Download PDF | Pınar Üre - Reclaiming Byzantium_ Russia, Turkey and the Archaeological Claim to the Middle East in the 19th Century-I.B. Tauris (2020).
225 Pages
Introduction:
Regenerating distant past Nationalist and Imperialist uses of ancient history in the 19th century But no physical object or trace is an autonomous guide to bygone times; they light up the past only when we already know they belong to it. Memory and history pin-point only certain things as relics; the rest of what lies around us seems simply present, suggesting nothing past.
In May 2016, the famous Mariinsky Symphony Orchestra of St. Petersburg organized a classical music concert in the famous Roman theatre of the ancient city of Palmyra, which was recently liberated from the destruction of ISIS, or the so-called Islamic State by the forces of the Russian-backed Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.2 Before the concert started, Russian president Vladimir Putin addressed the audience through a videoconference and stated that the concert was ‘an amazing humanitarian act’.3 The concert, which was named ‘With a Prayer from Palmyra: Music Revives the Ancient Walls’, was a celebration (and an obvious PR campaign) of the victory of the Syrian and Russian forces in the Syrian Civil War. The implicit message behind the spectacle was a clash between the ‘civilized and uncivilized’, and Russia naturally appeared as the redeemer of civilization by saving the ancient monuments of Palmyra from further destruction at the hands of militants. Russia’s relationship with the ruins of Palmyra, or antiquities in the Near East in general, did not start in the 21st century with the Syrian Civil War.
In fact, archaeologists of the Russian Empire were conducting studies in Palmyra and in other ancient cities across the Near East already in the late 19th century. Just like it is in contemporary politics, back in the 19th century, ancient history was already a stage for imperial rivalry and great power politics. Hence, the discovery and protection of archaeological artefacts were regarded as signs of imperial prestige and triumph of civilization. On the Ottoman side, foreign archaeological activities were regarded with suspicion especially in the late 19th century. In an attempt to preserve its vulnerable sovereignty, Ottoman Empire closely monitored foreign archaeological activities on its territories. For the Ottoman Empire, archaeology was also a way of projecting its image as a modern, Westernized empire. For both Russian and Ottoman archaeologists, European scholarship was regarded as an example that should be followed, and a rival at the same time. The 19th century was marked by the institutionalization of archaeology as a scientific discipline, particularly in Europe.4 University chairs and museums were established in European capitals. Academics from Britain, France, and later Germany and the United States organized archaeological institutes, societies and schools in the famous centres of the ancient world – primarily Rome, Athens and Cairo.5
These historical cities became meeting points for archaeologists from different countries, who found the opportunity to share their projects with international academia. The study of the ancient world provided the archaeologists a window through which they could look into the origins of European civilization as they saw it. Modern European empires defined themselves as the spiritual heirs of the ancient civilizations that flourished in the Mediterranean basin and the Near East.6 The creation of schools of archaeology in cities such as Cairo and Athens mirrored the political competition between major European powers. The success of archaeological activities was increasingly associated with national and imperial prestige.7 The political rivalry between Britain and France was replicated by the British Museum and the Louvre, and Germany caught up with them after its political unification in 1871. Antiquities flowing from Egypt and the Near East filled European museums.8 National museums in the imperial capitals became the visual representations of the territories each empire held under its control, while overseas archaeological institutes became the physical embodiments of their imperial presence in the given territory. Around the same time, touristic trips to ancient cities and museums gradually became a part of leisure for European upper classes, who wanted to flee modernity into realms of alternative imagination. The first ‘Grand Tourists’ of the 18th and early 19th centuries were members of the European upper classes, but with the growth of mass tourism in the late 19th century, middle classes joined them.9 After visiting archaeological sites in Greece, Italy and the Near East, European travellers recorded their observations with the help of photographs, travel diaries, and guidebooks, and recreated the ancient past through a Western lens. The preoccupation of different segments of the society with ancient history meant that re-creation of the past in a modern context was not only an official project initiated by the state, rather, it was simultaneously influenced both from above by the state and from below by individuals.
Intensive European archaeological involvement in other parts of the world implied that modern inhabitants of ancient lands either had lost the glamour of their past or were the descendants of ‘barbarians’ who destroyed the ancient civilizations under examination. After a long period of ignorance and neglect, it was European archaeologists who were unearthing this glorious past and were therefore the legitimate heirs to the heritage left by ancient civilizations.10 Therefore, a direct historical line was drawn from the ancient civilizations of the Near East to modern European nations, with European culture standing at the peak of human progress.11 In an 1853 issue of the Illustrated Magazine of Art, an anonymous author professed that ‘France and England divide the glory of having rescued from the underground darkness and oblivion of twenty-five centuries, some of the most magnificent remains of the old world’.12 As Díaz-Andreu Garcia argued, archaeological discourse was useful in legitimizing the assumed inferiority of people inhabiting the regions under European political, economic and cultural control.13 In fact, archaeology provided a narrative explaining the ‘inevitability of certain lands to be conquered and the right of certain people to rule’.14 Archaeology’s links to power politics became even more evident during the First World War, when many archaeologists put their knowledge of local languages, cultures and topography to the use of the intelligence services of their states.15 The Russian Empire joined the competition over the ancient world as a latecomer. The choice of location for the first overseas Russian archaeological institute was neither Rome nor Athens – but Istanbul, or Constantinople, or the Russian Tsargrad, the former capital of the Eastern Roman Empire and Orthodox Christianity, a capital for whose possession some Russians longed in the 19th century.16 This study will explore Russian archaeological practices in the Ottoman Empire through the prism of a scholarly institution, the Russian Archaeological Institute in Constantinople (Russkii Arkheologicheskii Institut v Konstantinopole, hereafter as RAIK), which operated between 1895 and 1914. Established under the administrative structure of the Russian Embassy in Istanbul, the institute occupied a place at the intersection of science and politics. Focusing nearly exclusively on Byzantine and Slavic antiquities in the Ottoman Empire, the activities of the institute reflected the imperial identity of Russia at the turn of the century. As was explicitly expressed by Russian diplomats, bureaucrats and scholars, the establishment of an archaeological institution in the Ottoman capital was regarded as a foreign-policy tool to extend Russia’s influence in the Near East, a tool of ‘soft power’ in modern parlance. At the time of its existence, RAIK contributed significantly to the development of Byzantinology with its numerous excavations and publications. Russian archaeologists had to close down their office with the outbreak of the First World War. The complications that arose with the disintegration of the institute were solved only in the late 1920s between the Soviet Union and Republican Turkey, under completely different political circumstances. The relationship between ancient monuments, archaeological practice and politics attracted the attention of scholars of history and archaeology in recent years. The subject was covered from a variety of perspectives: scholars questioned how archaeological knowledge was used in the nation-building process in different parts of the world from Southeast Asia to Western Europe, or how knowledge production influenced centre–periphery relations in colonial settings. The development of archaeology in the Ottoman Empire, both as a local Ottoman practice and in terms of foreign archaeological activities on Ottoman territories also received considerable attention. Although there has been a great deal of interest in the political aspects of the archaeological activities by British, French and other Western European nations in the Near East, Russian archaeological activities did not receive the same level of interest. The archaeological activities of RAIK defy easy categorization: Russian scholarly institutions in the Ottoman Empire cannot be characterized as colonial, as Russia was not a colonial power in this region and the Ottoman Empire, at least theoretically, was an empire of equal status. It cannot be categorized as strictly nationalist, as the focus of its interest went beyond Russia’s ‘national’ borders. Russian archaeological activities in the Ottoman Empire gives insight into the relationship between these two empires, as well as Russian Empire’s aspired place in international politics. When talking about foreign archaeologists in the Ottoman Empire, scholars generally draw a line between European archaeologists who had higher scholarly qualifications and local Ottoman bureaucrats who tried to counter European imperialist discourse by claiming antiquities for the Ottoman state. The unequal political relationship between great powers of Europe and the Ottoman Empire was reflected in the sphere of archaeology, as well. In this dichotomy, it is the European scholars that set the agenda and determine the parameters of scholarship, and Ottomans merely follow them with a desire to prove their equal status. Russian archaeologists were different from their ‘more’ Western counterparts, and the diplomacy of archaeology between Russia and the Ottoman Empire was distinctive for a number of reasons. As two latecomers to modernization and Europeanization, scholars, bureaucrats and diplomats of both empires regarded such practices as archaeology as an entry ticket to Western civilization. The act of engaging in scholarly activities was regarded as a sign of being a part of the ‘civilized’ nations. On the other hand, by emphasizing Byzantine, Slavic and Orthodox cultural heritage, Russian archaeological activities in the Ottoman Empire reaffirmed distinct characteristics of Russian imperial identity, and were also closely linked to its foreign-policy priorities. In his article on the political aspects of archaeology in the 19th century, Bruce Trigger identified three main currents: nationalist, imperialist and colonialist. Nationalist archaeology was employed by the young nationstates in search of ancient ancestors for their newly created regimes. Trigger associated imperialist archaeology with a small number of states that exerted political, economic and cultural influence over large areas of the world.17 Finally, colonial archaeology was identified with the archaeological activities of – mostly – European archaeologists in the colonial domains of their empires. Nevertheless, none of these categories seem to explain Russian or Ottoman archaeological activities with justice. Actually, the literature on the political aspects of archaeology generally focuses on either colonial archaeology, as was practiced by European archaeologists in European colonial possessions, or nationalist archaeology, as was practiced by native archaeologists in sovereign nation-states in an attempt to legitimize the nation-state rhetoric. However, Russia and the Ottoman Empire, as two cosmopolitan, traditional empires of the pre-First World War period, do not fit in these categories. Russian archaeological activities in the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman reactions to them rather reflect their imperial identities, and how the political programs and imperial visions of the Ottoman Empire and Russia came into conflict with each other. An ancient site, a monument and an object of archaeological interest may have multiple histories and multiple meanings, depending on the position of the interpreter. An ancient monument is not only a reminder of a bygone past, but it is also a medium for the (re)construction and (re)making of identity through a particular interpretation of history. After all, remembering and interpreting the history of an ancient monument in a specific way, while ignoring other possible readings, is a political choice. Multiple actors with opposed world views may promote their conflicting interests through the symbolism of historical monuments. In other words, the competition over antiquities may be correlated with political competition between different groups. In his seminal book Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson observed that along with maps and censuses, archaeology has also been an important ‘institution of power’ that reflected the way in which colonial states imagined the history of their colonial possessions.18 Archaeological activities and the establishment of national museums helped visualize and classify history into strictly delineated national, geographic and demographic units. Ancient monuments proved to be visible links between particular cultures and lands, stretching from immemorial past to present, providing legitimacy for existing states to rule over territories once inhabited by their assumed predecessors.19 Anderson’s study brought up questions about the spatial dimension of history, and in recent years this particular dimension has been scrutinized with reference to imperial Russian history, as well.20 It should be noted that this study does not intend to question the scientific legitimacy of archaeology or put forward epistemological questions about whether archaeological data can or cannot provide objective knowledge. The recreation of the past through archaeological or historical scholarship is not entirely a mental construction but requires data; therefore, even when their analyses is coloured by particular social and political concerns, the scholarship is justifiable as long as it helps us understand the past.21 Nevertheless, as Trigger pointed out, ideologies influence the questions archaeologists ask or refrain from asking.22 This study is concerned with questions that Russian archaeologists preferred to ask, the motivations that prompted Russian imperial government to support and fund certain archaeological projects and the symbolic meaning of ancient history in the diplomatic relations between states. As will be discussed in the following chapters, the relationship between RAIK staff and Russian diplomatic representatives in the Ottoman Empire had a close-knit nature, which implied a convergence of interests between the two groups. The political relevance of archaeological projects were often emphasized both by Russian diplomats and archaeologists who encouraged the establishment of the institute. Of course, not only Russian but also French, British and German scientific communities in the Ottoman Empire were supported by their respective governments and diplomats, since it was easier to secure research permits in a foreign country through diplomatic channels than it was for individual scholars. However, in an autocratic regime like Russia, where the individual autonomy and freedom of scholars were constrained by state authority, scientific projects that diplomats preferred to support indicated the priorities of imperial foreign policy. RAIK’s projects reflected Russian imperial identity and underlying ideological tenets of Russian foreign policy at the turn of the century. At the same time, the shortcomings and failures of RAIK shed light on the limits of Russia’s political influence abroad. RAIK came into existence at a time when there was increasing international political competition over the Balkans and the rest of the Ottoman territories. There was pressure both from above and from below: on the one hand, nationalist movements swept through Ottoman territories. On the other hand, European powers worked hard to preserve the international status quo in the face of Ottoman decline. Russia’s inevitable rivalry with European powers, and the necessity to catch up with them in every sphere, including science, appeared frequently as a theme in the discourse of Russian archaeologists and diplomats. In the late 19th century, overseas archaeological institutes were the visual expressions of the political influence of European empires over a given region. The people who supported the establishment of RAIK argued that if other European empires invested in archaeology, then Russia should follow the same path. Archaeological scholarship was regarded as a sign of prestige and civilization, and a tool for extending political influence at the same time. Selim Deringil defines Ottoman and Russian imperial identity in the 19th century with the term ‘borrowed imperialism’. He argues that Ottoman and Russian elites adopted European colonial discourse as regards the periphery of their respective Empires in their attempt to survive in a world where rules were made by the industrial empires of Western Europe.23 For both Russia and the Ottoman Empire, embracing the imperialist rhetoric borrowed from Europe was a way of establishing their precarious status as ‘European’. This imperial self-perception was reflected in the way Russia and the Ottoman Empire responded to the archaeological rivalry among imperial powers in the 19th century. Since archaeological discoveries became a marker of national and imperial prestige, promoting archaeological excavations and exhibiting the findings in their imperial museums were essential for Russians and the Ottomans. In addition to highlighting Russian imperial identity, RAIK’s contacts with the Ottoman Empire and Balkan nations give insight about the political agendas of these governments and Russia’s relationship with them. Neither the Ottoman Empire nor Balkan states were merely passive actors in this process. The development of legal frameworks to monitor foreign archaeologists and sensitivity about ownership rights over ancient objects imply that monuments were regarded as symbols of sovereignty by the countries that hosted antiquities. Particularly for the Ottoman Empire, archaeology was a means of asserting its place among European empires. By sponsoring archaeological studies of its own and compelling foreign archaeologists to obey certain regulations, the Ottoman government was in fact indicating that it was on an equal footing with Europeans. As two multi-ethnic and multireligious empires, the ‘diplomacy of archaeology’ between the Russian and Ottoman Empires defy easy categorizations such as nationalist, imperialist or colonialist archaeology; rather require a multifaceted analysis. This study is based on official correspondence between RAIK and Russian diplomats, various ministries, government bodies, and the Ottoman government, as well as personal letters of RAIK members, especially those belonging to the director of the institute, Fyodor Ivanovich Uspenskii (1845– 1928). Reports submitted to the Ministry of Public Education, excavation and expedition reports also constitute an important source-base for the study. These materials were gathered mainly from the St Petersburg branch of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences (PFA RAN), Russian State Historical Archives (RGIA) in Russia, Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives (BOA) in Turkey, and from the Bulletin of the Russian Archaeological Institute in Constantinople (IRAIK).24 The holdings at the Ottoman Archives included correspondence between the Russian Embassy and the Ottoman government offices, most notably Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Education. The Ottoman Imperial Museum was bureaucratically under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, therefore archival documents about the Imperial Museum are located under the Ministry of Education files. In this book, there are several references to the documents of the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of Education (Maarif Mektubî Kalemi, MF. MKT.). The activities of Russian archaeologists were overseen by local officials appointed by the Ministry of the Interior, in addition to the Ottoman Imperial Museum. The documents of various Ministry of the Interior offices are categorized into subgroups under the files of the Dâhiliye Nezâreti (The subgroups used in this study include DH. HMŞ., DH. İD., DH. MKT., DH. EUM. MTK.). Because of RAIK’s diplomatic links, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an active participant in the dialogue between Russian archaeologists and the Ottoman government. The references to the documents of the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Hariciye Mektubî Kalemi, HR. MKT.) highlight the exchange between Russian archaeologists and the Ministry. The decrees sanctioned by the Sultan are referred to as İrade, and the documents cited as İ. HUS., İ. MMS., İ. MSM., İ. ŞD., İ. TAL represent the sultans’ irades. Under the Hamidian regime, there was an extensive network of government officials and spies reporting every incident across the Ottoman Empire directly to the Sultan himself. The documents collected at the personal palace of Abdülhamid II are accessible under the title Yıldız Evrâkı. The archival documents cited as Y. A. HUS., Y. PRK. ASK. and Y. PRK. BŞK. are parts of this file. Finally, the documents from the office of the Grand Vizier (Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi, A. MKT.) and documents from the Archive of the Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Âli Evrak Odası, BEO) are widely used in this research. With regard to the archives in Russia, the bulk of materials concerning the history of RAIK is located at the St Petersburg Branch of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences (PFA RAN).25 This archive hosts the diplomatic correspondence between RAIK and the Russian Embassy in Istanbul and various Russian consulates across the Ottoman Empire, yearly reports of RAIK submitted to the Ministry of Public Education, personal papers of archaeologists affiliated with the Institute, and visual materials. Specifically, I looked into three fonds: 26 Fond no. 116 holds documents pertaining to the director of RAIK, Fyodor Ivanovich Uspenskii. Uspenskii’s correspondence with diplomats, bureaucrats, Russian and foreign archaeologists, as well as his personal notes can be found within this fond. Fond no. 127 is entitled ‘Russian Archaeological Institute in Constantinople’ and holds documents about the establishment of the Institute, its bureaucratic structure, personnel profile, scientific expeditions and the final dissolution. This fond also deals with relations of Russian archaeologists with the Ottoman government. The last fond I investigated at PFA RAN is fond no. 169, which holds materials about RAIK’s Trabzon27 expedition in 1916–17. One of the most politically interesting expeditions of the Institute, the Trabzon expedition coincided with Russian occupation of the city, and gives insight into Russian military and political presence in occupied Ottoman towns during the First World War. The second most important archive that holds materials on RAIK is Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA). At RGIA, I looked into files dealing specifically with the Russian Archaeological Institute, which were located under fond no. 757. Due to RAIK’s official links to the Russian Embassy in Istanbul, Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI) also holds documents concerning the Institute, although at a smaller scale compared to PFA RAN and RGIA.28 The duration of this research coincided with the closure of AVPRI. Luckily, the documents at PFA RAN and RGIA, both in terms of their quantity and in terms of the value of information they provided, were sufficient to examine the political and bureaucratic context in which RAIK was established and operated. In addition to these archival sources, I also made use of published primary sources. Without doubt, the most important published source about RAIK was the annual publication of the Institute. From 1896 to 1912 RAIK published an annual journal, Izvestiia Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Instituta v Konstantinopole (Bulletin of the Russian Archaeological Institute in Constantinople) in a total of sixteen volumes. Except for the first two volumes, Izvestiia was published in Sofia. In addition to academic articles, Izvestiia included yearly reports outlining RAIK’s scientific activities, communication with Russian and Ottoman government offices, and budgetary questions. Academic articles in the Izvestiia incorporated detailed archaeological information, but also provided interesting observations about local customs, topography and political situation in the expedition area. The entire collection of the Izvestiia was available at the Library of the Istanbul Archaeological Museum – once known as the Ottoman Imperial Museum.
Individual archaeologists affiliated with RAIK also produced academic works based on their research in Ottoman territories. Among the most important of them, we can count Uspenskii’s magnum opus Istoriia Vizantiiskoi Imperii (History of the Byzantine Empire), which was published in 1913 in three volumes, and his Ocherki iz Istorii Trapezuntskoy Imperii (Essays on the History of the Trebizond Empire), which was published posthumously. Russian academic journals, most importantly Vizantiiskii Vremennik (Byzantine Chronicle) and Izvestiia Akademii Nauk (Academy of Sciences Gazette) contain articles relevant to my project. I had the chance to find these sources in the Library of the Academy of Sciences (BAN) in St Petersburg. In the 20th century, many city and town names in Asia Minor and the Balkans were changed by the newly established nation-states. Throughout the book, place names are indicated as they were officially used in the time period under examination. For instance, Manastır is preferred instead of Bitola, or Üsküp instead of Skopje. Selânik, the official name of the vilâyet, is preferred instead of the often-used version Salonica. The full name of RAIK included the word Constantinople, and I maintained the exact translation when referring to the Institute. I also referred to the Orthodox Patriarchate in the city as ‘Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople’, as this is the official title of the institution in question. As for the city itself, I used Constantinople for pre-Ottoman and Istanbul for the Ottoman times. Similarly, I preferred Trebizond for pre-Ottoman and Trabzon for Ottoman era. The contemporary names of cities and towns are given in brackets when they are first mentioned in the text. As for the transliteration of Russian words, the rules set out by the Library of Congress are followed. All the translations from Russian to English belong to myself. Since RAIK focused primarily on Byzantine history and archaeology, this book will give special importance to the political aspect of Byzantine studies. Both the Russian and the Ottoman Empires had historical and cultural connections to the Byzantine Empire, although in different ways. Chapter 1 will touch upon the development of academic archaeology and Byzantinology in the Russian Empire. The special place of Byzantinology within Russian historical/archaeological scholarship, and more broadly, the image of Byzantium in Russian thought both at ideological and academic levels will be outlined, because the establishment of RAIK can be more clearly understood as an outcome of these scholarly developments. Chapter 2 will explain the development of Ottoman archaeology in the face of increasing foreign activities across the Empire and how ancient objects acquired a symbolic meaning in diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and European powers. The importance attributed to ancient objects in the late 19th century will be analysed within the context of Ottoman modernization. Ottoman perceptions of foreign archaeologists and major foreign archaeological expeditions which prompted a change in Ottoman policies will also be examined. The establishment of the Ottoman Imperial Museum and the antiquities regulations of 1869, 1874, 1884 and 1906 will be explained in detail. The aim of the chapter is to understand Ottoman appreciation of ancient history, and its implications for Ottoman selfperception at the turn of the century. The development of archaeology in the Ottoman Empire is important to understand as the context in which RAIK was established and operated. Finally, this chapter will deal with the interactions between RAIK and Ottoman officials and how Russian archaeologists were perceived by the Ottoman bureaucracy. This chapter will also deal with Ottoman appreciation of Byzantine monuments and Byzantine history. Chapter 3 will explain the establishment of RAIK and its sister organization, Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society (hereafter as IPPO). Diplomatic and academic efforts for the establishment of an archaeological institute, alternative projects and the ideas behind RAIK will be examined in detail based on the official exchange of letters between various government offices of the Russian Empire. The bureaucrats and diplomats who supported RAIK’s establishment and their justifications will be outlined. Most importantly, the positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public Education, Holy Synod, and the Tsar himself will be explained. Finally, the bureaucratic structure of RAIK, its links to the Russian Embassy in Istanbul and the Russian government will be described. The aim of this chapter is to understand the underlying reasons for the establishment of an overseas Russian archaeological institute. Did the RAIK project reflect the mindset of only a handful of individuals responsible for its creation, or did it indicate the ideological orientation of the Russian government in general? This question will be kept in mind while explaining RAIK’s official links to the Russian government. Chapter 4 will continue with the scholarly activities of RAIK. The focus of RAIK’s scholarly interests, its studies on Byzantine and ancient Slavic history will be analysed, keeping in mind the political dimension of Russia’s interest in Byzantine and Slavic archaeology. The scientific expeditions of the institute, with a specific focus on expeditions to Bulgaria, the Black Sea littoral, Macedonia, and Istanbul will be explained. There will be discussion about the interactions between RAIK and the Ottoman government, Ottoman perceptions of Russian archaeologists, international political background, and Russian archaeologists’ opinions on contemporary political developments.
Chapter 5 takes on from where the previous chapter left off, and continues with RAIK’s archaeological studies in the Balkans right before the Balkan Wars. The archaeological activities will be explained in reference to the international political developments of the period. Special attention will be devoted to the Slavic Department established within RAIK in 1911, and what the Department meant for RAIK’s mission in the Balkans. The sixth and last chapter will highlight the fate of RAIK after 1914, and briefly explain the outcomes of the First World War. RAIK’s last archaeological expedition, the Trabzon expedition in 1916–17 will be analysed in this chapter. Diplomatic complications, which emerged as a result of RAIK’s sudden evacuation of Istanbul were solved in 1929 by an agreement between the two new regimes in both countries, Republican Turkey and the Soviet Union. The developments between 1914 and 1929, and Byzantinology’s fall from favour in the Soviet period will be explained in this chapter. The changing attitudes towards Byzantinology from the Russian Empire to the USSR implies that the activities of RAIK reflected Russian imperial identity, an identity that was deemed out of fashion in the Soviet period.
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