Download PDF | Andrew De La Garza - The Mughal Empire at War_ Babur, Akbar and the Indian Military Revolution, 1500-1605-Routledge (2016).
221 Pages
The Mughal Empire at War
The Mughal Empire was one of the great powers of the early modern era, ruling almost all of South Asia, a conquest state, dominated by its military elite. Many historians have viewed the Mughal Empire as relatively backward, the Emperor the head of a traditional warband from Central Asia, with tribalism and the traditions of the Islamic world to the fore, and the Empire not remotely comparable to the forward looking Western European states of the period, with their strong innovative armies implementing the ‘military revolution’.
This book argues that, on the contrary, the military establishment built by the Emperor Babur and his successors was highly sophisticated, an effective combination of personnel, expertise, technology and tactics, drawing on precedents from Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and India, and that the resulting combined arms system transformed the conduct of warfare in South Asia. The book traces the development of the Mughal Empire chronologically, examines weapons and technology, tactics and operations, organization, recruitment and training, and logistics and non-combat operations, and concludes by assessing the overall achievements of the Mughal Empire, comparing it to its Western counterparts, and analyzing the reasons for its decline. Andrew de la Garza is an Instructor in the Department of History and Geography at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, USA.
Introduction
The Mughal Empire was one of the great powers of the early modern era. It eventually grew to include almost the entirety of South Asia, from Afghanistan to the southern tip of India and from the Indus River to the frontiers of Burma. It accounted for more than a fifth of the world’s total economic output. This great expansion in both political and economic wealth was due in large part to success on the battlefield. The Mughal Empire was a conquest state dominated by its military elite, with a government where military and civilian administration were closely interconnected. It devoted a substantial portion of its total resources to expansion and defense.
War and readiness for war were essential elements in the shaping of the Mughals’ political, social and cultural identity. Despite these basic facts there have only been a handful of books dedicated to Mughal military history ever written, with a gap of nearly a century between William Irvine’s colonial-era study and the works of later scholars like Jos Gommans and Dirk Kolff. Most general works on the Empire devote relatively little space to military matters, and even dedicated works of military history in this period primarily address background and context – how an army was funded, its social and cultural foundations, the political implications of its expenses and actions.
There has been little exploration of how the Mughals and their enemies actually fought. The primary purpose of this work is to bridge that gap. It explores the creation of a new military system by the Empire’s founder, Babur, its continued evolution under successors like Humayun and the Afghan usurper Sher Shah Suri, and its growth into a mature institution during the reign of Akbar. The emphasis is on the practical aspects of Mughal warfare – technology, tactics, operations, recruitment, training and logistics. I argue that events in India during this period in many ways paralleled the early stages of the ongoing ‘Military Revolution’ in early modern Europe. The Mughals effectively combined the martial implements and practices of Europe, Central Asia and India into a model that was well suited for the particular demands and challenges of their setting. Contrary to conventional wisdom based on the idea of Western exceptionalism, South Asia during this era was no backwater.
It was a center of military innovation and achievement. Likewise, the Mughal Empire was not simply a loosely confederated medieval kingdom expanded to enormous size. It was a highly capable and organized early modern state, as evidenced by its successful integration of new concepts and technology and its mastery of complex systems. This work addresses a number of key questions: Technology: From what sources did the Mughals acquire new technology? How was it integrated and implemented? How did it affect tactics and the conduct of war? Tactics: How exactly did the Mughals conduct battles? How were these processes learned and/or invented? Did they change over time? Operations: How did the Mughals manage campaigns and other events larger than a single battle? Recruitment and training: Who fought in the Mughal army? How were they recruited and organized?
How were they trained? How was military knowledge preserved and transmitted? Logistics and support: How did the Mughals support their forces in the field? How were weapons, equipment and other supplies manufactured or procured? Comparisons: India experienced a revolution in military affairs under the Mughals. How similar was this process to the European ‘Military Revolution?’ How did it differ? Why did India and the Mughals evolve differently and why did they fail to reach the ‘mature stage’ of their military and political transformations as Europe would do in the eighteenth century and beyond? The text starts with a chapter on theory. The second chapter is devoted to narrative.
The succeeding chapters are thematic, covering different facets of the Mughal military system. Chapter 1 places the Mughals within the context of existing theory and literature. It discusses the evolution of concepts such as the Military Revolution, Western Way of War, and Gunpowder Empires, and how those theories support the idea of emerging European exceptionalism in the early modern era and corresponding qualitative deficiencies in contemporary non-Western military establishments. It also examines the first efforts to expand the Military Revolution narrative to include similar events in Asia.
I assess the military historiography of South Asia in general and of the Mughals in particular and argue that this body of work has two important flaws. It mostly focuses on the context of warfare instead of its actual execution, and it greatly underestimates the military achievements of the Mughal Empire and the magnitude of the revolution in military affairs that took place in India during its foundation and consolidation. Chapter 2 relates the essential narrative of the early Mughal Empire. It sets the stage, describing the important developments in military technology and practice in Europe, Central Asia and other parts of the world that would greatly influence later events in India. It recounts the career of Babur, the founder of the Mughal Empire, recounting his growth as a commander and his eventual adoption of new technology and tactics.
The chapter describes Babur’s conquest of India, the reversals suffered by his successor Humayun, the rise of Sher Shah Suri and the eventual re-conquest and consolidation of the Empire by Akbar. It explains how a new military system emerged and matured over the course of these events. Chapter 3 discusses technology and weaponry. It starts with ‘traditional’ edged weapons and armor and then moves on to missile weapons, which were most profoundly affected by the introduction of gunpowder. It describes the evolution, role and capabilities of bows, crossbows and eventually, the musket. The chapter also discusses the various types of artillery introduced during this period, including heavy siege cannon, lighter field pieces and more novel weapons like ‘camel guns,’ rockets and grenades. I argue that the large number of missile weapons available – both small arms and artillery – and the resulting volume of fire on Indian battlefields profoundly altered tactics. Chapter 4 covers tactics and operations.
It discusses the personnel employed by Mughal armies – both cavalry and infantry – their roles and how those roles evolved. It explains the traditional Central Asian tactics initially used by Babur and how he modified these methods after the introduction of gunpowder weaponry. The chapter describes how Babur’s system was further refined by Akbar as the Mughal military machine continued to grow. It includes a number of examples from specific battles and campaigns to illustrate this process. I argue that conditions unique to India caused tactics to evolve differently than in Europe during this era. An abundance of trained archers – especially horse archers – and the large numbers of missile weapons available – not just bows, muskets and conventional artillery but also highly mobile and lethal devices like rockets and camel guns – created a battlefield saturated by fire. This environment precluded the development of linear formations and forced an emphasis on small unit tactics, field fortifications and the tactical defensive.
The remainder of the chapter describes how the Mughals managed naval operations, sieges, counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare. Chapter 5 describes recruitment and training. It discusses how the Mughal army was organized, the various classifications of officers and enlisted men and how these soldiers were recruited. It explains what sort of people actually joined this organization and the role of India’s military labor market and its martial ethic. The chapter describes how soldiers prepared themselves for war. It examines the role of combative sports like martial arts and hunting in both the physical and mental preparation of warriors and the creation of a unifying martial culture.
It continues on to assess the role of more formal military training, drill and maneuvers, and concludes with a discussion of more intellectual exercises like strategy games and the preparation of military manuals and other instructional literature. Chapter 6 is devoted to logistics and support. It explains the role of various support personnel like pioneers, porters, craftsmen and engineers. It describes how the Mughal military camp was organized and how the Empire kept its troops fed, supplied and sheltered in the field, and how it manufactured or procured their supplies and equipment. The chapter also discusses how they handled medical care for the wounded and sick, dealt with prisoners, performed police duties and gathered intelligence. Chapter 7 is a brief conclusion.
It assesses the Mughals’ military achievements and compares them with the contemporary developments in Europe that have been described by other scholars as examples of a ‘Military Revolution’. I recount how the Mughal military system, shaped by its unique environment, evolved differently to its Western counterparts. I also examine possible reasons for its ultimate failure, including the decline of the horse archer and technological limitations. The chapter ends with a discussion of the Empire’s decline and fall – an outcome that led later historians to question and discount its previous accomplishments. I conclude that contingency and human error, not inherent structural flaws, were the primary causes. Most problematic were the afflictions of success.
The Mughal Empire eventually achieved a position of such dominance that it was no longer driven to evolve and innovate. When it was finally torn apart by mismanagement and internal divisions, it left a vacuum too profound for any of its Indian successors to fill. This work addresses significant omissions in both military historiography and the historiography of South Asia in general. Hopefully it will stimulate further examination and discussion of not only the Mughal military system and Indian warfare in the early modern period but also of the ongoing technological, social and intellectual developments in the region. The Mughal Empire should take its deserving place as one of the major players in a world moving slowly but surely towards modernity.
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