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CONTRIBUTORS
Scott Aikin is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Director of Undergraduate Studies at Vanderbilt University. He is the author of over eighty essays in epistemology, Greek and Roman Philosophy, pragmatism, and informal logic. Additionally, he is the author of Epistemology and the Regress Problem (2011) and Evidentialism and the Will to Believe (2014).
James Allen, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, is the author of Jnference from Signs: Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence as well as articles on a range of subjects, and is the co-editor of Essays in Honour of Michael Frede.
Catherine Atherton is Adjunct Associate Professor in the Departments of Classics and Philosophy at the University of California at Los Angeles. She has taught at the universities of Cambridge, Oxford, and Nottingham.
Emily Austin is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Wake Forest University. Much of her research focuses on Ancient Greek moral psychology, especially grief and the fear of death. Her publications in this area include Epicurus And The Politics Of Fearing Death (2012) and Plato on Grief as a Mental Disorder (2016).
Richard Bett is Professor of Philosophy and Classics at Johns Hopkins University. He has translated several works of Sextus Empiricus with notes or commentary, most recently Against Those in the Disciplines (2018). How to be a Pyrrhonist (2019) is a selection of his essays on Pyrrhonian skepticism.
René Brouwer teaches law and philosophy at the University of Utrecht, the Netherlands. He has published on a variety of topics in the history and philosophy of law as well as in ancient philosophy. See especially his monographs The Stoic Sage (2014) and Law and Philosophy in the Late Roman Republic (2021), and the co-edited volume Fate, Providence, and Free Will (2020).
Anna B. Christensen is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Central College in Pella, Iowa.
She focuses her research on ancient accounts of death and suicide, which she balances with the cheerier topics of love and friendship.
James A. Dunson III is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Xavier University of Louisiana. He is the author of Sedation, Suicide, and the Limits of Ethics (2017), and the co-author of Citizen of the World: Suffering and Solidarity in the 21st Century (2013). His main areas of interest are biomedical ethics, the history of moral philosophy, and political philosophy.
Andree Hahmann is a DAAD Visiting Professor of Philosophy and Germanic Languages at the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of Aristoteles gegen Epikur: Eine Untersuchung tiber die Prinzipien der hellenistischen Philosophie (2017) and Aristoteles ‘Uber die Seele’: Ein systematischer Kommentar (2016), as well as various articles on topics in ancient and modern philosophy.
Ian Hensley is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at East Tennessee State University. He holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Cornell University, and his research focuses on the philosophy of the Hellenistic Stoics. He has recently published articles in Ancient Philosophy and the Journal of the History of Philosophy that focus on the principles and elements of Stoic physics.
Lisa Hill is Professor of Politics at the University of Adelaide. Her most recent publications include Adam Smith’ Pragmatic Liberalism, The Science of Welfare (2019) and The Intellectual History of Political Corruption (with Bruce Buchan, 2014).
Anna Maria Ioppolo is Emeritus Professor of Ancient Philosophy at University of Rome Sapienza. She is the author of Aristone di Chio e lo stoicismo antico (1980), Opinione scienza: Il dibattito tra Stoici e Accademici nel terzo e secondo secolo a. C. (1986), and La testimonianza di Sesto Empirico sull’Accademia scettica (2009). Her most recent book is Dibattiti filosofici ellenistici (2013).
Jacob Klein is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Colgate University. His research focuses on Stoic ethics and moral psychology. He received a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Cornell University and has been a Fulbright research fellow at the Humboldt University in Berlin.
Thornton C. Lockwood, Jr., is Professor of Philosophy at Quinnipiac University. His research focuses on ancient Greek and Roman ethical and political thought and most recently he has published the co-edited volumes Aristotle's Politics: A Critical Guide (2015) and Aristote Politique VII: La constitution « selon nos voeux » (2019).
Michael McOsker works primarily on the Herculaneum papyri and the history of Hellenistic philosophy and poetics. His book On the Good Poem According to Philodemus is forthcoming, and his edition and translation of Philodemus’ On Anger with David Armstrong is also forthcoming. Currently, he holds a post-doc from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung at the Universitat K6ln working on an edition and translation of the Epicurean Demetrius Laco’s On Poems.
Stefano Maso is Professor in ancient philosophy at the University of Ca’ Foscari — Venice. Among his books are Grasp and Dissent: Cicero and Epicurean Philosophy (2015); Epicurus on Eidola: Peri Phuseos Book II: Update, Proposals, and Discussions (2015).
Phillip Mitsis is A.S. Onassis Professor of Hellenic Culture and Civilization, New York University, and Academic Director of the American Institute for Verdi Studies. He has published over a dozen monographs and edited volumes on Greek and Roman philosophy and literature, and most recently has edited the Oxford Handbook of Epicurus and Epicureanism (2020).
Georgia Mouroutsou is Associate Professor of Philosophy at King’s University College and at the Graduate Program for Ancient Philosophy at Western University Canada. She has mostly published on later Plato. Currently she is working on her second monograph, Plato s Twofold Dialectic of Pleasure: Critical Dialogue with Hedonists and Critical Analysis of Pleasures (with Brill).
Tamer Nawar is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen.
Attila Németh is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, Research Centre for the Humanities, Budapest, and a Fellow in Ancient Philosophy at the Center for Hellenic Studies, Harvard University (2018-2020). He is the author of the book Epicurus on the Self (2017).
Tim O’Keefe is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Georgia State University, in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. He has published two books: Epicurus on Freedom (2005) and Epicureanism (2009) and numerous articles on Epicureanism, and also on the Cyrenaics, Pyrrhonian skeptics, and other topics.
Christiana Olfert is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. She is the author of Aristotle on Practical Truth (2017), and is currently working on a book on Pyrrhonian Skepticism as a way of life.
Casey Perin is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. He is the author of The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism (2010), and articles on Plato, Aristotle, Stoicism, and ancient skepticism.
Massimo Pigliucci is the K.D. Irani Professor of Philosophy at the City College of New York. His books include How to Be a Stoic: Using Ancient Philosophy to Live a Modern Life (2017) and A Handbook for New Stoics: How to Thrive in a World Out of Your Control (2019, with Gregory Lopez). He blogs at massimopigliucci.com
Benjamin A. Rider is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Central Arkansas. He has published on Socrates, Plato, and Epicurus, including most recently “The Ethical Significance of Gratitude in Epicureanism” in the British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
Jan Maximilian Robitzsch is a Lecturer at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, specializing in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy as well as Social and Political Philosophy. More about him and his work can be found on his webpage: www.jmrobitzsch.com
Ricardo Salles is a Researcher at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosdficas of the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México in Mexico City. He has published numerous articles on Stoic physics and metaphysics. One of the latest is “Two Classic Problems in the Stoic Theory of Time” (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 55).
Whitney Schwab is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. His recent publications have appeared in Phronesis, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Apeiron, and the Journal of the History of Philosophy.
J. Clerk Shaw is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. He is the author of Plato's Anti-Hedonism and the Protagoras (2015).
Simon Shogry is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford and Tutorial Fellow of Brasenose College. His research focuses on Plato and Hellenistic philosophy, most recently Stoic logic, epistemology, and ethics.
William O. Stephens is Professor of Philosophy at Creighton University. His books include Marcus Aurelius: A Guide for the Perplexed (2012), Stoic Ethics: Epictetus and Happiness as Freedom (2007), and an English translation of Adolf F. Bonhdoffer, The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus (1996).
Harald Thorsrud is Professor of Philosophy at Agnes Scott College in Decatur, GA. He is the author of Ancient Scepticism (2009), and most recently of articles on the Academic Skeptics Arcesilaus and Carneades, as well as Aristotle’s ethics.
Svavar Hrafn Svavarsson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iceland. He has mainly written on ancient epistemology and ethics.
Christopher Turner is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at California State University, Stanislaus. He has authored (or co-authored) a number of articles on ancient and twentiethcentury philosophers and he has translated (or co-translated) numerous works including, most recently, Christoph Menke’s Critique of Rights (2020).
Renata Zieminska is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Szczecin. She is the
author of The History of Skepticism: In Search of Consistency (2017) and a member of the Society for Skeptical Studies and the International Society for the Study of Skepticism.
INTRODUCTION
Kelly Arenson
The Hellenistic era refers to the period between the death of Alexander the Great (323 BCE) and the Battle of Actium (31 BCE), where the Roman leader Octavian defeated the last Greek dynasty by conquering the forces of Mark Antony and Cleopatra. During the roughly three hundred years of the Hellenistic era, Greek culture spread throughout Asia Minor and the rest of Persia, courtesy of Alexander’s conquest of these areas and the governance by his Greek generals after his death. Hellenistic philosophy concerns the three main schools that emerged during this period: Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism.
A brief summary of the major views of each of the three main schools is in order for those readers who are encountering Hellenistic philosophy for the first time. Although it is difficult to capture the entire approach of each school in a small space, it should be possible to adumbrate the main features of Hellenistic views by providing a general sense of the epistemology, ethics, and physics of the era. (Readers looking for more background on the history of each school and its figureheads should consult the chapters in Part 1.)
The Epicureans were egoistic hedonists: their main goal in life was personal pleasure, which they described as the absence of pain in the body [aponia] and disturbance in the soul [ataraxia]. The school is named after its ancient Greek founder Epicurus; other prominent members include the Roman poet and philosopher Lucretius as well as the later thinkers Philodemus of Gadara and Diogenes of Oinoanda. Epicureans believed that the basic building blocks of reality are atoms, which circulate in a void of infinite magnitude. According to Epicureans, the study of physics is essential for a proper understanding of perception, truth, and knowledge, and also for living well. One of the best examples of the influence of the Epicureans’ physical theory on ethics is their claim that death should not be feared because it is a state lacking sense perception: the experience of anything through the senses (e.g., pain after death) requires a living soul, which, according to the Epicureans, is composed of atoms and dies along with the body.
Like the Epicureans, the Stoics pursued ataraxia, but many scholars would argue that this is where the similarities more or less end. The word ‘Stoic’ derives from the ancient Greek word stoa poikilé, which simply means ‘painted porch’, a place in the ancient Athenian marketplace where members of the school supposedly spent their time. The Greek philosopher Zeno of Citium is credited with founding the school, which was transformed in significant ways by later members, particularly its third head, Chrysippus.
Stoicism, especially the ethics, persisted well into the Roman Imperial period, when it was taken up by Epictetus, Seneca the Younger, and the emperor Marcus Aurelius. Whereas the Epicureans believed the good is pleasure, the Stoics believed it is virtue, which they claimed should be sought to the best of one’s ability even though it is rarely, if ever, fully achieved. Later Stoics emphasized living a simple life, one focused on what is up to us and akin to our nature. As for their natural philosophy, Stoics believed the universe consists of physical material; they also made significant developments in logic and the study of language.
The philosophy of the skeptics was arguably less unified than that of the other two schools, owing to the fact that its members espoused many different perspectives on the methodology and goal of skeptical inquiry. The two main branches of ancient skepticism were the Pyrrhonian and the Academic. The former owes its name to the Greek thinker Pyrrho of Elis, about whom we know fairly little. We do know that his philosophy was resurrected a couple centuries later by Aenesidemus, and a few centuries after that by Sextus Empiricus, whose texts are our main source for ancient Pyrrhonism. Skeptics of the Pyrrhonian variety formulated various “modes” or methods for refuting any claim, the result of which is the suspension of judgment, an approach they claimed is accompanied by ataraxia. The Academic skeptical tradition was inaugurated by the Greek philosopher Arcesilaus, who developed it from Plato’s Academy, of which he was a figurehead, and was continued by Carneades and others after him. Academic Skeptics employed Socratic methods of investigation and argumentation, and tended to focus on refuting Stoic views in particular. They determined nothing and suspended judgment, while also attempting to articulate concepts that would allow them to live in the world without committing to the truth of appearances.
The beginning of Hellenistic philosophy is marked off fairly clearly, but its end is not: many of the schools of the Hellenistic era continued to flourish long after the Battle of Actium. For instance, Stoicism had numerous prominent adherents in Imperial Rome (27 BCE to ~180 CE), and Pyrrhonian Skepticism underwent a revival. Nevertheless, it has been argued that post-Hellenistic followers of the Hellenistic schools did not significantly alter their respective school’s thought,’ and thus they should not be included in the scope of Hellenistic philosophy proper. Indeed, other guides to Hellenistic philosophy usually end their coverage at around 100 BCE, leaving out the skeptic Aenesidemus and the revival of Pyrrhonism, as well as the later Epicureans Philodemus and Diogenes of Oinoanda. In addition, many guides do not treat in their own right the Imperial Roman Stoics, which is an interesting omission given that much of the current fascination with Stoic ethics as a form of self-help or psychotherapy has its roots in the writings of the Stoics of that period.” Because their philosophies are timely and accessible, it is unsurprising that these Stoics regularly find their way onto college reading lists.
Although it may be controversial to do so, this Handbook covers not only the philosophies of the Hellenistic era proper but also their later revivals. Even if later “Hellenistic” philosophers did not significantly alter the doctrines of their original schools— a claim that some scholars of later Skepticism and Stoicism would surely dispute—they nevertheless made significant contributions to the history of Hellenistic thought. At the very least, the existence of later “Hellenistic” thinkers points to the persistent importance of Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism in the ancient Greek and Roman world; Hellenistic philosophy did not end at the Battle of Actium, even if the Hellenistic era did.
This Handbook aims to extend the coverage of Hellenistic philosophy, but it does not aim to cover every last topic, even if does aim to cover more figures than previous guides.
The chapters are designed to appeal to a wide range of interests, covering specific topics addressed by individual schools as well as broader topics across several schools. For instance, there are chapters dedicated solely to Stoic epistemology, but also a single chapter on piety and theology in Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Given that some of the chapters are broad and comparative, there is an inevitable amount of overlap, which is intentional: the mix of specific and broader chapters will enable readers to gain a sense not only for how an idea took shape in a particular school, but also for how ideas flowed from school to school. This Handbook is designed in part to highlight the ways in which the various schools refuted or reformulated each other’s arguments, one of the more fascinating aspects of Hellenistic philosophy.
The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy is divided into six parts. Parts 1 and 2 provide general overviews of the schools as well as background material. Parts 3, 4, and 5 are organized by theme rather than by school, and they address the core issues in Hellenistic philosophy: roughly, epistemology, physics, and ethics. Chapters in these parts range from treatments of specific topics to broader treatments of several schools. Finally, Part 6 considers the contemporary relevance of Hellenistic thought.
Part 1: Methods and Background
Part 1 (Chapters 1-4) addresses the methodology of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Skeptics. This section introduces the history and figureheads of each school and fleshes out the connections among the parts of each school’s philosophies. The aim of the chapters of Part | is to give readers a sense for what it meant to do philosophy in the Hellenistic world.
This Handbook begins with J. Clerk Shaw’s chapter on the relation among the parts of Epicurean philosophy. Shaw explores the Epicurean commitment to philosophy as a means to living well, and argues that even physics has practical benefits according to Epicureans: studying nature helps us replace false, troubling beliefs with true, calming ones, and gives us a better sense for how important elements of human happiness (mainly pleasure, pain, and desire) should be featured in our lives if we wish to avoid disturbance and achieve tranquility.
William Stephens introduces us to the major players in Stoic philosophy, providing detailed and intriguing accounts of their lives and philosophies. Stephens shows that Stoicism, unlike other major ancient Greek schools, did not have a main figurehead who established doctrines for the entire school; rather, Stoicism was more of a collection of the views of many of its members, resulting in a system that evolved for several centuries.
Renata Zieminska outlines the offensive and defensive argumentative strategies employed by Pyrrhonian and Academic Skeptics. Offensively, these skeptics argued for the suspension of all judgment; defensively, they attempted to address charges that their philosophy was impractical, inconsistent, and self-refuting. Zieminska shows how skeptical strategies shifted over time: Pyrrhonists solved some problems that Academic Skeptics did not, and vice-versa.
One of our most important sources for the philosophies of the Hellenistic era is the Roman orator and statesman Cicero, who Thornton Lockwood contends was not merely reporting Hellenistic views to a Roman readership but was presenting them in a critical mode in accordance with the methodology of the philosophical school to which he ascribed, namely, Academic Skepticism. Lockwood shows that Cicero was a philosophizer in his own right, one who was inspired by the views of Epicureans and Stoics even though he was highly suspicious of their dogma.
Part 2: Early Influences
In Part 2 (Chapters 5—10) we address the connections between Hellenistic thinkers and their philosophical predecessors, particularly the Cynics, Presocratics, Socrates, and Aristotle. The idea is not to cover every philosophical influence on the Hellenistic thinkers, but to home in on specific, significant areas of influence that will prepare readers for the later chapters focused on Hellenistic doctrines themselves.
Stefano Maso examines the influence of the Atomists and Cyrenaics on Epicurean physics, epistemology, ethics, and psychology. He considers the atomistic materialism of Leucippus and Democritus, showing that their notion of the nature of the atom differed from Epicurus’, even if they all agreed that atoms are the fundamental building blocks of reality. Maso also investigates the ways in which Epicureans disagreed with Cyrenaic hedonism, especially its view that we should pursue pleasures that are instantaneous and provide continual variety, and its claim that bodily pleasures are worse than mental ones.
Christopher Turner addresses the ancient Cynic roots of Stoic ethics. He begins by dealing with problems regarding the availability and interpretation of Cynic texts, and then introduces the basic features of the Cynic conception of happiness, showing that it emphasizes flexibility and simplicity, two key notions in the Stoics’ own practical advice for attaining freedom and tranquility.
Ricardo Salles investigates the place of the Stoics in the tradition inaugurated by Presocratics of describing the material components of natural beings in terms of the four sensible elements: fire, air, water, and earth. Salles considers in detail our main source for the elemental theory of the Stoics, focusing on why they centered their physical system on principles that neither they nor many Presocratics considered to be elements, namely, god and matter.
Jacob Klein compares Stoic and Aristotelian accounts of virtues of character and intellect. He considers each school’s understanding of human nature and shows that they differ regarding the role of reason and non-rational motivations in ethical dispositions and actions: the Stoics believed that virtue consists of the right use of one’s rational faculty, whereas Aristotle claimed that virtue involves not only reason but also feelings and appetites. In addition, Klein compares Stoic and Aristotelian views on the sufficiency of virtue for happiness, moral epistemology, and the nature of the sage.
The last two chapters of this section consider Hellenistic responses to accounts of the life and philosophy of Socrates. René Brouwer presents the reaction of early Stoics— especially Zeno of Citium—to accounts of Socratic ethics. Brouwer shows that, unlike Academic Skeptics, Stoics saw Socrates as more than a proponent of a skeptical method of inquiry; they believed he was a thinker with a particular ethical agenda—which they shared—that was focused on articulating the value of virtue, the relation between virtue and knowledge, and the theory that virtues are interrelated. Stoics aimed to approach these ethical concerns with an attitude of humility and fallibility, just as they believed Socrates had done.
Svavar Hrafn Svavarsson closes out the section with a discussion of the ways in which the Academic Skeptics Arcesilaus and, after him, Carneades were inspired by Socrates’ argumentative techniques. Svavarsson shows that Academic Skepticism was influenced especially by Socrates’ claim that he knew nothing and by his dialectical method of inquiry, which Academic skeptics used as an argumentative technique against the claims of several ancient schools.
Part 3: Soul, Perception, and Knowledge
Part 3 (Chapters 11-16) covers a mix of epistemology and psychology—particularly the various Hellenistic conceptions of the soul and its capacities (e.g., the emotions)—and Epicurean and Stoic theories of truth, knowledge, and belief. Part 3 also includes two multischool chapters: one on skeptical defenses against the opposition’s charge that skeptical attitudes are incompatible with action, and the other on skeptical critiques of criteria for truth offered by the Epicureans and Stoics.
In the section’s first chapter, Ian Hensley tackles Stoic epistemology, particularly the concepts of assent, impression, opinion, scientific knowledge, and cognition. He articulates the differences between the Stoic sage and all other humans, and points out a commonality: wise and unwise people alike experience cognitive impressions, which are the starting point for the latter’s epistemic development.
Tamer Nawar examines Stoic psychology, considering the soul’s composition, function, relation to the body and identity, as well as the nature of certain psychological processes. He situates the Stoic notion of the soul within their theory that only corporeal things have causal power, and he concludes the article with a brief discussion of the Stoic psychology of the passions and moral choice.
Epicurean epistemology is the subject of Andree Hahmann’s chapter. He focuses on the Epicureans’ claim that all perceptions are true, and argues that this includes not only sense impressions but also all mental images, such as dreams and hallucinations. Hahmann then relates the Epicureans’ account of truth to their atomic theory of perception, exploring the latter through various examples of sense deception.
Epicurean attitudes toward irrational fears of death are the topic of Emily Austin’s chapter, which touches on epistemology as well as psychology. She closely examines the Epicureans’ main arguments against such fears, carefully constructs their premises regarding perception and the soul, and considers potential objections. Austin shows that their main arguments seem to address only the fear of being dead, not fears about one’s experiences during the process of dying, such as pain. She contends that, in order to combat the latter type of fears, Epicureans offered coping techniques rather than rational arguments, and they believed that some versions of the fear of death are ineliminable.
Whitney Schwab considers several ancient skeptical responses to the apraxia, or inaction, charge: if skeptics do not commit to beliefs, then they do not commit to the belief that the world is as it appears to a perceiver, yet such a belief would seem to be required in order to justify taking any action. The result, according to the objection, is total inaction. Schwab mainly focuses on skeptical replies to the Stoics’ version of this charge, particularly the responses provided by the Academic Skeptics Arcesilaus and Carneades, as well as by the Pyrrhonian Skeptic Sextus Empiricus.
Scott Aikin juxtaposes several Hellenistic theories in his chapter on skeptical responses to Epicurean and Stoic criteria for truth. He shows that both Epicureanism and Stoicism rely on the idea that false opinions must be replaced with true ones, which, though veridical, diverge significantly from popular beliefs. What is therefore essential to the success of these schools’ philosophy is a criterion for distinguishing truth from falsity. Aikin examines skeptical critiques of such a criterion, focusing on skeptical arguments against the Epicureans’ claim that all perceptions are true and the Stoics’ position that there is a class of impressions—those called ‘kataleptic’—that are always consistent with reality.
Part 4: First Principles, Nature, and Teleology
Part 4 (Chapters 17—22) concerns physics and teleology, focusing on Hellenistic conceptions of nature and the basic principles of existence, the ramifications of Epicurean and Stoic physical theories for these schools’ respective positions on free will, and the Academic Skeptics’ contributions to Hellenistic debates on fate and determinism. Multi-school chapters compare Stoic, Epicurean, and Skeptical ideas on language and piety.
In the section’s opening chapter, Jan Maximilian Robitzsch presents Epicurean ontology. He investigates how Epicureans use their atomic system to account for the existence and composition of all entities. Atoms and void are the basic components of reality, and Robitzsch considers how this is true even for entities that might be understood as conceptual or incorporeal, such as time, the gods, and thoughts.
If everything everywhere can be explained in terms of the collision of atoms in an infinite void, as the Epicureans claim, how is it not the case that the natural world and the humans in it are causally determined? The Epicureans’ response to this question is considered by Attila Németh, who presents their positions on freedom and teleology. He situates their anti-teleological views among the teleological theories of their predecessors— the Presocratics, Plato, and Aristotle—and examines Epicurean conceptions of agency, moral responsibility, and the infamous ‘swerve,’ the random motion of atoms that was intended to account for indeterminacy.
Anna Maria Ioppolo investigates the Stoics’ conception of nature and the place of humans within it. She shows that the Stoics had no single description of nature—it was understood by some heads of the school as human nature, by others as cosmic nature, and by yet others as both. The last of these three views belonged to the early Stoic Chrysippus, who argued that nature is a rational principle that orders the whole universe. Naturally, this raises the problem of determinism, which Ioppolo considers also in the Stoic Zeno’s account of fate. She explains that Chrysippus’ distinction among types of causes was an attempt to allow for moral responsibility in the fatalist system articulated by Zeno.
Catherine Atherton considers the Epicurean and Stoic views on the relation among language, logic, the world, and education. She begins by addressing each school’s account of the origins of language, focusing on their theories regarding etymology, the vocalization of sounds, and naming. Of concern also is the connection between speech and thoughts, as well as the complex theory of Stoic grammar. Atherton shows that the Stoics saw rhetoric as an important part of proper philosophical training, whereas the Epicureans saw no need for education in rhetoric, in keeping with their desire to avoid political activity.
Freedom is revisited in James Allen’s treatment of the Academic Skeptic Carneades’ dialectical response to Epicurean and Stoic views on fate. Carneades agrees with the Epicureans, against the Stoics, that we should reject causal determinism. But he agrees with the Stoics, against the Epicureans, that every proposition is either true or false, including ones about the future. Allen considers also Carneades’ skeptical response to the Epicurean swerve as well as to the Stoics’ view that voluntary action is possible despite determinism.
The section closes with a multi-school chapter by Harald Thorsrud, who presents the concepts of god and piety in Epicureanism and Stoicism—two schools that argued in some sense that the good life is to become like god—and then examines critiques of these schools’ positions offered by Pyrrhonian Skeptics. This chapter also considers Epicurean and Stoic accounts of the nature of the gods and the ideal and proper human attitude toward them, and deals with epistemological questions faced by these schools about the source and adequacy of human knowledge of the divine. In the end, Thorsrud shows that despite Pyrrhonian Skeptics’ criticisms of religious dogma, they might nevertheless be motivated to engage in customary religious practices because of attitudes that are not based on beliefs.
Part 5: Ethics, Politics, and Society
The ethical and political dimensions of Hellenistic philosophy are explored in Part 5 (Chapters 23-28), which focuses on the moral goals of the various schools (e.g., tranquility, pleasure, virtue, happiness), as well as Hellenistic accounts of how mortal needs and desires influence humans’ development into ethical, rational agents.
The section opens with Casey Perin’s treatment of ataraxia [tranquility] in early Pyrrhonian skepticism and especially in its Imperial Roman revival. Perin considers whether goal-directed activity is consistent with skepticism: it would seem that the pursuit of a goal entails committing to, rather than suspending judgment about, a belief concerning the goal’s worthiness. He also considers why Pyrrhonists set ataraxia as their target instead of some other end. Can skeptics seek tranquility without becoming dogmatists?
The next three chapters cover various aspects of Epicurean ethics. Benjamin Rider tackles the fundamentals of Epicurean pleasure, showing that their hedonism has a eudaimonist framework, meaning that it aims not at securing every available pleasure but at an overall happy, pain-free life. Rider addresses the sticky issue of the Epicurean classification of different types of pleasure, our understanding of which derives mainly from Cicero’s De Finibus, a controversial source. Rider concludes his chapter with a look at the overall shape of the Epicurean good life: the mind is free of anxiety stemming from irrational fears, the body experiences minimal pain, and there is a proper understanding of nature and the limits of human desire.
Anna Christensen takes up Epicurean attitudes regarding other people: as egoistic hedonists, how did Epicureans deal with politics, friendships, and community? Christensen shows that although they typically avoided public life, they sought out communities of likeminded individuals, with whom they could cultivate lasting relationships aimed at promoting tranquility and joy. She concludes that Epicurean egoism is not inconsistent with genuine feelings for others.
Michael McOsker examines the therapeutic hedonism of later Epicureans, particularly that of Philodemus of Gadara, a first-century BCE thinker who spent much time in Italy. McOsker shows that Philodemus conceived of therapy as medicine: the Epicurean ‘doctor’ diagnoses the ‘patient,’ then cuts out the disease as if wielding a scalpel. Epicurean ‘physicians’ tailored their therapeutic tactics to each patient’s maladies—most likely false beliefs about death, the gods, and our desires—with the goal of eliminating anxiety and engendering happiness.
The section continues with two chapters on Stoic ethics, treated in its own right and through the lens of skeptical critiques. Georgia Mouroutsou takes up the moral philosophy of the main Stoics in Imperial Rome—Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius— whose prescriptions for life have come to form part of contemporary self-help philosophies. Mouroutsou examines how these later Stoics prioritized ethics above other philosophical concerns, such as epistemology or physics: they pursued philosophy as a means to understanding and eventually eradicating the passions. She argues that this concern is what ultimately unites later Stoic thinkers, despite differences in philosophical style and background.
In the final chapter of this section, Christiana Olfert tracks the debate among Stoics and Academic Skeptics about the proper goal of action. She begins by analyzing the Stoic account of moral development, focusing on what it means to live according to right reason as well as the role that our primary, uncorrupted impulses play in achieving happiness. The Stoics proposed “aiming well”—that is, trying as hard as one can to live in accordance with nature—as the highest good, which the Academic Skeptics claimed was an incoherent goal and insufficient for living well. Olfert contends that although scholars tend to juxtapose only the epistemological views of the two schools, it makes sense to do so also for the ethical views: we gain a greater understanding of the refinements each side made to their philosophies in light of their opponents’ criticisms.
Part 6: The Hellenistic Legacy in Contemporary Issues
Part 6 (Chapters 29-35), the volume’s final section, considers the relevance of Hellenistic thought to contemporary issues in medical ethics, psychotherapy, environmental ethics, politics, feminism, and modern-day skepticism. This Handbook aims to leave the reader with the belief that Hellenistic philosophy continues to inform many of the ethical, epistemological, and political aspects of modern life.
Richard Bett articulates several important differences between ancient skepticism and its contemporary incarnation, and then considers how the former might intervene in a controversy in recent Anglophone philosophy over whether skeptical ways of thought are natural or necessary. Bett crafts a potential response mainly from the perspective of Sextus Empiricus, who would not have considered this to be a simple issue: there is good reason to believe Sextus takes everyday, non-skeptical attitudes about the world—attitudes that would seem to be required for normal life—to be natural, yet his position on the naturalness of skepticism itself is ambiguous.
The next three chapters consider how we might apply Stoicism to various aspects of contemporary life. James Dunson explores the relevance of Stoicism to contemporary bioethics, arguing that the former serves as an important basis from which to develop challenges to and a deeper understanding of the methodologies and theories at work in medical ethics. Dunson shows that Stoicism offers an important conception of individual autonomy, one that he argues has interesting significance for debates regarding end-of-life issues, particularly physician-assisted suicide and the question of how to define death.
Massimo Pigliucci considers the relevance of Stoic ethics to everyday living, beginning by combatting the view that the Stoic sage is a heartless creature who suppresses all emotion: Stoics aim to avoid negative emotions and cultivate healthy ones, such as joy and love. Pigliucci argues that we can achieve this goal by following the Stoics’ advice to pursue virtue, understand the limits of our desires, respect the dignity of others, avoid rash judgments, and acknowledge our roles in life and their accompanying duties. He concludes the chapter by articulating how a Stoic might respond in three different scenarios: how we might deal with our desires, our attitudes toward other people, and mistaken first impressions.
Simon Shogry applies the Stoics’ theory of cosmopolitanism—put very simply, the theory that we are all citizens of one and the same worldwide community—to contemporary environmental ethics. According to Stoicism, the universal community consists only of rational beings, which entails that non-human entities are of no moral concern. While this might seem to rule out any consideration for the environment, Shogry shows that this is not the case: Stoics believed that humans are naturally endowed with the capacity to contemplate the order of the cosmos, and this activity contributes to happiness, the achievement of which will be thwarted if order is disrupted by environmental degradation. Stoics might therefore support preserving the natural world.
Stoic cosmopolitanism’s ramifications for feminist thought are explored by Lisa Hill, who considers whether Stoics believed men and women are equally capable of becoming sages. She notes that although there is evidence that Roman Stoics’ attitudes toward women were less progressive than those of their Greek predecessors, the former were nonetheless committed to the equality of all humans, which meant they rejected male chauvinism and the idea that women cannot be on equal footing with men when it comes to achieving virtue and exercising right reason.
How would Epicureans react to today’s consumer culture? What treatment would they offer for our overactive desires and fixation with wealth and the acquisition of material goods? Tim O’Keefe formulates the Epicureans’ diagnosis of the ailment and outlines their cure, which centers on living simply and using practical reason to understand the realities of our desires: human needs are minimal, and we shouldn’t be upset about not getting what we don’t need. O’Keefe considers the objection that an economy of Epicurean consumers would fall into recession, and concludes the chapter by showing that contemporary studies on happiness support the Epicureans’ view that materialism is harmful to our well-being.
This Handbook closes with Phillip Mitsis’ investigation of the influence of Hellenistic philosophy on the economic views of the Enlightenment, especially ideas concerning scarcity, labor, and utility. He argues that there are significant parallels between the economic arguments of modern thinkers, such as Locke, Smith, and Galiani, and those of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Skeptics. Economic histories standardly look to the modern period for insight into the origins of later economic thought, but Mitsis finds insight in the philosophies of the Hellenistic era, uncovering their lasting influence on the economic theories of the Enlightenment and beyond.
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