Download PDF | Charles J. Halperin - Russia and the Golden Horde. The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History-Indiana University Press (1987).
193 Pages
Preface
Among historians of Russia, neglect of the period of Mongol domina- tion has been the rule rather than the exception As Michael Cherniavsky aptly observed, "There seems to have prevailed a vague desire to get rid of, to bypass, the whole question as quickly as possible" Most special- ists in medieval Russian history have described the Mongol influence as negligible or entirely deleterious and then moved on rapidly to other topics of investigation. Russia's historical experience since the "Tatar Yoke" has itself contributed to this traditional prejudice among Russian writers During the imperial period, when Russia was constantly at war with such Asiatics as the Ottoman Turks, the Central Asian Muslims, and the Japanese, the Russian populace tended to regard Muslims, nomads, and Asians with contempt and suspicion Westernization, initiated by Peter the Great, introduced European feelings of superiority into eighteenth-century Russian historiography and racist and colonialist ideologies into nineteenth-century Russian historical writings. Imperial Russian policy toward minorities at the turn of the twentieth century engendered rabıd chauvinism The scholarly discipline of Inner Asian studies bloomed only at the end of the nineteenth century in Russia, too late to influence the treatment of Russo-Tatar relations in the classic mul- tivolume histories of Russia Even the early Russian oriental studies reflect all the prejudices of their times against nomads and Muslims. Soviet scholarship since the Russian Revolution has made grea strides in the study of medieval Russia and the Mongol Empire. At the same time, it bas perpetuated some of the prejudices of Imperial Russian historiography and interpolated some newer dogmas Among Russian emigré scholars, the Eurasian movement of the 1920s tried to reinterpret Russia's relationship with the steppe but foundered in metaphysical parti- sanship Eurasianism did inspire George Vernadsky, the recognized American specialist on Russo-Tatar relations, but his contributions to the subject contain their own idiosyncratic flaws. Western scholarship, with its own set of biases, has too often echoed, at various levels of sophistica- tion, the famous but apocryphal epigram, "Scratch a Russian and find a Tatar." Thus nationalistic prejudices, cultural condescension, and schol- arly ignorance have contributed to the continued neglect of the impact of the Golden Horde on Russian history In recent years the situation has begun to change. A number of Western and Soviet historians, archaeologists, and philologists have shed much needed light on the period of Mongol rule. Thus far, however, no one has attempted to integrate their findings or to present a new overall interpretation of the role of the Mongols in Russian history. In this mono- graph I will approach this task using the paradigm of the medieval ethno- religious frontier as a comparative framework..
The Medieval Ethno-Religious Frontier
DURING THE MIDDLE AGES TWO UNIVERSALISTIC CREEDS, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM,
struggled for control of Europe, the Mediterranean world, and the Middle East. Christians and Muslims believed devoutly that all peoples would eventually convert to their own faith, the only true one, and that all false religions would be swept from the earth. In the meantime, theologians of both religions condemned infidels to eternal damnation. Religious doc- trine proscribed all (nonviolent) contact, even the breaking of bread, as an abomination. Inevitably, the religious conflict was accompanied by mutual bad feelings, ranging from contempt and suspicion to outright hatred. Enmity between the two faiths was based, of course, on more than theological differences. Though both Christians and Muslims spent much time fighting their coreligionists, sometimes over matters of doctrine, they also made war on one another. The forces of Islam swept out of the Arabian desert in the seventh century to conquer the Middle East, North Africa, and parts of Spain and the Balkans and soon threatened all of Europe. Christian Europe retaliated, with varying success, and through the fifteenth century sought to stem and reverse the Muslim tide. In these wars the sack of towns, the massacre of populations, and all the in-humanities of medieval warfare exacerbated the acrimony between the two cultures and reinforced their prejudices Even hostilities, however, require a certain degree of intimacy. The efficient prosecution of the wars depended on accurate knowledge of the enemy's political organization, social habits, and economic resources, not to mention his military strategies and the nature of his lands and defenses Ironically, the fighting necessitated occasional peaceful con- tacts, if only for negotiating surrenders, exchanging prisoners, and ar- ranging truces Such delicate interactions called for at least a modicum of understanding of each other's cultures to avoid potentially dangerous faux pas For the same purposes interpreters and bilingual emissaries had to be found, or if necessary, trained While Christians felt assured that in the long run all Muslims would be brought into the Christian ecumene, and Muslims were confident that someday all Christians would bow to Allah, the fact remained that in the short run both inhabited the same earth, often in close propinquity Unable to exterminate one another, the two sides were forced to develop some sort of modus vivendi .
On the frontiers between Christendom and the world of Islam it was inevitable that a wide variety of suspiciously friendly contacts would arise. It was often expedient for each side, when warring with one group of infidels, to make alliances with another, politics has always made strange bedfellows Convenience and economic need often dictated that Muslims and Christians trade with one another, and traveling merchants from both sides penetrated into the lands of the unbelievers In the inter- est of profit, visitors and hosts alike learned to make concessions to each other's faiths, diets, and customs The obvious benefits of cooperation demanded social and cultural accommodation that was difficult to recon- cile with religious doctrine and religious prejudices Cordial personal relationships unavoidably arose between individual Christians and Muslims Rulers and warriors grew to respect the political acumen, military prowess, and integrity of their adversaries Merchants were impressed with the business sense or honesty of their counterparts of the other faith Christian clergy and Muslim theologians studied the languages and scriptures of their opponents the better to refute their doctrines and win over their adherents Research of this kind could lead to grudging admiration for the other side's philological skills or analytical abilities In theory, of course, it was possible to recognize in an infidel good qualities that did not change his essential wickedness (Thus aChristian could consider a Muslim a good man, but only compared to
other Muslims) However, in practice the personal bonds created by intercourse between the two faiths obscured the pristine simplicity of religious bigotry The ebb and flow of Christian-Muslim warfare led to the creation of conquest societies in which the two faiths lived side by side Islam from its inception had had to deal with significant religious minorities, includ- ing Christians, in the Middle East Some Christian states in the outlying areas of Europe-the Iberian peninsula, the Balkans, Eastern Europe- faced the same problem in reverse The territories of the Umayyad Arab Empire and the early Ottoman Empire included large Christian popula- tions, and at times the Byzantine Empire won back lands that had in the interim acquired sizable Muslim populations. Usually conquerors were greatly outnumbered by their subjects, as the French crusaders were in Palestine When King James's Spanish Catholics took Valencia in the thirteenth century, the kingdom was eighty-five percent Moorish Massacre or expulsion of the entire taxpaying populace of a con- quest state would have deprived its rulers of the economic wherewithal to continue to wage the holy war Yet these multireligious societies faced practical problems of cooperation far beyond those of two cultures mak- ing selective contacts across a common border As a result, though the avowed purpose of Christian conquest was the spread of Christianity, and
the aim of the Jihad the spread of Islam, the rulers of conquest societies were often forced to tolerate or even adopt parts of the culture of their subjects To lessen the strain of foreign domination, it was expedient to retain local political divisions, bureaucracies, and taxing systems Con- quest invariably depleted population, and many states turned to the infidels to recoup these demographic losses King James, in the thirteenth century, invited Muslims to settle in Valencia, and Sultan Mehmed II ordered Orthodox Christians to relocate in Constantinople after he had made it the capital of the Ottoman Empire in 1453 Social intercourse between Muslims and Christians rose precipitously in precisely those conquest states created to eliminate the need for, or even the possibility of, such contact. In addition the ruling elite had some tendency to imitate the customs of the indigenous population. Catholics in Valencia took to the communal baths; the French in Jerusalem adopted the local diet, Umayyad rulers lived in Byzantine palaces decorated with very un- Muslim representational art. To be sure, religion and politics set very sharp limits on social assimilation Political supremacy depended on maintaining social divisions, and religious prejudices precluded much cultural osmosis. Nevertheless, the very existence of conquest societies where Christians and Muslims dwelt together confounded the logical basis of religious warfare Muslim and Christian clergy attempted to some degree to adjust their theologies to the realities of life on the ethno-religious frontier. Both agreed that involuntary conversion lacked conviction, and that forcible proselytization violated religious ethics (In practice the line dividing persuasion and coercion frequently became blurred, and religious en- thusiasm often overrode such scruples.) Muslims were obliged to wage Jihad, the holy war, only when success was guaranteed. Therefore truces with Christian states, if not eternal peace treaties, could be justified. The theologians of both cultures conceded the unavoidable if unpalatable necessity of permitting the infidel to continue to exist both within and without one's borders. Christian theorists argued that a Muslim state might have natural legitimacy if it did not oppress Christians, did not inhibit missionary activities, did not impede pilgrimages, and did not occupy non-negotiable Christian zones such as Palestine and perhaps any territory once part of the Roman Empire. According to Islamic doc- trine, Peoples of the Book, such as Christians, could live among Muslims if they refrained from insulting the Muslim faith, did not ring church bells, did not interfere with conversion to Islam, paid special taxes, and ac-
cepted inferior legal and political status. Of course, no self-respecting Muslim or Christian community under foreign rule could live up to the excessive and unrealistic demands of these convoluted theories consis- tently or for long. Similarly, they were of little practical value to the rulers of conquest states in dealing with their infidel subjects. Nonetheless, theologians had tried to accommodate the de facto coexistence in the frontier world. Not even the flimsiest theological rationale could be found to justify borrowing institutions from unbelievers Yet it occurred in every frontier conquest state in medieval times. The Arab and Ottoman conquerors may simply have lacked alternatives. Neither had previous experience with advanced political institutions. But the Catholic Spaniards in Valen- cia, for example, had their own Arago-Catalonian institutions but simply chose at first not to impose them on the preponderantly Islamic popula- tion. The sheer numbers of their potentially hostile subjects dictated that existing political structures be left in place, and they were. To do so was shrewd and pragmatic but this strategy could not possibly be reconciled
with the religious foundations of the Christian cause. Muslim states, too, confronted, or rather avoided confronting, this same problem. In some areas the conquerors were able to maintain distance from the subjugated culture by using as intermediaries interstitial ethnic groups that spoke both languages. In Spain, for example, Jews who spoke both Arabic and Spanish were used as officials, clerks, translators, and in- terpreters. In Crusader Jerusalem Eastern Christians (Semites such as Nes- torians, of heretical or schismatic Christian sects) played an analogous role. Such groups helped mınımıze direct contact between the dominant elite and the bulk of the population. Thus they softened the disparity between the proclaimed goal of spreading the faith and the glaring fact that many Muslim states were Muslim, and Christian states Christian, in only the most technical of senses. The paradoxes posed by the very nature of the frontier states could be only slightly mitigated by such buffer systems, which after all merely substituted contacts with one unbelieving people for those with another. Wherever Muslim and Christian popula- tions overlapped they could not remain unaware of the contradiction that campaigns undertaken in the name of conversion or extermination had led instead to cohabitation. The emptiness of theological attempts to rationalize this distasteful state of affairs was self-evident. Nor did the conquest societies of the frontier have the leisure and economic re- sources to subsidize such pursuits. Instead, to deal with the discrepancies between their prejudices and aims on the one hand and their experiences and accomplishments on the other, Muslims and Christians all along the frontier resorted to a different method-the ideology of silence. The mixed Christian and Islamic societies of medieval times in effect resolved by common consent or mass conspiracy or social conven- tion not to draw conclusions from the evidence around them. The realities of daily life simply were not allowed to intrude into the realms of religious ideology or to disturb religious prejudices. The sacred tenets that defined unbelievers as deadly foes were never questioned, nor were they allowed to interfere with peaceful social, political, and economic relations between the faiths. Alien institutions were borrowed or adopted but not acknowledged. Only the old names betray the origins of the Moorish tax structure used in Valencia or the Byzantine bureaucracies in the Umayyad and early Ottoman Empires. Sixteenth-century Ottoman histories pass over in silence the widespread use of Christian soldiers, farmers, artisans, and bureaucrats in the early Ottoman Empire.
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