Download PDF | Warren T. Treadgold - Byzantine State Finances in the Eighth and Ninth Centuries-Columbia University Press (1982).
171 Pages
PREFACE
I first became aware of the problem treated in this monograph during a casual discussion at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1977, when Robert Lopez expressed exasperation and even incredulity that all Byzantine state archives had disappeared. In my subsequent work, I have come to realize that the loss of those archives (which at least for the eighth and ninth centuries does seem to be total) is a major problem, and particularly damaging because it encourages the attitude that no specific statements about the workings of the Byzantine state are possible. I first planned this study as a fairly brief article arguing that even the scanty evidence we possess is enough to confirm in a general way the total proposed long ago by Ernst Stein for the budget of the ninth-century Empire. As I worked, however, I gradually found that the evidence was not as scanty as I had supposed, and was probably absent for some categories of revenue and expenditure only because those categories had never existed or were insignificant. The result is this short book.
It is still a limited study. If I had not confined myself here to the task of reconstructing the state budget, the project would have turned into a general history of Byzantium that was distorted by an exaggerated emphasis on state finance. (I am now at work on a separate general history of Byzantium from 780 to 842 that I hope to keep free from that distortion.) By the same token, this monograph omits references to many sources and secondary works that give important information about such topics as the Byzantine army and economy but proved not to be directly useful for estimating any budgetary items.
I have, however, tried not to overlook any relevant study or approach, and in that effort I have consulted a variety of scholars. At one time or another I have presented material from this project to the Byzantine Studies Conference, the Oxford Byzantine Society, the Stanford Social Science History Workshop, and the Stanford Classics Department, and received helpful comments from each audience. I have also benefited from the advice of a number of scholars who kindly agreed to read the typescript in one form or another: Arther Ferrill, Michael Hendy, Michael Jameson, Walter Kaegi, Patricia KarlinHayter, Cyril Mango, Pierre Noyes, Nicolas Oikonomidés, Ihor Sevcenko, and Carl Solberg. Most of the research and writing was done at Munich and Oxford with the support of a Research Fellowship from the Humboldt Foundation; the writing was completed at Stanford ona fellowship from the Mellon Foundation. I am pleased to thank all these groups and scholars, especially Professor Ferrill, whose encouragement was particularly important, and Professor Oikonomidés, whose criticisms were particularly useful and whose invaluable book was the prerequisite for such a study as this one.
I emphasize here that, except in a few cases in which the sources give information that probably derives from the lost archives, most figures I propose in this study are estimates with large margins for error. Such figures should not be pressed too far; but neither should they be dismissed simply because they are rough estimates. The estimate that Byzantium had a population of around ten million in 842 is probably about as accurate as the widely quoted estimate that China has a population of around a billion in 1981. Both numbers are guesses based on imperfect census materials well removed from the dates in question; either could easily be wrong by as much as 20%. On the other hand, neither is at all likely to be wrong by as much as 50%, and no sensible Sinologist would say that the population of contemporary China cannot be usefully estimated. The Byzantinist cannot afford to be more fastidious.
THE PROBLEM
Most contemporary scholarly controversy over the condition of the Byzantine Empire between the seventh century and the ninth is a matter of scale. Scholars generally agree that after the early seventh century the Empire lost about two-thirds of its territory, and that its remaining cities, trade, educated class, population, and resources also contracted. On the other hand, no one denies that in this period the Empire still had some population centers, trade, and educated class and considerable population and resources, and that in the ninth century all of these began to expand. The dispute is over how much damage the Empire had suffered. Some see the Empire as severely impoverished and devastated during this time, with its provincial cities reduced to mere towns, villages, forts, or even ruins, and its overall trade, communications, and security drastically disrupted.' Others find the Empire still relatively prosperous and powerful, with urban life maintained in Asia Minor and even to some extent in Greece and Thrace, and important trade and a sizable money economy persisting. ? The controversy may be summed up as a disagreement over the size of the Byzantine economy.
Nevertheless, the controversy has seldom been over specific numbers. Relative sizes of coin finds have been discussed without conclusive results; otherwise only isolated figures have been used as examples. Thus Speros Vyronis has illustrated his case for a relatively large economy by estimating the ninth-century military payroll in Asia Minor at around a million nomismata; and Cyril Mango has illustrated his case for a relatively small economy by estimating the population of Amorium in 838, when it was the chief city of Asia Minor, at 20,000 or less.> Yet it is not obvious that these two figures are incompatible with each other, or which view they would support if they were both correct. Like the numbers of coin finds, they are numbers out of context, and can suggest to different observers very different pictures of the situation as a whole.
What would probably be the ideal measure, an estimate for the Byzantine gross annual product at various times, is out of reach today. Records of this are not only lacking now but never existed, and any monetary value assigned to it would be an abstraction, given that most of the Empire’s production was consumed or bartered without ever being turned into cash. The most useful estimate that may be attainable is for the annual cash revenue of the Byzantine government. Because this figure was by definition entirely in cash, it can be computed without evaluating non-monetary resources. In fact, it was surely recorded as such in the Byzantine archives; as we shall see, our sources preserve totals for the Byzantine revenue in the fourteenth century and for the revenue of the Abbasid Caliphate in the eighth and ninth centuries. Especially if such a figure were divided into the revenue from taxes on agriculture and that from taxes on trade and industry, it would be a fairly good index of the power and wealth of the Byzantine state—though not necessarily of the prosperity of its subjects. It is certainly worth recovering, if it can be recovered.
Sixty years or more ago, two eminent Byzantinists made estimates of the cash revenue of the Byzantine state in the ninth century. In 1912, J. B. Bury, following K. Paparrhegopoulos, estimated the annual revenue of the Emperor Theophilus (829-42) at 45 to 50 million nomismata.* In 1919, Ernst Stein estimated the annual revenue under the Amorian Dynasty (820-67) at no more than six million nomismata—one-eighth as much, or less.” Three years later, Andreas Andréadés entered the controversy, making no estimate of his own but arguing that Bury’s estimate was much too high and Stein’s estimate much too low.® Stein responded with a review in which he defended his estimate and implied that Andréadés had misunderstood his arguments.’ In the late thirties Andréadés had the last word, repeating that though no exact figure could be given the estimates of Bury and Stein were “equally erroneous.”® Today, more than forty years later, the question seems to have progressed no further in print.?
Some of the implications of these estimates can be seen by means of comparisons with our figures for the revenue of the contemporary Caliphate and for the later Byzantine Empire. First, the revenue of the Caliph Harin Al-Rashid (786-809) has been recorded in a tax-list, and was equivalent to some 35 million nomismata. Though the figures that survive for the revenue of Theophilus’ contemporary Al-Ma’mun (81333) are not quite complete, a comparison with Harun’s tax-list shows that Ma’miun’s revenue must have been equivalent to about 22 million nomismata. !°
Thus, according to Bury, the Empire had at least twice the cash revenue of the Caliphate, so that its failure to halt the Arab raids of Asia Minor and its defeats in the battles of 838 and 843/4 seem a remarkably poor defensive performance. On the other hand, according to Stein, the Empire had at best about a quarter as much revenue as the Caliphate, so that its continuing to survive the Arab onslaught at all seems a considerable feat. Though of course the military balance between Empire and Caliphate depended on other factors besides wealth, our evaluation of those other factors would be utterly different depending upon which estimate we adopted.
Second, we know that in the year 1321 the Emperor Andronicus I], by means of fiscal heroics, managed to raise the annual revenue of his imperfectly restored Byzantine Empire to the equivalent of half a million nomismata of Theophilus’ time.!! The condition of Andronicus’ Empire is not a subject of serious dispute: the Empire was exhausted, with its territory not only ravaged and impoverished but gradually slipping from central control.'!* Any comparison of revenues should take into account that Andronicus’ Empire was a barely a third the size of that of Theophilus. Still, if Bury is night that Theophilus was able to raise revenue at thirty times Andronicus’ maximum rate or more, Theophilus’ Empire would have to be considered a wealthy one. Stein’s estimate that Theophilus raised revenue at four times Andronicus’ rate or less, especially if it were much less, would leave open the possibility that Theophilus’ territory too had been rather badly ravaged and impoverished.
Another way of looking at these estimates is to compare them with estimates of the cost of living in Byzantium, which are based on a considerable body of evidence. George Ostrogorsky put the cost of basic sustenance for a family in early Byzantine times at some seventeen nomismata a year, and Romilly Jenkins made a similar estimate for the middle Byzantine period.'? Accordingly, Bury’s estimate for the Staté revenue is a sum that could have supported about three million families, which may well have been more than the whole population of the Empire at the time. '* If this is correct, or even if the population were twice as numerous, the Empire would have to be considered rich—and probably severely overtaxed as well. But Stein’s estimated revenue would have been enough to support no more than around 350,000 families—a substantial number at the maximum, but certainly far less than the Empire’s population. Such a case might be characteristic of a state with extortionary taxation but no great wealth among its subjects.
The unbridgeable gap between the estimates of Bury and Stein, the minimum of one being seven and a half times the maximum of the other, may seem an indication that the source material is hopelessly inadequate to permit any meaningful estimate of the ninth-century revenue to be made. But the gap is at least as much a sign of the underdevelopment of the Byzantine field. Though no doubt Andréadés was right that the Byzantine revenue cannot be estimated with complete precision and certainty, our sources are hardly so scanty and contradictory as to lend equal support to the positions of Bury and Stein, and to the rather too easy position of Andréadés that they are equally wrong. |
In fact, the published arguments of these three authorities rely con-. siderably more on subjective judgments than on thorough examination of the source material. Bury’s estimate is derived from an estimate of Paparrhegopoulos that rests mostly on a single late figure of highly debatable significance. !> Stein’s estimate is mainly based on data from the sixth century, supplemented by his guess at the proportion of the revenue of the ninth-century Empire to that of the Caliphate. Andréadés, after considering arguments that appeared to him to support Paparrhegopoulos against Stein, dismissed Paparrhegopoulos’ estimate with the simple assertion that for a pre-modern state such a large sum was preposterous.!© None of these scholars made any systematic attempt to reconstruct an itemized budget for the middle Byzantine period to explain and check their conclusions, though Stein suggested a rough outline of the sixth-century budget. !’
Nevertheless, materials do exist for a much more thorough study than has yet been made of the Byzantine state budget in the eighth and ninth centuries. A nearly complete account of the numbers, organization, and pay scale of the Byzantine army about 842 survives in the works of three Arab geographers. They, combined with certain Byzantine sources, provide material for reconstructing the whole military payroll and a substantial part of that of the civil service. Certain other evidence on state expenditure survives, including some official paperwork for three tenth-century military expeditions and what seems to be an inventory of the decorations of St. Sophia and their value. As for revenues, only a few fragments of cadastral documents survive, but the tax rates are fairly completely recorded in several. places. Though modern estimates that have been made of the Empire’s population and of the average size of Byzantine farms are speculative at best, they are at least worth checking by considering their consequences for the budget. Like the direct tax rates, the rates of the Empire’s trade and market duties are known, and a few figures survive for the amounts of these duties collected in certain places. Further, literary sources provide apparently reliable figures for the surpluses in the treasury at several different dates. Only a fraction of this evidence has been exploited so far. :
Obviously, the figures in these sources cannot be accepted without question; they may be mistakes, groundless guesses, or even textual corruptions in our manuscripts. But many must be right, or very nearly so. The Empire could not have functioned if its muster-rolls, payrolls, cadasters, accounts, and receipts had been utterly wrong. Sometimes they were correct by definition, because even padded payrolls were paid in full, and whatever taxes were embezzled on the spot were not listed as collected. The offic .'i gures for various items were known to many members of the bureaucracy, who were by and large the class who wrote and read history. Even when they did not have direct access to exact figures, bureaucrats were in a position to make reasonably close estimates, and would not be deceived by figures that were too far from the mark.
Among the more or less correct figures, the textual corruptions, wild guesses, and outrageous distortions are usually easy to detect. The best test of any number in ancient or medieval sources is its compatibility with other numbers in independent sources. Therefore, every figure or estimate should be checked against every other as far as possible, and accepted only if its logical consequences in other areas are plausible. Admittedly, most estimates will still have to be approximate ones, but making an estimate with a margin for error of even 50% is better than being content with the difference of more than 700% between the estimates of Bury and Stein.
The aim of the present study is to reconstruct the broad outlines of the financial records of the middle Byzantine Empire, and consequently to estimate the annual cash budget of the Byzantine government. The period studied closely is approximately that from the accession of Leo III] in 717 to the accession of Leo VI in 886. No attempt has been made to estimate the budget in the seventh century, an extremely unsettled period for which evidence on state finance is exiguous. For the tenth century the sources are if anything more abundant than before; but they do not translate as easily into overall numerical estimates, since they apparently include neither figures for the total sum in the treasury like those for 842, 856, or 867, nor a figure for the total military payroll like that for ca. 867, nor a statistical survey of the army like that of Al-Jarmi for ca. 842, nor a description of the bureaucracy nearly as detailed as that of Philotheus for 899. For the present purpose, the best course seems to be to make use of whatever evidence of the tenth century and later bears on the situation in the ninth century, to discuss changes in the army and bureaucracy from Leo VI’s reign on as far as these affect that evidence, but not to attempt any systematic account of the finances in the later period. As it is, the period chosen has the advantage of beginning at a time when the revival of the middle Byzantine Empire had pretty plainly not yet started, and of ending at a time when that revival was obviously well under way.
For conveninence, all estimates and most figures quoted are expressed in nomismata, the nomisma being the principal gold coin at the time. Sums recorded in the sources in other monetary units are converted into nomismata at the official rates, and the debased nomismata of the eleventh century and later are converted into old nomismata according to their gold content.!® In order to avoid the problem of converting non-monetary values into monetary ones, the main estimates here exclude all revenues and expenditures that were outside the money economy, such as food and mounts that were levied as taxes in kind and distributed to the army, billeting of troops, corvee labor, and grants of land to soldiers and naval oarsmen. Though these revenues and expenditures were important, as we shall see, they had no place in the cash budget and ought not to be confused with it.
Because of the uneven distribution of the evidence and the fact that the state budget could vary substantially from year to year and over longer periods of time, the main body of this study has two parts. The first is a full discussion of the finances during a base period, the regency of Theodora from 842 to 856. Within this period each major budgetary item is discussed in turn. In the second part this examination is taken as a basis for a general outline of the state finances from 717 to 886, with each budgetary category again considered individually and illustrated by estimates for the reign of the Empress Irene (780802). Most of the quantitative material is summarized in tables that appear at the end of the study. A comparison between the estimates for Irene’s reign and those for Theodora’s regency should provide a rough measure of the progress of the Empire’s economic revival during what has usually been considered its first great spurt of growth.
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