الأحد، 2 يونيو 2024

Download PDF | Doris Behrens-Abouseif - Practising Diplomacy in the Mamluk Sultanate_ Gifts and Material Culture in the Medieval Islamic World-I.B.Tauris (2014).

Download PDF | Doris Behrens-Abouseif - Practising Diplomacy in the Mamluk Sultanate_ Gifts and Material Culture in the Medieval Islamic World-I.B.Tauris (2014).

285 Pages 




Introduction

Since the 1920s much has been written on the meaning of gifts in human society. The recent florescence of studies of the history of diplomacy has stimulated scholarship on its material aspects, and specifically on diplomatic gifts in the medieval and the Renaissance periods. Historians of Islamic culture have sporadically dealt with gifts in the context of diplomacy, and recently the exhibition Gifts of the Sultans was accompanied by a catalogue with collected papers discussing different categories of gifts at different periods in different regions, including pious donations, personal gifts and bonuses.1 Diplomatic gift exchange is a topic in its own right that needs to be discussed separately from personal gifts, bonuses or pious endowments. It has a long Middle Eastern tradition that reaches back to the beginning of history and continues well into early modern time. 
















The prominent role of the Mamluk Sultanate in medieval world diplomacy, at a crucial time in Islamic history and a transitional moment in global history, demands a closer look at the material cultural aspect of its diplomatic intercourse. Some important contributions to the study of Mamluk diplomatic gifts have already been made, notably in bilateral contexts.2 The aim of this book is to explore the objects exchanged as gifts in Mamluk diplomacy, and consider the extent to which their selection was ruled by universal paradigms of contemporary court culture in relation to Mamluk-specific values of self-representation. The discussion will deal only with gifts exchanged between monarchs and not with gifts at the lower echelon of the diplomatic scale, about which Mamluk sources are less informative. The material culture of Mamluk diplomatic gifts leads inevitably to a scrutiny of the relationship between such objects, and of what we define as Mamluk Art. 














The study reveals a significant discrepancy between the two, which necessitates a revision of our definition of Mamluk Art, taking into greater consideration Mamluk society’s perceptions of its own artistic culture. As will be demonstrated, not all artefacts can be indiscriminately associated with diplomatic gifts, as has often been done. The selection of diplomatic gifts followed complex criteria that did not seem obvious to me at the beginning of my study. In spite of the uneven availability of material on the gifts offered by the Mamluks, it is possible to discern an evolution over time in the policy of diplomatic gifts that reflects the political and social vicissitudes within the Mamluk Sultanate. Mamluk chronicles are repletewith information about diplomacy and embassies and include references to the exchange of diplomatic gifts. However, descriptions of gifts are not always available or as detailed as we would hope and they are usually less informative about the gifts offered by the Mamluk sultans than about those they received. 

















The chroniclers usually refer to the main features of a ‘gift package’, leaving us with many questions unanswered. Their enumerations of gift items are not always comprehensive and they vary between different accounts of the same subject, as in the case of Baybars’ presents to Berke Khan, or the Venetian gifts presented by Domenico Trevisan to Sultan al-Ghawri. In the first case, the variations are between Mamluk texts, and in the latter there are differences between the Mamluk and the Venetian versions. Some spectacular gift packages, like the one Qaytbay sent to Lorenzo di Medici, are not mentioned by Mamluk historians. However, this shortcoming is partly compensated for by a number of diplomatic letters, copied in Mamluk chancellery manuals, that refer to gifts, notably Qalqashandi’s Subh and the anonymous text of the Bibliothèque Nationale (ms. ar. 4440), to which Bauden has drawn attention.3 Mamluk diplomatic letters often included an appended list of the accompanying gifts presented by the embassy that brought them. 
















Material from the counterparts of the diplomatic exchange, either archival or narrative sources, can be used to fill some of the gaps. The approach taken in this book is to consider the entire period of the Mamluk Sultanate, which covers 267 years. This panoramic perspective focuses in on gift exchange in particular and is not meant as a survey of Mamluk diplomacy. This approach can only be one sided, being based in the first place on the choices made by the Mamluk chroniclers, who often omit what they find obvious; it cannot evenly cover all the ramifications of diplomatic gift exchange with the world around them. Some diplomatic relations are less documented than others. Little is recorded about diplomatic gift exchange with Muslim Spain and Byzantium, which explains the absence of a dedicated entry for these subjects, while Borno in West Africa is mentioned because of an odd gift that arrived in Cairo from there. 


















The picture conveyed here needs to be complemented by other specialised studies focused on other courts and their own diplomatic and material cultures. However, it is useful at this stage to explore the copious Mamluk narrative sources and to compare and relate the information they provide with what is provided by art history and material culture of the period. This initiative should prompt further case studies in this field.













The World of the Mamluks

Due to its geographical location between Africa, Asia and the Mediterranean, the Mamluk Sultanate occupied a central position from which it derived much of its power, wealth and prestige. At the same time, its position in world history, and Islamic history in particular, following the hiatus of the Mongol invasion, enhanced the role of the Mamluk Sultanate as the embodiment of a Muslim and Arab revival. The Mamluks stepped onto the world stage at a most critical time in Islamic history, when the Crusaders from the West had occupied the Syrian littoral and the Mongols from the East had terminated the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad in 1258 and subdued most of Central Asia. 
















The Mamluks were the soldiers who, in the second half of the thirteenth century, stood up to both the Crusaders and the Mongols almost at the same time, evicted them from the Holy Land and Syria, and undermined alliance schemes between them. Under the rule of Sultan al-Zahir Baybars (1260–77), who, after usurping the throne from Qutuz, united Egypt with Syria and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina under his central authority, the Mamluk capital, Cairo, became the largest city in the medieval world,1 and the epitome of the last splendour of Arab Islamic culture. The military achievements and the pious patronage of the Mamluks earned them legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects and the Arab world, although some of their Muslim rivals would not acknowledge this. Although they were purchased, as indicated by the term mamluk meaning ‘owned or possessed’, the Mamluks were not slaves. The status of the mamluk was not associated with servitude, but rather with the fact of being a soldier in a military aristocracy that ruled an empire. 

















When Mamluk documents refer to mamluks as diplomatic gifts, they mention them separately from the ordinary slaves. The Mamluk regime of military recruitment was based on a system, which already had an established tradition in the Muslim world, of purchasing young males for the army in ‘pagan countries’. The Mamluks of Egypt and Syria were either Turks from the Kipchak steppes or Circassians from the Caucasus. They converted to Islam when they received their military training and were issued with a certificate of manumission before they began their professional military career. The first mamluks of Egypt were recruited by the last Ayyubid sultan, al-Salih Najm al-Din, to serve as an elite corps in his army. After his death during the battle with the Crusaders at Damietta, which the Mamluks won, they took control of Egypt. From that moment, the Mamluk recruiting system not only served the army, but was also extended to serve and supply the new sultanate and its ruling aristocracy. The Mamluks recruited mamluks to serve them and to succeed them.
















 Although it was in principle a first generation aristocracy that did not acknowledge hereditary succession, the fourteenth century was dominated by the Qalawunid dynasty, which ruled from 1279 to 1382. However, the new sultan had to be elected by the great emirs from among his predecessor’s mamluks. The Mamluks were proud of earning rather than inheriting their status and prestige, and in theory only those who had been purchased were eligible to reach the highest positions in the state. However, some of their Muslim adversaries, such as the Mongols, Timurids and Ottomans, looked down on the Mamluks for their lack of lineage, regarding them as slaves and challenging their religious patronage and their guardianship of the Muslim holy cities.






















Although the Mamluks, unlike the Ottomans, were not great conquerors, they managed, right up to the end of their history, to consolidate and secure the integrity of the territory they had shaped at the beginning of their rule. When they faced the Ottoman conquest, their empire collapsed without having first crumbled. At the fringes of this territory the Mamluks maintained suzerainty over smaller kingdoms and principalities. In the north, they controlled Little Armenia and East Anatolia, while Yemen and Nubia belonged to their zone of influence in the south,safeguarding Mamluk interests along the Red Sea–Indian Ocean connection. 




















The Mamluk Sultanate owed its wealth and prosperity to the blessing of its geographical position: in addition to the natural and human resources of Egypt and Syria, the spice trade between the Far East and Europe, over which they held a monopoly, provided the major source of revenue, comparable in a way to the role of the Suez Canal in Egypt’s economy today. Trade and related matters of safety and freedom of passage were, therefore, a major factor in the diplomacy of the Mamluk period, which coincided with the age of a ‘commercial revolution’ in the world, whose driving force was this very spice trade.2 The strongly centralised character of the Mamluk state gave the sultans hegemony over foreign trade in their realm, increasingly so in the fifteenth century, thus fastening the link between diplomacy and commerce. 


















As much as diplomacy, pilgrimage was intimately linked with commerce. Issues regarding Christian pilgrims travelling to Palestine and Muslim pilgrims going to Mecca were frequently involved in the diplomatic relations of the Mamluk Sultanate. Its control of Jerusalem, Mecca and Medina compelled Christian and Muslim states to cultivate diplomacy with the sultans and to win their favour with lavish gifts. Moreover, the presence since Baybars’ reign of a symbolic Abbasid caliph in Cairo, who was often requested to issue letters of investiture to various Muslim rulers, added to Mamluk religious and, by the same token, diplomatic prestige in the Muslim world.3 The Mamluk sultans were very well aware of their leverage in the world, as was forcefully displayed in their lavish receptions of foreign embassies in Cairo, which aimed at cultivating the image of a power of worldwide significance. The number of foreigners and embassies arriving at the Mamluk court enhanced the prestige of the sultan in the chroniclers’ view.


















 The Ayyubid sultan al-Malik al-Kamil (r. 1218–38) was praised for attracting a unique gathering of embassies at his court from Khawarizm, Georgia, Hims, Hama, India, Europe (faranj), Shiraz and al-Andalus,4 and years later Ibn Shaddad dedicated a whole chapter in his biography of al-Zahir Baybars to listing the scholars, refugees, princes and diplomats who came to his court. 5 Maqrizi writes that in 668/1268–9 almost all neighbouring countries sent envoys to Baybars,6 and in his obituary of al-Nasir Muhammad, he praises this sultan for the gifts he received from the rulers of the Maghrib, India, China, Ethiopia, Africa (Takrur), Nubia, Byzantium, the Turks and the Franks.7 The pride the Mamluks took in their worldwide connections is also reflected in their pious patronage of academic institutions, which were meant to host scholars and students from the entire Muslim world, and in the markets of their cities, in particular Cairo, Damascus and Aleppo, which boasted goods from all over the world. Al-Zahir Baybars, the first great Mamluk sultan, combined the virtues of a military hero, who celebrated triumphs against the Mongols and Crusaders, with the wisdom of a statesman who, for the sake of stability and commerce, cultivated diplomatic relations with the East and the West including former enemies. After several successful military campaigns against the Crusaders, he exchanged embassies and signed truces with the remaining Frankish rulers in the Levant as well as with the Hohenstaufen and the Angevin kings of Sicily, with Castile, Aragon, France, Genoa and Byzantium. 





















The sultan obtained authorisation for Mamluk vessels to cross the Bosphorus, and later Qalawun signed a treaty with Constantinople that secured the slave trade that supplied the Mamluk state with the vital manpower of mamluks via the Crimea. The Byzantine emperors also interceded in favour of the Christians in Mamluk lands and the churches in the Holy Land. Amicable relations with Byzantium continued under al-Nasir Muhammad.8 These good relations did not preclude, however, the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453 from being highly celebrated in Cairo. Baybars also fostered an alliance with the Mongols of the Golden Horde, as soon as they converted to Islam, in order to neutralise their Mongol rivals who were ruling Iran and at the same time to secure the purchase of mamluks through the Black Sea.9 His next significant successors, Qalawun (r. 1279–90) and his sons al-Ashraf Khalil (r. 1290–3) and al-Nasir Muhammad (r. 1293–1341 with two interruptions) continued and consolidated this diplomacy. Following a period of tense relations with the Mongol ruler of Iran, the Ilkhanid Ghazan (r. 1295–1304), al-Nasir Muhammad, whose long reign enjoyed a period of stability and prosperity, signed an entente with Abu Sa‘id (r. 1316–35) that served the interests of both sides by consolidating and promoting trade, taking advantage of the reopened Silk Road. A period of intensive diplomacy followed between the two sultanates.Afterthe break-up ofthe Mongol Empire, which had been favourable to commercial activities between the East and the West, Mamluk hegemony on the transit trade between the Far East and the Mediterranean was reinforced. The Pope’s ban on trade with the Mamluks in the post-Crusade period could not have a decisive impact on their commercialrelations with Latin European states, who were able to circumvent it. 




















Among the Italian states, Genoa and Venice were major trade partners of the Mamluks alongside Aragon, all three being the major players in Mediterranean trade and navigation.10 The shift in the technological lead during the fourteenth century towards Europe led to a dramatic increase of European textile export to the Levant, thus favouring the import of other Eastern goods to Europe. In spite of the regular postCrusade raids on Mamluk coasts and piracy in Syrian and Egyptian waters, notably by the Catalans, which provoked harsh reprisals against the commercial and religious interests of all Europeans, embassies carrying gifts were regularly sent to promote European exports and regain the sultans’ favour. After the elimination of the Crusaders from Syria and Palestine, the main threats to Mamluk territory came from their Muslim rivals, the Ilkhanids, followed by the Timurids and the Ottomans. While diplomacy with Europe after the Crusades was mainly about trade and pilgrimage, diplomacy with Muslim powers included issues of legitimacy, power and territory. The fifteenth century opened with a military and economic disaster for the Mamluks, caused by Timur’s raid on Syria in 1400–1 and the temporary vassalage of Sultan Faraj. Timur’s ambitions in the western Muslim world were pursued, albeit in a different style, by his son Shahrukh, who pursued a vivid diplomatic correspondence with Sultan Barsbay (r. 1422–38) and his successor Jaqmaq (r. 1438–53). 
























Shahrukh’s embassies arrived regularly in Cairo asking for the permission to donate the curtain (kiswa) of the Ka‘ba in Mecca, which is traditionally renewed on a yearly basis. This request was rejected by Barsbay, who perceived it as a challenge to Mamluk supremacy over the sacred sites of Islam and by the same token to the Mamluks’ religious leadership. Barsbay’s successor, Jaqmaq, showed more leniency in the handling of this matter. The conquest of Cyprus by Barsbay in 1427 was a significant and last addition to the area of Mamluk domination. The island, which held a key position in Mediterranean trade and was a bone of contention between Aragon, Naples, Genoa and Venice, remained tributary to the sultanate till the Ottoman conquest. This led to the involvement of the Mamluk sultans in issues of Cyprian throne succession. Barsbay also gave special attention to Indian trade, and under his rule the port city of Jeddah, governed by a Mamluk emir, replaced Aden as the major port of the Red Sea.11 



















The Timurids in the east and the Ottomans in west Anatolia and southern Europe contributed to the increasing pressure on the Mamluk Sultanate, which in the later period could be defended only at very high cost. Following the disintegration of the Mongol and later Timurid empires, the Turkmen states of the Qaramanids(1256– 1475 in southern Anatolia), Dhul Qadir(1337–1521 in south-eastern Anatolia), the Qara Qoyunlus (1351–1469 in eastern Anatolia and western Iran), the Aq Qoyunlus (1396–1508 in eastern Anatolia, Mesopotamia and western Iran) and the Ramazanoglus (1378–1608 in Cilicia) added to the complexity of the Mamluk diplomatic map with new suzerainty bonds and intermittent alliances that were often troubled by rivalries, betrayal and conspiracies. Cairo at that time saw a regular traffic of Turkmen embassies. Trade with China went through the Indian Ocean, India and Yemen along the same routes as the spice trade, so that there was no need for regular diplomatic relations, although some attempts to establish direct contacts are recorded.12 There were, however, diplomatic relations and gifts exchanged between China and the Rasulids of Yemen.13 























The spice trade and the Muslim connections in the Indian Ocean, including the pilgrimage to Mecca and issues of pious foundations, required diplomatic contact and gift exchange with the sultanates of India in Bengal, Delhi and Gulparga.14 The rulers of the Tughluq and Lodi dynasties of Delhi, the Bahmanids and others used to send embassies carrying precious gifts and exotic animals to Cairo, requesting the investiture diploma from the Abbasid caliph to legitimise their rule.15 Owing to the significance of the Red Sea as the major channel to the Indian Ocean, the Mamluks controlled it, as had their Ayyubid predecessors, and prevented non-Muslims from navigating its waters without authorisation. Along this route, Yemen was a vital link in the chain of the spice trade and the connection with China, and its rulers had to abide by Mamluk rules and send gifts that were in fact tributes. 















The Timurid and then Safavid threats imposed temporary alliances between the Mamluks and the Ottomans, as did the Portuguese advance in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean a century later. An intensive exchange of embassies took place between the two courts almost to the day before Sultan Selim I overthrew the Mamluk Sultanate. Ottoman ambitions regarding the heartland of the Muslim world, in particular after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, had become obvious to the Mamluks, who fought at a high price to defend their territory until they finally lost the battle in 1517.























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