Download PDF | Christine Isom-Verhaaren - The Sultan’s Fleet_ Seafarers of the Ottoman Empire-I.B. Tauris (2022).
297 Pages
Introduction
Turks, Byzantines, and Latins: Competing for Maritime Prizes The Ottoman navy provided an essential component in facilitating Ottoman expansion from the reign of Orhan in the fourteenth through the early eighteenth centuries. Nothing concerning naval forces is known from the period of Osman; however, for every succeeding Ottoman ruler, the status of their fleet impacted all their other activities, especially including expansion by their territorial forces. This being the case, it is remarkable that most general histories of the Ottoman Empire devote little attention to naval affairs and then usually as a brief passing mention. A paucity of sources for the earliest period is a possible explanation, but that has not deterred historians from writing about land-based military expansion during all periods.
The few historical surveys of Ottoman naval forces that have been written by Ottoman historians omit the fourteenth century and ignore the Ottoman’s Turkish rivals who excelled in seafaring before the Ottomans expanded navally.1 However, it is essential to begin with the fourteenth century if the full transition from Byzantine and Latin political rule of maritime locations to Ottoman rule is to be studied in its entirety. This history is an account of Turkish naval expansion, which eliminated the political control of maritime territories by both Byzantines and Latins in the region of the Aegean Sea and the straits that lead to the Black Sea. There were many battles fought on a variety of ships; however, the focus of this account is to study the accomplishments and challenges of the men who brought about Ottoman naval expansion and their relations with the sultan and his elite administrators.
The geographical setting of this expansion is also a theme, as the desirability of these locations has led to conflict over the centuries. The sultans’ fleets were an integral component to Ottoman expansion during the first four centuries of the empire’s existence. Turks arrived in Anatolia after the battle of Manzikert in 1071 soon expanding to the west until their leaders established their capital at Iznik (Nicea) on the doorstep of the Byzantine fabled capital, Istanbul (Constantinople). Their impact was great, leading to this region eventually becoming Turkish speaking and ruled by a Turkish dynasty, the Seljuks of Rum. The Byzantine emperor begged assistance from his Christian coreligionists in the west under the Pope of Rome to remove the Turks from his vicinity and requested some mercenary soldiers to enter his service to defeat them. Instead this proposal led to the crusades, bringing Latins (Roman Catholics from Europe) in greater numbers into his domains.
The Turks became a permanent fixture in Anatolia and the Latins eventually conquered Constantinople in 1204 during the Fourth Crusade and established a Latin Empire there, and their Byzantine rivals retreated to Iznik. In 1261, the Byzantines regained Constantinople putting an end to the Latin Empire, but not to the many Latin lordships in the Balkans, Anatolia, and on Aegean islands. In the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, the descendants of the original Turks who had spread throughout Anatolia made little headway in establishing a presence in coastal cities of the Aegean, Black, or Mediterranean Seas. However, during the period that the Byzantines regained Constantinople new waves of Turkish migration swept across Anatolia and these Turkish beys (lords) founded petty states (beyliks) throughout Anatolia, including in maritime regions. These Turks began to challenge Byzantines and Latins for control of the surrounding seas. This book traces the contest between Turks, Byzantines, and Latins for rule of maritime lands and seas that eventually became core territories and seas of the Ottoman Empire (see Table 1). For unlike the previous Turkish rulers of Anatolia, most notably the Seljuks, the Ottoman sultans considered themselves rulers of lands and seas: Mehmed II (d. 1481) after he became known as the Conqueror because he had conquered Istanbul claimed to rule the two lands and the two seas: Anatolia and the Balkans and the Aegean and the Black Seas. This conquest demanded naval power to secure because without at least partial control of the Aegean and Black Seas his prize would always be endangered. Thus, whenever Ottoman naval power weakened over the centuries the security of Istanbul was threatened. This contest for control of especially the Aegean is seen through the exploits of the many Turkish, then solely Ottoman seafarers who served Ottoman sultans in the process of transforming these valuable maritime locations into possessions of the Ottoman dynasty. The Turkish Straits, as they are officially known, consist of the Dardanelles to the South, and the Bosporus to the north, which the city of Istanbul straddles today. The book traces the exploits of the seafarers during the middle centuries of Turkish naval expansion, from approximately 1300, when several Turkish beyliks were established on the Aegean coast, until 1718 when the Ottomans defeated Venice in a final war between them and regained key Ottoman maritime territories. The contest is viewed primarily through narrative sources produced by Ottoman authors who celebrated the victories and mourned the defeats of Turkish seafarers. Ottoman naval encounters with their competitors have given rise to sources written by authors sympathetic to the Ottomans and those who favored their opponents and each type of source has its strength and weaknesses depending on the interests of the historian. Byzantine and Latin sources are valuable, but they only present the nonTurkish, then non-Ottoman, perspective on the naval conflicts described in this book. These sources are often of crucial importance in delineating events, but they frequently obscure an Ottoman understanding of the conflict. Sometimes sources produced by outsiders include factual errors, such as claiming that Mezemorta led the Ottoman fleet in the Mediterranean in 1690, when in fact he was leading naval forces on the Danube that year. Of greater significance, because they are more difficult to counter, are biased views of the motivations of Ottoman seafarers. For example, during the Morean War, each side claimed that the other fled from battles and was unwilling to fight. Sources written from the perspective of Ottoman participants might explain why they fought in some instances and not in others, without it appearing that they were inherently cowardly rather than making rational decisions based on their ability to defeat the enemy in a given encounter. Reasonable caution by one’s own forces can be portrayed as cowardice in an enemy; however, such judgments should be questioned. There were instances of Ottoman cowardice, but they should not be confused with occasions of reasonable choices to retreat until a more favorable opportunity to defeat the enemy presented itself. Thus, understanding the motivations of the Ottoman actors to the extent possible requires favoring Ottoman sources.
Organization of the Book Chapter 1 highlights the accomplishments of Umur of Aydın (d. 1348), a seafarer from a rival Turkish beylik, who sailed forth from Izmir (Smyrna) to challenge Byzantines and Latins for control of the surrounding seas. Umur was the greatest gazi (warrior of the faith) that the Turks of Anatolia produced in the first half of the fourteenth century. He began his career by conquering a key location, the fortress of the harbor at Izmir, recruited a ship builder who was also an expert in naval warfare, and began his first attack on a galleon near the straits. The ship ultimately escaped, but he discovered his vocation, naval warfare, and proceeded to increase the size of his fleet and the scope of his conquests. Eventually, he became such a thorn in the side of Venice that the leaders of the city incited a crusade against him in 1344, which succeeded in conquering the harbor fortress of Izmir. Umur died attempting to regain this fortress, which controlled the harbor of Izmir, without which his days as a sea gazi were essentially over. Umur was the hero of an account written by one Hoca Selman, which was incorporated into the Ottoman author Enveri’s fifteenth-century epic. Somewhat later, the Ottoman historian Oruç during the reign of Bayezid II (d. 1512) included Sufi-inspired episodes linking Umur to Süleyman Pasha, the son of the Ottoman ruler Orhan (r. 1326?–62). Both Umur and Süleyman son of Orhan died relatively young after expanding the lands ruled by Turks in the fourteenth century, by sea and by land. Chapter 2 reviews the accomplishments of many individuals none of whom reached the stature of Umur Bey in terms of exploits against Latins and Byzantines. The chapter considers the centrality of Gallipoli, a fortress town on the Dardanelles already important under the Byzantines as a naval base. The Ottomans gained control of this location in 1354, during the reign of Orhan after an earthquake destroyed its defenses and they occupied it without opposition from the inhabitants who fled. This port became the Ottoman base for controlling the straits and for expanding across them into the Balkans. Until the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Gallipoli was the most important crossing for Ottoman forces moving from Anatolia to the Balkans. The Ottomans began to incorporate their Turkish neighbors’ territories into their own lands, beginning with Karası, which had an ideal location controlling the southern shore of the Dardanelles. Bayezid I (d. 1403) annexed the beyliks of Menteşe, Aydın, and Saruhan with their access to the Aegean Sea. During this period, the Ottomans endured succession crises and Gallipoli played a role in Ottoman princes’ battles for sovereignty. The Ottomans attracted two major crusades against their expanding power, the crusade of Nicopolis in 1396 and the crusade of Varna in 1444, as well as the minor crusade of Amadeo of Savoy in 1366. Amadeo briefly returned Gallipoli to Byzantine control, while the crusades of Nicopolis and Varna resulted in resounding Ottoman victories by their land armies. However, during the crusade of Varna, the transporting of Murad II (d. 1451) and his Ottoman troops across the Bosporus on Genoese ships was key to Ottoman victory.
Chapter 3 recounts the naval accomplishments of the Ottomans during the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror. The conquest of Constantinople in 1453 would have been impossible without the effective use of naval forces during the siege. Although the Byzantine Empire came to an end with the conquest, the Venetians had designs on the city and their rivalry with the Ottomans for key bases continued throughout the reign of Mehmed II. Moreover, Mehmed did not rest on his laurels after this amazing feat; he proceeded to conquer maritime districts to secure his victory. Mehmed demanded success from his admirals and, if they did not deliver, they were demoted or executed. During his reign he established Ottoman rule on several Aegean islands, including Lesbos, Lemnos, Bozcaada (Tenedos), Gökçeada (Imroz, Imbros), and Eğriboz (Negroponte), and along the coasts of the Black Sea. He attempted to conquer Rhodes and to establish a base in southern Italy at Otranto. His naval vision was most clearly recounted in the writings of Kritovoulos of Imbros, who keenly appreciated Mehmed’s naval accomplishments. Chapter 4 pivots to the naval accomplishments of a pair of seafarers whose family originated in the rival beylik of Karaman, Kemal Reis and his nephew Piri Reis. Kemal fought in the Eğriboz campaign of 1470; however, he spent much of his career as a freelance corsair sailing to the western reaches of the Mediterranean as well as becoming a thorn in the side of Venice in the east. With the rise in power of the Habsburgs of Spain, Muslim territories in North Africa were threatened and welcomed gazis from the Ottoman lands. Eventually Kemal and Piri were recruited by Bayezid II (d. 1512) into his service and Kemal became an adviser to the sultan on naval matters earning the enmity of the sultan’s elite associates. Kemal died while in Bayezid’s service in 1510, and Piri became more notable as a cartographer than as a seafarer. He attempted to earn the sultan’s favor in 1513 with a world map that he presented to Selim I (d. 1520) in Egypt after he conquered the Mamluks. When Süleyman (d. 1566) became sultan, Piri Reis attempted to earn his favor with another world map and with a portolan, a written guide to the Mediterranean Sea accompanied by many small-scale maps. His accomplishments were many but failed to win him the recognition he desired. He recorded his uncle’s exploits and his own in his Book of the Sea, which, beyond recording the location of dangerous shoals, also recorded the changing status of many lands along the Mediterranean both east and west. This work provides a snapshot of Ottoman expansion up to the early years of Süleyman. Chapter 5 recounts the exploits of the greatest Ottoman seafarer of them all, Hayreddin Pasha known in the west as Barbarossa. He originated from a mixed marriage on the island of Lesbos, but he fled to North Africa, where he gained control of Algiers. He was recruited by Süleyman, in the midst of his naval rivalry with Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and king of Spain. Hayreddin deserved the sultan’s favor as he defeated his rivals at the battle of Preveza in 1538, including both the fleets of Venice and of Andrea Doria of Genoa. Hayreddin conquered additional islands in the Aegean, including Andros, and was given a province created for him, that of the islands, meaning the islands of the Aegean. His impact was great and through his clients, such as Turgud Reis’ influence, Ottoman naval prowess was exerted through most of the remaining years of the sixteenth century. When his clients were excluded in favor of palace favorites, Ottoman naval power suffered leading to a major defeat at Lepanto in 1571 under Müezzinzade Ali Pasha during the reign of Selim II (d. 1574) after the conquest of Cyprus from Venice. Hayreddin’s exploits were reported in a Gazavat-ı Hayreddin Paşa (History of the Holy Wars of Hayreddin Pasha) consulted by the historian Katib Çelebi in his naval history. Chapter 6 reviews the adventures of three admirals of Italian heritage: Kılıç Ali of Calabria, the survivor of Lepanto, his client Uluç Hasan of Venice, and an admiral of Genoese heritage Cigalazade Sinan Pasha. Kılıç Ali had been a client of Hayreddin’s client Turgud Reis. Kılıç Ali was talented and led the fleet after Lepanto and at the conquest of Tunis in 1574 completing the Ottoman waterfront from Algiers in the west around the eastern Mediterranean to the Adriatic Sea. He is given favorable treatment in the naval history of Katib Çelebi, who barely mentions Uluç Hasan. Katib Çelebi praised Cigalazade, whose background he briefly mentioned, since his father was a Genoese corsair, while his mother was the daughter of the dizdar (castle warden) of Herceg Novi and thus an Ottoman woman. After his capture, Cigalazade combined an elite education at the palace school at Topkapı with a corsair background through his father and served as admiral twice. Although he had no notable victories leading to the conquest of new territories, Katib Çelebi considered him to have been a competent admiral. The inclusive nature of Ottoman recruitment is exemplified by the careers of these admirals. Chapter 7 focuses on the seventeenth century, especially the period of the war against Venice to conquer Crete, the final major outpost of Venice in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Many admirals had brief stints in this position, and few of them were naval experts. A few naval specialists encountered elite opposition when they failed to pay the expected amount to obtain their position. Hüsambeyzade Ali Pasha’s accomplishments during the war to conquer Crete are recorded by Katib Çelebi in his naval history, but his conflicts with the elite are expounded by Mustafa Naima in his history. Ultimately the Ottomans conquered Crete, under the leadership of the Köprülü dynasty of grand viziers, completing their possession of most of the important bases in the eastern Mediterranean. Chapter 8 recounts the Ottoman loss and then regaining of the Mora (Peloponnesus) in two final wars with the Venetians that ensured Ottoman control of the waters of the eastern Mediterranean. The outstanding naval figure during the Morean War was the admiral Mezemorta Hüseyn Pasha, a corsair originating in the Ottoman territories of North Africa who was recruited to the position of admiral in 1695. Mezemorta desired to reform the navy and make it a competently administered organization with key leadership posts filled by men who possessed naval expertise, a dramatic departure from the lackluster performance by palace favorites that characterized most of the seventeenth century. His reforms likely aided the Ottomans to regain the Mora, key for the safety of their capital and of the Aegean. The peace of Passarowitz in 1718 during the reign of Ahmed III (r. 1703–30) restored Ottoman possession of the Mora, key to their control of the core waters of the Empire in the Aegean Sea. Several Ottoman historians, especially Silahdar Findiklili Mehmed Ağa, provide evidence confirming Ottoman naval exploits during these final wars with Venice.
Place Names
Many of the places that are significant in this book have at least three names, Turkish, Greek, and Italian. If there is a well-known English version of a name, I have preferred that; otherwise, I privilege the Turkish names while also providing the Greek and/or Italian name of the place when it is first introduced in the text. The Ottoman capital after 1453, Istanbul, is referred to using this name throughout the book, except for in primary source quotations. This city was referred to as Istanbul in a fifteenthcentury Ottoman epic that incorporated a fourteenth-century Turkish text. Clearly, among some Turks and Byzantines the name Istanbul was in common usage at the beginning of the period studied here. The Ottomans used several names for this city, but the simplest for our purpose here is Istanbul. Also using the name Istanbul reflects the view from the seafarer periphery rather than the administrative center that often referred to the capital as Kostantiniyye, for example, on coins, or Ku(n)stantiniyya on some Ottoman documents.
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