Download PDF | Amalia Levanoni - A Turning Point in Mamluk History_ The Third Reign of Al-Nasir Muhammad Ibn Qalawun (1310-1341) (1995).
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I owe a foremost debt of gratitude to Professor Nehemia Levtzion who kindly read this study in draft and gave me many useful suggestions. Throughout my research he has been more than generous in giving me of his time and sharing with me of his knowledge. I am grateful, too, to Professor Michael Winter for his many helpful remarks; it was as his student that I first became intrigued by the Mamluk period. Furthermore, I greatly benefited from comments by Professor Ulrich Haarmann, who encouraged me throughout the writing of this book and graciously saved me from mistakes in the transliteration of Turkish names. Finally, I wish to thank Professor Donald P. Little for his kind observations.
A fellowship from the Ministerium fiir Wissenschaft und Forschung of Baden-Wiirttemberg made it possible for me to work intensively on this book throughout the Spring of 1993. For their hospitality during my stay in Germany and their concern in facilitating my research I owe many thanks to the Orientalisches Seminar of the Eberhard Karls Universitat in Tiibingen and especially to Professor Heinz Halm. The Research Authority and the Faculty of Humanities of my own university, the University of Haifa, generously covered the costs involved in preparing the manuscript for publication.
For the care and dedication with which he helped me edit my manuscript I often felt I had found my own loyal mamluk in Dick Bruggeman, while Genoveba Breitstein proved delightfully undaunted by the arduous task of word-processing the text. The photographs were taken by Professor John Williams and appear here by courtesy of Visual Education. Sigal Levin drew the maps.
My own family will by now have forgiven me for the many Strange “guests” I insisted on bringing to our dinner table. For their unfailing understanding and constant encouragement I wish to dedicate this book to Shlomo, Yossi, Michal and Dorit.
Amalia Levanoni
INTRODUCTION
Modern historical research usually divides Mamluk autonomous rule in Egypt (648—923/ 1250-1517) into two periods, a Turkish or Bahri period (648—784/ 1250—1382) and a Circassian or Burji period (784— 923 /1382—1517). In this it follows contemporary Mamluk sources which already contain this division. Mamluks of Turkish origin were dominant in the army and held the reins of power during the first period while Circassians formed the majority in the army and sultans were drawn from their number during the second.'
Also found already in certain Mamluk sources and adopted by modern historians is the view that the misrule that characterized the Mamluk state especially from the beginning of the 15th century and led to its decline, started with the rise to power of the Circassians.” Circassian rule is seen as having caused the gradual deterioration of military standards in the Mamluk army which subsequently had its impact on the economy and social order throughout the state.> Since instances of the collapse of the traditional Mamluk system are regarded primarily as belonging to Circassian rule,* when signs of similar phenomena are found to occur as early as Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad’s third reign (709-741/1310—1341) and that of his immediate successors, these are treated as mere “sporadic manifestations”.
Furthermore, even though violations of the traditional principles of the Mamluk system are widely agreed to have been rife during the Circassian period, the system itself is portrayed as having remained constant. According to David Ayalon, these principles “remained the backbone of the military servitude in the Circassian period as well.” Thus, deviations are not regarded as perversions of these principles but rather seen as variations in the way they were implemented. “None of the principles on which the Mamluk system has been based was fully carried out (certainly not for long). Yet the cumulative effect of these partly carried out principles proved sufficient to ensure that unique might and longevity of the Mamluk system.”’
The present study is an attempt to show that, on the contrary, the Mamluk system, while it contained certain elements that remained constant, was a dynamic one, susceptible to change throughout its history. That is to say, the pivotal place the Mamluk system occupied in the life of the Mamluk elite led, almost from the outset, to reciprocal influence. Thus, the increasing number of deviations from Mamluk principles that occurred prior to the Circassian ascent to power should be seen as stages in a process of change already set in motion.
Our main thesis is that the origins of this process are to be found in the special conditions al-Nasir Muhammad created in the Mamluk army, the repercussions of which were to affect the entire range of Mamluk norms.
Chapter One describes the Mamluk system as it took shape during the formative years of the Mamluk state, the reigns of Sultans al-Zahir Baybars and al-Mansur Qalawin. This description is then used, in Chapter Two, to throw into relief the changes effected in the Mamluk system by al-Nasir Muhammad. First introduced into the Mamluk army, these changes are found to have had their impact on the social and political life of the Mamluk elite already during al-Nasir Muhammad’s lifetime. Chapter Three then traces their development from al-Nasir Muhammad’s death up to the end of Mamluk autonomous rule and reveals the transformation they wrought in the Mamluk code of values and Mamluk political concepts.
Chapter Four, finally, deals with the overall economic decline of the Mamluk state. After a brief outline of its various causes as found in modern historical research, viz., demographic decline, monetary crises, and the collapse of agriculture and industry, the link of each of these with the misrule of the Mamluk government is established. Here it is the repercussions of al-Nasir’s expenditure policy on the economy which reveal his reign as a point of no return in that they crippled the state’s ability to withstand the crises which were to beset it during the second half of the 14th century. Underscored, too, is the connection between the norms that came to prevail among the Mamluk military elite following al-Nasir Muhammad’s death and the worsening of the economic crisis.
A few words on methodology. Unlike earlier periods of Islamic history, the Mamluk era is well documented. Contemporary Mamluk sources contain a wealth of information on the Mamluk system itself, the changes that occurred in it and the effect these had on Mamluk rule throughout the Mamluk period. A number of difficulties arise, nonetheless. Firstly, nowhere do Mamluk sources offer us a “systematic theory” on Mamluk training and advancement systems, and thus the way these were organized has to be pieced together from information scattered—often widely—throughout them. Somewhat more detailed descriptions—but, again, far from containing a complete picture—are two passages found in the works of the historian Tagi al-Din Ahmad al-Maqrizi (d. 845/1442), a relatively late historical source on the period of Baybars and Qalawin.
Secondly, as soon as signs of the decline of the state began to appear—in the course of the second half of the 14th century—contemporary Mamluk chroniclers increasingly came to depict the first sultans as the founding fathers of the state and tended to hold up the period of their rule as the ideal for their own and future generations to emulate.’ Al-Magrizi, for example, praises them as “rulers who ruled kingdoms and commanders who fought the Holy War”,'° while he decries the Royal Mamluks of his own time s “the most contemptible, indolent and despised among men, most deprived spiritually, utterly ignorant of the ways of the world, and deviating from the true faith.”'’ Ibn Taghri Birdi writes: A salute to that time and its people! How excellent were their deeds, how becoming were the ways in which they considered the education of their young and the honour which they extended to their elderly.
Because of this they ruled the land and the people yielded to them. They won the hearts of their subjects and gained high office. But our times are the exact opposite of theirs, commanders are backward [in their ignorance] and the young evil-minded ... [li-/ahi darru dhalika al-zaman wa-ahlihi ma kana ahsana tadbirahum wa-aswaba hadsahum min jawdat tarbiyat saghirihim wa-ta‘zim kabirihim hatta malaki al-bilad wa-danat lahum al-‘ibad wa-istajlabu khawatir alra‘iyya fa-nali al-rutab al-saniyya, wa-amma zamanina hadha fahuwa bi-khilaf dhalika kulihi fa-l-mugaddam mw’akhkhar wa-l-saghir mutanammir . . .).'*
Are these the usual regrets of laudatores temporis acti or can we read such passages as representative of their authors’ own time? In order to overcome these and similar difficulties inherent in Mamluk sources and to allow confident use of the information they contain I scanned the writings of Mamluk historians contemporaneous with the reigns of Baybars and Qalawun and could only conclude that they wholly corroborate the descriptions found in the later sources.
Throughout this study I have availed myself of contemporary and retrospective historical chronicles, encyclopaedias and sociogeographical writings. Modern literature based upon these sources, in particular when dealing with the structure of the Mamluk system and the social and economic history of the Mamluk era, have furthermore proved of invaluable help.
CHAPTER ONE
THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE MAMLUK STATE
And not one of them was occupied with anything other than the arts of war (...) and they became highly proficient in all military skills.
(Sulack, 1, p. 512) Organization
When the Mamluks rose to power in Egypt (648/1250) they based their claim to rule on continuing the reforms instituted by al-Salih Ayyib (637-—647/1240—-1249),' reforms which had shaken the very foundations of Ayyubid rule and had led to its subsequent elimination by the Mamluks.? When Sultan al-Zahir Baybars (658-676/ 1260-1277) attained power there was total chaos in the regions which had been under Ayyubid control, since the Mongols had meanwhile crushed the autonomous political power bases that had sprung up in Syria. Political instability was rife in Egypt as well, as shown by the rise of three different rulers in the space of ten years, each of them having taken power after the murder of his predecessor. This instability, and the continuous threat of Mongol invasion, had left the first Mamluk sultan with neither the time nor the opportunity to build up a governing apparatus adequate to the needs of the emerging Mamluk state.”
As with the Ayyubids, Saljuks, Ghaznavids and others before them, the Mamluks could derive legitimacy in the eyes of the people only from being seen as the custodians of the faith. Muslim tradition viewed the task of government as defending Islam from its enemies from without and ruling the country according to the dictates of the shari‘a from within. In this sense, the Mamluks may indeed be perceived as the successors of the Ayyubids. Baybars restored the Abbasid Caliphate in Egypt after it had been eliminated in Baghdad by the Mongol conquest (656/1258).* He also established a judicial system based on the four Muslim legal schools and instituted procedures for its administration.” Al-Manstr Qalawin (678-689/1279-1290) continued this trend, while introducing further changes in the religious establishment and the legal system.°
Towards military and administrative institutions, however, Baybars showed an innovative and independent approach, and the far-reaching reforms he instigated—further improved during Qalawtn’s rule— were to become part of the accepted code of conduct of the Mamluk army.’
The importance of the reorganization of the Mamluk army during just this period stemmed from the fact that Baybars’s rule, like that of Qalawin after him, was a time of successive wars with the Crusaders and the Mongols. Because the state needed permanent and clearly defined military and administrative bodies to enable the successful management of a single, large army at times of crisis, these years of war made a distinct contribution to the formation and definition of the Mamluk state’s ruling institutions.
The entry, furthermore, of very large numbers of Mongol soldiers into Egypt during Baybars’s rule and later, and Baybars’s admiration for the methods of Mongol government and the standards maintained in their army may also have contributed to the formation of the new military and administrative structure of the Mamluk state: “And al-Malik al-Zahir ... acted according to the principles of the Mongol kings and most of the laws of Genghis Khan as the yasa....
More than anything, however, it was the change that had occurred in the political status of the Mamluk army which infused Baybars’s innovative actions. While during the Ayyubid period the army had existed to serve the ruling elite—with the Mamluk units only part of it—the Mamluk army now had itself become the ruling elite and from its own ranks provided the sultans of the Mamluk state. This in turn created the difficulty of how the sultan was to impose authority on his erstwhile colleagues and made it necessary to establish clearly defined formal rules for the administration and organization of the army, guaranteeing the sultan’s sway over the ruling elite of which he himself was a part.
At the time of Salah al-Din’s death, the Ayyubid army did not have a single unified military framework but, rather, each Ayyubid principality had its own specific military structure dictated by its own traditions and needs. Though there were some common features, the command structure and manpower that each principality had at its disposal decided the size and formation of its army.’ These armies were run according to the needs and whims of the individual Ayyubid ruler who headed the principality and not by any permanent and formal administrative practices.’ Moreover, while it was left to the ruler to determine the size of the military unit inside his principality, such a unit changed structure from the moment it was incorporated into the larger Ayyubid army brought together for a particular military venture."
Following the battle of ‘Ayn Jalut (658/1260) after which Baybars took power, the army in Egypt was composed of a large mixture of elements which included different Mamluk factions that had survived from the times of al-Salih Ayyub, al-Mu‘izz Aybak, and al-Muzaffar Qutuz. Apart from these, the army had provided a haven for many refugees from the Ayyubid armies in Syria, the Kurdish tribes, the Turkomans, and others vanquished by the Mongols.” When Baybars set out to lay the foundations for the organization of the army in the Mamluk state, the first thing he did was create a discrete framework for a single army which he made subordinate to the central government. This framework contained three components: the Royal Mamluks (al-mamalik al-sultaniyya), the amirs’ soldiers, and the halga. The Royal Mamluks were to gain a status of exclusivity in the Mamluk army, through permanent and clearly defined procedures which will be discussed below. Mamluks of amirs remained under the direct command of their masters but were to be placed at the disposal of the state if and when necessary.'? The halqa consisted of soldiers not included in the two above-mentioned bodies, stood under direct control of the sultan and had its own command and administrative structure. Its status in the Mamluk army was secondary, since the sultan naturally fostered the Royal Mamluks."*
During the reign of Qalawun, the Mamluk army was organized on a permanent war footing. Both Qalawun and the military administration kept a list of all of the amirs in the Egyptian and Syrian armies defining their duties on either the right or left flank of the Mamluk army at times of war. In the event of mobilization, messages were sent to the amirs who, together with their soldiers, were then to ready themselves immediately for battle.’°
Baybars established uniformity throughout the Mamluk army through two new procedures. First, he introduced the supply of equipment for the mamluks’ needs out of the Sultan’s treasury:
And those who had preceded him economized on clothing, grants, and equipment, and these, I mean the army of al-Zahir ... were the opposite because the expenses of the first were taken from their fiefs, while the expenses of the second al-Malik al-Zahir himself incurred [wa-kana ula’ika al-ladhina kani qablahu . . . muqtasidin fi al-malbis wa-!-nafaqat wa-l-‘udad wa-hd@ula’i a‘ni ‘askar al-zahir kani bi-ldidd min dhalika wa-kanat kulaf ma yaludhu bihim min igtda‘atihim wa-ha’ula’i kulafuhum ‘ala al-Malik al-Zahir].'®
In other words, Baybars did away with the improvisatory nature and the personal interpretation of the rules which had characterized the Ayyubid army when it came to equipping the Mamluk soldier and replaced it by a standard framework and standard rules for all Mamluk soldiers. It was Baybars’s custom to inspect part of the army twice a week in order to verify that the orders regarding equipment were being carried out, while the entire army was inspected periodically.'’ For these latter inspections, the troops were ordered to parade all on one and the same day and with all their equipment, “so that no soldier would be able to borrow items [of equipment] from his comrades [hatta la yasta‘ira ahad min ahad shay’].”'® On these occasions, “the sultan distributed to his mamluks superior military equipment [al-‘udad al-jalila].”'? On one rare occasion, Baybars ordered five mamluks to be executed by hanging because they had been absent from an inspection that he had carried out in Hims. They were strung up in the main hippodrome which was used for military training.”? Similarly, Qalawin equipped the army according to a set of standing orders.”!
The second procedure intended to underpin the uniformity of the Mamluk army had to do with the granting of fiefs (igta‘at).”* While during the Ayyubid period principles guiding the granting of igta‘at had always been somewhat unclear and ill-defined, Baybars and Qalawun introduced basic reforms which established a clear formal link between a soldier’s rank and the size of his igta‘. Unlike the more abstract notions, such as seniority, which had been an integral part of the Ayyubid amirate, a soldier’s rank now indicated the degree of economic power that came with it, implying the establishment of a military hierarchy.’ During Baybars’s reign it became the accepted rule, for example, that the size of the igta‘ of an amir of forty was a third of that of an amir of one hundred. We learn this from Shafi‘ Ibn ‘Ali, who was in charge of correspondence during the reign of al-Malik al-Sa‘id, son of Baybars. When Amir Kunduk was demoted by al-Sa‘id from amir of one hundred to amir of forty, Shafi‘ Ibn ‘Ali was instructed to write an order reducing Kunduk’s igta‘ by two thirds. Shafi‘ Ibn ‘Ali adds: “And I wrote his order [ordering] the reduction of two thirds and that was the practice of those who held [the rank of] one hundred cavalrymen [wa-katabtu manshiuran fi gat‘ al-thulthayn wa-hiya ‘adat sahib al-mi’at faris).”"* Husam al-Din Turuntay, who was appointed naib al-saltana immediately after Qalawun had risen to power, further improved the reforms linking the hierarchy of rank to the granting of igta‘at.”
For Ayyubid rulers the army had primarily been a tool for enforcing their decisions, which, of course, reflected on their advancement policies. Commanders were appointed according to the needs of the immediate circumstances, the status of the soldier in question and the length of his service only seldom taken into account.
There was no clearly defined hierarchy within the amir class, and Ayyubid military commanders did not serve in a specific Ayyubid army on a regular basis but were mercenaries who sold their services for specific periods of time. Thus there never arose a permanent hierarchical framework among the amir class and no linkage ever existed between administrative and court offices and military rank. In general, only a small number of military personnel filled administrative and court offices.”° Obviously, such procedures left no room in the Ayyubid army for the creation of a defined advancement path and failed to encourage individual soldiers to try and make it up the ranks.
The absence of a hierarchy in the Ayyubid army is evident from the system of ranks it used. Distinct terms indicating some kind of rank in the Ayyubid army are amir, amir isfahsalar, and amir kabir. The term amir was used to describe a senior office-holder but did not define his duties. The rank of amir isfahsalar may have been equal to that of amir tablkhana, the amir of forty during the reigns of Baybars and Qalawtn. Amir kabir appears to hint at some abStract part of an amir’s position, such as status and seniority. The appointment to a military rank in the Ayyubid army was not part of standard procedure, and the rank itself was subject to changes at the whim of both the appointer and the appointee, and to local custom.
In contrast, the system of ranks Baybars established was a permanent one while he endowed those ranks which had survived from the Ayyubid period with new significance. It was Baybars who decided upon a military hierarchy of amir of ten, amir of forty, and amir of one hundred. Each rank was linked to the size of the military force, i.e., number of mounted soldiers the rank-holder was entitled to maintain, and thus a clear command framework was established. Moreover, amirs of one hundred could be given the command of one thousand troops in the battlefield. This rank was called taqgdimat alf (command of one thousand) and the amir of one hundred who held it mugaddam alf.”’
A similar hierarchic pyramid soon developed also for courtiers and administration personnel, since these posts were increasingly filled by Mamluks.”* The characteristics of the court offices of ustadhaldar, hajib, amir jandar, and khdazindar, in existence from the Ayyubid period, were changed by Baybars,” and he added the new offices of dawddar, amir akhur, rwius al-nuwab, amir malylis, and others.*? “And it was al-Malik al-Zahir who, during his reign, began [to appoint] office-holders from among the amirs and the rank-and-file soldiers [ibtada’a fi dawlatihi bi-arbab al-waza@’if min al-umara@ wa-l-jund], and even though some [of the offices] had existed before his time, they were not as they had been before [ falam takun ‘ala hadhihi al-sigha abadan}.”*' Qalawin further added new offices.** Most of these offices were mainly ceremonial in nature and directly connected to one or another of the constituent elements of the distinct Mamluk government and military hierarchy.
During the reign of Qalawun dress came to provide further evidence of the hierarchy of rank and igta‘at in the Mamluk army. During the Ayyubid period all troops had worn the same type of clothing, but in Qalawun’s time new forms of dress became a means of differentiating between ranks.”
The sources give no evidence of the existence of military schools and barracks, al-tibaq, for the Royal Mamluks prior to Baybars’s rule: “And he [Baybars] established... barracks for the mamluks which overlooked the great al-Dirka gate and inside al-Qarafa gate he built... a big building with small halls for the mamluks’ quarters and above them barracks for those who were married.”** Later, during the rule of al-Nasir Muhammad, the number of barracks apparently reached seventeen, while according to al-Zahiri there were twelve during the 15th century.* These barracks and their growing number are also indicative of the institutionalization of the Mamluk army. Baybars, moreover, built stables for his own horses and their equipment and four stables for the mounts of his mamluks.”*°
During Baybars’s reign tournaments and military maneuvers were introduced in the Mamluk army and, again, later perfected. Thus, lance tournaments became part of the military training during Baybars’s rule, to be refined by Qalawun’s mamluks.*’ Baybars introduced a horseback target game, al-gabaq, for which he built a hippodrome bearing the game’s name. The game itself was further improved during the reign of Qalawin and his son, al-Ashraf Khalil.*® From 666/1267 until the reign of al-Nasir Muhammad, this hippodrome was the main training site for the sultan’s army.”
Baybars had the habit of visiting the hippodrome each day, between noon and the evening prayer, to supervise the amirs and mamluks and to encourage them in their tournaments. His presence inspired every amir and mamluk to reach the height of his ability and thus greatly influenced standards of training.*° Baybars also insisted that military training be carried out under strenuous conditions.*’ Every now and again, he would go out disguised as a rankand-file soldier in order to check how training was being carried out without his supervision. In this and other ways, Baybars succeeded in maintaining his army at the highest pitch of performance.** In 662/1263, e.g., Baybars ordered maneuvers for the entire army with full equipment: “And not one of them (the soldiers) was occupied with anything other than the arts of war, like using the lance... and they became very proficient in military exercises [wala ishtaghala ahad minhum illa bi-naw‘ min anwa al-harb ka-lramh... wa-tafannani fi anwda‘ al-furisiyya].
Baybars furthermore established the mawkib, the procession whereby the sultan paraded through the streets accompanied by ceremonial officers and part of the army. The mawkib had definite military characteristics and became a standard procedure in the Mamluk state until the beginning of the 15th century, when it was discontinued by Sultan al-Nasir Faraj.“
Important also is the efficient system of intelligence and mail services, al-barid, which Baybars established.* Well known in the Islamic world from the Umayyad period, this system was based upon waystations which housed fully equipped horses and homing pigeons taking messages to and from the sultan. During Baybars’s reign the system was the epitome of efficiency and no one would dare to use its horses without special order from the sultan.*° The obvious link between a highly efficient intelligence service and superior military deployment was not lost on Baybars.
Baybars’s reforms and Qalawun’s after him naturally also extended to the Mamluk training system, for this was designed to prepare the Mamluk cadres for their future positions in the army. Contemporary sources reveal an extensive correlation between the mamluks’ initial training and their performance and advancement during their military career, indicating that the Mamluk training system, too, was set up in the spirit of the new norms both sultans had introduced into the army. It was these norms which future generations came to look upon and venerate as the traditional Mamluk way.
Principles of Training
Mamluk training was based on the principle of loyalty. Its primary element was the inculcation of khushdashiyya, i.e., the fostering of a common bond between mamluks who belonged to the household of a single master and their loyalty towards him.*’ It was this sense of loyalty which bound Mamluk factions together, and in the case of the sultan, khushdashiyya among his mamluks was the mainstay of his rule and endowed him with the necessary power and authority.
Because this bond between mamluk and master greatly influenced the political stability of the Mamluk state, maintaining a clearly defined, tightly knit framework for Mamluk training and military advancement became of prime importance and great efforts were invested in securing it. For the ruler, this framework had the advantage that it made it fairly easy for him to handle the mamluks— it left no room for a mamluk’s personal aspirations except within the dictates of the system.
Mamluk training methods were based on a rigid hierarchy, special attention being given to the interim periods during which the mamluk prepared himself for one of the next stages he had to pass through from the moment of his purchase to his emancipation and recruitment into the army.
According to the traditional procedures as described by al-Magrizi, the mamluk was purchased at an early age: “And the order was that the traders should bring only young mamluks [al-mamalik alsighar].”“® The mamluks purchased by the sultan were the pick of those brought by the traders,” while the rest were purchased by the amirs and others: “(.. .) Each time one of the traders in mamluks came to [the sultan’s trader], he had to warn the [other] traders not to sell those mamluks suitable for service with the sultan to one of the amirs, whoever he might be; he had to warn them with all the force at his command, and if he found suitable mamluks of superior quality [min al-jins al-jayyid], they had to sign an agreement of purchase with him.... ”°°
The historian Baybars al-Mansiri (645—725/1247-—1325) was purchased as a young mamluk by Qalawin when the latter was still an amir at the beginning of Sultan al-Zahir Baybars’s reign.”' Baybars al-Mansuri’s descriptions of his experiences during his education as a mamluk and later, during his military service, are of salient importance since they offer us a first-hand account of the methods used during the reigns of Sultans Baybars and Qalawan—according to Ibn Taghri Birdi, Baybars al-Mansuri was more conversant with the history of the period of al-Zahir Baybars than other historians who were office-holders in Baybars’s service: “And he knows more of [al-Zahir Baybars’s] motives than anyone else [wa-huwa a‘raf bi-ahwalihi min ghayrihi].””*
From Baybars al-Mansuri we learn that his purchase at an early age was not an extraordinary event at all. During the initial period of his training, al-Mansuri was one of a number of boys who because of their young age were put together to form a class: “I was one of the young boys [kuntu ma‘didan fi jumlat al-sibyan al-sighar].”” Additional evidence can be found in the biographies of several amirs. Amirs Kunduk al-Zahiri, Shams al-Din Sunqur al-Alfi, and Badr al-Din Bilik al-Khazindar were all purchased by Sultan Baybars when they were young,” and Sultan Qalawin purchased ‘Alam al-Din Sanjar al-Shuja‘i and Balaban al-Tabbakhi as youngsters.” Qalawiun “raised” Amir Qajqar “as a son [rabbahu fi sughrihi kal-walad]’.°° Husam al-Din Lajin grew up in the house of Qalawin in Cairo at the time when the latter was an amir in al-Zahir Baybars’s army,’ and a similar case was that of Arghin al-Dawadar who was purchased by Qalawun at an early age and grew up together with Qalawin’s son, al-Nasir Muhammad.” Zayn al-Din Kitbugha al-Mansuri was bought by Qalawun from among the prisoners taken at the first battle of Hims against the Mongols (659/1260) when he was “a lad, or possibly an adolescent [wa-huwa shabb wa-la‘allahu kana fi sinn buligh al-hilm]’.° Al-Nuwayri provides a conflicting version of this story and claims that Kitbugha was already an adult at the time of his purchase from among the prisoners. The first version, however, of this story is the more feasible as Kitbugha died in 702/1302 when he was “middle-aged [ft sinn al-kuhila]”’,” which means that he must indeed have been young, at best an ado-lescent, when he was captured. Furthermore, al-Safadi claims that Kitbugha, Qarasunqur and Turuntay were all nearly the same age,®! and the sources are unanimous on the fact that Qarasunqur was very young at the time of his capture. Shams al-Din Qarasunqur al-Mansuri, who apparently belonged to the Christian inhabitants of the village of Qara,” was bought or captured as a child after the village had been taken by the Mamluks in 664/1265.° And his was not an isolated event: Following the conquest of the village, “the children of the village were taken as mamluks and trained together with the Turkish mamluks in Egypt and some of them became soldiers and amirs [wa-ukhidhat sibyanahum mamalik faruttibu bayn al-turk fi al-diyar al-misriyya fa-sara minhum ajnad wa-umara’|”.™ Taken together with Baybars al-Mansiri’s testimony that mamluks were trained in peer groups, the incorporation of these Christian children from Qara into the Turkish Mamluk groups may be seen as a Clear indication of the age of the Turkish mamluks, who were then the majority in the Mamluk army. Another source of young mamluks were the Mongols, the Uwayratiyya, who voluntarily chose to serve the Mamluks in Egypt; their sons were taken as mamluks at an early age by the amirs in Egypt.
Once the property of a master, the young mamluk was given religious education which continued until he reached adulthood.” It was said of Baybars: “And he arranged a teacher for each group of mamluks who would teach them the Qur’an and an imam who would lead them in prayer... .”°’ As soon as he had become adult, the mamluk embarked on his military training: “And when he had reached adulthood, they started to teach him [the arts of] warfare, such as archery, throwing the spear... .”°* For example, when Baybars al-Mansuri was nearing adulthood, he was under training with the units supporting the troops who took part in the battle of Arsuf in 663/1264.° This stage of Mamluk education was extremely rigorous and came to an end only when the mamluk had reached the proper standard in his military specialization: “until he acquired the complete and necessary knowledge [hatta yablugha al-ghaya fi ma‘rifat ma yahtaju ilayhi].”" Baybars’s mamluks are described by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir as being highly proficient in their skills,” while Qalawun spent the same amount of dedicated training on his mamluks when he taught them the finer points of archery, not relenting until they had achieved expert mastery.”
The mamluk’s training period at the time of the early sultans was a long one, extending over several years. Ibn Taghri Birdi attests to the fact that Barquq (784—801/1382—1399) emulated these educational methods when he allowed only one class of mamluks to graduate each year after a long period of training whereas with his predecessors this had been two classes a year.” Their long period of training served to inculcate the mamluks with a specific code of conduct which included modesty, order, and strictness. During the entire period they dressed in clothes of simple cotton and flax,” and were under the constant scrutiny of their teachers and instructors to ensure that there were no deviations from the established code of conduct:
And they (the mamluks) had a group of instructors and senior disciplinary officers who inspected each one strictly, reproved them severely [if they infringed upon the rules] and demanded an accounting for their deeds [wa-lahum uzma min al-khuddam wa-akabir min rwiis al-nuwab yafhasina ‘an al-wahid al-fahs al-shafi wa-yu’akhidhinahu ashadd al-muw’akhadha wa-yunagqishinahu ‘ala harakatihi wasakanatihi].”°
Sharaf al-Din al-Zahiri (d. 689/1290) was mugaddam al-mamalik al-sultaniyya” (the head of the Royal Mamluk schools) during the reigns of both Baybars and Qalawin. The sources describe him as one who “was... awe-inspiring, who had a compelling presence, tremendous control, and who commanded great respect from the mamluks. He was highly respected by the kings and amirs, and only seldom was there a mamluk amir of al-Zahir, al-Sa‘id and al-Mansur that Tawashi Mukhtass had not either struck, cursed, or tried. And they had fear in their hearts and great respect for him.”” It was said of Shihab al-Din Fakhir (or Qajir) al-Mansuri who filled the same post, that “he commanded respect and great influence among the Royal Mamluks. Veteran mamluks respected him and junior mamluks feared him. He was a noble soul.” An assessment of Fakhir’s superior educational methods can be found in Ibn Taghri Birdi when of the education received by Aruqtay al-Mansuri he writes: “He was given the best education by Tawashi Fakhir.””
As the above makes clear, stringent discipline was an insoluble part of the mamluk’s military training, foremost so as to foster a sense of respect for authority. Baybars demanded strict discipline from his mamluks while at the same time setting a personal example through his own behaviour.®° The same goes for Qalawin,®! who was described as “a great influence on his mamluks, one who put terror in their hearts, and who never allowed them to do repulsive deeds [kana dhu [!] satwa ‘ala mamalikthi la yuhsinu lahum fil qabih qattu).””
Principles of Advancement
At the end of his period of education and training, the mamluk underwent a ceremony of emancipation from servitude and was brought into his master’s military service.’ Thereafter, his advancement was a gradual one. At the beginning of his military career, the mamluk first filled a number of small jobs through which the code of conduct and military skills that he had acquired during his training were meant to find full expression: “And when he joined the men, he was given an adequate post. He was to fill it according to the training he had received during his youth.’** According to Baybars al-Mansuri, the mamluks’ gradual advancement was designed to provide them with as rich an experience as possible, intended to assist them once they reached the upper echelons of the military hierarchy. We find evidence of this period of service in the advancement of the mamluk, for example, in the career of Amir Husam al-Din Lajin, when he served Qalawun before he became sultan, and Amir al-Hajj Al Malik, who “advanced gradually through various jobs until he was made an amir [taraqqa fi alkhidma hatta ummira}.”*®
As he progressed from job to job, the mamluk’s salary during this period of service also increased gradually, from three to ten dinars, depending on the job he filled.®’ Considering that the average igta‘ of a halga soldier brought its owner an income of some sixty dinars a month,® these wages were extremely modest. (The iqta‘ of the halga troops themselves were again, of course, of much lower value than those of the Royal Mamluks.) It is therefore not surprising that Aqish al-Afram, who was one of Qalawiin’s senior amirs, claimed he had been in constant need when he served as a mamluk.*”
Outside their normal wages mamluks and amirs were given special grants for valour in battle or outstanding performance in military training. In 671/1272, Baybars gave Qalawin a special reward for his bravery in the battle against the Mongols at al-Bira.”” Those who excelled at al-gabaq tournaments were given rewards—amirs received horses complete with saddle and harness, while rank-andfile mamluks were given fine garment.”’ Of Amir Kurji it is reported that when he was despatched from the battlefield to inform Baybars of the conquest of Lesser Armenia by the Mamluks (664/ 1265), Baybars saw that he had the makings of an excellent soldier and awarded him the rank of amir tablkhana.”
When Sultan al-‘Adil Kitbugha (694-696/1294—1296) at one point decided to deviate from the norm and award the rank of amir of forty to Mongol soldiers immediately upon their arrival in Egypt from the Persian Ilkhanate (695/1295—6) even before their conversion to Islam, the outrage felt by the mamluks at this breach of the accepted code clearly indicates that this period of service was considered yet another obligatory and important stage in accepted Mamluk advancement. Referring to this incident, Baybars al-Mansiri criticizes Sultan Kitbugha:
And it would have been proper if they had advanced through the ranks gradually before being awarded command rank and if he (Kitbugha) had waited until they had converted to Islam, and when they had become Muslims and performed the rituals so that their conversion was assured, only then should he have promoted those suitable and awarded them a wage based upon land income [akhbaz] and an amirate. And when the Islamic amirs saw what he had done with them without due consideration, and promoted them prior to the most respected mamluks, they despised this act.”
Thus, describing the rule to which Kitbugha should have adhered Baybars al-Mansiri corroborates that mamluks went through a definite period of service before they could be awarded the rank of amir. This also verifies al-Magqrizi’s descriptions.
The excerpt above furthermore shows that there were accepted military criteria for the award of an amirate. An incident in the biography of Amir Sayf al-Din Salar bears this out. Al-Malik al-Salih, the son of Qalawin who was appointed regent,” returned from the hunt one day with a large haul, some of which he sent to Qalawiin and Turuntay, the nd’ib al-saltana, and other amirs. The mamluk sent to divide the haul was Salar. Just as it was being displayed before Qalawun, Turuntay came to see him on government matters, and when Qalawin asked him what he thought would be a suitable reward for Salar on the successful completion of his task, Turuntay answered that al-Malik al-Salih would no doubt be pleased if Salar were awarded the rank of amir of ten. Qalawun then replied: “‘Turuntay, in the name of Allah, a country in which Salar is an amir of ten is not a country! [wa-allahi dawla yakiun, fiha Salar amir ‘ashara dawlat kadha].’ And he commanded that he be granted five thousand dirhams and did not approve the rank of amir of ten... .””° This same Salar later became n@’ib al-saltana in Egypt and the sources describe him as “one of the most courageous and wise mamluks.””° Salar’s military status and personal qualities all indicate that he was indeed worthy of the amirate rank which he later received.?’? Since Qalawiin was renowned for his objective attitude to his mamluks—”He favoured those in whom he detected noble traits, whoever they might be’”’*—his objection to awarding an amirate to Salar could only mean that at the time of the above-mentioned incident Qalawun did not think Salar had yet fulfilled his criteria. ;
Throughout the reigns of Baybars and Qalawun, evidence remains of the strict trend towards slow advancement and of a hierarchy founded on Mamluk seniority and military talents. Baybars “awarded amirates to those who deserved them and appointed commanders [of the mamluks] who were suitable for command [... wa-ammara man yastahiqqu al-imra wa-qaddama ‘alayhim man yasluhu lil-taqdima].’”’ Several examples illustrate Baybars’s methods. In his book, Mufarrij al-Kurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyub, Ibn Wasil gives the personal account of Jamal al-Din Ibn Nahar concerning Baybars’s objective and uncompromising attitude towards the advancement of his mamluks in comparison to others.'” Ibn Nahar relates that once al-Zahir Baybars observed something from his window that obviously aroused his ire. Later, Amir Badr al-Din Bilik al-Khazindar came into the room, whereupon Baybars reprimanded him for having behaved disrespectfully towards his (Baybars’s) colleagues in that he had failed to acknowledge their greetings while on his horse—Baybars’s colleagues were senior mamluks while he, Bilik, one of Baybars’s mamluks, was young in years and junior to them in rank. Baybars ordered him flogged so as to maintain the firm trust of his colleagues. When he explained his motives for this act to Ibn Nahar, Baybars said that as ruler he was obliged to act objectively towards all his troops, and he illustrated this with his attitude towards the mamluks closest to him: “Among my bodyguard [halga] there are men who love me and whom I love, and their incomes from the land [akhbaz] are small, and there are also men who hate me and whom I hate, but their incomes from the land are great. And I cannot bear the consequences if I were to take the good akhbdaz from those who hate me and give them to those who love me, for I am Bilik’s master.”?®!
Other examples come from the biographies of Baybars’s amirs. Amir Aqsunqur al-Fariqani was awarded the rank of amir of ten after he had captured the ruler of Antioch during the Mamluk conquest of 666/1267.'° He was later promoted from amir of ten to amir of forty following the successful completion of an espionage mission by a Mamluk unit under his command in the al-Jazira region.'°? Hasan, one of Atlas Khan’s men, was awarded the rank of amir of forty for valour in the battle of Acre in 660/1261.'% Amir Balaban al-Rumi al-Dawadar, one of Baybars’s trusted confidants, was in charge of intelligence affairs during his reign, at first together with Husam al-Din Lajin al-Aydamuri, and later alone. Despite his distinguished position, Balaban al-Rumi never attained senior amir status. According to one version, he was awarded amir of ten while, according to another, he did not attain amirate rank at all: “And despite this special position, he was one of al-Malik al-Zahir’s amirs of ten, and some say just a simple soldier.”'™
In his description of his personal career as a mamluk before he became an amir, Baybars al-Mansiri affirms of Qalawin that he, too, advanced all his mamluks gradually: “And this was his (Qalawitn’s) custom in his attitude towards the rest of his servants (mamluks in his service), to be slow in the award of their ranks during his rule [wa-kana hddha da’bahu fi sa@’ir khuddamihi an yaniya ma‘a [?] maratibihim fi ayyamihi].”'© Baybars al-Mansiri had reached Egypt as a mamluk in 660/1261, and only some twentytwo years later, on 14 Rabi‘ al-Awwal, 682/12 June 1283, was he first awarded the rank of amir. The igta‘ of his amirate was enough to support fifteen tawdshi. From the text of the order awarding the igta®, al-manshur,'"’ we learn that Baybars was awarded amirate rank because of his talents and his seniority in the service of his master: “... and he has the astuteness of a commander and service long enough to make him a [suitable] candidate for election [as an amir] ... [wa-lahu nabaha tugaddimuhu ...wa-qgidam khidma turashshihuhu ... }.”'®
A year later, on 5 Shawwal 683/16 December 1284, Baybars alMansitri was awarded the rank of amir of forty and an igta‘ which could support fifty cavalrymen.'” When he was awarded the niydba of Karak in Sha‘ban 685/October 1286, he was made an amir of eighty, and served in this post for five years.'!° Baybars al-Mansiri thus served for about twenty-five years before he reached the rank of amir of eighty, and yet this was not the pinnacle of military rank in the Mamluk army at the time. This he attained when in 693/1293—4, at the beginning of al-Nasir Muhammad’s first reign, he was awarded the office of head of court correspondence, diwan al-insh@’, and made amir of one hundred and commander of one thousand."
From the biographies of the amirs who received their Mamluk training during the reign of Qalawun, we learn that Baybars alMansiuri’s advancement path was not uncommon and that his claim that Qalawun advanced his mamluks slowly was in no way intended as an apology for his own slow advancement but was indeed a true reflection of Qalawiin’s methods. Amirs Al Malik al-Hajj, Aydamur al-Shuja‘i, Aybak al-Mawsili, Arjuwash al-Jamdar, Bahadur al-Mansuri, Baybars al-Shuja‘i, Baktamur al-Husami, Baktamur al-Silahdar, Balaban al-Tabbakhi, Jawarshi al-Mansiri, Husam alDin Turuntay, Sayf al-Din Salar, Sanjar al-Shuja‘’, Qifjaq al-Mansiri, Shams al-Din Qarasunqur, and Kitbugha al-Mansiuri all underwent long periods of service as mamluks before they were awarded amirate rank.!!2
Two features characterized the award of appointments during the reign of Qalawin as they had during Baybars’s reign. The first was their permanence. It was said of Baybars’s policy: “And everyone whom al-Malik al-Zahir appointed of the provinces’ governors and others was diligent in his office during [the entire] period of his reign, and he did not relieve a single one of his duties [walam yubaddil bi-ahad minhum].”'’*? Husam al-Din Lajin al-Darfil, e.g., was Baybars’s dawddar from his accession until his death.'"
During Qalawin’s reign, important office-holders were relieved of their offices only in weighty circumstances, such as when they had broken the sultan’s trust.''? The following amirs, for example, held office from the time of Qalawtn’s accession until his death: Husam al-Din Turuntay was nda’ib al-saltana and atabak al-‘asakir in Egypt,''® Husam al-Din Lajin was nd’ib of Damascus,'!’ Balaban al-Tabbakhi was na’ib of Hisn al-Akrad,'"® Zayn al-Din Kitbugha was na’ib al-ghayba,''? while Qarasunqur al-Jikandar became nd’ib of Aleppo in 680/1281 and was still in office when Qalawin died.'”° In 679/1280, Sayf al-Din Qajqgar al-Manstri was appointed na’ib of Safad, an office he held until his death in 686/1287.
The second feature that affected the award of appointments during the rule of Qalawun was that most of his appointments were senior amirs who had served him prior to his accession to rule. Evidence of this can be found in a list of forty amirs mentioned by Baybars al-Mansuri in his review of the period of Qalawtn’s rule who all attained senior posts. Their common denominator is that they came from the ranks of “the senior and respected Mansuri Royal Mamluks in his service from the time of the amirate, who had seniority [gidam al-hijra| and served him through good times and bad.”!”* The words gidam al-hijra refer to seniority in the Mamluk army but their use also indicates a special dimension to the mamluks’ standing as Muslims. Like the first converts to Islam who had migrated with the Prophet from Mecca to Medina, they had left their home countries to become mamluks serving Islam, and as the principle of deciding the leadership after the death of the Prophet was based upon precedence in Islam, the senior mamluks, by the same token, felt entitled to assume leadership over their colleagues.'”
In another passage in which Baybars al-Mansuri describes Qalawtin’s advancement methods in detail, he repeats that advancement was based upon seniority and executive skills: “And he (Qalawun) appointed each man endowed with talent [rabb wazifa] to a suitable post [wazifa la’iga bi-mithlihi] for he awarded first his senior mamluks the rank of amir of forty, then his second-rank mamluks amir of twenty and fifteen, and his third-rank mamluks amir of ten and of lesser igta‘at; and they advanced with years and later received fiefs of amir of one hundred, became experienced amirs and experienced in administration [fa-kanu bi-l-imra mudabbirin wa-fi al-tadbir mujarrabin].”'™*
Together with consistent and strict adherence to these customs of appointment it was the system of hierarchy which contained the model of Mamluk society and consolidated its framework. Status symbols, over and above economic standing expressed in the stratified granting of igta‘at, were part of the mamluks’ life during the entire period of their military service. As mentioned earlier, the standing of the amirs during the reign of Qalawin was distinguished by their dress, the different ranks each marked by a particular dress.!?5 One item of clothing used in this way was the sash. The sash of a commander of one thousand cost 300 dinars, that of an amir of forty, 200, while that of a commander of the halga cost between 100 and 150 dirhams.'*° Commanders of one thousand wore golden sashes on ceremonial occasions to emphasize their special status.
At the annual ceremony at which the sultan allotted horses to the mamluks, the amirs of one hundred were given horses complete with saddle and harness, while the others were given horses only, which was also intended to “make the prominent among them stand out from the rank and file [tamyiz khassatihim ‘ala ‘ammatihim].””!?"
Since the importance of the hierarchy had been an essential part of his training and military service, naturally a mamluk who was awarded the rank of amir guarded the essence and insignia of his new status jealously, conscious of the benefits that came with his new rank:
And when the mamluk attained a senior position and high rank, he knew its value and how the hardships he had known [compared with] the convenience [it afforded him] [fa-idhad wasala ila manzila kabira wa-rutba ‘aliya ‘arafa miqdaraha wa-ma kana fithi min al-shaqa@ wa-ma sara ilayhi min al-na‘im].'*
It was this awareness on the part of the mamluk of the importance of his standing which, in turn, formed one of the main factors of the consolidation of Mamluk tradition: While it inspired him to hold on to his position, it reinforced his sense of solidarity with all of Mamluk society. The result of such an overriding identification was an utmost degree of respect for the dictates of the Mamluk elite and of awe for the authority of government, in particular that of his master, the sultan.
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