Download PDF | Zoe Knox - Russian Society and the Orthodox Church_ Religion in Russia after Communism-Routledge (2004).

Download PDF | Zoe Knox - Russian Society and the Orthodox Church_ Religion in Russia after Communism-Routledge (2004).

270 Pages 

This book examines the Russian Orthodox Church’s social and political role and its relationship to civil society in postcommunist Russia. It shows how Orthodox prelates, clergy and laity have shaped Russians’ attitudes towards religious and ideological pluralism, which in turn have influenced the ways in which Russians understand civil society, including those ofits features – pluralism and freedom of conscience – that are essential for a functioning democracy. It demonstrates how the non-official church, including nonconformist clergy and lay activists, has contributed to the construction of civil society, while the governing body ofthe Church, the Moscow Patriarchate, has at times impeded the development ofcivil society. 

These opposing contributions to the country’s postcommunist trajectory point to the myriad influences of Russian Orthodoxy on modern Russia. Zoe Knox completed this book whilst a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Centre for European Studies at Monash University, Melbourne. She is currently a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Center for the Study of Cultures at Rice University, USA. Her research interests include Russian Orthodoxy and democracy; the Orthodox Church and Russian national identity; religion and post-Soviet nationalism; and religion and national identity in postcommunist states.

Acknowledgements

I have incurred many debts during the journey from this study’s conception to its publication. This book is a revised and updated version ofmy doctoral dissertation, which was undertaken in the Centre for European Studies at Monash University. I am grateful for the counsel and support of my main supervisor, Pete Lentini, and ofmy associate supervisor, Marko Pavlyshyn. Pete offered thoughtful and thorough feedback at each stage of my research. Marko provided invaluable guidance; his patience and encouragement are especially valued. My PhD thesis was prepared for publication during my period as a PostDoctoral Fellow in the School ofLanguages, Cultures and Linguistics at Monash University, so I owe thanks to that institution for the financial support which allowed the initial research as well as the revision required for publication as a monograph. 

The resources held at the Contemporary Europe Research Centre at the University of Melbourne were invaluable for my research. I am indebted to members ofthe scholarly community in Russian and Ukrainian studies in Melbourne. I have enjoyed conversations with Stefan Auer, Leslie Holmes, Anthony Phillips, Valentyna Shapiro, Robert Horvath and Cezary Milosinski. Peter Sowden at RoutledgeCurzon and Barbara Duke at Taylor & Francis Books provided guidance during the final stages ofpreparation. The usual caveat applies: any mistakes or oversights are exclusively my own. I met many scholars during research trips who shared my interest in religion and democracy and inspired me to interrogate the role ofreligion in democratising Russia, and so continue with my research when I was daunted by the complexity ofthe topic. I owe thanks to the academics, librarians and specialists – too many to name here, although I do hope they will know who they are – who encouraged my research in Europe, Australia and the USA. An earlier version ofChapter 4 appeared as ‘The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate's Post-Soviet Leadership’ in Europe–Asia Studies, 55, no. 4 (2003), pp. 575–96 

 I am grateful to Taylor & Francis for allowing me to reproduce parts ofthat article here. Acknowledgements Susan Venz and Eva Woodrow have maintained a keen interest in my research, which has, in turn, encouraged me to continue when challenged. Anthony Moran and Steven Slaughter have been good colleagues and good friends during the years I worked on this study. This book would quite simply never have been written without the love and support ofmy parents, Elizabeth and Martin Knox, at every stage. My husband, Jason Eyre, has closely followed the preparation of this study for publication and offered encouragement and inspiration during the final stages. For these reasons, this book is dedicated to Elizabeth, Martin and Jason, with sincere thanks.

Introduction

The federal law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations’ of 1997 (‘O svobode sovesti i o religioznykh ob’edineniiakh’) was arguably the most contentious legislation passed in post-Soviet Russia.1 The drafting and revision processes (following President Boris Yeltsin’s rejection of the legislation on the grounds that it was unconstitutional and violated international human rights conventions) demonstrated the irreconcilable differences between, on the one hand, conservatives and nationalists, who sought legislative guarantees for the protection ofthe Russian Orthodox Church,2 and, on the other, liberals and democrats, who sought guarantees offreedom ofconscience for all denominations. 

The legislation threatened the relatively recent formalisation of religious freedom and equality after the demise of Soviet Marxism–Leninism. It also accentuated the fissure between the official Church, represented by the Moscow Patriarchate, the Church’s governing body, and the unofficial Church, represented by nonconformist clergy and lay activists. The great paradox ofRussia’s post-Soviet religious renaissance was the transition ofthe Moscow Patriarchate from a suppressed institution, directed and regulated by an atheist regime, to an institution which directs considerable effort to suppressing other religious bodies by discouraging religious pluralism and enjoying state-sanctioned privileges in a secular country. This contrasted sharply with Church life outside the Patriarchate’s official structures. Orthodoxy as a belief system fostered a movement for the perestroika (restructuring) of Church life in order to make the faith more accessible and relevant to post-Soviet realities. The calls for reform fomented discord between traditionalist prelates, clergy and laity and reformist clergy and laity. 

The new pluralism challenged the Moscow Patriarchate to reclaim its position at the centre ofnational religious life. Orthodoxy’s heritage as Russia’s traditional faith enabled the Church, both as an institution and as an assembly ofbelievers, to garner support from diverse social and political forces. Some of these invoked Orthodoxy to encourage the development and consolidation of civil society, integral to Russia’s democratic project. Others appropriated the national Church to augment antidemocratic platforms and ideologies. The Church’s post-Soviet path was determined by the struggle to appropriate Orthodoxy by these diametrically opposed tendencies. Both ofthese Introduction conflicting currents affected the Church’s stance in the social and political arenas, as well as the religious sphere, and the dynamics within Church structures. The extent ofOrthodoxy’s influence in these three spheres ofcivil society is central to this analysis ofthe Church’s contribution to Russia’s postcommunist development. The Orthodox Church was highly visible in the new Russia. The Church’s resurgence was buoyed by renewed consideration ofRussian identity. Russians have long regarded the Church as the protector ofnational interests and the defender of national traditions. In the uncertain socio-economic conditions ofpost-Soviet Russia, many Russians looked to the Orthodox Church for guidance. Consequently, the Church was frequently invoked in discussions ofnational identity and in deliberations over the country’s future. Orthodoxy’s resurgence encouraged leading political figures to identify the Church as an influential ally. Politicians’ recognition of the utility of appeals to national identity and tradition fortified the Church’s sway. Thus, from the weak position of a faith tolerated by an atheist regime, the Orthodox Church secured an influential and prominent position in postcommunist Russia. Although the Church had rivals in schismatic Orthodox groups, other traditional faiths, and in Western and, to a lesser extent, Asian denominations, the Orthodox Church benefited from the new freedoms more than any other faith. The Moscow Patriarchate reclaimed Orthodoxy’s pre-revolutionary position at the centre ofRussia’s religious life. Indeed, the Patriarchate directed considerable effort toward securing a heightened influence in the pluralist religious sphere. This book examines the tension between the Church’s official and unofficial contributions to civil society in Russia. It is argued that the Church contributes to the emergence ofcivil society in unofficial, or informal, ways. This influence emanates from outside Church structures. Lay activism, for instance, has been central to disseminating ideas about tolerance, religious pluralism and ecumenism and an inclusive notion ofnational identity, while adhering to Orthodox beliefand the rules and practices ofthe Church. Conversely, though the Moscow Patriarchate has the potential to contribute to the development ofRussia’s civil society, in an official, or formal, capacity some ofits activities obstruct the consolidation ofcivil society both in the social and political arenas and in the religious sphere. The Orthodox Church’s heightened influence affects the activities of both traditional and nontraditional denominations operating in the religious domain. The 1997 law On Freedom ofConscience and Religious Associations confirmed the Church’s privileged position. The federal law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations The legislation’s most contentious features are the preamble and the categorisation ofreligious bodies. The preamble is curious for a number of 2 Introduction reasons. First, it ‘affirm[s] the right of each person to freedom of conscience and freedom of religious profession, as well as to equality before the law, irrespective ofreligious affiliation and conviction’. The guarantee of equality before the law is, however, contradicted in later statutes which distinguish between the religious organisation (organizatsiia) and the religious group (gruppa) and accord the two radically different legal rights. (Because ofthis distinction, this study follows the legislation in employing the term ‘association’ [ob’edinenie] as a general term constituting both organisations and groups.) Second, the preamble affirms that Russia is a secular state, but also refers to the ‘special role of Orthodoxy in the history ofRussia and in the establishment and development ofits spirituality and culture’. Third, the recognition of‘Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and other religions, constituting an integral part ofthe historical heritage of the peoples ofRussia’, implies a hierarchy offaiths, with Orthodoxy at the pinnacle, a group offaiths recognised in the preamble on a second tier and the unnamed ‘other religions’ on a lower tier. Finally, the Orthodox Church is the only denomination (as opposed to religion) named in the preamble. The 1997 law categorises religious associations as either organisations or groups. The rights ofreligious groups are restricted to performing services and other religious rites and ceremonies and conducting religious instruction and education oftheir adherents (Art. 7.3). This is in sharp contrast to religious organisations. Organisations are able to establish and maintain buildings (Art. 16.1), conduct services in a range ofpublic and private spaces, such as hospitals and children’s homes (Arts 16.2, 16.3), produce and disseminate religious literature (Art. 17.1), produce religious artefacts and material (Arts 17.2, 17.3), establish charitable and cultural-educational organisations (Art. 18), and invite foreign citizens to engage in professional activities, including preaching (Art. 20). There are many advantages to being classified as a religious organisation. The differences in the legal rights of organisations and groups mean that the former are in a much stronger position to carry out evangelical work than the latter. Eligibility to be classified as an organisation is dependent on bureaucratic record keeping and decision-making. The most controversial prerequisite is that an organisation has to have been registered for fifteen years, since 1982 (Art. 9.1), when Leonid Brezhnev was still party secretary. The Soviet regime’s persecution ofreligious communities and individual believers made registering with authorities a hazardous move for suspect faiths. The regime permitted official bodies a degree of freedom, but only at the expense of a compromised and censored existence, which some religious communities regarded as an unacceptable concession. In the post-Soviet period these communities have retained the status ofa gruppa, which precludes the basic rights enjoyed by an organizatsiia. The logic is that disruptive and dangerous faiths are short-lived and will not survive the fifteen-year ‘trial period’. Only religious associations that acknowledged the legitimacy ofthe Soviet regime are able to enjoy the freedoms conferred by the status of organisation. Introduction 3 Debate about the 1997 law served to reinvigorate polemics about Orthodoxy and democracy, and, by extension, about ecumenism, religious pluralism and Russian national tradition. The polemics can be regarded as a litmus test for Orthodoxy’s potential to contribute to civil society in a pluralist environment. Though the legislation appears to violate the Russian Constitution and Russia’s international human rights agreements, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, it is not the purpose ofthis book to explore the legality or illegality ofthe law. Nevertheless, the legislation is ofprimary importance for the central argument ofthe book, and its implications will therefore be examined in detail. The passage and provisions ofthe law On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations stimulated dispute centred on issues such as the presence offoreign missionaries and the spectre ofProtestant incursion, religious pluralism and Russian culture, the link between the national Church and national identity, Russia’s historical and spiritual destiny, and the relationship between Church and state and its import for Russia’s governance. These issues derive from or have been reinvigorated by debate about the legislation. They polarised prelates, clergy and laity. After the passage ofthe law On Freedom ofConscience and Religious Associations in 1997 the debate did not subside, but rather escalated. Many social and political forces in Russia and in the international community aligned themselves with this legislation’s advocates and adversaries. The law has been arbitrarily applied to discriminate against and to repress religious minorities, particularly in Russia’s regions. The discretionary interpretation ofits provisions is encouraged by inconsistencies between federal and regional religious legislation. Cases of discrimination and repression, especially against denominations with contacts in the West, are often swiftly and widely publicised, within and outside Russia, via electronic mail and links with religious liberty and human rights bodies in the West. The consequences ofthe law have been more apparent at the regional and local levels than at the federal level. Its application has obstructed the activities ofindigenous bodies, particularly Protestant, more than foreign ones. Occasionally violations ofreligious freedom can be attributed to Orthodox priests’ favour with local authorities charged with overseeing religious issues on their territory (see Chapter 6 for further discussion). While the Supreme Court abolished some ofthe law’s provisions, this has not significantly altered its application. The legislation remains a salient topic in Russia. Russian Orthodoxy and post-Soviet polity and society The 1997 law showed how important the Church was seen to be in Russia’s post-Soviet political, social and cultural development. Orthodoxy has long been central to Russian political life. Prince Vladimir’s introduction of 4 Introduction Eastern Orthodoxy to Kievan Rus’ marked the beginning ofan intimate link between Church and state, guided by the Byzantine symphonic ideal ofthe dual rule ofthe ecclesiastical and temporal authorities. The Church remained a significant political force until the reign of Emperor Peter I. His initiatives, notably the abolition ofthe Patriarchate and the creation ofa council oflaypersons in its place, subjugated the Church to the state. The movement for greater Church independence in the early twentieth century was interrupted by the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. There followed a decisive break in the overt linkage ofChurch and state, though this did not bring about the demise ofOrthodoxy’s influence among the population, as the Soviet regime had hoped. The number of self-identified Orthodox believers is testimony to the Church’s preeminent position in Russian national consciousness. In the Soviet period Western researchers could offer little more than educated guesses about the number ofOrthodox adherents. The 1937 Soviet census was the first and last to ask respondents to state their religiia (religion);3 56 per cent ofthe population identified themselves as believers.4 Despite the regime’s closure ofchurches, the execution and imprisonment ofhierarchs and clergy, and the sustained persecution ofits adherents, Orthodoxy retained a significant following. The census return revealed the failure of anti-religious propaganda and policies. Soviet researchers were not able to broach the subject ofreligious belief with the objective analysis ofindependent scholars. Consequently, their estimates ofthe number ofbelievers are oflittle use, except as testimony to the ambitions ofthe atheist regime. Jane Ellis, who wrote the definitive account ofChurch life under communism, claimed in the mid-1980s that, while estimates ofthe number ofbelievers in the USSR by both Western and unofficial Soviet sources usually cited between 30 million and 50 million, the actual number was higher and ‘could number 55–60 million’.5 The degree of Orthodox adherence is highlighted by the fact that, even at 50 million, the number ofbelievers was two and a halftimes the membership ofthe Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union (CPSU), which in January 1990 numbered close to 19 million.6 The number of self-identified Orthodox believers rose sharply in the postSoviet period. The regime’s cessation ofthe repression ofindividual believers and religious communities and the eventual demise ofmaterialist Marxism–Leninism allowed unprecedented religious freedom. Estimates of the number of self-identified Orthodox believers range from 50 million, which amounts to roughly one-third ofthe population, to 70 million, or half ofthe population.7 Muscovites are just as likely to identify themselves as Orthodox as are rural Russians.8 This departs from the stereotype of the rural and uneducated Orthodox believers that was increasingly misrepresentative from the 1970s, when the intelligentsia began to turn to the Church.9 Data on the registration ofOrthodox associations is one indicator ofthe Church’s preeminence in the religious sphere. A large number ofchurches, Introduction 5 seminaries, monasteries, nunneries and educational institutes were established or reopened throughout the 1990s. In 1990 there were 3,451 registered associations ofthe Russian Orthodox Church.10 According to the Ministry ofJustice, by 1 January 1993 this number had risen to 4,566; in 1994 it was 5,559; in 1995 6,414; in 1996 7,195; in 1997 8,002; and by 1 January 1998 the number ofregistered Orthodox associations had reached 8,653, accounting for more than halfofall registered religious associations in the country.11 According to the Moscow Patriarchate, this growth has continued. In 2003 there were 128 dioceses in Russia and abroad (compared to 67 in 1989), 19,000 parishes (6,893 in 1988), and some 480 monasteries (just 18 in 1980).12 The Church has a strong presence outside Russia; there are more parishes in the former Soviet states than in Russia itself– halfofthem in Ukraine13 – and there are parishes as far away as Melbourne, Australia. Though these figures suggest a revival of Church life, levels of church attendance have led some observers to a different conclusion. An influential study ofOrthodox religious life by the sociologist B. V. Dubin, published in late 1996 in Informatsionnyi biulleten’ monitoringa, analysed data from surveys carried out between 1991 and 1996. Dubin reported that 7 per cent of self-identified Orthodox believers attended church once a month or more; 17 per cent from one to several times a year, while 60 per cent replied that they did not attend church services at all.14 A survey carried out in 1999 by the Russian Academy ofSciences and the Academy ofFinland returned almost identical results.15 There is thus a gulfbetween Orthodox self-identification and active worship.16 While this book is not a sociological inquiry,17 it should be noted that, though Orthodox adherence is widespread, active worship is the exception rather than the norm. This analysis ofthe Orthodox Church’s influence on civil society therefore also examines the Church’s influence outside the ecclesiastical realm and in the temporal world ofpolitics and society. Reports on levels oftrust in the Church are a further indicator ofthe Church’s prominence. A survey conducted in 1993 and 1994 demonstrated that Russians trusted the Orthodox Church more than any other public institution, including entities as disparate as the law courts, trade unions, private enterprise, the media, the army and the government.18 This confidence in the Church continued throughout the 1990s. A 1999 survey found that 23 per cent ofrespondents had a ‘great deal’ and 46 per cent a ‘fair amount’ ofconfidence in the Russian Orthodox Church, placing it above all other public institutions.19 The political and social importance ofthe Orthodox Church in postSoviet Russia is not an exceptional phenomenon in the modern world. Religion has been central to the emancipatory movements ofLiberation Theology, which emanated from Latin America, and of Solidarno¤‰ in communist Poland; to Middle Eastern and United States politics; and to the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Northern Ireland. The traditional churches are ofparticular political significance in postcommunist 6 Introduction Europe. These societies seek to institute religious pluralism after communist rule. The authority ofthe national churches, buoyed by the resurgence of the so-called ‘new nationalisms’, is considerable, and they have an impact on policies toward religious and ethnic minorities and other religious issues. Though the Catholic leadership in communist Poland was an opposition force (unlike the Moscow Patriarchate), it went on to become the preeminent conservative force in postcommunist Poland. In the postcommunist period the Moscow Patriarchate and the Catholic Church’s leadership have sought to curb the spread oftolerance, pluralism and secularism: notions that are central to the concept ofcivil society. Orthodox prelates exerted influence over the political processes in postSoviet Russia. Patriarch Aleksii II was elected to head the Patriarchate at the June 1990 Arkhierei sobor (Bishops’ Council) after the death of the elderly Patriarch Pimen, who had led the Church from 1971.20 The Patriarch and the ecclesiastical ranks below him – Metropolitan, Archbishop, Bishop and Hegumen – comprise the Church leadership. Ofthis hierarchy, the Patriarch and the Metropolitans hold power, and it is the outcome ofdebate among them that produces (or resists) change. The success ofthe Patriarchate’s campaign to implement legislation limiting the activities offoreign missionaries and religious bodies is demonstrative ofOrthodoxy’s leverage on matters that extend beyond its jurisdiction and into that ofpolitical governance. The campaign gained support from nationalist and conservative politicians, from Orthodox believers and from representatives of other major religions, who also felt threatened by the perceived interlopers. The 1997 law not only significantly reduced the legal rights of foreign religious bodies, but restricted most religions and denominations except the Russian Church. The Church’s domestic political significance was also illustrated by a leading newspaper’s regular list ofRussia’s most influential political figures; the Patriarch consistently ranked in the top fifteen.21 A study ofthe 1996 presidential election revealed that the major candidates (Boris Yeltsin, Gennadii Ziuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovskii) perceived the political mileage in presenting themselves as supporters ofthe Church.22 President Vladimir Putin frequently conveyed his piety. The Church’s international significance was demonstrated when, in 1997, Madeleine Allbright, the US Secretary ofState, went directly from Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport to see the Patriarch on a private visit. Given the large number ofOrthodox adherents and the tangible authority ofthe Orthodox Church in the social and political arenas, the Church was poised in the post-Soviet period to reclaim its position at the forefront of national spiritual life. The Church figured prominently in various discussions as the driving force behind Russia’s renewal and recovery. In 1990 Vladimir Poresh, a former prisoner of conscience and Orthodox dissident, wrote ofthe Church’s challenge: ‘Never has so much been expected from it by so many people’.23 It soon became clear that the Introduction 7 Church leadership could not meet these challenges, and there was increasing disaffection with the leadership for not keeping in step with the needs and wishes ofits congregation.24 In many ways the course ofthe Orthodox Church in the post-Soviet period has been one ofstruggle between competing visions ofhow to meet the challenges ofpost-Soviet realities. Western (mis)perceptions of the Russian Orthodox Church Despite the centrality ofreligion to Russia’s post-Soviet development, Western scholars habitually overlook the Orthodox Church’s influence. The Church leadership seeks to instil values and norms in society to create a social and political consensus based on Orthodox doctrines and traditions. In this respect, the Patriarchate’s quest for influence is not especially different from that of other groups seeking to gain power in the new Russia. There are, however, important reasons why the extent ofOrthodoxy’s influence should be ofcentral concern to analyses ofcivil society in postcommunist Russia. Dmitrii Pospelovskii, a distinguished scholar on the Russian Church, is an apologist for the Patriarchate’s weak response to post-Soviet challenges. He excuses the leadership’s lack of‘clarity ofdirection and stability’: As human beings, with typically human faults, they are an inseparable part ofa nation living through a deep crisis ofidentity, searching for the meaning ofits horrible twentieth-century experience and for a new way oflife, humiliated by the revelations ofterror and tortures committed by their fathers and brothers, incompatible with the myths of Holy Russia, resulting in a common temptation to find scapegoats rather than coming to terms with the national guilt.25 It is true that the legacy ofSoviet religious repression and the manifold complexities ofthe postcommunist transition have presented the Patriarchate with significant challenges. Pospelovskii’s apology for the institutional Church’s incoherent contribution to civil society overlooks the experiences ofdissident clergy in the Soviet Union and nonconformist clergy in post-Soviet Russia. The dissidents experienced the terror and tortures, not the prelates, and the nonconformists underwent harassment in the post-Soviet period at the instigation ofthe Church leadership. Reformist clergy have had a significant impact on the construction of civil society, in spite oftheir experiences in the Soviet period. Worse than overlooking the diametrically opposed tendencies in Orthodox Church life is the proclivity of Western analysts to paint the Church as a monolithic body, one that uniformly ‘does not support liberalism’.26 It is true that the traditionalist current, which emphasises powerful authority and limits on pluralism, is strong, both within and outside Church structures. The statement in an editorial in The Times (London), however, 8 Introduction that ‘[t]he Russian Orthodox Church is in the grip ofextreme nationalists and anti-Semites’ is overblown and reduces the movement among reformist clergy and laity for perestroika in Orthodox life to inconsequence.27 It seems that some Western commentators on Church life perpetuate the cold war ‘Evil Empire’ suspicions, the catch-cry for anti-Soviet propaganda. This book argues that the Orthodox Church is an important social and political force. By contrast, a major study of postcommunist Russian politics by leading scholars contended that the infrequency of Orthodox Church attendance indicated widespread indifference toward religion. The same survey that led the eminent political scientists Stephen White, Richard Rose and Ian McAllister to conclude that there was a high level oftrust in the Church also led them to assert: ‘In parallel with secularization in Western Europe, Russians have increasingly become indifferent to religion rather than dividing between believers and anticlerical secular groups’.28 This statement is problematic. Ronald Inglehart, drawing on surveys conducted in fifteen countries in the 1980s, noted that when evaluating levels of religious practice, Ifwe were to base our conclusion on church attendance rates alone…we would obtain a crude and somewhat misleading perception ofmass orientations toward religion. Church attendance statistics are better than nothing, as a rough indicator oftrends in religious belief– but they clearly are no substitute for direct measures of these beliefs.29 There is ample evidence to support Inglehart’s contention that church attendance is a poor indication oflevels ofreligious practice in the Russian context. Despite surveys which demonstrate the infrequency of church attendance, the Orthodox Church maintains a high profile, demonstrated by high-level politicians consulting with Orthodox dignitaries; continued polemics about the Church’s role in mainstream (and peripheral) media; religious themes in art and literature; and the constant presence ofthe Church in discussions ofthe nation’s historic path – past, present and future.30 The lack ofanticlerical groups is not a symptom ofindifference toward religion but the product ofan underdeveloped sphere ofindependent associations. Such an independent sphere is an integral part ofcivil society as civil society is defined for the purposes of this study. There exist a not inconsiderable number ofOrthodox lay organisations – those united in the Soiuz pravoslavnikh bratstv (Union ofOrthodox Brotherhoods) for example. The infrequency of church attendance does not necessarily mean secularisation is underway. Though a small number ofbelievers attended church in the Soviet period, it became clear in the perestroika years that the population was not indifferent toward religion. The extent of Orthodoxy’s influence should not be as readily dismissed as some political scientists propose. This study aims to overcome Western misconceptions ofthe Russian Church. It contends that the Moscow Patriarchate has a significant social Introduction 9 and political influence, that there is a division between reformist and traditionalist clergy, and that a distinction must be made between the Church’s official and unofficial influence. The competing visions of Orthodoxy’s role in Russia are crucial to understanding changes within this dynamic body. Once the Church’s influence on civil society (more precisely, the three spheres ofcivil society identified in Chapter 1 ofthis study) is analysed, positions such as that ofWhite, Rose and McAllister are seen to be excessively reductive. An inquiry into the influence of the Church on civil society is important also because ofthe centrality ofOrthodoxy to polity and society, the high levels of Orthodox self-identification and the importance of the national faith to the postcommunist transition. That the interplay of religion, politics and civil society is indeed a central issue for the Russian Federation is indicated by the fact that it is an object of deliberation in the Kremlin, in the scholarly journals ofthe Russian Academy ofSciences and in the mainstream media. Methodology The tension between the traditionalist and the reformist factions in the Orthodox Church is a product ofdiffering concepts ofthe Church’s postSoviet role. At the crux ofthese tensions are the issues ofOrthodoxy’s accessibility, the Church’s relations with other confessions, the place of Orthodoxy in national identity and the opportunities for alternative understandings ofOrthodoxy to be expressed. These issues, and thus the conflicts within the Church, are essentially about civil society. The best insight into the role ofthe Church in post-Soviet Russia is gained through the analysis ofOrthodoxy and civil society. The concept ofcivil society provides the theoretical basis ofthis study. Chapter 1 offers a more thorough examination ofhow the concept ofcivil society used in this inquiry has been derived. The transition of the official Church’s position from the Soviet to the post-Soviet period has been one ofthe most startling developments in the religious sphere. The understanding ofthis transition is a key aim ofthis book. While in the USSR, the Church existed as an institution in a compromised form, toeing the regime’s line in domestic and international affairs and forgoing evangelism, there existed lively and impassioned debate in clandestine religious circles. The relaxation ofreligious discrimination in the Gorbachev period and the subsequent demise ofthe atheist regime permitted freedom of conscience for the first time in Russia’s history. It was immediately apparent that there was a vast gulf, both in experience and in perceptions ofOrthodoxy’s role, between Church dignitaries – in the main traditionalists – and formerly dissident clergy, who were mostly reformists. This gulfhas widened in the post-Soviet period. The negotiation of Church–state relations in the new pluralist environment has been problem10 Introduction atic. The polemics generated by Patriarch Aleksii’s attempts to negotiate a middle ground have served to highlight this division. The period under study is crucial as the Church’s post-Soviet role is yet to be consolidated. The liberation oftraditional faiths, the influx offoreign missionaries and the rise ofindigenous cults and sects led to a dynamism in the religious sphere that made it difficult for the Church to secure a position ofcertainty among the numerous canvassers for converts. There were arguably more changes in the religious sphere between 1991 and 2001 than in any other decade in Russia’s history, except perhaps for the Bolshevik’s assault on religious belieffollowing the 1917 Revolution. This book argues that the influence on the emergence of civil society of both the official and the unofficial Church is to an increasing extent informing debate on religious life. Official Church life is represented by the Patriarchate’s stance and unofficial Church life by nonconformist clergy and lay activism. As the distinction between formal Church influence and informal Church influence is at the heart of this analysis, it is necessary to elucidate what is intended by these terms. 

The official influence emanates from the Moscow Patriarchate and from Church dignitaries. It should be noted that prelates may adopt inconsistent positions on particular issues or events, which makes it problematic to attribute any declaration, policy or indeed ideology to a single dignitary within the Patriarchate or to the Church as a whole. Patriarch Aleksii is the only individual at liberty to represent and to determine the Church’s policy. The weight given to these ideas and policies by the wider community – whether it be the social or political community – determines the extent of the Church’s formal influence. Although it has been demonstrated that Orthodoxy has a significant influence outside the walls of its churches, what is meant by informal influence needs further explanation. Michael P. Fogarty, in a seminal text on Christian Democracy, argued that Christian Democracy is located in a ‘level ofaction inspired by Christian ideals’. The following definition ofthis ‘level ofaction’ is appropriate for this evaluation ofthe informal contribution to civil society: [the level] at which the laity take over entirely and act on their own initiative and responsibility, though within the normal framework of beliefs, rules and practice of their church. 

The ‘laity’ in this case includes members ofthe clergy who may, for instance, enter politics on the same footing as laymen, leaving behind for that purpose the special authority oftheir clerical office.31 A wide range ofsocial, political and economic activities can therefore be construed as this informal influence. Patriarch Aleksii is adamant that clergy may not be involved in politics (despite the fact that, along with five other priests, he was elected to the USSR’s Congress ofPeople’s Deputies in April Introduction 11 1989).32 In October 1993 the Sviatoi sinod (Holy Synod) decreed that priests could not hold political office. As a result, Gleb Iakunin, a reformist priest and an outspoken critic of the Patriarchate, was defrocked after his election to the Duma, the lower house ofparliament, and eventually excommunicated by a decision ofthe February 1997 Bishops’ Council.33 Hence, there is little overlap between the activities of the official and unofficial Church. This book is based on a selective analysis ofdata on Orthodox religious life. It is textually based, drawing on both Russian- and English-language sources. Data for the Soviet period have been obtained from three sources: for the official material, the Church leadership’s statements and publications have been consulted, and for the unofficial material, samizdat (selfpublished) material informs analysis of Orthodoxy’s contribution to civil society. 

The state’s policy toward religion has been examined through statesanctioned anti-religious and atheist publications and official decrees. These three pools ofresources allow an understanding ofthe official Church’s position, the activities ofnon-Orthodox dissidents and church–state relations in the USSR. In the post-Soviet period primary source material for the Church’s formal influence is provided by official statements and publications by departments ofthe Patriarchate and interviews and statements by the Patriarch and other Church dignitaries. The Bishops’ Council and Holy Synod issue periodic statements on matters ofecclesiastical and temporal importance. The reports, pamphlets, articles and monographs issued by the Patriarchate’s Publishing Department have been utilised. In addition, the Patriarchate’s official website, which contains thousands of official documents, declarations and addresses and is updated almost daily by the Communication Service ofthe Department for External Church Relations, has been consulted.34 

The analysis ofthe contribution oflay activism to the emergence ofcivil society is evaluated through the laity’s work in social, political and charitable organisations, and also through the initiatives ofreformist clergy, who seek to make Orthodoxy more ‘transparent’ and accessible. Both these groups have received a great deal ofattention in Western and Russian media, and there are many interviews and commentaries on Church life and on wider social issues. The large number ofarticles is testimony to the importance ofthese groups in articulating an alternative Orthodox position to that ofthe Patriarchate. Russian newspapers, which frequently publish polemical tracts about church–state relations, are a valuable secondary source. The high-profile activities ofOrthodox dignitaries such as Patriarch Aleksii II and Metropolitan Kirill (head ofPatriarchate’s influential Department of External Church Relations) and the publicity generated by the Patriarchate itselfensure that there is wide coverage ofprelates’ activities in the mainstream media. 

The visibility ofthe Church leadership points to their influence in public life, if not in the political life of the country. Use has 12 Introduction been made ofreports by religious liberty and human rights organisations active in Russia. Publications by religious associations, both indigenous and foreign (especially Western), have been consulted, though these are largely impressionistic accounts ofthe Orthodox Church’s preeminence in the religious sphere, particularly in relation to their own experiences. They are therefore oflimited relevance to this study. The use ofonline resources has, for the most part, been limited to official websites. Book structure This study is in four parts. In the first part, Chapter 1 addresses how it is best to approach an inquiry into the Church’s influence. Civil society has become a ‘buzzword’ in analyses ofthe postcommunist countries’ democratic transitions. Ernest Gellner wrote in 1994 ofthe antiquated phrase ‘civil society’: ‘all ofa sudden, it has been taken out and thoroughly dusted, and has become a shining emblem’.35 Chapter 1 asks whether this ‘shining emblem’ is useful for an analysis of the Church’s post-Soviet role. It establishes why the concept ofcivil society is a serviceable tool ofinquiry in advance ofproposing a new way ofevaluating the Orthodox Church’s obstruction of, and contribution to, the democratic project. 

The chapter focuses on three spheres ofcivil society. The major shortcoming ofthe existing literature on the Russian Church, from the scholarly deprivations of the Soviet period to contemporary Russian understandings of grazhdanskoe obshchestvo (civil society), is the neglect ofdifferent currents in Orthodox life, both within and outside Church structures. This chapter articulates just how the concept ofcivil society is useful for this inquiry and how the different currents in Church life are best analysed through the three spheres ofcivil society. The second part turns to the unofficial influence of the Russian Church. Chapter 2 asks whether there is any precedent to Orthodoxy’s contribution to the emergence and development ofcivil society. Given the communist persecution ofthe Church, whether Orthodoxy was able to contribute to the emergence or development ofsocial organisation independent from the state will impact on its post-Soviet influence.

 The question of whether the Soviet experience provided any basis for the Church’s contribution to the emergence ofcivil society in the post-Soviet period is explored. The Church’s leadership changed little from the communist to the postcommunist eras. The divide in Church life between prelates and nonconformist clergy and laity did continue. The Russian Orthodox Church came to the fore of discussion about the recovery and regeneration ofsociety in the Gorbachev era. This became evident with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost’, which allowed the discussion ofpreviously forbidden issues in an attempt to reinvigorate Soviet socialism. The Patriarchate’s claims to a leading role drew on Russian national tradition and national identity. The prevalence ofreligious themes in the rhetoric ofreform and the rediscovery Introduction 13 ofRussian national identity indicated that the Church would play a significant role in the creation ofa new Soviet (and subsequently Russian) order. Chapter 3 analyses the changes in the religious sphere with the demise of atheist Marxism–Leninism.

 The new climate oftolerance allowed believers to emerge from silence and celebrate their faiths; they flocked to reopened churches, chanted long-quieted liturgies, demonstrated their devotion and in many other ways practiced faith without fear. Neophytes found solace in the beliefsystems ofthe newly liberated faiths, both Orthodox and nonOrthodox, and Western Protestant groups flooded into Russia at this first opportunity. After some seventy years of militant atheist rule, the animation ofthe religious sphere was one ofthe most striking developments in postSoviet Russia. The Moscow Patriarchate faced significant challenges; the most serious was the division that developed between reformist and traditionalist clergy. Chapter 3 considers whether, given the Soviet-era division between dissenters and prelates, this remained a salient cleavage in the postSoviet period. 

The analysis ofthe influence ofthe informal current in Church life questions whether the agendas of these two groups coalesced with the end ofthe distinction between the tolerated and the repressed. The key features ofthe alternative vision ofOrthodoxy indicate how the reformist agenda is compatible with the dissemination of concepts central to civil society and how reformist clergy contributed to civil society. The resultant rift in the Church is also examined. The third part examines the official influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. In a secular multi-confessional state it would be expected that the Church would co-exist with other bodies in the ‘sphere ofassociations’ that constitutes civil society. The demise ofthe Soviet regime heralded the end ofthe Orthodox Church’s traditional position as the official religion of the Russian state. Yet the Church’s continued privilege is demonstrated by the legislation On Freedom ofConscience and Religious Associations. Chapter 4 asks how, ifcivil society is social self-organisation independent from the state, the relationship between the temporal leadership and the traditional Russian church impacted on this position. It questions whether post-Soviet church–state relations are conducive to the emergence ofcivil society. Chapter 4 analyses the Moscow Patriarchate’s visions ofchurch– state relations, especially the historic formulae of symphonia, and whether this is conducive to the emergence ofcivil society. Forces hostile to civil society appropriated Orthodoxy to promote antipluralism in the new ideologically pluralist society. 

The Church became the key constituent ofa reinvigorated Russian national consciousness. Discrimination against religious minorities in the name ofOrthodox tradition was a central concern ofreligious liberty and human rights groups, who viewed their work defending religious communities and individual believers as just as important in the post-Soviet period as it had been in the Soviet period. Chapter 5 considers in whose name the forces of national chauvinism invoked Orthodoxy and how the Church’s centrality to national 14 Introduction tradition and identity was used to oppose concepts central to civil society. Given the strength ofthe ethno-national linkage among the population, which makes Orthodoxy a centrepiece ofnational chauvinism, this inquiry is essential. This chapter considers how religious pluralism forced the Church leadership to address unprecedented problems and how the Patriarchate ultimately adopted a defensive position toward both internal and external challenges. Since the Moscow Patriarchate had a significant political influence, it is essential to analyse how its mediation ofcompeting visions ofOrthodoxy’s role impacts on this influence. Chapter 6 examines to what extent the Church obstructs civil society. 

This allows the analysis ofthe official Church’s stance on religious pluralism and thus its official influence on civil society. Orthodox conceptions ofcommunality and freedom provide the basis oftensions between Orthodoxy and Protestantism. These are indicative of the significant differences between the worldview of each denomination. This book’s evaluation ofreligion and civil society acknowledges the different theological underpinnings to civil society in Russia’s largest Christian churches and whether the implications ofthe different visions determine the Church’s post-Soviet path. The final part, comprising the Conclusion, considers the conflicting viewpoints of the official and the unofficial currents in Church life. This allows an analysis ofthe implications ofthe Church’s post-Soviet role and considers how the division between the reformist and traditionalist factions impacted on perceptions ofthe notions central to the concept ofcivil society. Given the Church’s conspicuous role in Russian polity and society, the analysis ofits contribution to the democratic project is vital to an understanding ofthe nature ofpost-Soviet Russian politics.

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