avoiding areas where the sources are weak. A broader narrative can avoid difficult areas by being vague. I have made a broad-based narrative without shying away from details. To construct a narrative, much guesswork and assumptions are needed at times. Hopefully, I explain the assumptions well and leave the ground open for others to improve on the narrative. Our understanding of the Mongol military campaigns is certain to improve with time. Hopefully this reconstruction, like that of Baynes for Heraclios, can contribute positively to this process. As rendered by the ‘36 Stratagems’, I ‘toss out a brick to attract the jade.’
I would like to thank publisher Duncan Rogers, editor Serena Jones, and map maker George Anderson for helping transform my script and drafts into this book.
Introduction
Seven hundred years ago a man almost conquered the earth. He made himself master of half the known world, and inspired mankind with a fear that lasted for generations.
- Harold Lamb'
Napoleon associated great military achievement closely with individual military genius, saying: The Gauls were not conquered by the Roman legions, but by Caesar. It was not before the Carthaginian soldiers that Rome was made to tremble, but before Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian phalanx which reached India, but Alexander. It was not the French army that reached Weser and the Inn; it was Turenne. Prussia was not defended for seven years against the three most formidable European powers by the Prussian soldiers but by Frederick the Great.^
During the 13th century, the Mongols established the greatest land-based empire known to history, stretching at one point from the Adriatic Sea in the west to the China Sea in the east. Initially an insignificant tribal group, the Mongols united the Inner Asian tribes under their leadership and then proceeded to make territorial conquests unequalled in speed and extent. What genius, it may be asked, was the driving force behind this achievement?
Genghis Khan was the dominant personality of the early Mongol period. To Napoleon and his era, Genghis Khan was a bloodthirsty conqueror who overwhelmed his foes with innumerable forces. It was only during the first part of the 20th century that the Mongols came to be seen as masters of warfare who won by means of skill rather than numbers, and Genghis Khan was accepted as one of most outstanding military commanders known to history. Had Napoleon made his comment in, say, 1934 he might have included Genghis Khan amongst his Great Captains. American general MacArthur was certainly impressed. He wrote during that year in his closing report as Chief of Staff:
Were the accounts of all battles, save only those of Genghis Khan, effaced from the pages of history, and were the facts of his campaigns preserved in descriptive detail, the soldier would still possess a mine of untold wealth from which to extract nuggets of knowledge useful in moulding an army for future use. The successes of that amazing leader, beside which the triumphs of most other commanders in history pale into insignificance, are proof sufficient of his unerring instinct for the fundamental qualifications of an army.^
The Mongol Empire continued to expand after the death of Genghis Khan. The later conquests are closely associated with his general Siibeetei. Not as widely known as Genghis Khan, Sfibe’etei has gained a high reputation amongst military specialists. For example, famed military theorist Liddell Hart wrote: As a logistical strategist Napoleon is unrivalled in history - save possibly by the Mongol Subutai, from what we can pierce together from the scanty records of his campaigns.’"*
Though many military historians and commentators regard Genghis Khan and Siibe’etei highly, the details of their actual operations are far from clear to them. One of the most well-known Mongol campaigns is the one Genghis Khan directed against Khwarezm in what is now Uzbekistan during 1220. It has been described in detail in many popular militarily-focussed accounts, for example by Liddell Hart, Trevor Dupuy, and James Chambers. Liddell Hart and Dupuy both have high reputations as military theorists and commentators and Chambers wrote a very influential account of the Mongols’campaigns in the Near East and Europe.
However with regard to the Mongol operations against Khwarezm they fail to agree on basic details. According to Liddell Hart the Mongol left wing struck from Kashgar in the east, entering Ferghana to ‘distract’ the enemy (for locations see map 14). The Mongol main forces, in the west, struck through the KyzyUcum Desert to suddenly appear in front of Bokhara. Dupuy improved on this narrative, saying the Mongol left struck from Kashgar across the Pamir Mountains to the lower Amu Darya, an ambitious outflanking movement.
Further, he proposed the main forces actually moved around Aral Lake to reach Bokhara from the north-west. Chambers adopted the version of Liddell Hart with regard to the movement of the main army, but made the left wing execute an outflanking movement as described by Dupuy. Adding his own twist, he says another Mongol column coming from Kashgar made hit and run attacks along the entire length of the Syr Darya - the enemy front. With such major differences it is fair to wonder ‘who is right?’ In fact, as will be seen later, none are.
Liddell Hart, Harold Lamb, and Michael Prawdin published articles and books during the years between the First and Second World Wars, helping to shape a new view of the Mongols. They saw the Mongols as military supermen.® The generals of the First World War were widely criticised for being unimaginative and ineffective, suffering great losses in dead and wounded that could have been avoided. The Mongols provided an example of how war should be waged; by means of brilliant strategy they were held to have won easy victories. Liddell Hart wrote: ‘they had grasped the essentials of strategy, while their tactical mechanism was so perfect that the higher conceptions of tactics were unnecessary’.
Harold Lamb worried that Nazi Germany had unlocked Mongol secrets: ‘There are other indications than these that readers in the Third Reich have made a close study of the Mongol campaigns and especially the Mongol technique of attack.’^ The Western historiographical ‘Mongol supermen school’ has evolved and gained traction up until the present, sustained by a remarkable unwillingness to make use of primary and good-quality secondary sources. A whole host of later historians have added to the original narrative.
Later authors include Trevor Dupuy, Leo de Hartog, James Chambers, Stephen Turnbull, Bevin Alexander, and Richard Gabriel to list a few. They all agree on the brilliance of the Mongols, but cannot agree on operational specifics. This holds true for the 1241 invasion of Central Europe, the 1220 campaign discussed above, and even more for operations in China. None of the cited authors had access to many primary sources. While most know the Secret History and some of the Muslim sources, the bulk of the Chinese sources have not been properly translated into any European language. Without these it is difficult to go into detail with regard to many military operations of the Mongols.
The military campaigns and operations of notable commanders such as Alexander III (‘the Great’), Hannibal, Caesar, or Napoleon are dealt with in detail in many high-quality works. Authors describe events step by step and consider the decisions taken by the commanders at different points. They review alternatives and evaluate the performance of the key players. Alexander is often faulted for not pursuing the Persians after defeating them at Issus in 333 BC; Hannibal for not marching on Rome in 216 BC; and Caesar for dallying with Cleopatra in Egypt when his foes raised new forces in Africa and Iberia in 47-46 BC.
In Belgium in 1815, misunderstandings left the corps of Erench officer Erlon marching between two battlefields without having an impact on either of them, perhaps denying Napoleon a decisive victory. Napoleon relied on certain strategic ploys he tended to repeat. When he defeated two enemy armies in detail in 1796 it was a novel idea. When he tried the same in 1815 his foes knew what he was up to and did what it took to defeat him. When Eederal commander Grant struck into the Wilderness in 1864 he was severely mauled by Confederate commander Lee, but instead of accepting defeat and retreat, as his predecessors would have done, he pushed forward.
Though losing more men than Lee, his army was larger and the Union able to replace losses. Lee on the other hand could ill afford to fight a war of attrition. These are samples of military considerations and different situations, be it lost opportunities, impact of friction of war, innovation and the enemy response, or trade-off between a quick victory and reliance on attrition. In the Mongol supermen school, no errors are seen in their conduct, no worn-out strategic ploys fail to surprise the enemy, and no unexpected event derails a plan.
This is how Montgomery wanted the world to see the battle of Normandy in 1944, with everything unfolding in accordance with his master plan. It is also how Liddell Hart, Trevor Dupuy, and James Chambers see the Mongol conquest of Transoxiana in 1220 or of Hungary in 1241. Complex plans were implemented with ease, giving the Mongols cheap victories. This, however, does not fit the reality of war. There are always mistakes, misunderstandings, opportunities missed, and surprises.The aim here is to produce a more realistic narrative of the Mongol military campaigns, based on primary and good-quality secondary sources. No a priori assumptions will be taken about the Mongol military brilliance. They would have had to overcome the friction of war as much as Alexander, Hannibal, Napoleon, and other commanders.
War can be considered in many different ways. The historian John Keegan famously focussed on the experience of battle, how the soldiers actually fought.* This can be called a ‘bottom up’ approach. Strategic movement, numbers, and maps help look at the reality of war from a different angle. This is what will be the initial focus here. Combat is a social action, but statistical laws govern it. At heart, war works like a Lancaster model. One hundred men fighting against 50 in the open with similar weapons, training, and social context will have an advantage. If the 50 men hold a pass or a fortified position, it becomes a different matter. If one side have the advantage of surprise or more supplies, it can again change the context.
Trevor Dupuy promoted this type of thinking and developed analytical tools.’ Mongol victories and defeats must he understood in operational context, as the commanders of the period would have seen it. To track events, the focus needs to be on geography, time, and numbers. Numbers and geography are no easy matter, especially with regard to the early wars of the Mongols. What the numbers were is often a matter of guesswork and many locations are either uncertain or not known at all. In the interest of establishing a framework, estimates and guesses wUl be made. The timing of operations is generally well understood when the theatre of war is in central China, the Near East, or Europe, but much less so in the plains far from sedentary states.
There is much still to understand with regard to how Mongols and their foes fought, that is to say the face of battle as well as grand tactical details such as unit deployment, formations, and movement during battle. The sources are far from satisfactory. Certainly there is no description of the kind that, for example, Polybius offers on the battle of Cannae (216 BC) or Arrian offers for the battle of Gaugamela (331 BC). Even so, the sources offer some information. Although not the main emphasis here, the point will be pursued wherever the sources allow it.
The ‘hig man’ theory of history is generally discredited today, though as seen above Napoleon does not agree with this. Eor sure, Genghis Khan, his general Siihe’etei, the other Mongol commanders, and their foes operated with teams around them. It is difficult to say much about this. The reader should always consider that the commanders functioned in a team and operated in an organisational structure. A little is known about how Genghis Khan managed war as the people around him and his organisation is quite well described in near contemporary sources, but for other key players almost nothing is known.
This book is structured into two main sections with the focus being Genghis Khan in the first and Siibeetei in the second. Before that an overview wUl be given of the world where Genghis Khan and Siibeetei operated. Genghis Khan was active from before 1191, to 1227. What he did before 1191 is almost entirely lost to history. Siibeetei had his first significant independent command in 1216 and retired only just before his death in 1248. They operated joindy in 1220,1226, and 1227. The last two of these years wUl be covered in the Siibe etei section only. The bulk of the narrative is focussed on the campaigns Genghis Khan and Siibeetei directed in person, but in addition an overview is given of other Mongol campaigns in China (1216-1228 and 1235-1246), and Korea.
The numbers given for armies are rounded and nominal. The effective totals were certainly lower, though by how much is hardly ever known. The nominal totals help give a magnitude even if effective totals could be much lower. This is especially true for infantry forces, the more so the larger they were.
The intention is to render Chinese names in Pinyin format. Quotes, however, will be given in the original format and can therefore be Wade-Giles. Modern names are used for the major cities, such as Beijing or Kaifeng, in China instead of whatever they were called at the time. Chinese administrative districts as well as the main city in them - where the administration was based - were called ‘zhou’, as, for example, Weizhou. ‘Guan’ means ‘pass’. On the maps, places like Weizhou are simply labelled Wei to save space. The Chinese distance measure li is about half a kilometre. The Chinese standard is to list the family name first.
A Note on Sources
The details of Temiijin’s ... rise to chief of the Mongol tribe are told in the Secret History of the Mongols, the Shengwu Qinzheng Lu, and in Rashid-ud-Din’s COMPENDIUM OF CHRONICLES. While often sharing episodes, they also diverge on many points, particularly chronology, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconstruct a synoptic narrative of his political vicissitudes before 1201.’
- Christopher Atwood*
The important sources for the rise of the Mongols are the Shengwujinzhenglu (SWQZL), the Yuanshi, Rashid al-Din’s Compendium of Chronicles, and the Secret History. Of these the Secret History is generally considered to be the earliest, with the other sources compiled somewhat later. They all appear to draw on common sources, with the SWQZL, Yuanshi and Rashid al-Din in particular being very closely related to each other. The two former, both Chinese chronicles, are shorter and crafted in the tradition of dynastic histories. This means having quite an economical account, leaving out non-essential information, and also to be respectful to the man with ‘the Mandate of Heaven’. In some parts there is also a clear link between the Secret History and the other sources.
The Secret History: The most well known early source, at least in the West, is the Secret History. It is in the style of an epic, and draws on oral traditions. Many episodes are described in great detail, but it is a selective account which fails to cover all events. This is clear, for example, from its short treatment of the early Xia or Jin campaigns (between 1205 and 1215). It also seems that the Secret History sometimes modifies events to build dramatic tension. On the positive side, the author is quite ready to be honest, in several places clearly saying some negative things about Genghis Khan. Clearly the overall chronology has somehow been mixed up, perhaps in part due to careless editing. The work may have been updated as late as c.1252, but the bulk of the material seems to have been compiled much earlier. Igor de Rachewiltz translated and provided a detailed commentary of the Secret History.^
Shengwujinzhenglu: The best overall early source is arguably the Shengwujinzhenglu (SWQZL). It is a more comprehensive source than the Secret History with regard to headline events covered and has a much more disciplined chronology. It is polite - it will not say that Genghis Khan was defeated - and does have some possible errors. The source loses quality once the focus shifts into China. The SWQZL places Samuqa’s Henan raid in 1215, a year too early, and says the Jin emperor left Kaifeng in September 1231, three months too early. Almost nothing is said about the final Xia campaigns during which Temiijin died. The SWQZL has been translated and annotated by PeUiot and Hambis up to the year 1201 in Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan - Chen-wou ts’in-tcheng lou.]o\m Emerson continued this work, adding 1202 and 1203. Erich Haenisch translated the years 1219-1227 in Die letzen Feldzuge Cinggis Hans und sein Tod?
Yuanshi: Yuanshi is the official dynastic history of the Mongol ruling house in China, finalised around 1370 during the Ming dynasty. The Yuanshi base annals {pYuanshi 1) are close to the SWQZL, but are generally more condensed. It does have details on the campaigns against Xia not found in the SWQZL. The Yuanshi as a whole seems to be edited somewhat poorly (it has been said it is the worst edited of any of the 24 Chinese dynastic histories). Eor example, Siibeetei has two biographies with different spellings of his name. Eight other non-Han Chinese also have two biographies. Temiijin’s march against the Merkits in 1198 is misplaced, and names and places where fighting took place against the Jin in 1211, 1212, and 1213 are duplicated. A wealth of detail about the campaigns in China and the Western regions is found in the biographies."^
Collected Chronicles: The Persian historian Rashid al-Din used similar sources as the SWQZL and Yuanshi, but made a more extensive commentary. Rashid al-Din’s understanding of geography outside the Middle East was poor. Eor events in China, where geographical understanding is important, his work is of less value. Thackston has made an excellent translation with a lot of effort to match names to those known from Mongolian and Chinese sources.* Before Thackston, the only European translation was in Russian.
For the later period, only the Yuanshi and Rashid al-Din’s Collected Chronicles remain important. For Genghis Khan, the Yuanshi 1 is most important. For the later period, in addition to Yuanshi 2, much valuable information can be gained from the many biographies. Other important sources are the Jinshi, the Songshi, Juvaini, ibn al-Athir, Nasawi, Juzjani, and the Georgian, Rus, and Central European chronicles.
Jinshi: The dynastic history of the Jin dynasty (compiled 1268-1343, during the Mongol Yuan dynasty) is much better edited than the Yuanshi-Ylixt base annals are not very detailed, but a wealth of detail is provided in the many biographies of the various military men. Many events can be followed on a day-to-day basis. In particular Jinshi 112 is vital for the 1231-1232 campaign.*
Songshi: The dynastic history of the Song dynasty (written like the Jinshi during the later years of the Yuan dynasty) is not all as effectively edited, as the Jinshi, but it is vast in scope. The compilers had access to many diaries and other contemporary records. The Songshi is especially noted for the high quality of its biographies. Much other Song literature is preserved in addition to the Songshi. Other early Chinese sources include accounts of Song ofhcials going to meet the Mongols as well as Mi Zhou’s eyewitness description of the 1234 campaign.^
WangYun wrote a biography about Siibe’etei and his family. He was a contemporary of Siibe’etei’s grandson Aju. This work is related to the two Yuanshi biographies.® Juvaini: A Persian civil servant in Mongol Iran who wrote a history c. 1260, Juvaini is especially well informed about events in and around Transoxiana and Khorasan. Rashid al-Din made use of his work.*
Ibn al-Athir: A contemporary (died in 1233) based in Mosul, Ibn al-Athir wrote a history of the world vast in scope. He is certainly well informed about events close to his hometown. For events further away he drew on Muslim traders and travellers as well as other people he met. The Mongol defeat of the Bulgars in 1224 is alluded to in the Secret History, only Ibn al-Athir provides details on this. Rashid al-Din relied on Ibn al-Athir for some sections of his work.^*
Nasawi: Shihab al-Din Muhammad al-Nasawi (died c.1250) was another contemporary who later wrote a history (around 1241). He was close to Jalal al-Din and hostile towards the Mongols. He wrote an account of the eventful life of Jalal al-Din.“
Juzjani: Minhaj al-Siraj Juzjani (born 1193) experienced the Mongol attack on Khwarezm first-hand and wrote what is at times a very detailed narrative of events. He is hostile towards the Mongols, providing balance to Juvaini and Rashid al-Din. He is best informed about events in what is now Afghanistan and Pakistan.'^
The Georgian/Armenian Chronicles: Written some decades after the events, Grigor Aknerc’i, Kirakos Ganjakec’i, Vardan Arewelc’I, and The History ofKart’li stiU has much to offer on the Mongol invasion of Georgia in 1221.*^
The Rus Chronicles: The early chronicles are The Chronicle of Novgorod and The Hypatian Chronicle, treating the northern and southern region best, respectively. The Nikonian Chronicle is a later work, merging the accounts of many chronicles into one continuous whole. It offers some information not found in the two earlier works.
The Central European Chronicles and sources: Julian, Thomas of Spalato, Rogerius, The Tartar Relation, Carpini, and others wrote eyewitness accounts. There are also many preserved letters sent by kings and dignitaries. In addition there are various chroniclers.^^
In general, the sources on Genghis Khan are weaker the earlier the period. For Siibe etei the sources are weak when he operated far away from Han China, Persia, or Europe.
Many modern historians have helped to make great progress regarding use of these sources and in developing an improved understanding of the period. They face a serious challenge, having to master Mongolian, Chinese, and many other languages. Paul PeUiot, Louis Hambis, Erich Haenisch, Francis W. Cleaves, Paul Ratchnevsky, Igor de Rachewiltz, Thomas Allsen, Paul Buell, Ruth DunneU, and Christopher Atwood are some of the important historians. For the Near East and Europe important translators and historians consulted include H. G. Raverty, V. V. Barthold, J. A. Boyle, W.M.Thackston, D. S. Richards, T. Bedrosian,J. EenneU, Martin Dimnik, and G. Strakosch-Grassmann. The only militarily focussed broader narrative of value is that of Desmond Martin. Helped by Chinese scholars, he drew on a large base of Chinese sources and developed a very detailed description of Mongol operations in China from 1209 to 1227.
Geographical locations in Mongolia are often hard to place. The views of PeUiot and de Rachewiltz are almost always followed in this study. There are many opposing views. Eor these the readers are referred to the commentary of de Rachewiltz on the Secret History. Eor locations in China reliance has been put on The Historical Atlas of China, volume VL The book Sino-Western calendar for two thousand years 1—2000 A.D. by Zhongsan Xue and Yi Ouyang has been used to convert traditional Chinese dates to modern Western ones.
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