Download PDF | Armies of the Ottoman Empire 1775-1820 by David Nicolle, Angus McBride, Osprey Publishing, 1998.
47 Pages
At llie cIdsp ofllic I81I1 cenuiiy ihc ()lIonian Km|jirp slill had huge iiiililaiA' polfiuial. It was a eoiiiplex stnictuie ol inililan' pmvinces, ■ aiilonoinoiis regions and virtnally indepeinlcnt ‘regencies’. Each inimnce had a governoi 01 /«}«, with a large .stall including numerous miliiaiT ligures. This local admitiistralion was primarily conceiiicd with the .Muslim population, while the Cihristian communities governed themselves - unless theii affairs impinged upon those of the Ottoman Slate itself. Some regions were of greater militan' signilicaiice than others, and most ol these were on the frontiers. They included the Danube valley which liad serveti as a major channel for Ottoman raids inlo central F.urope and now formed a vulneiahle opening where the Christian Habsburg F.tnpire (later known as .Austria-Hungaiy) could invade Ottoman territon. Several otttlvitig regiotis Itad, liowever, been lost siitet' the high point of Ottoman power in the lbth-17th eentnries. Nevertheless the massive loss of territon' which eharaelerised the linal centtin of (Xtornan hislor)' had harelv Ixtgitn.
1 he tnain problem which the Ottoman gov¬ ernment ettiiently laced was tlie leltisal of many provincial atithorities to obet the sttltati, widespread tltottgh stnall-scale revolts, and a steep ccotiomic decline which ttndettnined the government's ability to finance militaiy campaigns. Despite all these problems, however, Ottoman foices continued to fight hard and often well. Htit the impoverishment of the established milifatv' grotips meant that a large proportion had to find additional means of making a living, while many became so desperate that they turned bandit. Paradoxically perhaps, tliese same bandit groups would also provide the Ottomans with some of their most elTective troops befoie fundamental militan reforms produced a 'modern' army in the 19th centtiiy. In fact the sinvival of the Ottoman state during the.se diffictill decades, and in the face of predatoiy Christian neighbours, showed its basic strength.
Military men still formed a social elite and the Turks themselves regarded soldiering as the finest possible career. The Ottoman annv contintted to ftilfil iLs traditional jobs of border defence, quelling uprisings and providing a mobile field force against foreign invasion, ■fhe army was also designed to neutralise its own often bitterly antago¬ nistic rival elements. Ceremonial militaiy costume, weaponry and decorated horse-harness also continued to jilay a (irominent role in stich Ottoman cultural lile. Even so, there is no denving that the Ottoman armies were at their least elfective in the late 18th eenttiry. They still eonsisred of kapihuhi, salaried regular troops, most of whom were )anis.saries, and a huge variety of li/fmMi, tm()aid irregtilars, A large part of the Janissaiy corps vva.s ottt of government control and was unwilling to accept tnodernisation of its stnicturc, tactics oi weapomy. The old I'etidal ,Sipahi eavalry had virtually ceased to exist as a itiilitaiy force, largely having evolved into a peaceful rural atistociacy. Technical corps sttch as the artilleiy were in better condition since they had accepted some degree of modernisation dttiing the 18th centtny, whereas the Ottoman navy was in the worst shape of all.
I he Ottomait Empire was only capable of raising 30,000 troops for a major campaign. Consequently, the Ottoman army relied on defensive strategy and lost the military' initiative. 1 hese weaknesses had long been recognised by the sultan, but the question of whether a cure lay in bringing Ottoman forces back to theii original condition or by awholesale adoption of western Ktiropt-an militaiy systems wotilH remain unanswered until the destrurtion of the Janissarr cotps in 182(i. It was also dillicult to reform the militaiT while the state was at war, as the Ottoman Knipire wa.s on and oft throtighout the Napoleonic era.
Of all the Ottomans' neighbours, Tsarist Russia was the most predatoiy. It wanted control of the Kosphorus and Dardanelles .Straits and iiitetidcd to dominate the Orthodox Christian Balkans. Meanwhile, Napoleon saw Ottoman territories as the route to Biilish-i tiled India. Biiuiin it-sell leared both Russian control ol the Daidanelles and Ki ench inlltience in the Middle East, and consequently tended to sttpport the Ottoman Empire.
THE PEOPLE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
The ceremonial tents of the Vizier Davut Pa^a on campaign against the Russians and AustroHungarians In the Balkans, 1788. (Aquatint by W. Watts, after a drawing by Luigi Mayer, Bib. Nat. Oep. d'Estampes, Paris. France)
The Ottoman Empiie had a larger population than its land cotild actually supjxnt which resulted in bloated cities, migiation to iinderpoptilatcd motmtain regions, widespread banditiy anti piiacy. It also meant that Ottoman armies had a ready pool ol'militaiy manpower.
Within Ottoman Ettrope there were Muslim majorities in Albania, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Crete, parts ol Bulgaria and most of the cities. The Mu.slim population w'as, howeter, in relative decline because it stil'ieied disproportionately high militaiy casualties in a state where, officially, only Muslims served in the army. Christian expansion was also turning the Muslims into a threatened, though social!) dominant, elite. Furthermore, recent Ottoman militaiy defeats had witnessed an alamiing new phenomenon; namely the wholesale slaughter ol .Muslim populations in lost teri itorics. .Such 'ethnic cleansing' had not been seen before, but was to remain a feature of most Christian Balkan ‘national liberation' movement.s down to the present day.
The Muslim poptilation of the Ottoman Empire was largely of the Sunni persuasion, although there were huge ,Shia minorities in eastei it .•\natolia, .Syria and Iraq. Non-Mu.slims weie members of one of the millets or largely antononious comnnmilies into w'hich the entire Ottoman population was divided; stich as the Armenian Chiislians, Orthodox Christians, Catholic Christians, and Jews. In ruial regions these non-Muslim populations were titled by theii own ‘notables' who
Creek Christians enjoy¬ ed a cultuialb and even a politicalh piivileged posi¬ tion compaied to the others, btil the Western European \isitoi tended to be tlismissive of these fellow Christians, and gt'iierallv advocated alliance with the dominant Turks.
W’cslci ri .siildit-rs ;iiul tliploiiuil.s 1 k«1 a dear appredalioii ol' Ottoman tiiilitan" stteitgtiis attd wt'aktiesses. (ietteta! Koelilei', rite prituipal atlx'isei to tlte traililiotitil rorps, told his .sii|)etiots In l.ondon that tlieit leaders showed tio foresight iti ojjeiations against the ctieinv atid wiote: W hat is expected fnnn sucli troojis, oi tathcr ntob tints coitinititidedr Nothitig bin shame aitd disgrace, and vet they have fnie meti, excellent horses, good gittis, plenty ol atiiniunition, and prodsiotis, and lotage, itttd in shot t great ahttndance ol all the niaterials retptii ed to cotistititte a Ihie artnv, lint they watit oi der atid svstein, which wotild tint he dilftcttlt to estahlish if their j3i ini ipal officers were not so astonishinglv adv<-r,se to anr thing tending towards it,'
In lact. the I in ks anil nianv of their Muslim siibjecls reniained excellent inilitaiy material. ConlidenI, aggressive and motivated hv religions certainlv, theii highly tiaditional attitude towards warfare was ilhistrated in a little-known poem hv VVasif commemorating a defeat of the French in 18(11: When the mishelieiing French;ii:m suddenly swooped on Egypt’s land
Ottoman Fragmentation
.\s the sultan’s authority declined, local Muslim 'notables' lose to power in inanv provinces. They also assembled private armies which were of ten more numerous, beltei paid and belter equipped than those of the official Ottoman governors. Some of these ayam established highly effective regimes with lottil support from the local population. Ottoman regular troops were similaiiv thin on the ground in autonomous parts of the Balkans such as Wallachia and Moldavia (modern Romania). Within .'Viiatolia the sultan controlled only a few provinces, the rest having been in a greater or lesser state of rebellion for decades. As one visitor said: ‘It is governed by independent Agas, or Chiefs of Districts; revolted from oppression, every man asserting and maintaining his own... and defending his estates with resolution and effect. In the exigencies of War thev have made common cause with the state: they have contributed a (luote of men to tbe war; but upon no account have they suffered Fayas or officers of aulhotilv to come amongsl them to govern.’
.Much the same was tnie of the AralKspeaking areas, lliougb the situation in fgypt vvas different. Here a revival of Maniluk power had resulted in the ‘Neo-.Mamluk Household .System'. Substantial military forces dvmiinaled Egypt when the French invaded in 1798. Ottoman authority was yet more nominal in the autonomous \oilh African regencies - Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers, left to tbeii own devices as long as thev recognised the sultan and contributed fleets to his navy.
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