Download PDF | The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades_ Extracted and Translated from the Chronicle of Ibn Al-Qualānisī
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INTRODUCTION THE DAMASCUS CHRONICLE
THE absence of contemporary Arabic records of the First Crusade and its immediate sequel has been generally remarked by historians, though it is recognized that Ibn al-Athir and the subsequent Arabic compilers must have utilized contemporary materials for their work. Some years ago, however, one of the Arabic manuscripts preserved in the Bodleian Library (Hunt. 125) was found to contain the supposedly lost “‘ Continuation of the Chronicle of Damascus” of Ibn al-Qalanisi, a work which is frequently quoted by later writers, but which was thought to deal with a period posterior to the Second Crusade. Examination of the manuscript showed that more than two-thirds of the book was devoted to the history of the first sixty years of the Crusades, and the late H. F. Amedroz, recognizing its importance, edited and published the text in 1908, together with a summary of contents, notes, and extracts from other unpublished sources. Owing to lack of a translation the recovery of this chronicle seems to have passed unnoticed by European historians, and the extracts contained in the present volume constitute the first attempt to make it accessible to Western scholarship.
Of the author of the “Damascus Chronicle ”’ scarcely anything can be gathered from the work itself. Fortunately, however, brief but sufficient particulars of his life are to be found both in the biographical dictionary of famous men of Damascus compiled by his younger contemporary Ibn “Asakir, and in the pages of several later historians, thanks to their pious custom of closing the annals of each year with short obituaries of notable men deceased in its course.
Hamza son of Asad, known as Abu Ya ‘la, belonged to an old-established and respected family of Damascus, which boasted descent from the Arab tribe of Tamim and bore the surname of al-Oalanisi (‘‘the Hatter’’). Like most upperclass citizens, he was well educated in literature, theology and law, and went into public service as a secretary in the Correspondence Bureau or Chancery (Diwan al-Rasa’1l), of which, apparently, he rose to be head (‘amid). In addition, he twice held the highest civil office in the city, that of vais or Mayor, though the exact functions attached to this office are not quite clear to us. The same post was held also by his nephew in later years (A.H. 548; Arabic text p. 325). He died on Friday 7th First Rabi‘ 555 (18th March, 1160), Over ninety years of age, his elder brother Muhammad having predeceased him in January, 1145 at the age of eighty-four (both, of course, reckoned in lunar years). He was therefore, already of mature age when the First Crusade burst upon Syma and though he does not appear to have taken any part in the actual fighting, his Chronicle is of exceptional interest as presenting acontemporary account of the fortunes of the Crusaders, 1n so far as they were known at Damascus, from the beginning of the Crusades down to the year of his death.
Apart from his poems, many of which he quotes, the Chronicle seems to be the only literary work undertaken by Ibn al-Qalanisi. The composition and title of the book, ‘‘ Continuation of the Chronicle of Damascus”’ (Dhatl or Mudhayyal Ta'vikh Dimashgq), show that it was intended as a supplement to an earlier Chronicle, the work of the famous historian Hilal b. al-Muhassin al-Sabi’, from the point where it was interrupted by the death of its author in A.H. 448 (1056). On the other hand, whereas Hilal’s Chronicle was universal in its scope, Ibn al-Qalanisi’s continuation (together with the extracts from the earlier work which he prefaced to it) is centred on the city of Damascus and treats only incidentally of events in other regions.
It was, in all probability, the facilities offered to him by his official connections which led him to this undertaking, since the entire period with which he deals was covered by the lives of his father and himself. The information which he gives is derived from oral and written reports, sometimes taken down from the lips of actual participants. It is perhaps remarkable that he should so seldom quote documents, though many of his narratives doubtless give the gist of documentary materials. Most of them were apparently written down at the time when they were received and subjected to revision afterwards, as is evident from many indications in the text, such as the frequent use of the present tense, especially in the later sections. One obvious advantage of his work in consequence is the accuracy of his chronology of events. For the rest, he himself explains his methods of compilation in an excursus under date A.H. 540 (Arabic text p. 283) :
I have completed the narrative of events set forth in this chronicle, and I have arranged them in order and taken precautions against error and rashness of judgment and careless slips in the materials which I have transcribed from the mouths of trustworthy persons and have transmitted after exerting myself to make the fullest investigations so as to verify them, down to this blessed year 540. Since the year 535 and down to this point I had been engaged with matters which distracted my mind from making the fullest enquiries into those current events which required to be set down in this book, and from seeking out the truth concerning them and all the attendant circumstances. Consequently I left a blank space after the events of each year, in order to insert therein those narratives and events the truth of which was ascertained.
The importance of the “‘ Damascus Chronicle ”’ for the history of the early Crusades is evident from the fact that it formed one of the primary sources of all subsequent Arabic historians. It was extensively quoted by Sibt ibn al-Jawzi and Ibn al-Athir in their general histories and by Abi Shama in his biographical work on Nir al-Din, as well as by numerous later writers. As the works of all these compilers have been translated and utilized by modern historians of the Crusades, there is little of its contents that is entirely new. By itself also, it presents a one-sided view of the Crusades, since the interest of the writer was concentrated on Damascus, and he therefore devotes much more attention to the neighbouring kingdom of Jerusalem than to the struggle of the northern Crusading states with the principalities of Aleppo and Mosul. For this aspect of the Crusades it is necessary to supplement his history by the “Aleppo Chronicle’? of Kamal al-Din,' who, though he occasionally quotes Ibn al-Qalanisi verbatim, based his narrative on independent local SOUrCES. ?
Nevertheless the original work of Ibn alQOalanisi still retains so much material not utilized by the later compilers, and so many features of its own, that it will form an indispensable source for all future students of the early Crusades. It makes it possible, for example, to trace for the first time the hardening of Muslim feeling against the Crusaders, and the stages by which the mutual jealousies of the Muslim princes were overborne by the rising temper of the people, which came to expression in the reign of Nir al-Din and culminated in the great revanche under Saladin. In the writings of the generation contemporary with Saladin and even of one who, like Usama ibn Mungidh, lived through the earlier period but wrote his Memoirs late in life, this development is obscured. It is this fact which justifies the inclusion in these selections of what would other wise seem to be the excessive space given up to the record of the internal history of Damascus and its relations with other Muslim states. In addition to this, there are many episodes in regard to which the ‘““ Damascus Chronicle ”’ presents new material. Outstanding instances will be found in the lively accounts of the siege of Tyre in the winter of I1II-1112 below (pp. 121-5) and of the early activities of the ‘‘ Assassins ’”’ (pp. 187 ff). The close relations which, as Ibn al-Qalanisi shows, still existed between Damascus and the Fatimid court in Egypt also enabled him to give fairly full accounts of the sporadic Egyptian activities against the Crusaders. Moreover, the later chroniclers usually abridged his narratives very considerably, and in so doing omitted many details which are of value to the modern historian. One of the details thus omitted was the day of the week, which Ibn al-Qalanisi is generally careful to insert along with his dates, and which, by supplying a check upon the errors of copyists, is of special importance in determining the exact chronology.
On the other hand, the ‘‘ Damascus Chronicle ”’ presents difficulties of its own, particularly in regard to the language and style. In true diplomatic fashion Ibn al-Qalanisi frequently covers up his meaning with a mass of verbiage and vague phrases which make it difficult to gather the precise significance of his words. To the modern student this difficulty is enhanced by the peculianities of his vocabulary. Many usages of words are apparently peculiar to the Syrian style of his time, and while the Memoirs of Usama ibn Munqidh, the only other Syrian author of this period whose work is still extant, occasionally throw some light upon them, in most cases their meaning can only be inferred from the context. A number of these Arabic words and phrases are quoted in the footnotes, in the hope that others may correct the interpretation given in the text if it should prove to be faulty. Moreover, the reconstruction of a text from a single manuscript presents, as is well known, dangers in all languages, and in none more than in Arabic. Many readings are obviously corrupt, and the extracts from the “ Chronicle ”’ in later works give singularly little assistance in their correction, as most of the passages concerned have been omitted by the compilers. If undue liberties appear to have been taken with the text in consequence, it can only be pleaded that without such emendations it gave either no sense or an obviously wrong sense, and that where they could be tested by comparison with the excerpts given by later writers they have generally been found to be justified.
Since this version is primarily intended as a textbook for students, it has been the aim of the translator to render the Arabic text as literally as possible, neither adding to nor subtracting from the author’s own words and arrangement. For the same reason, the annotation has been kept down to a minimum, and no attempt has been made to correlate the narratives with those of the other Arabic chronicles and the western sources. Those who are most familiar with the pitfalls in the way of a first translation of an Arabic text will probably be the most ready to look with an indulgent eye upon its imperfections, and any corrections or observations which they may be kind enough to communicate will be welcomed.
SYRIA AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST CRUSADE
That the First Crusade owed its success in large measure to the weakness of the opposition which it encountered is a fact accepted by all modern historians. The complexity of the political situation in Syria at the end of the eleventh century and during the early decades of the twelfth, a complexity verging almost upon anarchy, is an element of the first importance in the history of the Crusades. Not only did it render the task of the invaders much less formidable than it would have been a few years earlier, but it also contributed greatly to the acquiescence of the Syrian princes in the establishment of the Crusading states, since the resulting political divisions followed on the whole traditional lines. The full appreciation of these circumstances naturally presents difficulties to the modern student, especially if he is unfamiliar with the background of oriental history against which the drama of the Crusades was staged, and a detailed analysis of conditions in Syria at this period forms a necessary preliminary to the study of the Arabic sources.
There were at this time six distinct forces which were in conflict with one another in Syria. These were: (1) the Fatimid empire ; (2) the local Arab tribes and princes; (3) the Saljtiqid Turkmen princes; (4) the Turkish military officers, or amirs; (5) the independent or non-Saljugid Turkmen tribes; (6) the general body of the population. It will probably be more helpful to deal with each of these elements separately than to follow a strictly chronological order of events. (1) The Fatimid Caliphate, which had established itself in North-West Africa in 909, and in 972 transferred its seat to Egypt, constituted a deliberate challenge to the religious headship of the Islamic world claimed by the “Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad. In order to press home their claim in Baghdad itself, it was necessary for them to hold Syria, and ever since their capture of Egypt they had made this their chief object, with the aid first of Berber troops from their African provinces and subsequently of Turkish slave-armies. In Syria, however, they encountered a bitter resistance, less on grounds of religious dogma! than from the ambition of the Arab Syrian princes to maintain their independence. Between 1038 and 1058 their authority was at length made effective throughout all Syria (with the exception of Antioch, held by the Greeks) and was recognized also in Western Mesopotamia; in the latter year their suzerainty was acknowledged even at Baghdad, thanks to the temporary success of a rebellious vassal of the “Abbasid government. From this moment, however, their power steadily declined, more especially after a prolonged economic and military crisis in Egypt (1062-1073) deprived them of the means of maintaining their authority. Aleppo was finally lost in 1060, Tnpoli and Tyre fell into the hands of local rulers, the governors in Damascus could not maintain themselves in face of military indiscipline, and the appearance of the Turkmen armies in Syria in 1070 led to the definitive loss not only of Damascus, but of the greater part of Palestine (including Jerusalem) as well.
The misrule of the first Turkmen general caused a general revulsion of popular feeling in favour of the Fatimids, but the opportunity was not followed up by effective military action. Sporadic expeditions were made into the interior, but they produced no results. On the other hand, the Egyptians were still powerful on sea, and thus succeeded in recovering (1089) the coast towns as far north as Jubail, and in holding them until the advent of the Crusaders. It will be seen from the pages of Ibn al-Qalanisi that, apart from the recapture of Jerusalem in 1098 and a few expeditions into southern Palestine during the rule of the great Armenian wazir al-Afdal, the share of the Fatimid state in the war operations in Syria was almost entirely confined to naval activities. In subsequent years the Fatimid armies were distracted by bitter internal feuds, and formed a greater danger to their rulers than to their enemies.
Nevertheless, it would be a serious mistake to assume that the influence of the Fatimids in Syria was entirely dissipated by their misfortunes and growing weakness. Our narratives show clearly that they still had a strong following both in the chief cities and in the outer districts, and that even the Saljtigid princes and their successors found it expedient to court their favour. The definite breach between the Fatimids and the Muslim princes of Syria seems to have come about only in the time and at the instance of Nur al-Din.
(2) The main opposition to the Fatimids in their attempts to establish their rule in Syria was offered by the shaikhs of semi-nomadic Arab tribes, who had created small principalities for themselves in, or taken possession of, various parts of the country. Transjordan and the western fringes of the Syrian desert were held by the tribe of Tayy, which was a perpetual thorn in their side in Palestine and remained to play a minor part in the history of the Crusades. Of greater political importance were the tribes of Mesopotamia, particularly the confederations of ‘Uqail and Kilab. The latter, under the leadership of the house of Mirdas, after half a century of struggle in northern Syria, finally succeeded in capturing Aleppo in 1060, only to lose it in 1079 to their ‘Uqailid rivals, who were at that time supporting the cause of the Saljiqids. The momentary expansion of the ‘Uqailid dominions from Aleppo to Mosul, however, brought them in turn into conflict with the Saljiiqid prince of Syria. In the upshot they were decimated and expelled from Aleppo and their Mesopotamian holdings, but two branches succeeded in maintaining themselves at Oal ‘at Ja ‘bar and on the Middle Euphrates until the time of Zanki and Nir al-Din.
It was not only the heads of great tribal groups, however, who succeeded in creating principalities for their own benefit in Syrian territory. At the time of the Fitst Crusade several important cities and fortresses were in the hands of local Arab rulers, who were able to maintain their independence by virtue of supple diplomacy and the dissensions of their more powerful neighbours. On the breakdown of the Fatimid government in 1070 the qadi of Tyre, Ibn Abi ‘Aqil, made himself independent, and held the city until it was recovered by the Egyptians in 1089. The qadi of Tripoli, Hasan ibn ‘Ammar, who revolted in the same year, was more fortunate, and Tripoli remained in the hands of successive members of the same family until its capture by the Crusaders.1 One of them, in 1080, even extended his rule to Jabala at the expense of the Greeks. It is noteworthy that neither in Tyre nor in Tripoli was the spiritual suzerainty of the Fatimid Caliph rejected, though the rulers of both sought the aid of the Turkmen invaders against iatimid attempts at the reconquest of their cities, and Ibn ‘Ammar at Tripoli claimed to possess a regular diploma of investiture from the Saljtiqid sultan at Baghdad.
A still more remarkable Arab principality was founded at Shaizar in 1081 by one ‘Ali ibn Mungidh, who bought the town and its citadel in that year from its Christian bishop. The tolerant policy which he pursued towards his Christian subjects stood his family in good stead, and the princes of Shaizar frequently figure in the annals of northern Syria until the entire family perished in the ruins of the citadel during the earthquakes of 1157. Usama ibn Mungqidh, the writer of those vivacious Memoirs ! which throw such a flood of light on the social history of the Crusading period, was a great-grandson of ‘Ali.
An adventurer of much less reputable character, Khalaf ibn Mula ‘ib, also succeeded in carving out an independent principality. He was originally established in Hims in 1082 by the ‘Uqailid prince of Aleppo, in order to form a buffer between himself and the Saljiiqid prince at Damascus, but was ejected thence in I0go0, and from Afamiya, whither he had betaken himself, in rogr. After some years of imprisonment in Isfahan he retired to Egypt, and was restored in 1096 or 1097 to Afamiya by the Fatimid Caliph, to whom the inhabitants of the town, in revolt against the Saljuqids, had sent a deputation to ask for a governor. The subsequent fate of Khalaf will be found in the extracts translated from Ibn alQOalanisi.
(3) The eleventh century witnessed an extensive migration of Turkmen tribes, known generally as the Ghuzz, from the borders of the Asiatic steppelands across Western Asia. The Saljiiqids were chieftains of one of these tribes, who succeeded in building up a strong military power, with which they established their authority successively in Khurasan, Persia, ‘Iraq, Armenia, and Anatolia. As strictly orthodox Sunnis, they constituted themselves the champions of the ‘Abbasid Caliphs of Baghdad, and were in consequence declared enemies of the Fatimid Caliphs of Cairo. The first Ghuzz bands appeared in Syria shortly before 1070. In that year one of their leaders, Atsiz, seized Palestine on behalf of the Saljuqid Sultan Alp-Arslan, who in the ‘same year made the ‘Uqailid prince of Aleppo his vassal. In 1075, Atsiz captured Damascus from the leader of the Berber garrison, but was defeated in the following year in an attack upon the outposts of Egypt— to the great joy of the Damascenes, who detested his tyranny.
The failure of Atsiz may have been in part responsible for the decision of Alp-Arslan’s successor, Malikshah, to dispatch his brother Tutush into Syria with a Saljigid army in 1077, at the same time investing him with the possession of “everything which he could conquer in Syria.”’ Tutush had little difficulty in seizing Damascus and recovering Palestine from the Fatimids, but Aleppo resisted his assaults. Indeed, Malikshah twice intervened in person in order, it would almost seem, to protect Aleppo against his brother. On the first occasion the ‘Uqailid prince had attempted to form an alliance with the Fatimids against Tutush ; Malikshah thereupon occupied the city at the close of 1082, but restored it to the ‘Uqailid as his vassal. Two years later, the Saljiqid Sultan of Anatolia, Sulaiman ibn Qutulmish, invaded northern Syria, recovered Antioch, and subsequently killed the ‘Uqailid in battle, but failed to capture Aleppo. A conflict then broke out (1086) between Sulaiman and Tutush, in the course of which Sulaiman was killed and Tutush seized Aleppo. Malikshah again intervened, occupied Aleppo, Antioch and al-Ruha (Edessa), and handed them over as fiefs to Turkish generals, Aleppo falling to the share of Aq-Sunqur, the father of Zanki.
During the next few years these generals loyally seconded the efforts of Tutush to extend the Saljtiqid dominions in Syma and to overthrow the power of the ‘Uqailids in Mesopotamia and DiyarBakr. Meanwhile, Malikshah had died (November 1092) and was succeeded as Sultan by his son Barkyarugq. But Tutush coveted the imperial title for himself and marched into Khurasan. His first attempt was, however, frustrated by the decision of Aq-Sunqur of Aleppo and several of his fellow generals to support Barkyadruq, and he was forced to retire to Syria in order to deal with them. In May, 1094, he routed the combined forces of Aleppo, al-Ruha, and Mosul, executed Aq-Sunqur and his allies, seized their cities, and once again marched into Khurasan. For a few months he was publicly proclaimed as Sultan, until Barkyadruq resumed the offensive and on 26th February, 1095, routed his forces near Rayy (Teheran). Tutush himself perished on the field, at the hands, it is said, of the troops of Aq-Sunqur. It was this battle which decided the fate of the First Crusade. Had the Crusaders been met with the combined resources of the unitary kingdom built up by Tutush, history would certainly have been rewritten; as it was, his hard-won Synan possessions were again disintegrated by the rivalties of his sons Rudwan and Duq&aq and the jealousy and self-seeking of his former generals.
(4) In the course of the tenth century the old bureaucratic administration of the Caliphate and the states which arose on its ruins had gradually given way to a military system of government. The governors of cities and provinces were selected from amongst the military ‘commanders or amirs, who were in most cases Turkish ex-slaves, and these governors not only enjoyed almost unfettered control of their “fiefs’’ but also maintained standing armies of Turkish slaves of their own. The temptation to assert their independence was enhanced by the arbitrary manner in which their overlords were accustomed to revoke their commands, despoil them of their possessions, and even execute them on mere suspicion. The accession of a weak ruler or a dispute regarding the succession was consequently the signal for the disruption of a kingdom into a number of petty principalities, the rulers of which, mere “ robber barons,’’ unceasingly engaged in warfare with one another until order was restored by the sword of the strongest. Not infrequently an amir betook himself with his private troops to some remote district and forcibly seized possession of it, maintaining himself until he was either dislodged or granted a formal diploma of investiture.
The Saljiigqids did not introduce any material change into this system, if such a term can be applied to it. Their own imperial organization consisted of a loose association of kingdoms under different members of the Saljiigid house (“‘ kings ”’), each of whom owed allegiance to the head of the family or “‘ Great Saljiiq ’’ in Persia and Baghdad, who bore the title of “‘ Sultan.’”” The subordinate Turkish governors were even required to maintain standing armies as a condition of holding their grants. This organization worked well enough under the first three sultans, but from the death of Malikshah in iI0g2 the old weakness began to reassert itself, and in various parts of the empire (and nowhere more than in Syria) the rival ambitions of generals and princes produced a gs -ate of constant warfare. It has already been seen that Tutush was faced with a rising of the governors in northern Syria, and though he was successful in putting it down for the moment, the spirit of revolt reappeared on his death. After the execution of Aq-Sunqur, the most powerful of the governors was Yaghi-Siyan, who had been appointed to Antioch about 1090, and whose dominions had subsequently been extended (apparently by Tutush) to Manbij and Tell-Bashir. From the moment of the occupation of Aleppo by Rudwan, son of Tutush, Yaghi Siyan was engaged in open hostilities with him, and his example was not long in finding imitators.
Another factor which contributed to the rise of independent Turkish principalities was the Atabegate, an institution peculiar to the Saljtiqids. We have seen that in the Saljiiqid theory of administration each province was governed by a member of the ruling house. To each of these princes there was attached a Turkish general, who bore the title Atabek, or “‘ tutor,’’ and who was responsible for their military education and the government of their provinces. Since the Atabek stood in a paternal relationship to the Saljiigqid “ king ”’ he enjoyed an authority far above that of the ordinary generals ; it seems also to have been the custom for the Atabek to receive in marriage the mother of his charge and to give one of his daughters in marriage to him. In accordance with the usual practice Tutush assigned the amir Janah al-Dawla al-Husain as atabek to his son Rudwan and the amir Zahir al-Din Tughtagin as atabek to Duqaq. After the defeat and death of Tutush, when Rudw4n occupied Aleppo and claimed possession of Syria, Janah al-Dawla assumed control of his territories without question. Duqagq, the second son of Tutush, also retired to Aleppo, but escaped to Damascus on the secret invitation of its governor and set up his rule there. Meanwhile Tughtagin was in captivity in Persia, having been taken prisoner at the battle of Rayy, but on his release shortly afterwards he at once proceeded to Damascus, and resumed his position as Atabek with the assistance of his wife, Duqaq’s mother, the energetic and intriguing princess Safwat al-Mulk.
With the decline of Saljiiqid solidarity, it was inevitable that in due course the Atabeks should substitute their own dynasties for those of their protégés. Yet this did not imply, as might be expected, a definite breach with their suzerains, the Great Saljiigs. On the contrary, they continued to maintain a strictly correct attitude of subordination to the Sultans, who, on their part, accepted the course of events with surprisingly little protest. The Atabegate became a mere form ; when, for example, it was decided in 1127 to appoint Zanki to the province of Mosul, he was officially assigned as Atabek to two of the Sultan's younger sons, but they neither took, nor were expected to take, any part whatever in the government of the province. Tughtagin’s elimination, therefore, of the Saljiigid ‘‘ kings ’”’ of Damascus after the death of Duqaq was wholly in accordance with the practice of the time.
(5) Together with the local Arab princes, the Saljigids and their Atabeks, and the Turkish amirs, a fresh element of political unsettlement was introduced by the Ghuzz in Mesopotamia and Diyar-Bakr. The influx of these nomadic Turkmens, who lived by horse-breeding and plunder, was itself a perpetual source of disturbances, which were accentuated by the impatience of restraint and political ambitions of their chiefs. Such a person was Atsiz, the precursor of the Saljiiqids in Syria, but the power of Malikshah and Tutush held them in check for a time, and many, at least, of the chiefs served in the Saljuqid armies. The dissolution of the kingdom created by Tutush restored their freedom, and within two or three years several of them succeeded in founding independent principalities.
Of these Turkmen chieftains the most prominent in Syrian affairs were Il-Ghazi and Sukman, the sons of Ortug, a Turkmen officer who had been appointed by Tutush to the governorship of Jerusalem. Il-Ghazi succeeded to his father’s position, while his brothers dispersed to seek their fortune elsewhere. Sukman at first allied himself with Rudwa4n in the struggle against Duqaq, and was rewarded with the possession of Ma ‘arrat al-Nu’man, but after the capture of Jerusalem by the Fatimid troops in 1098 he attempted to establish himself in al-Ruha. Subsequently he founded a more permanent principality in Hisn Kaifa, and also captured Mardin, which was however transferred to I1-Ghazi about 1108, and a second Ortuqid dynasty ‘established there. IIGhazi’s son Sulaiman had already made himself independent at Samosata before the advent of the Crusaders, and other members of the family founded ephemeral principalities during this period. Another Turkmen chief, Inal, revolted against Duqaq about 1096, seized Amid, and founded a dynasty there, which afterwards allied itself by marriage with the Ortugqids of Mardin.
(6) Amidst all these struggles of rival princes, chiefs, and generals, little place seems to be left for the initiative of the people themselves. But while in many parts of the Islamic world, notably in Egypt and ‘Iraq, they had ceased to count in political matters, in Syria, on the other hand, they had retained something of their martial qualities and still exercised an important influence on the course of events. The power of the Fatimids, the Saljiigids, and the Turkish generals, it is true, rested upon their slave armies, but the existence of such native principalities as that of the Bant Munqidh at Shaizar was possible only by reason of the support which they received from the local population. Even in the chief cities, however, especially in Aleppo and Damascus, the military strength of the citizens was sufficient to hold the autocratic tendencies of their governors in check. The Turkish rulers on the whole feared their martial spirit, and were more inclined to adopt repressive measures against it than to direct it into healthy channels. The natural consequence was that the ahdath or armed citizen bands tended to become an undisciplined mob rather than a disciplined force, and under the Fatimids the population of Damascus was notorious for insubordination to its governors. In the defence of their homes against the Crusaders, the civil population proved themselves to possess military qualities which with better support would certainly have been more effective in stemming the tide of conquest. It must not be overlooked that political vicissitudes and the ravages of war affected the citizen population no less than the helpless agriculturists. Sibt b. al-Jawziinforms us that the convulsions attending the dissolution of the Fatimid administration and the misrule of Atsiz produced such economic distress that in 1075 the population of Damascus had shrunk from half a million to three thousand. On the other hand, the enlightened administration and commercial policy of Re canaa brought a sudden revival of prosperity to Aleppo, and under Tughtagin Damascus also recovered with striking rapidity from the effects of the former misrule.
It is, however, less in the cities and in the rich agricultural lands of Syria that the strength of the popular movements can be discerned, than in the mountainous backbone which divides the interior from the coast. The ranges of Lebanon and its northward extension, the Jabal Summaq of the Arabs, were not only the home of the Maronite Christians, but also the refuge of rebels and schismatics, in which they were able to build up powerful organizations which defied all the forces of the Muslim princes. During the two centuries preceding the Crusades, two offshoots of the Shi ‘a sect, which in some of its earlier aspects bore the character of a popular revolutionary movement, had succeeded in establishing themselves in these fastnesses. To the north, in the Jabal Summagq, were the Nusairis; in the south, round Mount Hermon, were the settlements of their bitter foes, the Darazis or Driiz ; in between lay the mass of the Christian Maronites. The interposition of these independent, and often hostile, groups added to the difficulties of communication between the coast and the interior, and did much to prevent the possibility of common action. Moreover, their military organizations had recently been strengthened to meet the assaults of the Saljuqids, to whom, as orthodox Muslims and empire-builders, their heresy and their independence were equally obnoxious. On the appearance of the Crusaders, they adopted different policies. Of the Nusairis little is known, beyond the fact that large numbers of them were massacred by the Franks. The Druz threw in their lot wholeheartedly with the Muslims. The Maronites naturally sided with the Crusaders, and many of them fought in their ranks.
In addition to Nusairis and Driz, a third Shi ‘ite movement, also revolutionary in character, was in process of organization in northern Syria at the moment of the First Crusade. This was the celebrated Batini movement, a schismatic offshoot of the Fatimids, the adherents of which were popularly known as the Assassins. It was not until some years later that their public activities began, but there is justification for mentioning them at this point in the evidence which their movement affords of the continued existence of political activity amongst the general population, and especially of a strong sentiment of hostility to the Turkish governors and the other local rinces.
Finally, the population of Syria was not at all uniform in composition, or even in language. The great bulk of both the settled and nomadic population doubtless consisted of Arabs and Arabicized elements, who spoke Arabic. Amongst these are to be included large numbers of the native Christian inhabitants in the north, belonging to the Greek, Nestorian, and Jacobite churches. The Maronites, who appear to have still used Syriac to a considerable extent, formed probably the largest minority. In addition to these and the Turkish-speaking Turkmen immigrants, there were also large communities of Kurds and especially of Armenians, settled mainly in the north. In the foothills of the Taurus and on the banks of the Euphrates both Kurds and Armenians had succeeded in founding several baronies and even more extensive principalities, which were, however, disappearing before the onslaught of the Turkmens. In several, if not most, of the northern cities, Armenians formed the majority of the populations, and it does not appear that the treatment which they received was in any way worse than that meted out to the other subjects.
The foregoing analysis of the situation in Syria throws a clearer light upon the events which immediately , preceded the arrival of the first Crusaders. The central fact of the situation was the hostility between the two sons of Tutush, Rudwan and Duqag. Rudwan had acted as viceroy for his father in Syria during the campaigns of Tutush in Mesopotamia and Khurdsan, whereas Duqagq appears to have received Diyar-Bakr as his fief. When the news arrived of the battle of Rayy, Rudwan was on his way to join Tutush with reinforcements from Syria, and he at once retired to Aleppo, with the object of securing his inheritance as king of Syria. Before he was able to complete his measures, Duqaq also arrived at Aleppo, and on a secret invitation from the governor of Damascus escaped from his brother’s supervision and took possession of Damascus, while still retaining his earlier fiefs in Diyar-Bakr and Mesopotamia. Rudwan naturally prepared to assert his rights by force, and both princes, seeking for allies in the impending struggle, turned in the first place to the Turkish generals and Turkmen chiefs. The most powerful of these was Yaghi Siyan of Antioch, who would probably have supported Rudwan had it not been for a strong personal antipathy which he felt against Janah al-Dawla, Rudwdan’s atabek. He thus became the natural ally of Duqaq, who was joined also by Il-Ghazi, the governor of Jerusalem. Rudwan now turned for assistance to I]-Ghazi’s brother Sukman (then at Sariij) with his Turkmens, and to the Arab tribe of Kilab.
Hostilities were begun in 1096 with a successful attack by Rudw4n and his allies on the eastern possessions of Yaghi Siyan. Duqaq and I]-Ghazi appear to have gone to the assistance of YaghiSiyan, and in their absence Rudwan laid siege to Damascus. The attempt was foiled by the inhabitants, but Rudwan devastated a great part of the province before withdrawing to Antioch. Meanwhile a temporary estrangement between Duqaq and I]-Ghazi and the imprisonment of the latter had given Sukm4an an opportunity to take possession of Jerusalem. In the following year (1097), Duqaq and Yaghi-Siyan took the offensive and recaptured some towns in Northern Syria. About the same time I/-Gh4azi returned to Jerusalem and Sukm4n rejoined Rudwan, who with his assistance and that of Il-Ghazi’s son, who had made himself lord of Samosata, drove them back. Shortly afterwards, Rudwan fell out with his atabek, Janah al-Dawla, who quitted Aleppo with all his forces and seized Hims. Yaghi Siyan at once offered his services to Rudwan and constituted himself his atabek, giving him his daughter in marriage. Immediate preparations were made for a campaign against Hims and Damascus. At the same time, an embassy from Egypt reached Aleppo, and the opportunity was seized by Rudwan to propose a joint attack upon Damascus, on his undertaking to acknowledge the spiritual suzerainty of the Fatimid Caliph. This project was, however, dropped on the remonstrances of Yaghi Siyan and Sukman, and the three allies advanced with their forces to Shaizar. At this juncture news reached them of the arrival of the Franks on the northern borders of Syria. The report threw them into confusion and the expedition was abandoned, but instead of keeping together in face of the new enemy the army broke up. Rudwan_ hastily retired to Aleppo, while Yaghi Siyan set out for Antioch in order to defend it against the Franks. Even at this stage Sukman appears to have given no thought to the defence of Syria against the Crusaders. His ambition’ was wholly directed to the conquest of Diyar-Bakr, the governors of which had made themselves independent of Duqaq, and he even attempted to persuade Yaghi Siyan and Rudwan to march thither and pay no heed to the Frankish invaders. When his appeals failed, he set out in company with Yaghi Siyan, but subsequently rejoined Rudwan. Yaghi Siyan was thus left to face the first onset of the Crusading armies with none but his own forces and what piecemeal assistance he could obtain by appeals to the other princes.
THE ARMIES OF THE MUSLIM STATES
Few students of the Crusades will need to be reminded that the Muslim nation-in-arms had long since ceased to be. The old militia organization, when every man on the tribal registers received a pension from the public treasury and was required to hold himself permanently in readiness for military expeditions, had gradually been modified by the creation of standing armies, and during the ninth century the military basis of the majority of eastern Islamic states was profoundly altered. The nucleus of their forces was henceforth formed by a corps of salaried guards, composed for the most part of slaves who had been bought, levied as tribute, or inherited by the ruling prince ; these guards constituted a standing army, the cost of which was the first charge upon the revenues of the state. The majority were Turks from Central Asia, but their numbers were augmented by Slavs transported from Eastern Europe, and by Greeks and other captives from Anatolia, Armenia, and Georgia. They were organized in regiments, one of which constituted the private guard and furnished the personnel for ceremonial duties. All of them were mounted, and were especially skilled in shooting the bow on horseback ; for close fighting they were armed with lances and swords.
This standing army of mounted guards was termed the ‘askar, the individual trooper was called an ‘askart or ghulam (‘‘ boy,” whence probably the “‘ Angulani”’ of the Gesta Francorum). There appears to have been a regular system of promotion according to length of service, each rank being distinguished by some feature of dress. The commander of a regiment was entitled amir (often, but incorrectly, translated ‘* prince ’’), and the higher officers or the commander-in-chief hajib (‘‘ chamberlain ’’). The commanders were usually selected from the ruler’s private guard, and frequently held important court offices in addition to their military commands. The officers who rose to these high stations were permitted, even expected, to purchase and maintain private troops of their own slaves, which were enrolled on their master’s death in the general body of the ‘askar, usually as a separate regiment, called by the name of their former owner.
The principal amirs of course required large sums for the upkeep of their private troops, and for this purpose éach was allotted the whole or part of the revenues of a specified district, of which he became the governor and for the defence of which he was responsible in the first instance. This is a “ fief ’’ (tgta‘) in the Islamic sense; the term is too convenient to be avoided, but the sharp distinction between such “ fiefs ’’ and a true feudal system should be borne in mind. The gradual weakening of the bureaucracy, which had at first controlled the financial administration of the imperial provinces and maintained a check upon the military governors, gave the latter practically a free hand in the administration of their “ fiefs.”’ The natural results of this system were chronic misgovernment and endless rivalries between the amirs for the privilege of milking the most productive districts, in addition to the standing encouragement which, as we have seen, it gave to rebellion and the foundation of independent principalities. There were few rulers, however illustrious, who were not harassed by repeated attempts of the kind on the part of their amirs. The weakness of the Saljiigid Sultanate in particular, and its failure to support the Syrian princes against the Crusaders both at the outset and in after years, is explained by its constant fear of and preoccupation with such revolts in all parts of its dominions.
The numerical strength of the ‘askar naturally varied with the power and resources of the ruler, and the Arabic sources supply no figures for those of the Syrian princes at the time of the First Crusade. It is certain, however, that those of Rudwan and Duqaq, the leading princes in Syria, cannot have exceeded a few thousands each, and those of the lesser rulers were correspondingly smaller. The 2,000 optim: milites with which a western source ! credits Yaghi Siyan were probably his ‘askar. The smallness of these figures 1s borne out by the continued existence of such petty principalities as that of Shaizar, whose lords disposed of only a few hundred men, and by the extravagant expressions employed by Ibn al-Qalanisi in respect of forces which numbered at most some four or five thousand. The Atabeks of Mesopotamia, on the other hand, possessed much stronger standing armies, and the predominant part which they took in the subsequent history of the Crusades was in large measure, doubtless, due to this fact.
Although the core of the ‘askar was formed by the slave troops, its numbers were frequently supplemented by bodies of mercenaries in the stricter sense. Regiments of Dailamites, natives of the mountainous regions south-west of the Caspian Sea, were to be found in the service of most princes, and Armenians served in the ‘askars of at least Damascus and Egypt. In Syria, also, we hear of freemen enrolling in the ‘askar and receiving, like the regular troopers, a diwdan or assignment of pay from a stipulated head of revenue.?, On many occasions the standing ‘askars of the princes were reinforced by Turkmen tribesmen, who were likewise mounted archers, and are commonly referred to as an ‘askar. When we are told that the standing army of the Saljugqid sultan Malikshah numbered 400,000 men, we must take this figure to include the Turkmens under his command in addition to the very large guard of Turkish slaves (about 46,000 men) which he maintained. The Turkmens, however, in spite of their individual bravery and warlike qualities, lacked the stability and discipline of the regular troops, and often proved dangerous allies. The Kurdish tribesmen also supplied auxiliary cavalry forces, and in addition large numbers of Kurds were enrolled in the regular ‘askars.
The greater part of the ordinary fighting amongst the Syrian princes and between them and the Crusaders was waged by the ‘askars alone, with a certain number of camp-followers. On more important occasions a second line of troops was called up. The name given to these troops, jund (plural ajynad), is the same as that by which the old Arab militia had formerly been called. This militia system had in fact persisted in Syria and Mesopotamia down to a much later date than elsewhere in the East, owing to the continuance of the Arab tribal organizations and to the unceasing conflict with the Byzantines, but it would probably be erroneous to identify the ajynad of the eleventh century completely with the former militia. It is fairly clear from the Syrian sources, however, that they were still territorial troops of a militia type, in contrast to the ‘askaris. The military forces of the smaller Arab principalities, the Driiz, and other local organizations were composed entirely of such territorial troops; the princes of Shaizar, for example, had only a small ‘askar. From the narratives of Usama we learn that their ajnad consisted mainly of Arabs of various local tribes, together with incomers from the Maghrib (northwest Africa) and a certain number of Kurds.! It may therefore be assumed that the ajnad of Damascus and the other Syrian cities were composed of similar elements, at least in part. For the ‘askar system in its turn also led to the formation of a force of territorial reserves, likewise called ajnad, consisting of such troops as were not permanently mobilized and were maintained by grants of land. As these territorial reserves are attested for Egypt in the twelfth century,? they may also have existed in Syria at the time of the early Crusades. Whether the nomadic Arab tribesmen were normally reckoned amongst the ajnad is open to doubt ; they probably formed an independent guna, corresponding to the ‘askar of the Turkmens.
The troops who constituted the ajndad were, like the ‘askaris, mounted, and it was this, rather than any difference of organization, which distinguished them from the third line of troops, the footsoldiers. On the other hand, the aj7nad were not as a rule archers, but fought with the spear and sword. The footmen were composed of various elements : town levies, countrymen pressed into service, volunteers seeking the temporal and spiritual rewards of participation in the Holy War, camp- followers of all races and religions. Their military training and discipline was, like their equipment, at the mercy of chance, and though their courage need not be called in question their military value was generally small. Their part in the conduct of operations seems to have been limited to such subsidiary functions as the construction of military works and defences, mining operations during sieges, the protection of camps and garrisoning of fortresses and citadels.
The armour worn by the Muslim knights ordinarily consisted of a coat of mail, generally with a skirt, and a round helmet with back flap but no visor, along with which they carried a light circular shield. Light-armed horsemen wore leather jerkins or quilted coats in place of coats of mail. During the course of the Crusades various features of the Frankish armour, such as visors, vambraces, etc., were adopted by the Muslims. The horses appear generally to have been unprotected. The principal weapons of the Muslim horsemen were the bow, the lance and the sword. Their light and comparatively short lances put them at first at a disadvantage in combat with the Franks, but this was met by binding two lanceshafts together ! and subsequently by the adoption of the heavy Frankish lance. The bulk of the armour and of the weapons was kept, when not in use, in the arsenal of the ruler, situated in his citadel and under the charge of one of the most trusted officers of his ‘askar. When orders were issued to the ‘askar to make ready for an expedition, such equipment as was required was issued to the troops, and was replaced in store on their return. The ajnad were sometimes supplied from the arsenal also, but they were apparently expected to provide their own weapons as well as their own horses. Additional stores of weapons and armour were carried in the baggage train. The infantry also provided their own weapons, such as bows, swords, daggers, or at the least sharp stakes hardened by fire and used as javelins or spears. On campaign the ‘askar was accompanied by a large baggage-train, generally carried on camels and mules, which necessitated slow movements as a rule. Details as to commissariat are lacking, but it is evident that some sort of organization existed for the transport of provisions and forage, and that indiscriminate foraging, at least in friendly territory, was disapproved of. The difficulty of obtaining adequate local supplies, on the other hand, was one reason why campaigns were rarely undertaken during the winter, and even at other times of the year they were usually limited to rapid excursions, occupying no more than two or three months at a time. The Crusaders appear to have set the example of constructing special camps for the prosecution of winter campaigns. The usual mode of attack was to take up a position opposite the enemy and to engage first in an archery duel. When the enemy showed signs of weakness, the cavalry charged with their lances and engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with the sword. To charge on an unbroken line seems generally to have been avoided, as well as undue precipitancy in engaging the enemy. The Arab cavalry maintained their traditional tactics of advancing and wheeling in simulated flight before reaching the opposing line, then when the enemy started in pursuit, wheeling round again at a prearranged point and charging upon them. The Crusaders are often criticized for excessive caution, but their “‘ famous charge ’* was universally feared. The infantry played little part in the actual battle ; the fortunes of the day were decided by the cavalry charge, and the infantry of the defeated force were ruthlessly cut down, and taken prisoner by the victorious horsemen.
Prior to the advent of the Crusaders the technique of fortification and of siege operations was relatively simple. As a rule an attempt was made first to capture the town or fortress by direct assault, and preferably by surprise. If this failed, the attacking army often retired without more ado, or merely beleaguered the place in the hope of starving it into surrender. The principal siege weapon was the mangonel, sometimes supplemented by the battering ram, the use of both being ultimately derived from the Romans. A more effective method of breaching was to run a sap under a tower or part of the wall, and by lighting a fire beneath it cause the ground to cave in and bring down the superstructure. These methods, however, were of little avail against a citadel built upon rock, especially when its foundations, as was often the case in Syria, were of solid antique masonry, and a determined governor could generally hold out against attacks for an indefinite time. No little part of the success of the Crusaders was indeed due to their more thorough siege methods and the solidity of their fortifications.
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