Download PDF | Ferenc Makk - The Árpáds and the Comneni_ political relations between Hungary and Byzantium in the 12th century-Akadémiai Kiadó (1989).
216 Pages
Preface
The present work investigates Hungarian—Byzantine relations between the end of the 11th and the end of the 12th centuries. Since all through this period the throne of Hungary was occupied by the Arpads and, except for the last decade of the era under discussion, the imperial throne of Byzantium held by the members of the Comnenus dynasty, the political contacts of the two countries can be regarded as the connections between the two ruling dynasties. No attempt has so far been made to examine the question of the history of the political connections between Hungary and Byzantium in the 12th century monographically, though of all countries it was with Byzantium that Hungary had the closest and most wide-ranging connections at that time.
The significance of the contemporary Hungarian—Byzantine contacts is shown by the fact that they were considered important by Byzantium, too. Hungarian—Byzantine relations were widespread especially in the fields of politics, economy (commerce and finance), religion, ideology, arts and language and appeared in the most diverse forms of state and popular contacts. A series of specialized disciplines, such as political history, economic history, numismatics, history of ideology and religion, history of arts, linguistics and ethnography, work on the totality of this system of connections.
From among these different connections we have chosen and studied the political links between Hungary and Byzantium in the 12th century, as these relations influenced the above connections in a decisive way. By political relations we mean, as it were, the bilateral interstate connections between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Byzantine Empire and these, of course, include dynastic connections, trends of foreign policy reflected in the diplomacy of the two countries, military confrontations and generally all forms of manifestations of political history in the modern sense of the word.
The modern view of history has set up two basic requirements for the study of our subject. On the one hand, we could not be satisfied simply with giving an account (however precise this would be) of the events seen on the surface of the political relations between the state of the Arpads and the empire of the Comneni, as primarily reflected in the sources, but we had to grasp, one after the other, those main trends of the internal politics of Hungary and Byzantium, which played a decisive role in shaping the foreign policy and, consequently, the mutual contacts of the two countries. This means we had to follow with the utmost attention the changes within the internal political scenes in Hungary and Byzantium and, especially in the case of Hungary, the social factors of the shifts in internal political conditions. On the other hand, knowing that movements of foreign policy have some sort of autonomy of their own and that the relations of two given countries are affected by the aspirations of several other states, it would have been impossible to examine the problem of Hungarian—Byzantine connections without taking European (and in some cases even broader) international political relationships into consideration. For us it meant that we had to explore—in a range and depth determined by the relations between Hungary and Byzantium—the entire issue of the Hungarian and Byzantine foreign policies of the age.
As for Byzantium we have examined the political activities of the Greek Empire in the West (South Italian Normans, the Papacy, Italy, Germany), in the Balkans (mostly the Southern Slavs), in Russia and in the East (Asia Minor, the Holy Land). We have paid special attention to the problem of the Seljuqs and the Normans, who all through the 12th century, occupied the attention of Byzantium decisively. The dream of restoring the late Roman Empire was vividly alive during the time of the Comneni and especially influenced Emperor Manuel’s policy. The two main objectives of Byzantine foreign policy in the 12th century were the efforts to drive the Seljuq Turks out of Asia Minor and to restore Byzantine rule over Southern Italy. In connection with this we followed those temporary shifts in the centre of gravity of Byzantine policy which were not independent of the political events in Europe and Asia. As to the main tendencies in the foreign policy of the 12th century Hungarian Kingdom we tried to trace the changes in the relationships between Hungary and the following: the Russian principalities, Poland, Bohemia, the Holy Roman Empire (and its different provinces), the Papacy, France, the Norman Kingdom in Southern Italy, Venice and the Dalmatian towns and Southern Slav territories. Studying the Hungarian foreign policy of the age is rendered difficult by the fact that modern Hungarian historiography has quite neglected this subject in the last few decades. That is why, in several respects, we had to attempt to solve some of the problems in this field.
We carried out the present monographic study of 12th century Hungarian—Byzantine political relations on the basis of written sources and we had to neglect making use of additional information from sources of different types (e.g. archeology, history of art). At the same time, however, we endeavoured to achieve completeness as far as written sources are concerned. The material we examined was mostly Byzantine Greek and Middle Latin but, to a lesser extent, we also studied Old Russian, Middle High German, Old French, Italian (Dalmatian) and Arabic sources.
Several indispensable Hungarian and foreign studies and papers made an up-to-date study of the subject easier. Most of the credit for research, in the investigated field, must go to Gyula Moravesik, the eminent representative of Hungarian byzantinology. His work summarizing the whole of the history of Hungarian—Byzantine relations, along with his studies on more detailed questions and his invaluable source publications, serve as a starting point for all further research.
We hope that our attempt to draft the history of the political relations that influenced 12th century Hungarian—Byzantine connections in toto can be useful in several respects for students of the history of the 12th century. Besides treating the relations between Hungary and Byzantium in detail, the present work not only gives a picture of the foreign policies of the 12th century Hungarian state and the Byzantine Empire, but also provides a broad tableau of the most important toteign policy tendencies of Europe in the 12th century.
Relations at the turn of the 11th and 12th centuries
While a considerable amount of facts refer to Hungarian—Byzantine relations in different fields and of major importance during the early 1070s, direct connections between the two countries, according to the available sources, seem to have sunk to rather modest proportions during the reign of Ladislas (Laszlo) I (1077-1095). This low ebb in relations can be attributed to the unfavourable circumstances in the internal and external situations of both countries.
In the last third of the 11th century the Byzantine Empire entered one of the most critical periods of its history and reached the brink of total collapse. The crisis in the central imperial authority went hand in hand with a grave economic decline. Following the defeat of Byzantium at Manzikert 1071, the Seljuqs, around 1081, established the Sultanate of Iconium, and Asia Minor which used to be the heart of the Empire, was lost to Byzantium save for a narrow coastal strip. Guiscard Robert occupied the town of Bari in 1071 and thus the Normans completely drove the Greeks out of Southern Italy. Later developments were to prove that this was the final loss of the Italian territories for Byzantium.
In the spring of 1081 the Normans already attacked the empire in the Balkans, the ultimate goal of Robert Guiscard being the imperial crown itself. Alexius Comnenus (1081-1118) was able to drive off this attack only with the help of Venice, and by mobilizing the last resources of the empire and taking advantage of a favourable turn of events only as late as 1085. During the following century Norman expansion would be one of the central questions of Byzantine foreign policy. Meanwhile the situation in the North Balkan territories of the empire also changed for the worse: nomadic tribes (Pechenegs, Uzes, Cumans) kept raiding these parts proving themselves a thorn in the flesh to the rulers of Byzantium. Especially dangerous were the attacks of the Pechenegs between 1086 and 1091. Their invasion commencing in the spring of 1090 plunged the empire into a really perilous situation. During this attack the Pechenegs allied themselves with Tzachas, the Amir of Smyrna, who launched an action against Byzantium from Asia Minor. The main objective of this alliance was the occupation of Constantinople. Emperor Alexius I, however, inflicted a devastating defeat on the Pechenegs with the help of the Cumans in the battle of Levunium on April 29, 1091 and at the same time made a pact with the Amir of Nicaea against Tzachas.
Eventually, by the 1090s, Alexius I managed to defend the empire against the onslaughts of its enemies and even consolidate—though in a much smaller territory than before—the international position of Byzantium. The emperor’s administrative, economic and military reforms cured, at least temporarily, the internal weaknesses of the empire.”
During these decades Hungary was preoccupied with its own internal problems. The development of the feudal relations of production reached a decisive stage which included, on the one hand, the suppression of the movements of the free population, who were trying to escape subordination, while on the other, the further strengthening of the monopoly of the private ownership of lands, the state apparatus and the organization of the church. Law codes drawn up during the reign of Ladislas I reflect the strictness and force used to make feudal relations complete. Besides all this, Ladislas, not wishing to lose his crown, had to follow with the greatest attention the constantly renewed attempts of Salomon (Salamon) (1063-1074) for a whole decade, who tried to regain his lost kingdom with help from abroad. Ladislas sided with the Pope in the investiture contest, while Salomon was supported by the German emperor. This social and political situation made it impossible for Ladislas to start a policy of major expansion before the early 1090s. But the internal consolidation of the country and Salomon’s final disappearance from the scene created a favourable situation for conquests abroad.?
The Hungarian expansionist aspirations were most characteristic towards the Adriatic. As a first step, Ladislas I—interfering in the internal Croatian disputes— secured control over Croatia.*
In addition, Ladislas must have been planning the occupation of Dalmatia, but he was prevented from this undertaking by the Cumans, who launched an attack on Eastern Hungary and sacked it.’ Ladislas, having made his nephew Almos, King of Croatia,° led his army against the invading Cumans.’ The occupation of Croatia was not only against Byzantine claims, but also violated the interests of the Papacy in the first place, as Zvonimir, the ruling Prince of Croatia had received the title of king and a crown from Pope Gregory VII in 1076 and had gained possession of Croatia and Dalmatia as a fief from the hands of the papal legate.
The conquest by Ladislas meant the end of the Pope’s overlordship in Croatia. This clash of Hungarian and papal interests was one of the reasons why the King of Hungary turned away from Rome at this time and entered into alliance with Henry IV, the German emperor.? It is a widely held opinion among Hungarian specialists that in 1091, after the battle of Levunium, it was the Byzantine emperor who set the Cumans against Hungary in retaliation for the Hungarian expansion towards the Adriatic.'° This possibility cannot be completely ruled out, but none of the sources really supports this view. Anna Comnena, who among all the contemporary sources describes most minutely the antecedents of the battle of Levunium, the battle itself, the performance of the Cumans and the circumstances of their departure, does not even mention a Byzantine-Cuman agreement against Hungary.'' A Hungarian source also relates that the punitive campaign Ladislas conducted in 1092 in retaliation for the Cuman raid did not affect Byzantine territories.!*
It can be inferred, therefore, that the Cumans, who attacked Hungary in 1091 and kept breaking through into the country later on, were acting on their own initiative independently of Byzantium and their ultimate goal was to take possession of Eastern Hungary, especially Transylvania.13 The chief motive behind Ladislas’ wars against the Cumans was to avert this danger.'* As a matter of fact, Byzantium was genuinely afraid of Hungarian territorial expansion, but, although not being very happy about the conquest of Croatia, which belonged to its own sphere of influence, it was first of all Dalmatia, a dependency considered to be a part of the empire, that Byzantium did not want to lose to Hungary. In order to prevent the Hungarians from pushing further and to strengthen Byzantine rule over Dalmatia, Emperor Alexius I sent Norman mercenaries under Godfrey of Melfi, a Norman count and Byzantine sebastos, to the Dalmatian towns in 1091. The mercenary troops remained in Dalmatia until 1093 securing direct Byzantine rule over its towns and islands. This control was unbroken even after their withdrawal, which is proved by a charter in Zara (Zadar) from 1095 dated according to the reign of Alexius I.!°
Ladislas did not even attempt to acquire Dalmatian territories. During the last few years of his reign his foreign policy was preoccupied with the fight against the Cumans, conducting a campaign in Russia (1092) and interfering in the Polish (1093) and Bohemian (1095) internal disputes.!® On the other hand, Almos, as King of Croatia— according to a letter of Henry IV in 1096—intended to march against the Greeks, but gave up his plan for the sake of the German emperor.!’ It is fairly justified to assume that Almos—probably in 1095—was planning the occupation of the Dalmatian towns,!® which would have seriously hurt Venetian interests. In 1095 the German emperor, surrounded by his enemies and also hoping to get some help from the Doge, apparently had the claims of the Republic towards Dalmatia in mind when he dissuaded Almos from taking action against Dalmatian territories under Greek rule. !9 Be as it may, Hungarian expansion towards the Adriatic confronted Hungary with the Papacy, Byzantium and Venice.
King Ladislas died 1n the summer of 1095 and the Dalmatian conquest was left to his successor. The fact that Ladislas had made one of his nephews, Almos, King of Croatia and wanted his other nephew, Coloman (Kalman) to be a bishop?° clearly indicates that the king designated Almos as his successor. Coloman, however, did not accept Ladislas’ decision and fled to Poland but returned around the time the king died (July 29,1095).71 Recent research has proved that Coloman was crowned only in 1096.2? This signifies that Almos and his brother had fought for supreme power almost for a year before the balance tilted in Coloman’s favour. The struggle of the two claimants to the crown and the social forces behind them finally resolved itself in a compromise with the crown going to Coloman, while Almos was given the duchy (ducatus) covering a third of the country.?° The latter, in terms of actual political power, considerably surpassed that of the Croatian Kingdom, occupied and entrusted to Almos by Ladislas. The dukedom made Almos second only to the king in the country, as recorded by the sources.2* Beside other factors, having gained the duchy also contributed to the struggle Almos carried on for years in an effort to seize royal power. The first bout of this struggle between Almos and Coloman was over by the summer of 1096, for several of the sources already regarded Coloman as king.?5 No information is available as to whether the two rivals sought foreign help. The most important foreign ally Almos might have had was Henry IV—on the basis of their earlier relations—, but no help could have come from the emperor, surrounded by enemies in Northern Italy in 1094-1097 and expecting help from Almos himself as seen in his letter of 1096.2 On the other hand, Coloman, in the first place, might have hoped to get help from the ruling Prince of Poland, since he had once fled to his country. But from the fact—as is known from the letter of Henry [V—that in the first half of 1096 Wtadystaw Herman had asked Almos for help against Byetislaw II, the sovereign of Bohemia and protégé of the emperor,?7 we may conjecture that Coloman could not possibly have counted on Polish help against his brother. Anyhow, Almos, who in the first half of 1096 had not helped the Polish ruling Prince purely for the sake of Henry IV, was offered friendship, alliance and future help by the German emperor in the late summer of the same year. This, of course, determined the orientation of Coloman’s foreign policy, who had intended to bea priest. The letter (July, 1096) the King of Hungary received from Pope Urban II also influenced his decision.2° Coloman, unlike Almos, held out firmly beside the Papacy in the investiture contest. This was to be one of the most constant elements in his foreign policy. This is proved, from among other facts, by his Norman marriage,*° his declaration at Guastalla in 1106,*? the activities of Cardinal Kuno and the papal legate, Dietrich in Hungary in 1112 and 1115 and finally, by his opposition to Henry V, the German emperor.*?
The greatest problem for Hungary in the summer and autumn of 1096 was the march of the crusader armies across the country. Coloman opposed and cracked down on the troops that pillaged the country and after these bitter experiences he allowed the army of Godfrey of Bouillon to pass through the country only after sufficient securities had been received and precautions taken.*? The crusaders were treated with deep mistrust both in Hungary and in Byzantium. Alexius I, who had not asked the West for crusaders, but mercenary troops,>+ was afraid—especially because of the Norman participants—that the crusaders were planning to occupy his empire.3> There were moments in Hungary too, in the summer of 1096, when some crusader commanders were contemplating snatching the kingdom from Coloman*® and this compelled the King of Hungary even to consider fleeing to Russia.’ Although some sort of cooperation went on along the Hungarian—Byzantine frontier between the local Hungarian [at Semlin (Zemun, today a part of Belgrade)] and Byzantine (at Belgrade) authorities against the trespassing crusaders,** this did not lead to a rapprochement between the Hungarian Kingdom and the Byzantine Empire at that time. On the contrary, the sources testify to Alexius I fearing that the Hungarians also might attack Byzantine territories in 1096 and at the turn of 1096—1097.3° Besides the local skirmishes along the Danube it must have been Dalmatia that particularly caused headaches to the emperor, not entirely without cause, as, according to the sources, Coloman restored Hungarian sovereignty in Croatia at the turn of 1096-1097, a move, which the short reign of King Peter, taking advantage of the internal disputes in Hungary and the possibilities offered by the crusade, had rendered dubious earlier in 1096. After defeating Peter the Hungarian king conquered the coast in the spring of 1097*° as indicated by the taking of Tengerfehérvar (Biograd).*! Unwilling to lose Dalmatia, Byzantium decided to take steps against Hungary, but incapable of action on its own due to the crusade. Alexius I committed the government and defence of the region to the charge of the Doge of Venice making him Duke (dux) of Dalmatia and Croatia and Imperial protosebastos in 1097. The Doge, Vitale Michiel I, assumed the title of Duke of Dalmatia and Croatia thus clearly indicating the Venetian claims to the Croatian and Dalmatian territories.*? Spalato (Split) and Trau (Trogir) also made oaths of allegiance to Venice.+? Dalmatia—with the exception of Tengerfehérvar— actually remained under Venetian control between 1097 and 1103.
In the spring of 1097 Coloman married one of Roger’s daughters with papal mediation. Roger, a Sicilian Norman count,*> was one of the staunchest allies of Pope Urban II against the German emperor.*° Thus the marriage of the King of Hungary had obvious pro-papal anti-German implications*’ and, at the same time, it was directed against Venice—and, perhaps, Byzantium—the Normans being their potential enemies.*® However, this dynastic connection with the Normans did not give Coloman tmmediate help in his-efforts with the conquest of Dalmatia. He stopped occupying further territories and, around 1098, concluded a treaty of friendship— conventio amicitiae—with the Doge, based on the momentary status quo, although in this very treaty the Hungarian king disputed the Doge’s right to the title of Duke of Dalmatia and Croatia.*® This is conspicuously indicative of Hungary challenging the Byzantine and Venetian claims towards Dalmatia and Croatia.>*°
Coloman was probably restrained from open confrontation with Venice by the approach of an internal crisis fomented by the activity of Almos and his party.*! The following conflict between the king and the prince broke out in 109852 and Almos thought he had a good chance of winning supreme power. His ambitions had not been satisfied by becoming Duke, although the few available sources reveal that Almos, as overlord of the duchy, had great enough powers to be taken into consideration even by Coloman. The laws of the time, for example, specifically mention the prince’s territories and office-holders.*? Furthermore, he played an important role in settling foreign affairs. Thus in 1096 the prince must have been covering the march of the crusaders across the country together with the king.** At the turn of 1096-1097, when dynastic relations were established between Hungary and the Normans, Almos acted as one of the dignitaries undertaking a guarantee for Coloman to Count Roger’s envoys.°> Almos was not alone in his overreaching ambitions, his discontented followers also cherished great expectations and contributed to the controversy flaring up with their counselling of the prince.*° The armies of the rex and the dux were already facing each other at Varkony, by the river Tisza, when, instead of a showdown, the king and the prince eventually made an agreement.>*’ The rivals were probably urged towards reconciliation by the equality of their forces, which promised neither party an easy victory.°8
In the spring of 1099 Coloman was busy again with questions of foreign policy first interfering in the disputes of the Russian ruling princes then in Bohemian struggles. Svyatopolk, Grand Duke of Kiev, moved against Vladimir of Volhinia and the rulers of Terebovl and Przemysl in Halich. The Kievan sovereign dispossessed David, ruling Prince of Vladimir, of his territories but was defeated by the Princes of Przemysl and Terebovl, Volodar and Vasilko.°? Svyatopolk asked the Hungarian king for help against them but Coloman’s army was defeated at Przemysl by the army of David and his Cuman allies.°° Coloman and Svyatopolk’s failure at Przemysl was to the advantage of the forces of disruption in Russia and contributed to the acceleration of the process of disintegration of the Kievan Russian state. Objectively, the King of Hungary, while supporting Prince Svyatopolk, was trying to re-establish the unity of the Kievan state against the minor princes representing the tendency of disruption,®! so the 1099 performance of Coloman in Russia should by no means listed among the “useless, unjust and senseless’ or “conquering” campaigns in Halich.°
Soon after that Coloman wanted to interfere in the Bohemian succession disputes supporting the Moravian princes against Bretislaw II and marched to the border river OlSava where, eventually, negotiations resulted in his concluding a treaty of peace and friendship with the Bohemian sovereign.
After the turn of the century, the attention of the King of Hungary turned to the Adriatic again. Having himself crowned King of Croatia at Tengerfehérvar in 1102 is certainly indicative of this. The fact that during these years Coloman was rather isolated abroad has escaped the attention of scholars. Fhe Hungarian expansion towards Dalmatia had alienated Byzantium and Venice from the start. The German emperor was the ally of Almos, and Bofivoj, the new ruling Prince of Bohemia, was Henry I'V’s protegé. Almos, in the summer of 1104, married Predslava, one of the daughters of Svyatopolk, Grand Duke of Kiev® and through this marriage he became a relative of Bolestaw III, ruling Prince of Poland, who had married another daughter of Svyatopolk in 1103.°° In 1105 Coloman again interfered in the Bohemian succession disputes, supporting the pretender, Svatopluk, but the latter’s attempt failed temporarily®’ so Coloman’s endeavour to break this diplomatic barrier was frustrated.
It was the alliance with Byzantium that saved the King of Hungary from this foreign policy fixture. Probably around the turn of 1104—1105 Emperor Alexius I proposed to Piroska, the daughter of King Ladislas I, for his son, John, whom he had made coemperor. The Hungarian princess was taken to Constantinople by a Byzantine delegation headed by sebastos Eumathius Philocales, probably in the first half of 1105 and there, as Irene, she married the co-emperor.°* The Norman question was likely to lurk in the background of this marriage. Although in 1097 the Norman crusader commanders had sworn fealty to the Emperor of Byzantium, a year later the Norman Bohemond laid his hand on Antioch also much coveted by Alexius. This incident sparked off a series of armed conflicts between Byzantium and the Principality of Antioch. At the end of 1104 Bohemond, Prince of Antioch left for the West in order to launch a major attack on Byzantium. His ultimate goal was the occupation of the empire.°? Byzantium, obviously, wanted to prevent an anti-Byzantine alliance between Bohemond and Coloman, who already had Norman connections by way of his marriage.’° Through Piroska’s marriage to the Byzantine co-emperor Coloman became the ally of Alexius I. Thus the King of Hungary gave up his not very fruitful Norman connections for a Hungarian—Byzantine cooperation. This resulted, on the one hand, in breaking the ring of isolation, which had been choking Hungary while, on the other, Coloman could set out to subdue the Dalmatian territories which, since 1103, had been directly controlled by Byzantium.’! This move was, of course, understood by Byzantium and Venice reluctantly, the latter also being apprehensive of Norman expansion in the Adriatic.”72 In 1105 Coloman took the Dalmatian towns [Zara, Trau, Sebenico (Sibenik), Spalato] and the islands.73 He also managed to have the Papacy accept this change in the Dalmatian power constellation by giving up his right to appoint prelates in the declaration at Guastalla in October 1106.74 In the wake of the successful conquest of Dalmatia, Coloman assumed the title of King of Hungary, Dalmatia and Croatia”’* and had his four-year-old son, Stephen (Istvan), the heir apparent, crowned king.’°
The measures Coloman took to secure the succession for his son obviously crossed Almos’ ambitions. It cannot be a coincidence that the prince left Hungary for the court of Henry IV just around the turn of 1105—1106,”’ but the German emperor’s position was too delicate, owing to his serious domestic struggles with his son, to support the case of Almos.7® The latter had to return from Germany empty handed in 1106,79 but before long he was already looking for other foreign supporters. In 1106 he left for Poland where eventually he got help from his brother-in-law, Bolestaw III.°° The motive behind the Polish sovereign’s support—besides their being relatives—may have been the possibility of rallying Hungary, with Almos as king, behind himself in his fight against the eastward expansion of the Holy Roman Empire. Almos succeeded in breaking into Hungary from Poland with the military help of Bolestaw III and he seized Abaujvar.*! After that, however, the ruling Prince of Poland and Coloman settled the conflict by negotiations and ended up concluding a treaty of peace, friendship and alliance directed against the expansionist efforts of the Germans explicitly.8? Bolestaw no longer supported Almos, who had no choice but to patch up the quarrel with Coloman again.®3 In 1107, when the Hungarian prince was away ona pilgrimage to Jerusalem by way of Constantinople,®* it was already Coloman who helped the Polish sovereign in his struggle with the pretender Zbigniew. Finally Bolestaw seized Zbigniew’s province, Masovia.®> This must have been inspiring for Coloman, who had been trying to cope with an analogous problem and he subsequently stripped his brother of the duchy (ducatus), probably in 1107, taking advantage of the Duke’s absence, but he allowed Almos, on his return home, to have every possibility of pursuing his favourite pastime, hunting.®° The prince, had he still been a dux, would not have needed royal permission for doing so. Doing away with the territorial ducatus strengthened the central royal power®’ and dealt a heavy blow to Almos. Hence it is no surprise that he plotted to have the king murdered around the turn of 1107-1108 at the consecration of the church (provostship) of Domdés.®® On being discovered the prince wasted little time in running to the German court to solicit the help of Henry V against his brother. Almos was with the German king at Easter 1108®° and Henry V’s army set out to attack Hungary in September of the same year. While Henry was besieging Pozsony (today Bratislava), his ally, Svatopluk, ruling Prince of Bohemia, was raiding the valley of the river Vag. Coloman was helped by his Polish ally, Bolestaw III, who broke into Bohemia. In the end, the German sovereign had to give up his plans of Hungarian expansion, he withdrew his troops, but Coloman was once more obliged to restore Almos to favour.%
During the same period the King of Hungary was also paying attention to events in the Balkans. In 1106 Bohemond, sticking to his original plan, declared a crusade on Byzantium in France and in October 1107 his army launched a powerful attack on the Balkan territories of the empire. His ultimate goal was the seizure of Constantinople.?! It was the second time in a quarter of a century that Byzantium had been threatened by a Norman onslaught. Coloman and the Doge threw their support behind Alexius I and Hungarian troops, aided by the fleet of the Republic, took part in the manoeuvres against the Normans.°? The Byzantine-Venetian—Hungarian alliance saved Byzantium and Bohemond was forced into a humiliating peace treaty in September 1108.93 Coloman’s envoys were also among the signatories of the agreement.**
Helping Byzantium did not go without affecting the future of Hungarian sovereignty in Dalmatia. In some respect Hungarian rule was favourable for the Dalmatian towns as the Hungarian Kingdom, unlike Venice, was never an economic rival for these towns with their developed commercial life.°5 In 1108 Coloman granted the citizens of Zara, Trau and Spalato privileges that did not hinder their economic growth.°° Neither did the King of Hungary ever restrict the internal autonomy of the Dalmatian towns to any great extent.
Venice, on the other hand, would not tolerate the Hungarian domination of Dalmatia, since the political and economic subjugation of these towns was an important step in her eastward expansion (towards Byzantium and the Levant).°’ According to Andrea Dandolo’s chronicle, the Doge asked the Byzantine emperor to help him regain Dalmatia around 1112. Alexius I did not oblige Venice—though theoretically he had no objections to this—and suggested that the war against Hungary be put off.9° This attitude of Byzantium was determined by several factors. The emperor had other more pressing problems to attend to than the Venetian—Hungarian dispute over Dalmatia. During 1111 and 1112 Alexius I was negotiating the union of churches with Pope Pascal II and, in return for the proposed union, the emperor wanted the Holy Roman imperial crown of Henry V.9° Affairs in the East proved even more significant. At this time Byzantium was preparing for the subjection of Antioch, while in 1111 the Seljuq Sultan of Iconium was pianning to attack the empire. The armed hostilities that broke out in Asia Minor went on until 1116.!°° At the same time relations between Byzantium and Venice became markedly cooler during this period. Its origins reached back to the privileges of May 1082, which—in return for the military help the Republic lent Byzantium against the Normans—had granted Venice commercial favours, which gravely hurt the interests of Byzantine merchants. The privileges of 1082 practically opened the door for the economic entry of Venice into Byzantium and in order to counteract their effects the emperor approached Pisa, the rival of Venice. The pact between Byzantium and Pisa concluded in 1111 was thus directed against the privileged position of Venice.!°! As a consequence of this it was fairly reasonable that the emperor was unwilling to play the Doge’s game in Dalmatia at that time. Finally and obviously, the Hungarian participation in the Norman wars must also have influenced Alexius I when he was considering the Doge’s suggestion.
So the showdown between Venice and Hungary was temporarily postponed, but Coloman, nevertheless, deemed it advisable to take steps to secure Hungarian control over Dalmatia. About 1111 the king visited Zara again and confirmed the ancient liberties of Dalmatia.!°? ©
Nor were the last years of the reign of Coloman free from assorted difficulties at home and abroad. In 1112 the King of Hungary broke through into Austria devastating and looting the country along the border.!°* This may just have been a simple, cross-border raid for the sake of plunder, but it is also possible that Coloman was taking revenge on the Margrave of Austria, who had taken part in Henry V’s Hungarian campaign in 1108.!°4 In the summer of 1112 Coloman—his Norman wife having died—married Euphemia, the daughter of Vladimir Monomach, ruling Prince of Pereyaslavl and Suzdal, in order to improve his relationship with Russia.!°* This dynastic link, however, did not prove enduring as. around 1113-1114. the queen was caught in an act of adultery and Coloman promptly sent her home,!°° where his fatherin-law had become overlord of the Principality of Kiev in 1113.!°7 Sometime afterwards Euphemia’s son, Boris, the pretender to be, was born in Russia. !°
These years also saw the last clash between Coloman and Almos. The prince once more tried to seize the kingship around 1115, but his plans came to the attention of the king’s followers, who put an end to them in time. According to the sources Coloman, taking the advice of his counsellors, had the captive Almos and the prince’s little son, Béla, blinded lest either should succeed him after his death.!°° Several other dignitaries shared the fate of Almos and Béla!!°, which indicates that Almos’ actions were supported by a large-scale conspiracy.!!!
Simultaneously with these events Venice initiated military actions to reconquer Dalmatia. Previously the Republic had heeded the advice of the Byzantine emperor, but this time the Doge adopted new tactics. In August 1115 the Venetian fleet attacked the Dalmatian territories under Hungarian rule without consulting Byzantium and acting purely on her own initiative.!!? This time, however, she was only able to seize a part of Dalmatia and the Doge intended to complete his conquest in the following year.'!3 But those events already belong to another era, the reign of the new king, Stephen IT.
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