Download PDF | (Cornell Paperbacks) John Beeler - Warfare in Feudal Europe, 730-1200-Cornell University Press (1972).
294 Pages
Preface
The revival of interest in military history has done much to rescue medieval military institutions and practices from undeserved oblivion. Particularly during the last ten years, books and monographs dealing with all aspects of medieval warfare have been appearing at a gratifying rate. Most of these new studies are highly specialized, and the only survey of a general nature in English is Sir Charles Oman's two-volume work, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages (London, 1924), which is still valuable but now over forty-five years old. It is partly to fill this gap that I have been encouraged to write the present volume. To Professors Robin Higham of Kansas State University and C. W. Hollister of the University of California at Santa Barbara I am indebted for numerous helpful suggestions. I thank the library staff of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, especially Mrs. Elizabeth J. Holder, Miss Mary Robert Seawall, and Miss Emilie Mills, for invaluable aid cheerfully given. To Anne, my wife, and to my daughter Hazel I am in debt for, among other things, help in typing a draft from my longhand manuscript, and to Mrs. Louise Mills for typing the final draft. Greensboro, North Carolina St. Oswald's Day, 1970 John Beeler
Introduction
Possibly because of the obscurity that shrouds much of the period in European history usually labeled "feudal," few attempts have been made to describe or explain its warfare. Much is known about feudalism as a social, political, and military institution; we know something about how the feudal system produced fighting men, but little research has been undertaken to find out how these warriors were employed on campaign or in battle. The primary reason for this gap in our knowledge of the history of warfare is the generally unsatisfactory nature of the surviving sources. A few capitularies deal with the military organization of the Carolingian empire; occasional charters in France, England, Italy, and elsewhere mention, incidentally, conditions of military service. The Domesday Book and royal charters have something to say about such subjects as castles and municipal defenses.
The archaeologist can tell us much about the early fortifications of the feudal age. But this kind of evidence is not of much help in determining the sources of the troops, in reconstructing campaigns or battles, or in ascertaining the strategy or tactics used by a particular general on a spe cific occasion. And, unfortunately, the narrative accounts are frequently useless. For example, the two modern historians who have written in detail about the rather obscure battle of Cassel in Flanders ( 22 February 1071) totally disagree over which of the contending parties held the castle of Cassel at the start of the battle. Each scholar used exactly the same sources, which are so ambiguous that two competent historians drew from them quite different conclusions. In feudal Europe there.
were no military writers per se, and little specifically military writing. Narrative history was written by the only literate class of the day-the clergy, principally the monks. Understandably, they had little comprehension of military matters and even less interest in the complexities of strategy and tactics. Western Europe had to wait until the Renaissance for military writers of the caliber of the emperors Maurice, Nicephorus II Phocas, and Leo VI (the Wise), whose works give us a broad view of Byzantine military institutions and practices. Another difficulty is the extraordinary diversity of feudal military practices, which were as varied as those of modern times. Feudal warfare was in the process of evolution and modification for nearly five centuries, and its vestiges survived much longer. While military feudalism was fully developed in the Ile de France, elsewhere it was modified by a great variety of factors. Thus in places where it was indigenous feudal warfare was not the same as it was in areas where it was consciously adopted or was imposed by foreign settlers or invaders. There were also an almost infinite number of local variations. In northern France, for example, feudalism was theoretically everywhere essentially the same.
But actually the military capabilities of, let us say, the king of France differed markedly from those of the count of Flanders; a tremendous advantage lay with the count. My plan for dealing with this complexity is to discuss military feudalism as it originated and developed in the Frankish kingdom of the Carolingians, and as it operated during the early Capetian period in the Ile de France and the feudal principalities of northern France. Next I follow feudal developments, in roughly chronological order, in those states where feudalism was consciously importedlower Italy and Sicily, England, and Crusader Syria. Then I treat those lands in which the military structure revealed some feudal characteristics, but where, for a variety of reasons, military institutions were never more than superficially feudalized-southern France, Christian Spain, central and northern Italy, and Germany. I attempt to show how such factors as native military institutions, the pattern of landholding, economic structure,. manpower problems, and the like worked to modify feudal military institutions and practices.
It is likely that scholars have been turned away from the study of feudal warfare by a general misconception of its nature. Indeed, the term "feudal warfare" has been so misused by historians over the last century that its proper meaning has been almost lost or forgotten. The adjective "feudal" ought to be applied only to the wars and campaigns fought during the age of feudalism. But so universal is the belief that military operations in the feudal period were confused, aimless, and incompetently led that historians often use the word to describe actions meriting these strictures regardless of the period in which they took place. This does a grave injustice to the fighting men of the early Middle Ages. By no means were all military operations between the eighth and twelfth centuries confused and lacking in rational objectives. Moreover, the proportion of competent generals was probably as high in the feudal age as it has ever been. Many misconceptions have arisen from a lack of understanding of the true nature of feudal warfare.
While this lack stems in large part from the scarcity of contemporary accounts about how armies were formed and employed, it is also due to a failure to make full use of the available information. Much has been written about the social, political, and economic aspects of feudalism. Scholars are generally agreed that feudal society had its roots in the military necessities of the eighth and ninth centuries, when the old infantry levy of the Germanic peoples proved no longer capable of meeting the demands placed upon it, and that a new form of military efficiency based on mounted service slowly evolved. But little has been done to find out how the "feudal" troops were used in war. Only recently have scholars begun to show an interest in the military aspects of feudal society; the works of C. W. Hollister, Michael Miiller-Wille, Michael Powicke, and J. F. Verbruggen are indicative of the new trend in medieval military scholarship. The constitutional and legal aspects of feudal service have been more than adequately considered by such eminent scholars as J. H. Round, Sir Frank Stenton, Marc Bloch, and F. L. Ganshof, and the interested reader can refer to their works with confidence. No attempt is made in the present study to provide such information unless it will enable the student to understand the feudal chain of command. Nor do I give a blow-byblow account of all the wars fought between the eighth and twelfth centuries.
One purpose of a book of this kind should be to stimulate the reader to further exploration on his own. For this reason a single description of a particular type of action has been deemed sufficient for a given area. For example, Richard the Lion-Hearted, large as he bulks in the romances, had very little influence on the military practices of western Europe. His celebrated victory over Saladin at Arsuf (1191) was but another example of the type of running engagement characteristic of warfare in the Latin east. Since I describe in detail the much more interesting Busra campaign of 1147, it seems unnecessary to say anything about Arsuf. This book is concerned primarily with such subjects as the bases on which feudal service was exacted, the mustering and composition of armies and their subsequent operations in the field, and the quality and qualifications of their commanders. It would be useful to know something about the logistical problems faced by feudal generals, but apart from occasional references little information is available on how armies were supplied and equipped until well into the thirteenth century.
All soldiers were required to furnish their own arms and equipment, so it is bootless to inquire into the industry-which must generally have been local-that provided the armor and weapons with which feudal armies took the field before the stage when governments were prepared to equip their troops. Attention is given to the construction of fortifications and the devices used to garrison them. Any attempt to put a time limit on a particular historical period is arbitrary and bound to draw criticism. I have chosen the beginning of the thirteenth century because by this time commanders were raising their most reliable units by means that were certainly not "feudal." All too many students-and teachers-tend to equate "feudal" with "medieval," although the terms are by no means synonymous. Edward I, the Black Prince, Emperor Frederick II, Charles of Anjou, Henry V, and John Zisca simply do not belong in a book about feudal warfare. So before beginning to discuss feudal warfare, I had best define just what I mean by the term "feudal." A feudal soldier (perhaps warrior or fighter would be a more accurate designation) was an individual who in return for a grant-usually of land-known first as a benefice, later as a fief, contracted to serve in the armed forces of his lord at his own expense for a period of time. At first the benefice was not hereditary and the period of service was probably unlimited, but eventually the fief became heritable and a fairly standard service of forty days per year in time of war became customary.
A feudal army, then, would be an army in which all or most of the troops were serving at their own expense in return for fiefs, and feudal warfare would usually, but not always, involve opposing forces composed of troops raised in such a manner. All troops raised in other ways, or paid in some other fashion, must be described as nonfeudal. The term "antifeudal," which some authorities use, is essentially meaningless, since no one from the eighth to the thirteenth century would have been aware that the use of paid troops was in any way detrimental to the established order. The extent to which the term "feudal" can be applied to the armed conflict of these centuries is one of the problems examined in the following pages.
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