السبت، 13 أبريل 2024

Download PDF | John Haldon - Money, Power and Politics in Early Islamic Syria_ A Review of Current Debates-Ashgate (2010).

Download PDF | John Haldon - Money, Power and Politics in Early Islamic Syria_ A Review of Current Debates-Ashgate (2010).

227 Pages 




List of Contributors

Jairus Banaji is a Professorial Research Associate in the Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, and was a Member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, during 2006/2007 when his paper for this volume was written. He studied Classics at Oxford and Modern History at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His current research interests include a monograph on the Sasanian aristocracy, and recent publications include ‘Islam, the Mediterranean and the Rise of Capitalism; Historical Materialism 15/1 (2007) and Theory as History: Essays on Modes of Production and Exploitation (2010).













Clive Foss teaches late Roman, Byzantine and early Islamic history at Georgetown University (Washington DC). His research focuses on the seventh and eighth centuries in the Near East. He is author of Ephesus after Antiquity, Nicaea, Byzantine Fortifications, Arab-Byzantine Coins and numerous other books and articles.

















John Haldon is Professor of History at Princeton University. He studied in the UK, Greece and Germany, and is a Senior Fellow at the Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies in Washington D.C. His research and publications focus on the history of the early and middle Byzantine empire, in particular in the period from the seventh to the eleventh centuries; on state systems and structures across the European and Islamic worlds from late ancient to early modern times; and on the production, distribution and consumption of resources in the late ancient and medieval world, especially in the context of warfare.


















Gene W. Heck was a senior business development economist operating in the Middle East, working as an economic consultant to governmental and private sector organisations. He authored numerous books and articles on aspects of Middle East economics, and held a position as Adjunct Professor in Government and History at the University of Maryland. His research focused on the history of mining in the Arabian peninsula and on the economic development of the region. Sadly, he died suddenly during the final stages of production of this volume.

















R. Stephen Humphreys is Professor of History and King Abdul Aziz Al Saud Professor of Islamic Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His research focuses on the history, art and architecture of the medieval Islamic world, about which he has published widely. He is the author of From Saladin to the Mongols: the Ayyubids of Damascus (1977), Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry (1991), and Mu ‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyan: From Arabia to Empire (2006), among other works.











Lutz Ilisch is attached to the Forschungsstelle fiir Islamische Numismatik of the Orientalisches Seminar at the University of Tubingen. A numismatic historian, he has published widely on early medieval and Islamic coinages


















Hugh Kennedy is Professor of Arabic at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. He is a leading scholar of the history of medieval Islam, particularly in the Middle East, and has published extensively on Islamic politics, society, economy, urbanism and Christian-Muslim relations.


















Jodi Magness is the Kenan Distinguished Professor for Teaching Excellence in Early Judaism, in the Department of Religious Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She has researched and has published extensively in the field of the archaeology of the Holy land and early Islamic periods, including many books, most notably The Archaeology of Qumran and the Dead Sea Scrolls (Grand Rapids, MI, 2002) and The Archaeology of the Early Islamic Settlement in Palestine (Winona Lake, IN, 2003).

















Arietta Papaconstantinou is currently Marie Curie Fellow at the Oriental Institute, Oxford University. She is the author of Le culte des saints en Egypte des Byzantins aux Abbassides (CNRS, 2001) and of various articles on aspects of late antique and early Islamic social history and material culture. Her research focuses on the history of Near Eastern Christian communities during the transition from Roman to Muslim rule.















Alan Walmsley is Professor of Islamic archaeology and art in the Carsten Niebuhr section of the Department of Cross Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen. He has worked extensively as an archaeologist in the Middle East, most recently at the renowned site of Jarash in Jordan, where his work has significantly altered understanding of the social and economic transformations that accompanied the arrival of Islam. His most recent of many publications is Early Islamic Syria: an archaeological assessment (London 2007).














Preface


The social, political and cultural transformation of the eastern provinces of the Roman empire from the middle of the seventh century CE under the impact of Islam was one of the most significant events of the early Middle Ages, indeed has often been seen as marking a fundamental break with the previous cultural and political world, a break which saw out the world of late Antiquity and ushered in a very different medieval society. 
















More archaeological material, better understanding of the archaeology as well as of the written sources, even though in the context ofan increasingly complex relationship between textual, numismatic and archaeological evidence, new and sometimes more difficult questions, all have contributed to a constant process of revision and rethinking in ways that radically affect what we know or understand about the area, about statebuilding and the economy and society of the early Islamic world, and about issues such as urbanisation, town-country relations, the ways in which a different religious culture impacted on the built environment, and about politics. 

















The changes which took place in the greater Syrian area during the seventh and early eighth centuries are crucial to understanding the evolution of one of the core regions of the Islamic world through into the later medieval and indeed the modern Middle East. In many cases, however, the evidence itself is contested, unclear, ambiguous, most obviously with the partial and biased literary evidence, especially that from histories and chronicles, but also with archaeological and material cultural evidence. 























The chronology ascribed to a particular class of ceramics has immediate implications for associated material and for particular sites, as well as for the wider east Mediterranean world and for our understanding of the processes and chronology of change across the early post-Roman period and beyond. This volume represents the fruits of a workshop held at Princeton University in May 2007 to discuss the ways in which recent work has affected our understanding of the nature of economic and exchange activity in particular, and the broader implications of these advances for the history of the region.


























There were nine presentations, and all except one of those who presented a paper were able to submit their contribution for publication. To complete the coverage we invited Hugh Kennedy to write a paper dealing with an aspect of continuity and discontinuity in seventh-century Syria, and he has done so with an excellent contribution on the fate of the late Roman and early Islamic élite in greater Syria. 



















The papers were intended to encourage discussion and debate across several disciplinary boundaries and in particular to draw the work of historians, archaeologists and numismatists together. As well as the speakers, a number of colleagues were present who acted as respondents to the presentations: Chase Robinson, Patricia Crone, Don Whitcomb, Fred Donner, Alan Stahl, Michael Morony, Guy Stroumsa, and Michael Cook all deserve thanks for their invaluable contributions to the discussion, as do the larger group of colleagues and graduate students from Princeton, the University of Pennsylvania and Rutgers University who were present. We very much hope that the present volume will work in the same way as the workshop itself, to encourage debate, to broaden the discussion, and to raise new questions in a field of interest which is crucially important in the study of the emergence of the medieval Middle East.


John Haldon












Introduction

Greater Syria in the Seventh Century: Context and Background

John Haldon


The social, political and cultural transformation of the eastern provinces of the Roman empire from the middle of the 7th-century CE under the impact of Islam was one of the most significant events of the early Middle Ages, indeed has often been seen as marking a fundamental break with the previous cultural and political world, a break which saw out the world of late Antiquity and ushered in a very different medieval society. Until the Arab-Islamic conquests, the late Roman state drew the bulk of its income from Egypt and from the rich provinces of Greater Syria, Mesopotamia (northern Iraq) and Cilicia (the modern Turkish province of Adana), all lost to the Arabs after the 640s and only partially, in their northern perimeter, recovered in the 10th century. With the loss of these eastern provinces the income of the state collapsed to a fraction of the 6th-century total. As more archaeological material has become available and as the relationship between textual, numismatic and archaeological evidence has become more complex, the history of the conquered lands is becoming clearer, even if at the same time the questions we ask of our evidence have become more difficult. The period has been subject to revision and rethinking in ways that radically affect what we know or understand about both the area, about state-building and the economy and society of the early Islamic world, and about issues such as urbanisation, town—country relations, the ways in which a different religious culture impacted on the built environment, and about politics.


The changes which took place in the greater Syrian area during the 7th and early 8th centuries are crucial to understanding how pre-existing cultural forms, urban structures, community organisation and linguistic habits affected the evolution of the core regions of the Islamic world through into the later medieval and indeed the modern Middle East. The tensions and complementarities between clan and tribal community structures, kinship-based patterns of the exercise and transmission of power and the rights of nascent states and their rulers or élites, between urban, rural and pastoral economic activities, as well as the ways in which resources could be managed, manipulated, extracted and consumed, these are all fundamental to an appreciation of the evolution of the early Islamic political and cultural world. Yet in many cases the evidence itself is contested, unclear, ambiguous, most obviously with the partial and biased literary evidence, especially that from histories and chronicles, but also with archaeological and material cultural evidence. This has affected in particular approaches to the urban history of the region, for example,' where shifts in the date-frame ascribed to a particular class of ceramics have had serious and wide-ranging implications not just for associated material and for particular sites, but for the wider east Mediterranean world and for our understanding of the processes and chronology of change across the early post-Roman period and beyond.


Many of the local differences apparent in the archaeological and written sources for Greater Syria are a reflection of the fragmented landscape and geography of the region. Ranging from the rugged country of the mountains of the Lebanon and the steppes of the great Syrian desert to the fertile plains of central Palestine and the arid reaches of the Sinai desert, Greater Syria is a zone of many micro-regional variations. In late Roman times and before, the flourishing coastal cities were connected by local and by long-distance commerce to the Aegean, North Africa and the central and western Mediterranean, but trade also penetrated far inland along routes from Antioch in the north across to the Euphrates valley and thence into Iraq, or eastwards from the central and southern coastal centres inland to Jerusalem, north-east to the limestone massif, or across to Bostra or the Hawran and thence down into the Arabian peninsula. In the north the fertile region south of Aleppo stretches down to the plain around Emesa, to the south of which the fertile plain between coast and desert fringe became ever narrower, constrained by the Lebanon and anti-Lebanon ranges. To the south again the Dead Sea and the Sea of Galilee, linked by the Jordan, divide the region in two, the coastal plain of Palestine to the west and to the east the regions of the Hawran and Balga. Such a fragmented landscape generated substantial differences in the various localities of the Greater Syria region, and these differences were played out both before and after the Islamic conquest in its widely different economic, demographic and land-use patterns, as some of the contributions to this volume will show.


The history of the 7th century in Syria is a story of continuities and slow transformations in economic respects, as far as the evidence seems to tell us, of relative continuity in the institutional order, but of substantial political and ideological shifts.’ This is evident in several spheres. While the earliest Arab-Islamic administration of Syria, Palestine and Iraq, as well as of Egypt, relied initially on pre-existing institutional patterns and arrangements, both in respect of fiscal practices (methods of assessing and collecting “tribute” ie. tax, for example) as well as civil administrative structures, it served an entirely new political master with very different military and ideological aims from those of its late Roman predecessor. The early ajndd or army-districts of Filastin, al-Urdunn, Dimashq and Hims reflect pre-Muslim structures, although the extent and exact nature of this inheritance is unclear. It is apparent that these are not the late Roman provinces as they are known from 6th-century sources, but reflect rather military districts under the command of local officers in charge of units of /imitanei and some field forces. Whether they reflect in addition a change in military administrative arrangements under Heraclius or not remains a contentious issue. Furthermore, apart from references in the later Arabic tradition, there is really no evidence at all from the Greek or Syriac sources to say what happened to the provinces occupied by the Persians between about 614 and 629. We know hardly anything at all about their military or civil administration under the Sasanid régime, nor whether or not the older establishment was merely taken over by the conquerors, or whether a Persian administrative structure was established. Egypt provides useful material, since there is some important papyrological evidence for the sorts of continuity of Roman patterns of life and administration during the period of the Persian occupation of that province (619-29) — one dating formula shows that Egypt was considered to be under the rule of the Persians, but was also seen as under the rule of the Byzantine emperor in his capacity as a vassal of the Persian king.* It would be interesting to know whether the same assumptions were made in respect of the Syrian provinces. At the same time, however, the evidence also points to the reduction of much of the Roman Egyptian élite and its replacement by the Sasanian nobles who commanded the Persian armies and managed its fiscal system. This appears to have been a process which was continued and even intensified in the course of the Arab conquest (and later, although the evidence remains sparse, by Arabs such as ‘Amr b. al-‘As, who reportedly built a house and selected substantial landed estates from within the conquered province).’ To what extent a similar process occurred in Persian-occupied Syria remains unclear, but the evidence may well suggest that under the new Arab régime at least the Syrian élites suffered on a similar scale.* The contemporary collection of the life and miracles of Anastasius the Persian refers to a Persian military command at Caesarea in Palestine, marked by the presence of a marzban and soldiers, a commissariat, and so forth; but this tells us little about the administration of civil matters. We do not know what happened to the military units stationed in the regions which were overrun — the /imitanei, for example — and this has obvious consequences for any deductions we might make about the situation in which the Romans re-established imperial rule after 628/29. It is possible that the ajndd reflect some Sasanid institutional arrangement of which we know nothing, although in light of what happened in Egypt this seems a little less likely, although it cannot be discounted. The silence of the Syriac sources may be particularly significant, in view of the interest they tend to show in respect of institutional and administrative affairs.’ What the Egyptian papyrological evidence and the Syrian sources do show, and very clearly, is that late Roman fiscal administrative arrangements, including in many respects technical language and the titles of the responsible officials, remained more-orless unchanged well into the 660s.*


The demographic picture of greater Syria in the years before the conquests is also relevant to the evolution of early Islamic administration in the period up to ‘Abd alMalik. In particular, longer-term changes in respect of the increased importance of Arab federates during the first half of the 6th century played a role, especially in respect of the Ghassanids, who had come during Justinian’s reign to exercise an imperially-backed hegemony over a substantial number of other clans in the area. Some scholars have argued for an orderly withdrawal of regular Roman forces from the frontier-region forts as early as the 530s.” While the archaeological and literary record cannot prove that there was a marked decline in imperial involvement in the frontier regions adjacent to the Syrian desert southwards before the middle of the 6th century, approximately, it does suggest a reduction in such involvement by the later 6th century, as the Ghassanid or other allied clans took over responsibility for both defence and, in some cases, fortressmaintenance," and as fluidity of population and integration of new elements into the existing sedentary population took place.'' According to a pilgrim who travelled via Nessana to Sinai in the 570s, for example, the fort there had no military character at all, having been turned to use as a hospice for travellers.”


The Ghassanid confederacy dominated the steppe bordering the Syrian desert, but was also employed to control other nomad groups who inhabited these eastern provinces. Relations with their leaders were always tricky, and failures of diplomacy on the Roman side could have direct consequences. After the rupture between the emperors and the Ghassanid leader in the 580s, which must be understood in the context of Ghassanid support for Monophysite Christianity, especially in the Hawran region, their hegemony appears to have been weakened or broken; but they and other allied groups remained crucial to the Roman government in the East, both for frontier and internal security." Ghassanid troops are reported to have been based in the immediately pre-conquest years in the area of the Jordan itself according to a 9th-century tradition; and it was the Ghassanids who helped crush the Samaritan revolt of 529. A Ghassanid “phylarch” may have had on at least one occasion a general military authority in Palestine I] and Arabia; while the importance of the Arab allies and federates as support for the local Roman military commanders was clearly indispensable. During the period of the Persian war imperial reliance upon Bedouin allies seems to have increased, although the role of the Ghassanids in this respect remains uncertain. A later tradition notes that other allied or federated troops were established in the region to the west of the Jordan and the Dead Sea in the 630s; and although the evidence is ambiguous, Arabic sources give the impression that, by the time of the imperial victory over the Muslims at Mu'ta, which lies to the east of the Wadi Araba, midway between Arindela and Zoara, in 629, the Ghassanids and a range of other tribal groups were once more close supporters of the Roman establishment in these regions.’ Members of other clans fought on the Byzantine side during that battle; and it is well-known that early Muslim strategy was aimed specifically at detaching such groups from their Byzantine allegiance, by diplomacy, conversion or coercion.”


The Sasanid occupation of Syria and Palestine over the period from 613/14 to 628 must have affected the late Roman tradition of administration. There is no way of knowing to what extent this was actually the case; and if the example of Egypt is anything to go by, the effects in this sphere were probably minimal for most people except the upper echelons of the landowning élite.’* On the other hand, the continuity of Roman occupation and the loyalties and political-cultural identities of the population of the areas concerned must have been affected. Mayerson and Donner have stressed that, by the time of the Roman re-occupation, there will have existed a whole generation who will have had no experience or only the dimmest memory of Roman authority. The Ghassanid phylarchate itself may have ceased to exist; and real Byzantine authority seems to have reached only to the most north-easterly regions of Palestine III, although representatives of Roman political and ecclesiastical organisation were established in towns such as Ayla (Eilat), and Ma’an near Petra. In these conditions, a re-organisation of the military districts and possibly of some civil districts may well have occurred, and this may well be that reflected through the Arab ajndd. A passage of Theophanes records a vicarius named Theodore, together with Arab allies, defeating the Muslim raid at Mu’ta, and suggests that Roman military authority continued to be exercised in this region and northwards (even if the troops themselves were Arab federates and allies); but all the evidence points to the fact that no defensive arrangements for Palestine II were restored — reliance on subsidies and peaceful co-existence, together with the threat of military reprisals from the dux at Caesarea, some distance away (or possibly Petra), and allied Bedouin troops, were assumed to be adequate. The Romans appear to have assumed that they would have the continued support of the population of towns such as Ayla, which guarded the entrance to the “back door” of Palestine and the routes to Gaza from the Arabian peninsula; when such towns accepted Muslim overlordship, of course, as occurred in 630, this strategy was fatally compromised. And this seems to have been the principle on which the security of this region had been based since the 570s or 580s.'” The pattern of administration reflected through the later Arab ajndd reflects also these developments. Whether the later establishment of a large number of mints (albeit often at sites where older, pre-fifth-century mints had existed) from the 680s illustrates their new fiscal priorities and the fact that they did not simply follow the pre-existing arrangements without modifying them to suit their own requirements must remain uncertain.'® The jund of Jordan (al-Urdunn), for example, represented an expanded province of Palestine II, with the anomalous stretch of Phoenice extending in a narrow strip along the coast south of the river Laitah (Leontes), and with the westernmost section of Arabia and part of north-west Palestine I. If its territory indeed reflected some late Roman or possibly Heraclian administrative re-arrangement, then the precise reasons for this change, if it does not reflect a Sasanid administrative innovation, remain shrouded in mystery. The sources are silent on the subject. But such adjustments of boundaries are not in the least unusual in the history of Roman provincial administration. Internal security together with the efficacy — which appears to have been taken for granted — of the Ghassanids or their equivalent along the frontier steppe may well have played a role. It is significant, perhaps, that the “new” district of al-Urdunn included north Samaria and Galilee, both areas of strong anti-Roman sentiment. Their populations clearly supported and welcomed the Persians for a while during the wars of the reign of Heraclius; and it is also notable that the area offered virtually no resistance to the Arabs — the capital, Tiberias, capitulated (the first time, at least) without a struggle.”


Some continuity of administrative arrangements, then, seems highly likely. The initial arrangements for issuing coin with which both to pay the conquering soldiers as well as to maintain the economic life of the regions they had taken seem to reflect this to a degree, both in respect of the large number of mints which were established soon after the conquest, as well as in terms of the large-scale import into northern Syria of regular Byzantine issues into the later 650s (the exact reasons for which remain unclear). But from about 658 the empire appears to have reduced the production of the bronze coinage and restricted the areas to which consignments were despatched, a move which has been associated with the probable internal restructuring of tax-collecting mechanisms.” Its effects on the money supply within the conquered provinces of Syria are again unclear, but further research may clarify this question.”


Another sphere in which continuity rather than disruption or rapid change is evident is that of urbanism and the relationship between town and country. In Syria, cities shared in the same general trends and developments as those in other regions of the empire, but only until the late 630s. As many studies have now shown, there had been a slow process of transformation in the pattern of late Roman urban society over the centuries preceding both the Persian wars and the Arab-Islamic conquests. Archaeological work demonstrates a revival in the fortunes of many eastern cities in the later Sth and early 6th centuries, accompanied by substantial investment in public and private buildings often on a monumental scale; it also shows a fairly widespread tendency for many urban centres to lose many of the features familiar from their classical structure, the lesser provincial towns first, followed at a somewhat later date by larger, economically and politically more important centres. Indeed, the period from the 4th to early 7th century is generally seen as an era when public spaces were being lost asa result of lack of concern on the part of both civic elites and the government.” In a number of cases, certainly, major public buildings fell into disrepair, systems of water-supply were abandoned (suggesting a drop in population), rubbish was dumped in abandoned buildings, major thoroughfares were built on. But this was by no means a universal phenomenon, and in fact in many examples, while smaller streets were encroached upon by both dwellings and other structures, major thoroughfares, streets and shopping areas were kept open and clearly in regular use.** Well into the Umayyad period colonnaded streets were being constructed,” even if shifts in the focus of commercial life can also be shown to have taken place across the period from the Sth into the 7th century.” Even in urban centres where encroachment on public spaces did occur, such changes may not necessarily have involved any substantial reduction in economic or exchange activity, and they happened at differentiated rates across the different provinces of the empire according to local economic and political conditions. The construction of defensive walls around many cities during the 5th and 6th centuries has generally been interpreted as a shrinking of occupied areas of many cities, but this may not always have been the case, and reflected also shifts in cultural perceptions about the symbolic value of walls and defensive structures.** Thus, while there were a number of significant changes in respect of the maintenance of public structures or amenities in many major, traditional Hellenistic-Roman cities — baths, aqueducts, drains, street-surfaces, walls — this does not necessarily have to suggest a major shift in every aspect of urban living or of finance and administration. While the period after the arrival of the great Justinianic plague in the 540s is certainly marked in this respect, this shift is partly balanced by evidence for a considerable and widespread investment in church building (and related structures) of all kinds. An additional factor was the evolution of a more complex hierarchy of urbanism as many functions of the older cities began to be shared from the 4th century on by smaller centres, often fortified, and often the focus of military or civil administration as well as of local exchange and production for their localities.”


The archaeological evidence thus shows up strong regional variations, in particular a divergent trend between Anatolia and the European provinces of the empire, on the one hand, and Syria-Palestine and Egypt, on the other. Cities in the latter continued to flourish well into the 7th century and beyond, whereas much of Anatolia and the Balkans suffered from economic contraction, urban recession and demographic decline, in many cases setting in already by the mid-6th century. North Syria may also have experienced a different rate of change, beginning somewhat earlier, compared with the areas to the south.” If this interpretation of the available evidence is accepted, it has important implications for the early stages of Islamic political development and the economies of the conquered territories. As one commentator has noted, the study of urbanism needs to be situated within the broader context of the political and economic structures of which it forms a key element, rather than taken in isolation. Recent work for the medieval west, the Byzantine world and the early Islamic Near East has increasingly begun to approach the issue of urban and rural demography, patterns of settlement and of land-use from this perspective.” The pattern of village communities in the east Roman world likewise varied from region to region, but in general it is the case that the vast majority of urban centres served as central places and thus also as markets for their surrounding districts and, until substantial changes occurred during the middle and later 7th century in what remained under imperial control in Anatolia and the Balkans, rural communities. Villages and more isolated farmsteads proliferated and there appears to have been a considerable expansion of such rural habitats across the late Roman world in the east from the 4th and in particular from the 5th century, associated with both a recession in villa-type estates and farms, on the one hand, and on the other a shift in the hierarchy of settlement towards an increase in the number and density of what have been referred to as “secondary”, often fortified, towns with their adjacent and “dependent” villages.*° As well as being found in several regions in Anatolia, this pattern is also found in the southern Hawran, the Decapolis and central Jordan plain, southern Jordan,” and elsewhere.” There were thus in the years from the later Sth into the 7th century considerable fluctuations in respect of the relationship between the populations of urban and rural regions and in terms of their density.


An equally weighty issue which remains problematic is the extent and effect of the endemic plague in the period from the 6th to the 8th century, especially since it seems clear that the degree of regional and even local variation was substantial.** Given the contradictory character of much of the written evidence and the ambivalence of the archaeology it is difficult to arrive at generally acceptable overall conclusions about the precise effects of the epidemic.** Broadly speaking, it has been assumed that there was along downward curve in population in the Roman empire during the late ancient period, although with very marked regional variations, which continued into the later 7th and 8th centuries in what was left of the empire after the first Islamic conquests. But in the case of greater Syria, the archaeological evidence would now suggest a marked regional upturn during the 5th and 6th centuries, as well as for Mesopotamia and southern Iraq (albeit also with sub-regional variations, in particular in respect of urban-rural distinctions),°° with a possible downturn only much later, perhaps in the course of the 8th century.** The impact of the plague across the period is difficult to extrapolate from the available data.


Most urban centres surrendered to the Arabs without much struggle. Yet although it is clear that many towns continued to flourish, we still find a fundamental shift in their role. They often became centres of Muslim administration, and the administrators of local justice and tax-collection tended also to reside there. They never recover their former corporate identity, and their prosperity now depends upon their role as centres of commerce and exchange, as administrative centres for the new administration, and as foci for religious endowments. But the difference between the urban centres of what was left of the Byzantine state and those of the Caliphate is pronounced — those in the Caliphate in many cases continuing to prosper and to flourish, whereas those in the crisis-ridden Byzantine empire suffering from the dislocation of both their economic and political environment. The evidence for coin distribution demonstrates the continued widespread and intensive use of copper coins throughout former imperial territories now under Islamic control, where the archaeological as well as numismatic material shows virtually no disruption to the patterns of economic activity which had been established before the 630s, even if it demonstrates a shift in networks of distribution from the early 8th century onwards.*’ The evidence of ceramic distribution in particular supports such a picture, even if it also suggests changes in the patterns and direction of travel of much of the material. But pottery produced in Syria and Palestine was still reaching western Asia Minor and farther afield through the second half of the 7th and into the 8th century, suggestive of both the economic dynamism of the exporting regions as well as the continuing connections and demand from the importing localities.** And it is not just the archaeology that supports the picture of a comparatively flourishing urban life and a strong element of urban cultural continuity across Syria after the initial Islamic conquests. The thriving debates among representatives of the different churches in the east, as well as between Christians and Muslims, exemplified in the cultural life of late 7th- and early 8th-century Edessa and the writings of men such as Jacob of Edessa, a contemporary of Anastasios of Sinai, are illustrative.”


Such differences between Anatolia and Syria are not simply a result of the Islamic conquests or of the economic dislocation caused by warfare in either Asia Minor or the Balkans, but rather of longer-term regional variations already evident in the preceding period. There were other important regional variations: the numismatic, ceramic and textual evidence for Cyprus, which was thought to have suffered disaster at the hands of the Arabs in the middle of the 7th century, suggests that in fact it remained a major producer and exporter of table- and kitchen-wares to the Levant and southern Anatolia well into the 8th century. Greater Syria is hardly an exception, but represents one of a range of possible outcomes following the breakdown of a unified eastern Mediterranean zone of social and cultural exchange. The situation in the former Sasanian heartlands of Iraq as well as in the wealthiest of all the east Roman provinces, Egypt, offer further nuances in this general picture. Things did not stay the same — quite the reverse: the general shifts in the economic networks of the central and eastern Mediterranean impacted upon Greater Syria, Iraq, Egypt and N. Africa as much as anywhere else. But in the context of the conquest and of a new ruling elite and its needs, this had a radical effect on patterns of consumption, production and distribution of resources, and administration. This, then, is the background against which the following chapters, dealing with the broader picture of change in the former eastern provinces of the Roman state, including Egypt, are to be set.


















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