Download PDF | Studies in Ataturk's Turkey, The American Dimension,Edited by Halil İnalcık, Suraiya Faroqhi, Brill Publishing (2009).
245 Pages
CONTRIBUTORS
SECIL KARAL AKGUN, (Ph.D. Ankara University) is Professor of History at the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara. She teaches courses on Contemporary Turkish and Modern Ottoman History. She taught at the Giilhane Military Academy, War College and at Bilkent University in Ankara. She was awarded a Fulbright Grant in 1984 and did research in the U.S. on American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire. She served as a visiting professor, research fellow and lecturer at the University of Utah and Columbia University (U.S.A.); University of Frankfurt (Germany), and The Hebrew University in Jerusalem. She has published on modernization in the Ottoman Empire, the Gallipoli campaign and the Anzacs, the Armenian question, Turkish revolution and reforms, education, and the history of the Red Crescent. Currently, chair of the History Department at METU, Professor Akgiin is member of various Turkish and foreign historical societies and NGOs. She is heading the classification project of the Turkish Red Crescent archives as well as serving as the coordinator of the joint METU-Australia McGuire University project to commemorate the centennial of the Gallipoli campaign.
Nor BitcE Criss, (B.A. Ankara University; M.A. University of Florida; Ph.D. George Washington University) is State Associate Professor teaching at Bilkent University in Ankara and editorial board member for the journals Turkish Studies, The Middle East Review of International Affairs, and Journal of Central Asian Studies, and is also a contributing editor to The Journal of American History. Criss is author of Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923, and Atatiirk’s Legacy: A Worldview in Historical Context. She has published articles in such journals as Studies in Conflict and Terrorism; Journal of Strategic Studies; Security Dialogue; Journal of Peace Research; and the Journal of American History, and she has contributed chapters to such volumes as Turkey; Tiirkei und Europa, Facetten einer Beziehung in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart; Historical Image of the Turk in Europe; Terrorism and Politics; U.S. Military Forces in Europe: the Early Years; L’Europe et la Crise de Cuba; Der Grosse Exodus: Die Russische Emigration und ihre Zentren 1917 Bis 1941; International Institutions and Security; History and September 11;Turkish Foreign and Security Policy: Its Environs in Eurasia and the Middle East; The Importance of Being European: Turkey, the EU, and the Middle East; and What They Think of US: International Perceptions of the United States since 9/11.
GeorcE S. Harris, (Ph.D. Harvard University) after almost 40 years of government service, retired in 1995 as Director of the Office of Analysis for Near East and South Asia in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State. He also served as a Professorial Lecturer on Turkey and the Middle East at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, from 1968 to 1981. He has in addition been a Research Fellow at Bilkent University and a Professorial Lecturer at The George Washington University. Among his publications are Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971, Turkey Coping with Crisis, and The Communists and the Kadro Movement: Shaping Ideology in Atatiirk’s Turkey.
Howarp A. REED is Professor Emeritus of Middle Eastern, Islamic, and Turkish History from the University of Connecticut. Raised in Izmir, he has had lifelong experience in Turkey and the Middle East. He earned his B.A. from Yale and his Ph.D. from Princeton. He taught at these institutions as well as McGill University, where he co-founded and was Assistant Director and Professor of the Graduate Institute of Islamic Studies. He then served on the staff of the Ford Foundation before joining the University of Connecticut. He also has been a Visiting Professor or Research Scholar at Alaska Pacific University, the American University of Beirut, Bosphorus University, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, and UCLA.
SUHNAZ YILMAZ (B.A. Bilkent University, M.A. and Ph.D. Princeton University) is Associate Professor of International Relations at Ko¢ University, Istanbul. She specializes on International Affairs and the Middle East. She pursued her post-Doctoral Studies at Harvard University working on a project on the role of third party mediation in conflict resolution, focusing particularly on the U.S. role in TurkishGreek relations. Her areas of interest and expertise include foreign policy analysis, Turkish foreign policy, Turkish-American relations, Eurasian politics, Energy politics, Mediterranean cooperation and security, European Union Foreign and Security policy, and International development. She has publications in journals such as Middle Eastern Studies, Insight Turkey, World Today, Middle East Journal, and Political Science Quarterly. She also has a forthcoming book entitled Turkish-American Relations (1800-1952): Between the Stars, Stripes, and Crescent from Routledge Press International Studies Series. In 2007, Suhnaz Yilmaz received the Sakip Sabanci International Research Award, granted by Sabanci University and the Brookings Institution, and in 2008 she has received the prestigious Distinguished Young Scientist Award (GEBIP) of the Turkish Academy of Sciences.
INTRODUCTION
SUHNAZ YILMAZ
The origins of Turkish-American relations can be traced all the way back to the visit of the frigate George Washington to Istanbul in 1800 and to the signing of the first bilateral treaty of commerce in 1830. Since these very limited contacts, this resilient relationship has witnessed two world wars, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Republic of Turkey, the transition from balance of power politics to the bipolarity of the Cold War era, the challenges of the post-Cold War and post-September 11 international context, and numerous ups and downs in bilateral relations.
This volume provides invaluable insights regarding an often neglected, yet very important period in Turkish-American relations. It puts missing pieces of a puzzle together to form a more comprehensive picture about a seminal period in the evolution of Turkish-American relations during the years between the First and Second World Wars. An intricate web of initiatives and tensions marks this crucial formative phase, which laid the basis for the extensive relationship that marked the ensuing Cold War period. The book aims to provide a better understanding of how the relations as well as the perceptions of the two countries were mutually shaped and transformed in these interwar years. Within this context, a number of crucial factors defined the course of the relationship, including tensions between domestic and foreign policy, interaction of multiple variables (political, economic, cultural, and military) in policy formation, the impact of international developments on foreign policy decisions, and finally the role played by key diplomats and individuals. The primary focus of the book is on this often neglected final aspect, which made a significant impact during the period of early contacts in Atatiirk’s Turkey.
The Cold War years, during which strategic and security concerns resulted in extensive ties between Turkey and the United States has been the subject of numerous studies by both Turkish and American scholars. Important among these was Oral Sander’s analysis of Turkish-American relations focusing on the period from the Truman Doctrine (1947) to the first Cyprus crisis (1964). It was complemented by such works as George McGhee’s The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection, which concentrated on the strategic significance of Turkish-American relations in the Cold War era, and George Harris’ Troubled Alliance, which examined the major foreign policy issues (especially the Cyprus question) affecting relations between the two countries.!
The period prior to the Cold War, which provided the background and the framework for extensive relations between the United States and Turkey, however, has been comparatively neglected. Although a few studies deal comprehensively with American policies toward the Middle East as a whole in this era, these studies commonly devote only one or two chapters to relations with Turkey.” Thus, rather than presenting a detailed account and analysis of Turkish-American relations, these works are more useful in setting out the broader context in which to place these relations, as well as providing valuable bibliographical guidance. There are also more specific works focusing on a single aspect of the relationship. Most significant among these are Leland Gordon’s American Relations with Turkey (1830-1930): An Economic Interpretation; Robert Daniel’s American Philanthropy in the Near East (1829-1960), and James Barton’s Story of Near East Relief (1915-1930). These books play an important role in providing guidelines for an examination of the economic and philanthropic factors affecting diplomatic relations. However, other than Roger Trask’s The United States’ Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform (1914-1939), which evaluates the relations mostly from the American perspective without using any Turkish archival sources or libraries,’ there is rather limited coverage of Turkish-American relations in Atatiirk’s Turkey.
The major contribution of this collection is to present a comprehensive study of the formative stage of Turkish-American relations by making extensive use of Turkish, American, and British archival sources as well as private paper collections, including Louis Edgar Browne’s, Admiral Bristol’s, Louise Bryant’s, and Ambassador Grew’s private papers, some of which are hitherto unused by other authors. The book also does an unusually good job of presenting both sides of the coin by reflecting both the Turkish and the American perspectives through tracing the footsteps of critical individuals shaping the relations.
At the time of the Ottoman Empire, political relations between the two countries remained rather limited. Economic and missionary interests served as the dominant factors shaping relations in this period. While some important contacts were established, one of the most destructive developments in this long prelude to the future of the relationship was caused by Ottoman massacres and forced relocation of the Armenians. The haunting legacy of these tragic events, when combined with the intense negative publicity by some missionary and Armenian groups, resulted in the formation of the stereotype of the “Terrible Turk” in the United States. Even after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the impact of these developments would be strongly felt by the young Republic of Turkey in its relations with the United States.
In the wake of the termination of hostilities in the First World War, the United States found itself at a crossroads. On the one hand, the administration of President Woodrow Wilson sought to pave the way to play an active role in the post-war settlement of the fate of the Middle East and had aspirations to undertake new responsibilities, including mandates through hoped-for participation in the League of Nations. On the other hand, Wilson’s government faced strong pressures at home to maintain the isolationist foreign policy tradition of the United States. It was the clash of these internationalist and isolationist trends which determined the path that the United States would take at his critical juncture in history. While the isolationist current proved to be generally in the ascendant, the United States would nonetheless continue to strive to keep an “open door” abroad for its economic interests.
In the meantime, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire created a power vacuum in this region. In Anatolia, this vacuum was filled by a nationalist movement against the occupying powers. By prevailing in the end, this victorious nationalist struggle would enable the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.‘ The volatile period starting with truce at the end of the First World War and lasting until the reestablishment of diplomatic ties in 1927 proved to be a considerably more complex interlude in the history of Turkish-American relations than is usually recognized.
The first three chapters of the book focus on the early contacts of the Americans with the nationalists in Anatolia during the turbulent days of Turkey’s war of independence. These contacts were critical for opening the channels of communication. The following three chapters focus on the evolution and nature of official ties as shaped by prominent diplomats on both sides, a process which proved to be critical for filling the reservoirs of trust during a difficult period for the relationship. During these years, the efforts of able diplomats on both sides helped to create a Turkish-American rapprochement that under-girded amicable relations during this interwar era.
Secil Karal Akgiin’s contributions constitute two complementary chapters focusing on the contacts of Americans with the nationalist leaders in Ankara during the early days of Turkey’s national war of independence. With the emergence of the Turkish nationalist movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Atattirk), the Turks started to regain the ability to shape the future of their country. Allied miscalculation in supporting the Greek invasion of Asia Minor produced a nationalistic backlash. As a result, Mustafa Kemal was able to rally the Anatolian Turks to resist the Greek invasion and to oppose Allied occupation. The Sultan, who became a pawn of the Allies, was discredited, and the nationalists formed a de facto government controlling much of Anatolia.
During the initial stages of the nationalist movement (1919-1922) until the decisive victory of the Kemalist forces at the battle of the Sakarya River, the Allied Powers (especially the British) for the most part underestimated the strength and determination of the nationalists. Isolated during much of their struggle for independence, the nationalists reached out to establish close ties with the Soviet Union, whose military and economic assistance they welcomed. For its part, the United States became one of the first Western powers to take the nationalist movement seriously and to maintain constant contacts with it, albeit through non-official channels. The nationalists, in return, also viewed the United States favorably, particularly because of its non-involvement in the Allied plans for partitioning the Ottoman Empire.
In charting the role that the United States would play in determining the fate of former Ottoman territories after the First World War, Woodrow Wilson’s government saw itself faced with the need to be active on three fronts. In the Middle East, the Americans sent missions to collect information about the needs and wishes of different peoples of this area. With the Europeans, the American government made clear that its views and findings did not support the secret arrangements that the Western powers had sought to impose on the Ottoman Empire. And finally, in the United States, the Wilson administration had to fight a continuing battle to try to gain support for a new role in the world.
Inasmuch as the United States had never declared war on the Ottomans, its role in the post-war negotiations over Turkey was rather complicated. The Paris Peace Conference was the only venue where American representatives could participate in dealing with the future of the Ottoman Empire on an equal basis with their allies. President Wilson had indicated his interest in shaping the future of this region by declaring in the twelfth of his famous Fourteen Points that “the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.”° This gave notice to the Allies that the American view would contradict their secret arrangements regarding the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire.
The dissention between the Allies over the status of their mandates in the Middle East led Wilson to advocate the establishment of an international commission to inquire about the perspective of the peoples concerned. Accordingly, two commissions were appointed to assess the pros and cons of an American mandate in the Ottoman lands. Then, when France and Britain refused to participate due to their dispute over Syria, President Wilson dispatched the American members of the commission, President Henry C. King of Oberlin College and Charles R. Crane, to the region. The King-Crane commission, officially referred to as “the American Section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey,” also inquired about the viability of an Armenian state under an American mandate.®
Akgiin points out that Mr. Crane realized the significance of the nationalist movement in Anatolia for determining the future of the Turks as early as the turbulent days just before the opening of the Sivas Congress of 1919. Hence Crane requested that Louis Edgar Browne of the Chicago Daily News attend the Congress in order to be able to inform the Peace Conference of the decisions reached by this nationalist body. At a time when there was a significant duality of power between the Sultan in Istanbul and the nationalist movement in Anatolia, the presence of an American journalist in Sivas during the first national congress held by the Kemalists’ provided an invaluable international voice to the arduously struggling nationalists.
Making extensive use of the Browne Papers housed at the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University, Akgiin presents a compelling account of Browne’s one week stay in Anatolia, which in Browne’s own words was “more or less an Arabian nights experience with pass words and so on.”* In this period, Browne had the chance to contact the key nationalists, including a personal interview with Mustafa Kemal, to learn more about the nationalists and to inquire about their stance concerning the mandate question. During the Sivas Congress, which started on September 4, 1919, and lasted for eight days, Browne was the only foreign observer and non-Muslim present. Because the mandate issue emerged as one of the primary points of discussion, the presence of an American journalist aroused much interest and, as Akgiin pointed out, Mustafa Kemal also found his presence useful for the nationalist cause. At the end of the Sivas Congress, Browne witnessed firsthand how the Sivas resolutions, which embodied the National Pact to fight for Turkish independence, were circulated all over Turkey through a flood of telegrams lasting all night long. Indeed, before the eyes of a bewildered American journalist the transformation of a resistance movement to the basis of a nation state was taking place.
The articles Browne wrote about the Sivas Congress, Akgiin makes clear, brought the nationalist movement to the attention of the world, presenting to the American press the first favorable assessment of the Kemalists. However, the first contact between an official of the United States and Mustafa Kemal would take place only with the arrival of General James G. Harbord, who arrived in Sivas on September 20, 1919, only a few days after Browne’s departure.
In her second chapter, Secil Akgiin focuses on the contacts of General Harbord and his commission who were investigating the question of an American mandate for Armenia. In September 1919, the United States sent General Harbord to the region to provide factual information to be used in assessing the prospects for an American mandate over Armenian regions. When on October 16, 1919, the Harbord Commission presented its month-long survey, it listed 14 reasons in favor of and 13 reasons against the idea of an American mandate. The Harbord report, on the one hand, stressed the humanitarian motives favoring the mandate, while on the other hand it pointed out that such an undertaking would impose a heavy financial burden on the mandatory power.’
Based on the Harbord report, Akgiin also presents a detailed account of the general’s meeting with Mustafa Kemal. Their discussion focused on three critical issues: the organization and strength of the national movement; its attitudes and intentions toward non-Muslims, particularly the Armenians; and its understanding of and views toward the question of assistance and mandates. Overall, as reflected in his report, General Harbord received a very cordial reception from the Kemalists who informed him that “the nationalist party recognized the necessity of the aid of an impartial foreign country.”’? However, Akgiin stresses that unlike Browne, who interpreted similar remarks as the Turkish desire for an American mandate, Harbord was able to grasp the thin line differentiating the Turkish and American interpretations of the term “mandate.” Akgiin also provides an appendix entitled “Condensed Memorandum Concerning the Organization and Points of View of the League for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia,” which sets forth authoritatively and in some detail the aims and ideas of the Turkish nationalists at the time.
The Harbord report, therefore, did not provide sufficient justification for an American mandate. During the peace conference, President Wilson emphasized the principles of self-determination, protection of minorities, an “Open Door” for commerce and trade, and the concept of “peace without victors.” Yet his vision of a Middle East settlement through open diplomacy, within the framework of a general arrangement based on the League of Nations, and his desire for an American mandate were to be dashed by hard political realities, first during his negotiations with the Allies and then by a bitter political contest at home. Hence, on June 1, 1920, the Senate by 52 to 23 votes declined the President’s request for mandate authorization and refused to allow the United States to assume any political responsibility for developments in this part of the world.
Although Mustafa Kemal was the focus neither of Harbord’s journey nor of his report, during the few hours that they spent together, the American general was persuaded of the non-imperialistic and patriotic nature of the nationalist movement. He also emerged with a better understanding of the capabilities and potential of its charismatic leader, whom he addressed warmly as “My Dear General” in the note following their meeting. During the critical days in the wake of the Sivas Congress, the presence of General Harbord, just like Louis Browne before him, would serve as a golden opportunity for the nationalists to convey their aims and determination to the rest of the world. That makes the account given us by Akgiin of the nationalist movement and the question of an American mandate from American eyes all the more important.
In the third chapter, Howard Reed sheds light on the gripping accounts of a fascinating journalist, Louise Bryant, concerning her encounters with the Turkish people and the nationalist leaders in Anatolia during a particularly critical period in the life of modern Turkey. Based on the recently uncovered 1923 reports of Louise Bryant, donated by her only daughter, Ms. Anne Moen Bullitt to Yale University’s Sterling Library, Howard Reed presents Bryant’s penetrating first-hand depictions of Turkey during the year when the Republic of Turkey was founded.
Louise Bryant was one of those larger-than-life characters who flaunted custom in the pursuit of adventure. After leading a nonconventional life in the United States, in 1917 she served as a foreign correspondent reporting on the Western front during the First World War. Her second husband, John Reed, would become famous as the author of the landmark work on the Bolshevik revolution from the inside, Ten Days that Shook the World.' During the several months that they spent as eye witnesses to the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, they had the opportunity to interview key political leaders such as Kerensky, Lenin, Trotsky, and Chicherin as well as leading Russian women such as Alexandra Kollontai, Marie Spiridovna, and leading artists and dancers like Lunacharski and Stanislavski. After John Reed’s death from typhus in 1920, Louise Bryant also met such important Turkish figures in Russia as General Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), Nationalist Turkey’s ambassador to Moscow. He would serve as the Deputy Speaker of the Ankara Assembly later during the time that Louise Bryant came to Turkey as a reporter. In Soviet Russia, she also became acquainted with Enver pasha, who was in self-imposed exile after being the leader of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress party from 1913 to 1918.
After Bryant’s return to the United States from Russia, the young widow became the companion of William C. Bullitt, who had served as an important American diplomat at the Paris Peace conference in 1919. Bryant’s Turkey adventure started in April 1923 when she was sent to Istanbul, traveling with Bullitt, to report on Turkey for the International News Service. On the way to Turkey, the ambitious young journalist did not miss the opportunity to become the first woman and the first non-Italian to interview Benito Mussolini. As Howard Reed observes, her next target was to have an interview with Mustafa Kemal as a part of her impressive collection of face-to-face meetings with important revolutionary leaders.
Although she could not realize this goal because of Mustafa Kemal’s extremely busy schedule, during the seven months that she spent mostly in Istanbul or Ankara, she had several contacts with the leading figures of the nationalist movement, such as Dr. Adnan (Adivar) and his famed author wife Halide Edib, Fethi (Okyar), Rauf (Orbay) as well as with Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), her friend and admirer from their days in Moscow. Howard Reed argues that through these contacts she gained in-depth information concerning Turkey’s domestic and international situation. When she combined these valuable insights with her own personal observations, she was able to present a compelling account of political developments, as well as of critical issues, such as the position of women in Turkish society and the significant power of leadership in creating social change at decisive moments in history.
In the fourth chapter, Nur Bilge Criss examines successive stages in the gradual evolution of diplomatic relations with the United States. Starting with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, she carries her recital to the eventual full-time residence of the American ambassador in Ankara in 1937, an act which marked the establishment of full diplomatic reciprocity. Because the Ottoman Empire severed its diplomatic ties with the U.S.A. during the First World War and because Washington formally recognized the new Republic only in 1927, it is difficult to speak of official relations between Washington and Ankara during the period from 1919 to 1927. Nevertheless, Criss ably demonstrates that there was significant interaction through non-diplomatic channels as well as sustained economic activity. The growth of economic ties was due in large measure to the efforts of United States High Commissioner to Turkey Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol in Istanbul (1919-1927).
After the formation of the Republic of Turkey, he continued to strive diligently to expand American trade in Anatolia in consonance with the “Open Door” policy espoused by Washington. In doing so, and in lobbying during periodic visits to the United States, he also worked to prepare the ground to change the prevailing negative image of the Turks in the United States, for the cause of delay in resuming diplomatic relations lay in America, not Turkey.” Despite the foot-dragging that retarded Senatorial consideration of the Turco-American “Treaty of Amity and Commerce” signed in Lausanne in 1923 (and its eventual non-ratification by the Senate), Bristol was successful in negotiating a modus vivendi between the United States and Turkey that enabled the continuation of commercial ties until official relations were restored in 1927. Hence, despite the lack of diplomatic ties, the Americans and Turkish nationalists maintained continuous contacts from the earliest days of the Kemalist movement. Indeed, Admiral Bristol was one of the first Western officials to take the nationalists seriously. The nationalists in return were interested in keeping the Admiral informed about and supportive first of their struggle for independence and later of their newly established republic.
The year 1927 proved to be a crucial turning point in TurkishAmerican relations and marked the end of a decade-long break in diplomatic ties. Although the relationship with the new Turkish Republic had a problematic start due to the strong Armenian, American missionary, and Democratic Party opposition, relations began to improve rapidly once formal ties were established. Nur Bilge Criss highlights the significant contributions in the interwar era made by the first United States Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Turkey, Joseph C. Grew (served 1927-1932). Finally, during the term of Ambassador John Van A. MacMurray, the reciprocity of the recognition process was finalized, when the ambassador became a full-time resident of the capital in Ankara. Another very important point that Criss highlights in this chapter is that although the American policymakers were avowedly guided by the dictates of the Monroe Doctrine to avoid political and military entanglements abroad, the promotion of particularly their commercial interests (e.g. the support given to the American oil companies) constituted a main theme of their diplomatic activity.
Criss’ study is enriched by broad use of diaries, official correspondence, and biographies of well-known American representatives, notably Admiral Mark Bristol and Ambassador Joseph Grew. But she also has made extensive use of the records and papers of lesser-known American diplomats such as Ambassadors Robert Skinner, John Van A. MacMurray and State Department official G. Howland Shaw." That allows Criss to unravel a trenchant account of the conjuncture, processes, as well as the stages of how different shades of recognition were transformed into full diplomatic reciprocity.
In the last two chapters of the book, George Harris turns our attention to the efforts of two able Turkish diplomats: Ahmet Muhtar (Mollaoglu) (served 1927-1934) and (Mehmet) Munir Ertegiin (served 1934-1944). Both made significant contributions to the enhancement of TurkishAmerican relations. These two chapters fill a significant gap inasmuch as the contributions of these Turkish diplomats have not generally received recognition. In fact, these figures are for the most part mentioned very briefly if at all by scholars working on Turkish-American relations in the interwar period and the early years of the Second World War. George Harris, who was attached to the political section of the United States Embassy in Ankara between 1957 and 1962 and then worked and published extensively on Turkish-American relations during the Cold War era, this time, shifts his attention to an earlier period. By pulling together additional archival material, parliamentary minutes, and press accounts, he sheds light on the lives and accomplishments of these Turkish diplomats so that “more flesh can be put on the bones of the Kemalist revolution.” He argues that although these officials have worked against significant odds, they not only influenced the decision makers in Ankara by serving as the “eyes and ears of Turkey” in the United States, but they also formed the public face of the newly established republic that policymakers in Washington came to know and appreciate. Consequently, after an initial period of difficulty, they contributed to the establishment of amicable relations between the two countries.
In Chapter Five, George Harris focuses on the first Turkish ambassador to the United States after the First World War, Ahmet Muhtar, who had the challenging task of initiating official contacts after a turbulent era. Muhtar faced the additional challenge of serving in a period during which the “Terrible Turk” stereotype prevailed, in large part because of efforts by Armenian- Americans to blacken Turkey’s reputation. In this, these detractors were aided by the fact that Americans had very scant knowledge about Turkey. Although he lacked fluent English, Muhtar’s scholastic training in law and his diplomatic and consular experience, as well as his policymaker position at the top level, including being one of the deputies from Istanbul in the last Ottoman parliament and his membership in senior positions in the Grand National Assembly in Ankara proved to be important assets for him during his selection as ambassador to the United States. Since French was still the lingua franca of diplomacy, Muhtar did not have problems communicating on the official level. Harris argues that Muhtar gained the trust and support of Atatiirk. In fact, as Foreign Minister Bekir Sami was often abroad for treaty negotiations or international conferences, Muhtar served as Acting Foreign Minister (also on a number of occasions even using the title of Foreign Minister as highlighted by Harris), and thus emerged as the main architect of the new nationalist foreign ministry.
Upon his arrival in New York in November 1927, Muhtar was greeted by protesters supporting the Armenian cause and had to travel to Washington with an escort provided by the Department of State. However, soon the fire of the Armenian-American protests would fade, and particularly The Washington Post would start to have supportive media coverage for Turkey. As highlighted by George Harris, Muhtar would quickly become an active participant in the social life and activities in Washington, and the Post would favorably mention Muhtar and Turkey over 300 times during the ambassador’s seven-year tenure in the American capital. Although Muhtar encountered some difficulties due to his lack of English fluency, he shattered stereotypes by representing the urban and secular face of Turkey. Establishing relations with influential members of the Congress, social leaders, and military figures, he contributed to the improvement of the relationship.
In the final Chapter, George Harris presents a detailed account of how Muhtar’s successor (Mehmet) Minir Ertegiin carried the relationship to a new level, building on the base Muhtar had left. In this period, Harris argues, Ertegiin not only deepened the ties and dealt with the negative effect of the Armenian issue on public opinion, but also faced the challenge of forming a smoothly functioning military supply arrangement with Washington as Turkey’s principal arms supplier on the eve and during the early years of the Second World War. His solid training in law and extensive experience as a legal adviser on international issues, as well as his knowledge of English would prove to be important assets.
Unlike Muhtar, Ertegiin was not met by demonstrations on his arrival in the United States. Moreover, through his wife, Hayriinissa Riistem’s interactions with Eleanor Roosevelt, they also established personal contacts with the Roosevelt family. Soon, they were entertaining numerous powerful figures in Washington. Harris also points out that with the initiative of Eretegiin’s sons, particularly Ahmet Ertegiin, the Turkish Embassy became “a Mecca for Jazz enthusiasts,” and even took the lead in desegregating the capital by hosting black musicians. In this period, Ertegiin also worked effectively to curtail negative publicity against Turkey.
As the world moved toward a new conflagration, he strove diligently to establish ties to secure additional aircraft and other military equipment. His efforts accorded well with the direction of American economic warfare during the Second World War. Through “Lend-Lease Aid” and preemptive purchases of chrome, Washington sought to bolster Turkish resistance to Nazi Germany. The question of where Turkish chrome needed in the manufacture of steel armaments would end up significantly concerned the Allies. Hence, as argued by Harris, acquisition of war matériel increasingly became the “leitmotif” of Ertegiin’s tenure in Washington. In this way, he paved the way for the close ties and major economic and military assistance programs distinguishing the Turkish-American alliance in the Cold War period.
During the Cold War era, the parameters of Turkish-American relations were predominantly defined by the security interests of the international bipolar power structure. However, a thorough analysis of Turkish-American relations before the Cold War became once again particularly significant in the post-Cold War context, where again a bipolar power structure ceased to exist. Inasmuch as both the Americans and the Turks are seeking to redefine their relations based on constantly changing international dynamics, the past can provide much insight. In this respect, this collection makes a significant contribution by filling in the details of an important era in Turkish-American relations, just as a carpet mistress weaves the geometrically intricate designs of a Turkish carpet.
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