Download PDF | (Combat Aircraft 044) David Nicolle, Mark Styling - Arab MiG-19 & MiG-21 Units in Combat-Osprey (2004).
99 Pages
INTRODUCTION
The history of the Arab-Israeli confrontation is widely-known and ko This, however, is not the place to go into the convoluted rights and wrongs of a continuing struggle, nor even to offer an objective account of the air wars between the Arab states and what some of their governments still call ‘the Zionist entity’. This book tries to tell the story of two Soviet-designed fighters in frontline Arab service and of the men who flew and maintained them under appallingly difficult circumstances. To describe it as a story ‘from the other side of the hill’ presupposes that the authors and most of their readers will be on the Israeli ‘side of the hill’, which is of course not necessarily the case.
The first Soviet-bloc combat aircraft purchased by some Arab states was the MiG-15 in 1955, closely followed by the MiG-17. Their story will be told in a later volume in the Osprey Combat Aircraft series. By the late 1950s the arms race between Israel and its Arab neighbours
was becoming serious. In 1958 Egypt and Syria joined to form what was supposed to be a single state — the ill-fated United Arab Republic (UAR). In 1961 Syria seceded, although for another decade Egypt continued to call itself the UAR.
The Egyptian Air Force had been created in 1932 as the Egyptian Army Air Force (EAAF), being styled the Royal Egyptian Air Force (REAF) until a military coup in 1952. Not long after that coup, headed by Col Gamal Abdel Nasser, the monarchy was abolished and the air force became simply the Egyptian Air Force (EAF). That title would be restored in 1971 when President Anwar Sadat quietly dropped the name UAR.
In 1960 the UAR (Egypt-Syria) and Iraq began a major effort to improve their air strength, followed a little later by Algeria. This involved obtaining aircraft able to fly faster than sound in level flight, followed by subsequent purchases able to exceed Mach 2. The aircraft in question were the MiG-19 and the MiG-21, although Iraq was also acquiring Hawker Hunters from Britain. Nevertheless, President Nasser’s Four Point Plan to confront Israel on seemingly equal terms was only possible as the result of massive arms deliveries from the Warsaw Pact countries, primarily the USSR.
The Arabs’ ambition was to build air forces capable of facing the Israeli Air Force (IDF/AF), and this provided a golden opportunity for the USSR to extend Soviet political influence in a region previously dominated by the British.
THE ARABS GO
SUPERSONIC
In 1959 Israel acquired supersonic Super Mystére jet fighters from [Fan and the following year the UAR (Egypt and Syria) ordered the
similarly-performing MiG-19 from the Soviet Union. The Middle Eastern arms race was now in full swing, and Egypt initially intended to obtain four squadrons of MiG-19s. Eventually, the UARAF obtained about 80 of these first-generation interceptors, although not all came directly from Soviet factories. The first arrived in the summer of 1961, and comprised the MiG-19S day fighter, with limited all-weather capability, which could also be used in a ground-attack role. Later, Egypt obtained the all-weather MiG-19P or radar-equipped MiG-19PM, although not apparently from the USSR. These may have been among the aircraft transferred from the Iraqi Air Force, or they may have been licence-built Czechoslovakian S-106 versions of the MiG-19PM.
The structure of the UARAF, including its new MiG-19 squadrons, remained essentially similar to the Royal Air Force, on which it was modelled. A supposed restructuring along Warsaw Pact lines remained superficial, with a wing or jinaah now being translated as an air brigade. Most comprised three squadrons, each with between 15 and 20 aircraft. The MiG-19 air brigade, however, only ever had two squadrons, and for various reasons these would soon be combined into a single unit.
The first group of Egyptian pilots sent to the USSR to train on the MiG-19 had already flown MiG-17s, and included men who would subsequently become prominent in the UARAF. Four trained as pilot-attack instructors (air-to-air and ground-attack), including Sqn Ldrs Shalash, Ahmad el-Dirayni (who commanded Egypt's first MiG-19 squadron, and who was later killed while fighting Biafran rebels with the Nigerian Air Force) and Magdi el-Miklawi, who died during a MiG-19 night training exercise. Among the slightly younger pilots were Alaa Barakat, Abd el-Moneim el-Tawil and Nabil Shoukry, who went to the USSR in June 1960. Upon their return, these pilots formed Egypt’s first MiG-19 squadron at Fayid, close to the Suez Canal. During a graduation ceremony at the Air Academy at Bilbays in 1961, Alaa Barakat was among the MiG-19 pilots who performed a high-speed flypast to celebrate the formation of Egypr’s first supersonic interceptor unit. They broke all the windows in the control tower!
Nasser soon decided that instead of ordering further MiG-19s, Egypt should concentrate on the more advanced MiG-21. Meanwhile, the two MiG-19 squadrons gave the UARAF useful experience in operating supersonic fighters. The Egyptians had hoped to organise a MiG-19 aerobatic team to perform alongside existing MiG-15 and MiG-17 ones, but the aircraft proved unsuitable for such formation flying. Criticisms of the MiG-19 included its steep landing angle, big nose, which reduced visibility, limited range and poor payload in the ground-attack role.
Nos 20 and 21 Sqn soon formed No 15 Air Brigade under Ahmad Hassan Dirayni, while Alaa Barakat took over command of No 20 Sqn. Fayid was the air brigade’s main airfield, while Milayz, in the Sinai peninsula, was used as a forward base. In 1964, maintenance problems resulted in the two squadrons being combined into one ‘big squadron’, apparently renumbered as No 27/29, commanded by Alaa Barakat.
The biggest problem experienced with the MiG-19 was the positioning of the hot air venting pipes, which ran close to the aircraft’s hydraulic tanks. Unfortunately, the Russians failed to warn the Egyptians that holes could appear in these pipes and cause fires in the hydraulic tanks. As a result, the combined squadron was soon reduced from 26 to 20 aircraft. Despite such problems, the MiG-19s continued to fly patrols. Their CO, Alaa Barakat, recalled that before the Six Day War, Egyptian pilots used the British tactical ‘fluid four’ formation, rather than the tighter Soviet ‘finger four’.
The precarious peace in the Middle East was shaken in 1964 when clashes increased along the IsraeliSyrian border. On the Israeli-Egyptian frontier, however, United Nations observers in Sinai recorded very few problems, except for frequent cross-border overflights by mostly Israeli aircraft. On 23 July 1963, the IDF/AF used the anniversary of the 1952 Egyptian Revolution to once again demonstrate its ability to overfly Egyptian territory. This resulted in a clash with two MiG-17s— not MiG19s, as was reported at the time — with the UARAF claiming to have downed at least one Israeli jet. In fact no aircraft were lost on either side.
Just over three years later, on 29 November 1966, the MiG-19s were in combat for the first time. Having probed the border to test Israeli defences, two MiG-19s were intercepted by two Israeli Mirage IIIs. One MiG fell to a MATRA R.530 missile — the first time it had been used in combat — and the other was hit by cannon fire.
Another little-known aspect of the MiG-19's Egyptian service was its use
in Yemen, where an Egyptian expeditionary force helped the Republican government against Royalist tribesmen in a bitter civil war. But only a few MiG-19s were sent to this far southern corner of Arabia.
Egypt, or the UAR as it then was, first expressed an interest in the MiG-21 in 1961, and the following year the USSR agreed to supply 40 to oppose the Mirage IIICs which Israel had on order. At this stage the MiG-21 had no all-weather or ground-attack capability, while its dogfighting limitations reflected the fact that the aircraft was designed to attack large NATO bombers. Furthermore, Warsaw Pact fighters were intended to be used under very close ground control, which was not available in Egypt at that time. Even the MiG-21F-13’s cannon was supposed to be a close-range weapon to finish off an already damaged bomber.
The first Egyptian pilots to convert to the MiG-21 were experienced squadron leaders or flight lieutenants, and by 1964 Egypt had about 60 MiG-21F-13s, probably forming two squadrons. Clearly these first units faced problems. For example, Egypt’s first MiG-21s were not equipped with a blind landing radio ground control or guidance system. A temporary solution was found in the installation of arrestor-nets halfway down the runways. Soviet training was also highly orthodox.
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