Download PDF | ( Crusade Texts In Translation) David Cook Chronicles Of Qalāwūn And His Son Al Ashraf Khalīl Routledge ( 2020)
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CHRONICLES OF QALAWUN AND HIS SON AL-ASHRAF KHALIL
This volume provides translations of texts on the Mamluk Sultan Qalawiin (1279-90) and his son al-Malik al-Ashraf (1290-93), which cover the end of the Crusader interlude in the Syrian Levant.
Translated from the original Arabic, these chronicles detail the Mamluk perception of the Crusaders, the Mongol menace, how this menace was confronted, and a wealth of materials about the Mediterranean basin in the late thirteenth century. Treaties, battles, sieges and embassies are all revealed in these chronicles, most of which have not been translated previously.
The translated texts provide a range of historical records concerning Qalawiin and al-Ashraf, and include the court perspective of Ibn “Abd al-Zahir, the later biography by his nephew Shaff, and the writings of the Mamluk historian Baybars al-Mansiri.
David Cook is professor of religion at Rice University, US. His areas of specialization include early Islamic history and development, Muslim apocalyptic literature, radical Islam, historical astronomy, and Judeo-Arabic literature. His previous publications include ‘The Book of Tribulations’: The Syrian Muslim Apocalyptic Tradition: An Annotated Translation by Nu’aym b. Hammad al-Marwazi (2017).
CRUSADE TEXTS IN TRANSLATION
Editorial Board
Malcolm Barber (Reading), Peter Edbury (Cardiff), Norman Housley (Leicester), Peter Jackson (Keele)
The crusading movement, which originated in the 11th century and lasted beyond the 16th, bequeathed to its future historians a legacy of sources which are unrivalled in their range and variety. These sources document in fascinating detail the motivations and viewpoints, military efforts and spiritual lives, of the participants in the crusades. They also narrate the internal histories of the states and societies which crusaders established or supported in the many regions where they fought. Some of these sources have been translated in the past but the vast majority have been available only in their original language. The goal of this series is to provide a wide-ranging corpus of texts, most of them translated for the first time, which will illuminate the history of the crusades and the crusader-states from every angle, including that of their principal adversaries, the Muslim powers of the Middle East.
Titles in the series include
Keagan Brewer and James H. Kane The Conquest of the Holy Land by Salah al-Din
Graham Loud The Chronicle of Arnold of Litbeck
Carol Sweetenham The Chanson des Chétifs and Chanson de Jérusalem
Anne Van Arsdall and Helen Moody The Old French Chronicle of Morea
Keagan Brewer Prester John: The Legend and its Sources
Martin Hall and Jonathan Phillips Caffaro, Genoa and the Twelfth-Century Crusades
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This translation is mostly a labor of love, as while teaching the Crusades I found I wanted to contribute to the field, even though it is not my primary study. My colleagues at Rice University, Claire Fanger and Brian Ogren, from the Religion Department, aided me with some of the medieval and Jewish connections, Maya Irish in the History Department, with the material about Aragon and Castile. Michael Decker of the University of South Florida helped me out with the Byzantine connections, and Georg Christ of the University of Manchester with the Venetian and Genoese connections. My best friend, Deborah Tor of Notre Dame University, read over the introduction and critiqued it. Thanks to Destiney Randolph, who also read over part of the manuscript and critiqued it, as did Jena Lopez.
My mother, Elaine Cook, read over parts of the manuscript prior to her death on January 20, 2018, and I would like to dedicate this work to her memory. She very much loved to read about the interconnections of the medieval European and Islamic worlds. May her memory be blessed.
INTRODUCTION
Late Crusader period: Qalawin and al-Malik al-Ashraf
Both Qalawiin (ruled 678—-89/1279-90) and his middle son, al-Malik al-Ashraf (ruled 689—93/1290-3), are central to the history of the Crusades as it was largely due to their efforts that the Crusaders were expelled from the Syrian Levant. Qalawiin was the seventh Mamluk ruler, and the fourth of the four strong rulers who founded the Mamluk state (the others were Aybak [648-55/1250-57], Qutuz [657-58/1259-60] and Baybars al-Bunduqdari [658—76/1260-77]). While Baybars attempted to have his children rule after him—and two of them did—the attempt to make the Mamluk regime hereditary at that time was abortive, most probably because the senior emirs (commanders) viewed the accession of a minor with trepidation. The Mongol menace of the time was simply too serious for an inexperienced youth to be allowed to rule.
However, Qalawiin succeeded in this endeavor, although his success was not apparent until some 20 years after his death. This occurred when his youngest son, al-Malik al-Nasir Muhammad, ascended to the sultanate for the third time,! and became the first truly ruling Mamluk sultan who was not imported as a slave. He was followed by Qalawin’s grandchildren and even great-grandchildren. Qalawitin’s immediate successor, his middle son, al-Ashraf, attempted to accomplish this feat, but was murdered two and a half years after his father’s death.
The lives of Qalawiin and al-Ashraf are the focus of this translation monograph,”? with an emphasis upon their role in defeating and expelling the Crusaders. However, for the Mamluks during Qalawin’s time the Crusaders were no longer a very important priority. Indeed, while the immediate
contemporary (and primary) text of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir,? Tashrif al-ayyam wa-l-usur fi strat al-Malik al-Mansur (Ennobling the Days and the Epochs with Regard to the Life of al-Malik al-Mansur) provides us many details, this attention to detail with regard to the Crusaders for historians falls off sharply during the period to follow. This is true even for events such as the conquest of Tripoli (1289) and Acre (1291) that might objectively be seen as significant to the Mamluks.
This series of translated texts takes the panagyrics of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir concerning Qalawiin and al-Ashraf, followed by some selections from Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s nephew ShafT b. ‘Ali’s (d. 730/1330) biography of Qalawin, which is less laudatory and contemporary to the events it describes. These primary texts will be followed by the almost-contemporary three works of the secretary Baybars al-Mansiuri. The purpose will be to make available to historians and general readers the hitherto untranslated sources for the finale of the Crusader period in the Levant.
In general, Qalawin has received serious and competent treatment by historians. There have been four quality treatments of his reign, and a number of scholars have published valuable studies on side issues. Robert Irwin’s The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250-1382 gives a concise and competent overview of the reigns of each of the Mamluk sultans in chronological order.* The only negative aspect is because it was written so early, prior to the edition of a number of important texts, it is not as in-depth as it could be.
Although P.M. Holt’s Early Mamluk Diplomacy (1260-1290): Treaties of Baybars and Qalawiin is not a biography, it contains so many useful translations and elucidations that it should be viewed as a foundational text for period.’ I have relied heavily upon Holt for his translations; although there are differences, Holt’s readings are always worthy of consideration. Following closely upon Holt, Linda Northrup published a fine biography of Qalawin,° which was the first that brought together a wide range of sources, and analysis from a number of perspectives, especially concentrating upon economic issues.
Paulina Lewicka’s edition of Shafi’ b. ‘Alt’s biography of Qalawtin mentioned above is preceded by a very in-depth discussion of his life and the issues connected to it.’ Lewicka’s edition is accompanied by a vast array of notes, which are very helpful in understanding not only Shafi’’s text, but also those of the other Mamluk historians.
There has been surprisingly little written on Qalawiin since 2000, but one book that stands out is Amir Mazor’s biographical and prosopographical work on the Mansiuriyya regiment, which was the foundation for his and his descendants’ power.® In Arabic there have been a great many studies published during the recent past, of varying quality. Beyond these studies, there is a wealth of secondary literature that will be cited in the sources. Rich though these biographies are, they still lack the immediacy and intimacy of a translation. For this reason it is worthwhile to translate a section of the sources concerning Qalawin, and highlight the work of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir.
Historical context: East and West
From the Mamluk point of view, during the period of the early Sultans (1250-1300) Islam as a whole was under continuous attack. Mamluk official and historical propaganda utilized this fact (or viewpoint) to present the regime as the sole defenders of Islam. Of course the primary focus during this period was the Mongol danger, and this is adequately borne out by the focus in Ibn “Abd al-Zahir and the other chronicles detailed below. The level of detail given for the Mongols is considerable, while the focus upon the Crusaders, now reduced to about a dozen coastal enclaves, is comparatively minimal.
Perhaps because of the existential nature of the conflict with the Mongols, the Mamluks devoted much diplomatic and espionage effort to understanding their enemy. During the period 1260-80 the Mongols had been on the ascendant. With the Mongol Il-Khan Empire (1260-1335) having close relations to the Great Khans, and the Mongol population a military elite divorced by religion from the majority Muslim population, the Mongols had both strong external support and internal cohesiveness.
However, during the period of Qalawiin and al-Ashraf the external support and internal cohesiveness were eroding. With the conversion of the Golden Horde Mongols under Berke (d. 1267) to Islam, the Mamluks acquired a possible (sometimes) ally to the north of the IIl-Khan Empire, which, if it would not actually provide them with aid, did tend to draw off resources that otherwise could have been utilized against them.’ The Il-Khanate under Abagha (1265-82) was still a formidable opponent, however, and during Qalawin’s period launched a full-scale invasion of Syria that ended in their defeat at the Battle of Hims (1281).
Shortly after the death of Abagha, the IIl-Khan Empire went through a period of some disorganization under the rule of Tegtider/Ahmad (1282-4), whose conversion to Islam was not taken seriously by the Mamluks. The tone of Tegtider/Ahmad’s letters found throughout these translated chronicles is a world away from that of the early Mongol missives, and demonstrates weakness in his position. Whether he was actually attempting to achieve some type of peace with the Mamluks is open to question, however, and ultimately is academic because of his short reign.
Under Arghun (1284-91), his successor, the Mongol position in the I]-Khan Empire stabilized somewhat. But no further offensives towards the Mamluks were carried out, and the various Mongol vassal states, such as Armenian Cilicia and the Seljuqs of Anatolia, began to come under Mamluk pressure. Cilicia was the most vulnerable to revenge attacks (as a result of its open support for the 1281 invasion of Syria) by Qalawiin and al-Ashraf. Cilicia’s position immediately to the north of Antioch, taken by Baybars in 1268, made it essential that the mountain-passes linking the two regions were defended by the Armenians against Mamluk incursions.
During the late Crusader period (1279-91) the passes were not adequately defended. Time and again there are descriptions of Mamluk raids coming down into the fertile lowlands of Cilicia and devastating them. Unsurprisingly, Leon III’s truce with Qalawin appears in these texts, as the Armenians did not receive any aid from their Mongol overlords to repel these attacks. During this period Cilicia was not a serious opponent for the Mamluks, but it did represent a weak link in the series of Mongol vassal-states, and was closely linked to the remaining Crusader city-states and to the Kingdom of Cyprus by familial, trade, and religious ties."
The Crusader cities, which by the ascension of Qalawiin comprised a strip of territory from the Templar fortress of ‘Athlit, just south of Haifa running northwards along the coast, including Acre, Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, Jubayl, Botrun, and Tripoli, stopped at the Hospitaller fortress of Marqab, just a little to the north of Tortosa. While a few other small castles and towers remained in their possession, the Crusaders had virtually no holdings that were not adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea.
For this reason, the Crusaders were more or less vassals of the Mamluks at this time; their existence on sufferance because of their continued importance in trade. Materials in the chronicles support the conclusion that the Mamluks had good intelligence about the goings-on in the Crusader cities, and a reasonable grasp of the politics associated with the Templar and Hospitaller Orders, if not always an exactitude with regard to names.
No amount of secrecy could have concealed the disorganized and disunited state of the Crusaders on the coast. The hodge-podge of treaties signed by Qalawiin with Acre, the Lady Margaret of Tyre, the Hospitallers and the Templars tells the tale. All of these treaties mandate that the signatories will not help any other entities fight against the Sultan, or render any aid whatsoever to outsiders seeking to attack the Mamluks. It is difficult to see the cities of Tyre and Beirut in particular as independent entities after understanding the agreement stipulations they had made with the Mamluks. In the cities there were semi-independent quarters given over to the commercial interests of the Italian maritime city-states, who regularly committed infractions against the Mamluks. There was no one who spoke for all the Crusaders, who were united only against any outside authority trying to impose order upon them.
Probably the only bright spot among the Crusaders was the Kingdom of Cyprus, ruled during this period by Hugh III (1267-84), and Henry II (1285-1324). For the most part Cyprus was stable, having the long-running wars between the Imperialists and the Ibelins that had dominated the first half of the thirteenth century behind it. From Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s account, Qalawin kept a close eye upon Cyprus, but as the conquest of Acre proved, there was little the Cypriots could do to project force on the Syrian mainland.
The military orders of the Templars and the Hospitallers were not ones to save the day. Both made their own arrangements with Qalawiin, just as they had with Baybars before him. The Templars demonstrated little aggressiveness during this period; they had not fought heroically against the Mamluks since the siege of Safed in 1266. Templar resistance at the siege of Acre in 1291 was the one exception to this comparative passivity. At least the Hospitallers in their northern stronghold of Marqab demonstrated some fighting spirit, winning the only Crusader victory of this period against the unfortunate emir al-Tabbakhi early in Qalawiin’s reign.
By the end of Qalawin’s reign only the Ismailis, of all the small semiindependent non-Crusader states of Syria, survived, and their independence was severely constricted already during the period of Baybars. The Ismailis are usually referred to within the texts as a/-da‘wa (the mission); only once as al-Isma‘tliyya (in the treaty with Margaret of Montfort, lady of Tyre)."! They were utilized earlier as assassins, such as against Philip of Montfort,lord of Tyre (d. 1270), and the unsuccessful attempt against Prince Edward of England (the future Edward I, in 1272), but no assassinations during the period of Qalawin are attested, nor do they appear as an identifiable entity in his armies.
North of the Crusaders, the two more distant Mongol vassal states, the Georgian kingdom and the Seljuq Anatolian sultanate, were both in an advanced state of decay. Mostly, the Mamluk texts see the Seljuqs, referred to as the Rim, as collaborators with the Mongols, even as non-Muslims, and legitimate targets of raids. Both Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusraw HI (1265-84) and his successor, Ghiyath al-Din Mas‘id III (1284-96), are mentioned in the chronicles. They were both almost the last effective Seljuq rulers.'? However, during Qalawin’s and al-Ashraf’s lifetimes the Mamluks were not powerful enough to strike at the Seljuqs more than occasionally.
Most interesting is the mention of the Anatolian Turkish delegation, which occurred during the period of al-Ashraf (after 693/1291). This delegation included about a dozen emirs from the small emirates to the west, center, and south of Anatolia, and demonstrates that even at a comparatively early date, the Turks in the region saw the Mamluks as up-and-coming leaders. Thus, Ibn “Abd al-Zahir’s treatise on al-Ashraf, while abbreviated, proves to be a welcome addition to the meager historical sources on this region. Only the Ottomans, assuming that they even existed during al-Ashraf’s time, are not represented.
The Georgians are much more distant, and with the exception of the curious incident of the so-called Georgian monarch (!)—who was probably actually a nobleman of Demetrius I (1270-89)—said to have been taken prisoner while on pilgrimage to Jerusalem, there is not much interaction with them. However, it is worth noting that Georgians frequently are featured in the armies of both the Mongols and the Mamluks.
Beyond the Georgians, the Mongols of the Golden Horde loomed. Ever since the conversion to Islam of Berke (ca. 1255), khan of the Golden Horde, there had consistently been good relations between them and the Mamluks. From the point of view of the Golden Horde, the Mamluks represented Islam, and were a source of Islamic teaching, as well as controlling the way to Mecca for pilgrimage. From the Mamluks’ point of view, the Golden Horde was a counter-balance to the menace of the Il-Khan Mongols as well as a possible trade source of boy-slaves to replenish their ranks.
Interest in the doings of the Golden Horde is high throughout the chronicles, although it is fairly selective. There is no interest, for example, in any of the Golden Horde’s raiding towards the north or west. There is great interest, however, in the internal politics of the Golden Horde—which khan was
dominant, what was the character of the ruler, and the relative quality of his religiosity (when he was a Muslim). Upon these tenuous characteristics rested a good deal of Mamluk diplomacy, as the latter were acutely aware that communications with the Golden Horde had to be funneled through either the Rim Seljuqs by land or through the Byzantines by sea.
Briefly after the reconquest of Constantinople in 1261 from the Latin Empire of Constantinople, the Byzantines under Michael VIII Palaeologus (1261-82) were able to regain some of their old luster.!? This renewed glory lasted for the period of these chronicles, but not for much longer. Michael and his dynasty are referred to throughout the texts as Lascarids, harking back to Theodore I Lascaris (1205-22), the energetic founder of the reconstituted Byzantine Empire in Anatolia after the fall of Constantinople in 1204.
This misnaming, however, should not be construed to mean that the Mamluks did not value the Byzantines. On the contrary, the treaty between Qalawin and Michael VIII,"* and the eulogy about Michael translated in the texts indicate that the Mamluks did value the Byzantine alliance. How much practical aid each side rendered to the other is probably not the point; the fact is that the two realms were too far away from each other to constitute any danger to the other, but abutted mutual enemies, or at least groups that both would like to keep in check. The Mamluk—Byzantine alliance represented two comparatively older realms (seeing the Mamluks as a continuity of the Ayyubids in Egypt) that had a common interest in opposing newer upstarts.
The Mediterranean world of Qalawiin’s time was also in flux, with a fairly significant power vacuum opening up in spring 1282 as result of the Sicilian Vespers and the collapse of part of Charles I of Anjou’s erstwhile empire (1266-85).'> The Vespers revolt severely damaged what until then had seemed to be the dominating Mediterranean empire of Charles of Anjou. Continuing on the tradition of his brother St. Louis [IX (1226-70), whose Crusades dominated the 1250s to his death in Tunis, Charles captured Sicily from the Hohenstaufens, and then proceeded to annex or threaten most of the polities around the central and eastern Mediterranean, including a number in Greece, and the Crusaders in the Levant.
Although the period of Qalawiin and al-Ashraf was mostly after the peak of Charles’ imperial ambitions had come to naught, the placement that Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir gives to the issues of Sicily—in tandem with those of the Mongols—is testimony to the importance the Mamluks placed upon intelligence about him and his successors. It is possible that the intriguing anecdote that Sayf al-Din Qiltj b. “Abdallah al-Maliki al-Mansiri sent on an embassy by Qalawiin to an unnamed “king of the west” refers to Charles.'* Unfortunately, there are no firm details, and this embassy could equally have been directed towards Alfonso X of Castile or even be apocryphal.
But the detailed description of the Battle of the Gulf of Naples on June 5, 1284 between Charles of Salerno (Charles of Anjou’s son) and the Aragonese is rightly noted by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir as the turning point in this Mediterranean conflict.!’ It is the only European battle described in these texts. After Roger of Lauria’s, the Aragonese commander, victory over Charles of Salerno, and the latter’s capture, the Angevin period of dominance in the central Mediterranean ended.
Of the four popes who reigned during the period of Qalawiin and al-Ashraf, Nicholas III (1277-80, born Giovanni Gaetano Orsini), Martin IV (1280-5, born Simon de Brion), Honorius IV (1285-7, born Giacomo Savelli), and Nicholas IV (1288-92, born Girolamo Masci), only Honorius IV is mentioned by name in the texts. Yet, the policies of each of these popes stood behind many of the events in the Mediterranean that were of considerable concern to the early Mamluks. Therefore, it is not surprising that Ibn “Abd al-Zahir records the death of Martin IV and the ascension of Honorius IV as a crucial event.
Nicholas III, a Roman aristocrat by birth, initiated policies that ultimately led to the downfall of Charles of Anjou’s influence in central Italy. He received a letter from the I]-Khan Abagha in 1279, although there is no indication that he did anything with it during the short while he had before his death in 1280.'* To a large extent, Nicholas’ policies were nullified by Martin IV, who was French, and strongly sympathetic to Charles, and obliged him by excommunicating Michael VIII Palaeologus, the Byzantine emperor. Ironically, Martin IV’s pro-Angevin policies coincided with the period of the Sicilian Vespers, so Charles was not able to benefit as much from the pope’s support as would have been possible otherwise.
Honorius IV, another Roman aristocrat, was also pro-French, and more strongly interested in the issue of Sicily than his predecessor,” also received a letter from the I-Khan Arghun in May 1285.”° Nicholas IV, who was a Franciscan, corresponded quite extensively with Arghun as well.”! This association with the friars minor, with their many connections throughout the Mongol Empire, is probably key to understanding Nicholas’ interest in a new crusade. This crusade, when it arrived in Acre, succeeded in doing nothing but murdering Muslim merchants and locals, and gave Qalawiin the excuse for organizing the final attack upon the Crusader city states (carried out by al-Ashraf). Crusader spirit was quite dead in the Frankish Levant, which was largely a trading outpost, dominated by the Italian maritime city-states.
Of the three Italian naval powers—Venice, Genoa, and Pisa—that had been the life-line for the Crusader states during the previous 200 years, and the backbone of trade and pilgrimage throughout the Mediterranean basin, two were in decline during this period. Pisa had been decisively defeated at the (sea) Battle of Meloria (1284) by Genoa,” and Venice had suffered a series of reverses during the recent past.”
Genoa stands both in terms of its comparatively far-flung commercial empire, with colonies in Byzantium, and the Crimea, as well as trading outposts throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Thus, a Genoese alliance with the Mamluks seemed very practical.** However, the treaty cited by Ibn “Abd al-Zahir was brought about Genoan acts of piracy against Mamluk shipping, and it seems likely that there were elements of the Genoan republic who would have chafed under its stringent conditions.” It is interesting to note that the treaty is not reproduced in later Mamluk chronicles, and appears to have not lasted very long. Even during May 1291 the Vivaldi brothers from Genoa were attempting to find a route around Africa to circumvent the Mamluks’ trade routes.”
Venice was probably the more important of the Italian maritime powers for the future, in spite of its comparatively low point during this period. The description of the Venetian envoys meeting with al-Ashraf after the fall of Acre (text | (b)) was, in fact, part of the revival of the Republic’s trade empire that was to grow substantially during the following centuries. It is interesting that neither this meeting nor anything about Venice is mentioned in the later chronicles when describing this period.
While the French, other than Charles of Anjou, do not make much of an appearance in these texts, the Iberian kingdoms are prominent: as foes and possible allies of the Mamluks. Qalawiin was aware that the Iberian Christians were on the ascendant during the decade of the 1280s into the 1290s.’
Comparatively speaking, the Castilians, ruled by Alfonso X (1252-84) were of lesser importance, as the Castilian forces were focused mostly against the Granadan Muslims and the Moroccan Marinids. Indeed, the detailed Chronicle of Alfonso X does not mention anything about a diplomatic delegation from Qalawiin,”® which according to Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir was a waste of time. Alfonso was depressed and indecisive at the time and more concerned by the revolt of his son Sancho than concluding an alliance with the Mamluks. This picture rings true from reading the Chronicle; Alfonso’s death occurred shortly thereafter. It is not clear what Alfonso, who according to Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir initiated the diplomatic contacts, hoped to achieve by an alliance (or a treaty) with Qalawtn.
During the period covered by the chronicles, the Aragonese were much more dominant throughout the western and central Mediterranean, a dominance whose foundation was laid by the great Jaime I (1213-76), who conquered the Balearic islands from the Muslims. His successor Pedro III (1276-85) was no less renowned, and was elected king of Sicily in 1282. At the time of his election he was attacking coastal Tunisia.
Although this attack upon Tunisia came to nothing, from the Muslim point of view it demonstrated how easily, given the Christian command of the sea, their territories could be invaded by the Aragonese (and others). Some of Qalawiin’s intervention in Tunisian affairs, detailed by both Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir (text 1 (a)) and Baybars al-Mansiiri (text 4 (a)) was due to the fear of the growing Aragonese power.
Pedro III’s eventual successor in Aragon, Alfonso IIT (1285-91), was apparently not much of a crusader, and much more interested in securing the western Mediterranean. Therefore, he was willing to sign a treaty with Qalawiin which would divide the Mediterranean between them: Aragon to the west, Mamluks to the east. The only problem was that Mamluk sea-power was comparatively weak, in spite of the best efforts of both Qalawin and al-Ashraf. This weakness 1s reflected in the rather onesided treaty between al-Ashraf and Jaime II of Aragon from either 1292 or 1293 (text 2).
The non-Mamluk Muslim rulers during the period of Qalawin and al-Ashraf are a fairly paltry bunch, so it is not surprising to find that Qalawin considered himself to be preeminent among them. In the west, the small Muslim state of Granada, off and on a client-state or a target for Castile (and the Marinids in Morocco as well), was ruled by Muhammad II, usually called Ibn al-Ahmar after his ancestor who founded the dynasty. There is no evidence that Qalawin paid much attention to the remains of Muslim Spain, and no diplomatic initiatives survive from that region—not surprising given that the Mamluks were attempting an alliance with Castile. For the entire period under question, Muhammad II was playing off the Castilians against the Marinids, and enjoying a considerable amount of success.”
The Marinid Ya‘qib b. “Abd al-Haqq (1258-86) in Morocco was probably the only leader in the Muslim world, if one discounts the Il-Khans as Muslims, whose position could rival Qalawin. There are frequent mentions of him in the sources, especially those of Baybars (text 4 (a)), but apparently no diplomatic initiatives directed at him.*° The Marinids were, however, mostly a land-based power, and located at a considerable distance from Egypt, so perhaps there was no perceived need for an alliance. Qalawiin obviously sought diplomatic alliances with states that could offset the growth of a Angevin-style central Mediterranean state. Castile fitted that bill, as it bordered Aragon, which was expanding, but the Marinid state did not.
There is no evidence that Qalawin or al-Ashraf was in contact with the growing Muslim presence in West Africa. Apparently there was contact at this early date, however, between Mansa Abu Bakr I (d. 1285) or his successor Sakura of Mali and the Marinids, which would herald the
development of the trans-Saharan trade route during the fourteenth century and beyond.*!
Tunis was within striking range of Mamluk Egypt, especially by utilizing the Bedouin nomads dwelling in the deserts between the two regions. Tunisia’s rulers, ‘Umar b. Yahya (1282-4), and Yahya III (1285-95) are mentioned in a number of the texts (nos. | (a), and 4 (a)) as the targets of attacks initiated by or encouraged by the Mamluks. No Mamluk intervention is mentioned in any of the local Tunisian chronicles.” The entire region of Tunisia was severely destabilized by not only these attacks, but the ones initiated by France under Louis IX (who died outside Tunis in 1270), and the occupation of a number of coastal towns and fortresses, such as Jirba and others,** by the Aragonese.
To the south of Egypt and the Red Sea area, it is obvious that Qalawin, just like Baybars and the Ayyubids before him, considered this region to one of Egyptian preeminence. The texts translated here detail repeated interventions into the Christian kingdom of Nubia, which was comparatively weak and divided. The purpose of these interventions appears to have been to garner tribute, rather than outright conquest, and at least at this particular time, there does not appear to have been conversion to Islam. The texts portray the Nubian people as being favorable to the Mamluk interventions, although there is no way to know whether that was true. It is possible, however, that the locals had tired of the Nubian monarchs’ weak government.
The Muslim polities bordering on the Red Sea gave Qalawitin and al-Ashraf (and their successors) a great deal of trouble. Foremost was the semi-independent state of Mecca and Medina, at this time dominated by the mercurial Abi Numay,™ who was a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. Mecca and Medina could not be ignored because of the centrality of the pilgrimage to these holy cities. As the Ayyubids before them had secured the safety of the pilgrimage route, it was necessary for the Mamluks to do no less, especially because their political and religious legitimacy was based upon their defense of Islam.
Abt Numay resented his dependence upon the Mamluks, and sought to demonstrate that he was his own man. Although Qalawiin was not able to keep him in check, by the time of al-Ashraf he ran out of options, and was forced to throw himself at the sultan’s mercy. However, in the long run, the crafty Abi Numay continued to cause problems for the later Mamluks.
Further to the south, the Rasulid state in Yemen was just consolidating itself under its ruler, al-Malik al-Muzaffar (646-96/1249-95), who also turned out to be the most potent ruler of the dynasty.** Rasulid chronicles mention Qalawiin infrequently and al-Ashraf not at all, but the mentions of the Yemeni delegations to Egypt in texts | (a), and 4 (a) below ring true, even to the extent that Muzaffar is said to have asked for a safe conduct from them to be written on a shirt. There was no real Mamluk control in Yemen (in spite of Qalawiin’s occasional description of himself as ruler of Yemen), but there was considerable influence as a result of the trade towards the Red Sea and India. As trade was of major importance to Qalawiin and al-Ashraf, they wished to secure the route through the Bab al-Mandeb.
In India, the Ghiyathid dynasty of Balaban (664-85/1266-87) and his grandson, Kay Kubadh b. Bughra Khan (685-—8/1287-90) reigning in Delhi at this time are poorly attested from a historical perspective.*° There does not appear to have been any real contact between the Mamluks and the Ghiyathids. For the most part, the India described is south India, where the Muslim were merchants rather than rulers.
It is striking how many of the Muslim dynasties at this time were unstable or constituted new polities. Clearly, the destruction wreaked by the Mongols, the Christian advances in the west, and the conversion to Islam in Africa and south Asia, had created openings for new dynasties.
Two further groups of peoples mentioned in the chronicles remain to be discussed: those who were neither friends nor enemies, which were Ethiopia and Sri Lanka (Ceylon), and non-state groups, such as the Jews, the Bedouin, and the Turkmen. The materials on Ethiopia are interesting and unique, consisting as they do of a letter from the emperor Yekunno Amlak (1270-85), who was noted for having constituted (or reconstituted) the Solomonic dynasty, bringing the Zegwe dynasty to an end.*’ Inside text 1 (a) the letter Yekunno Amlak sent to Qalawiin in order to establish Ethiopian claims to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem is reproduced, and some historical material about him is given. However, it is significant that none of the later chronicles cite this letter, although there appears to have been contact with Amlak’s successor, Yagba Seyon (1285—94).*8
There is even less information about the two Sri Lankan rulers Buvanekabahu (1270-83), and Parakramabahu III (1283-93), one of whom presumably is the otherwise mysterious Abu Bakhba listed in Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s account (which is followed in text 4 (a)). Since the trading envoys from this ruler arrived in 1283, and Buvanekabahu could perhaps be rendered down to the Arabic Abt Bakhba, he is the more likely choice. We should not be surprised that he wanted to encourage trade, and probably wanted to expand the markets for Sri Lankan high-end items (all listed in the account) beyond what was available in the Il-Khan Empire.”
Trading connections were important to the Jews in Egypt, as is detailed by the materials in the Cairo Geniza.” It is rather surprising, given the importance of trade throughout these translated texts, that Jews hardly make an appearance. (It is worth noting, however, that the Coptic Christians of Egypt, who at this time would have been a substantial minority, if not close to a majority, are also almost invisible in these texts.*!) In Egypt and Syria, Jews are mentioned briefly as figures malevolent to Muslims.
Bedouin also are somewhat sinister to the mostly city-based chroniclers of Qalawiin and al-Ashraf. Their principal utility was their fighting qualities, which were useful against the Mongols and the Crusaders, and even against other Muslims, such as the Tunisians. The Bedouin leaders were the only apparent non-Mamluk group in the sources that had an emir commanding them. In general, however, the Bedouin were seen as pests, inimical to trade, attacking the pilgrimage caravan, and generally making a nuisance.” This was all the more true of the Turkmen, a group not
adequately defined by the sources,* except with regard to being utilized as auxiliaries when fighting the Mongols or the Crusaders. The Bedouin and the Turkmen were in the van (front) at the Battle of Hims, on the right and the left flanks respectively.
The period of Qalawiin and al-Ashraf had an abundance of smaller states, and other than the Il-Khan Empire, a comparative dearth of larger states. For this reason, continuing the general strategies of Baybars, the Mamluks attempted to swallow up as many of these smaller states as possible.
Qalawin and Ibn ‘Abd Zahir: Pharaoh and panegyrist
From deep antiquity one of the natural imperatives of a ruler of Egypt has been to dominate Syria—Palestine, expand the traditional boundaries of Egypt along the Nile River valley to the region of the Euphrates River, and to dominate the Nubian/Sudanese section of the Nile. Both of those imperatives are present in the strategic priorities of Qalawin and al-Ashraf, as they were also in those of Baybars before them. An Egyptian ruler, from time immemorial, as part of his sacral function also had to ensure the inundation of the Nile, care for agriculture, build magnificent buildings, and above all, ensure that any wars were fought on non-Egyptian soil. Qalawin’s career in these regards can be usefully compared to those of other successful Egyptian rulers, such as Thutmose III, Ramses II, Ptolemy II, or even the Fatimid conqueror, Jawhar al-Siqillt.
Starting out, Qalawiin’s position was not an enviable one. His base in Egypt was reasonably secure, but in Syria he faced a series of small states or citystates, and local rulers who were reluctant to swear allegiance to him and eager for independence. From Egypt’s point of view, going all the way back to Pharaonic times, Syria usually looked like a chaotic, divided place. This perception was also true during early Mamluk times. Qalawin’s overall strategy dealing with this chaos seems to have been to conciliate the smaller states and rulers, picking them off one at a time, and use the Mongol threat to unite Syria behind him.
Fortunately, the Mongols quickly obliged Qalawtn by carrying out a large-scale attack early in his reign, so that the latter could build upon his undoubted popularity subsequent to victory to construct the Mamluk state. The smaller semi-independent states, notably those of Baybars’ children in Kerak and southern Jordan, as well as that of Sunqur a/-ashqar in northern Syria obliged him as well, by consistently thinking small, and mostly holing up in their fortresses rather than uniting against Qalawin or trying to turn hisWhile this strategy seems fairly obvious in retrospect, it was not always clear that Qalawun thought things through. Our closest source, Ibn “Abd al-Zahir, was not privy to the private counsel sessions of the Sultan, and appears on a number of occasions, even when he was personally present, to have been genuinely surprised at the direction the Sultan took (e.g., the attack on the Hospitallers in Marqab in 1285). It stands to reason that a scribal functionary like Ibn “Abd al-Zahir was not privy to such sensitive information since Qalawiin probably did not speak Arabic well, and most likely discussed secret matters in Turkish.
When chaos reigned in Syria, which was true for most of Qalawiin’s reign, then he appears to have had an opportunistic strategy. Having more or less decisively defeated the Mongol incursion in 1281, he appears to have valued first of all securing the valley of Syria up to the border with the Armenians, and then removing the smaller Mamluk statelets (Kerak and the Syrian fortresses controlled by Sunqur al-ashqar), finally picking off Crusader fortresses as the opportunities presented themselves.
Was Qalawin biased towards certain Crusader factions and against others? He appears to have played the Templars against the Hospitallers, as he made a treaty with the former, but picked off the latter’s castles one by one. It does not appear that he had an overall strategy of finishing off the Crusader presence in the Levant until the very last years of his life. In general, the castles and cities he took during his first years were those which either aided the Mongols in some way or were close to the more sensitive northern region of Syria. He does not appear to have cared that the Crusaders controlled the region between Acre and Tripoli until 1289.
Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s works fulfill all the criteria of the historical Egyptian panegyric.* There is virtually not a single negative word about Qalawin or al-Ashraf in either of them. Lewicka states about Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir: “Due to the author’s servility towards the ruler, however, his record is not fully objective.”“° In Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s presentation, the Sultan is portrayed as a
wise, compassionate, a paternalistic ruler, who cares for his people, rides his emirs hard—while favoring those who are loyal and competent—and emphasizing his religiosity. Qalawtin, according to both Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, and the other Mamluk biographers and historians, was in fact Joseph/Yisuf, and it is not surprising that Qur’an stra 12, his story, is cited more than any other (a total of 11 times) in these texts.
The Joseph/Yusuf story works well for Qalawin, who similarly to the Qur’anic Yusuf, was said to have been physically attractive (Q12:31). Presumably Qalawin’s family sold him into slavery, like Joseph/Yisuf (Gen. 37:25-8, Q12:19-20). He was brought to Egypt at an early age, inducted into the households of the elite, and he quickly became a favorite. Descriptions of Qalawiin’s management of Egypt’s agricultural produce might also be harking back to this theme as well, as the biblical/qur’anic Joseph/Yusuf stored up produce for the prophesied seven years of famine.
Beyond this religious backstory, the Sultan needed to be omniscient. This appears to be the function of the many descriptions of “reports,” that are continually said to be flowing into the hands of the Sultan. This feature is designed to emphasize that everything, sooner or later, will be known to the Sultan, including arcane knowledge of foreign rulers such as the Mongols. People needed reassurance that the Sultan knew what was going on in the world. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir provides exact times for how long information takes to reach the Sultan—which most probably serves to emphasize the inevitability of his knowledge.
These distances also serve to emphasize the presentation that the Sultan is the center of the universe. Byzantines, Mongols, Armenians, Franks, Arabs, Indians, Ethiopians, Nubians, North Africans, Aragonese, French, and Italians all seek his favor. They are regularly described as “waiting at his gates” in order to emphasize their servility to his power and their awe at his majesty. Treaties with him inevitably describe him as “our master, the Sultan,” a phrase that does not usually appear with regard to Qalawin or al-Ashraf in chronicles beyond the time-period of those who knew him personally—a period that ends with Baybars al-Mansuri.
Bernard Lewis wrote that for the most part Muslims were not interested in the affairs of non-Muslims westerners during the pre-Ottoman era, or even aware of them.*’ Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir appears to be very much the exception to this rule, if it is a rule. In sharp contrast to chroniclers of later periods, including his own nephew, Shafi’ b. “Alt (text 3), Ibn “Abd al-Zahir gave a substantial number of personal names, both accurate and anecdotal information about the Crusaders, the Byzantines and the western Christian nations, and estimates concerning their abilities and limitations. This view was an immediate one, and did not transcend Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s lifetime, appearing in none of the later chronicles.
Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s text as it now stands does not constitute a biography of Qalawin. Rather, it is a series of biographical notes, disjointed anecdotes, and is apparently relating to specific time-periods when the author was either present or privy to information. There are numerous gaps, either because of the fragmentary nature of the manuscript—all of Qalawiin’s first three years are missing—as well as gaps in the later chronology. The entire text is best seen as a series of vignettes with Qalawin as the star figure.
The unique features of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, however, are amazing. Holt already has mined his extensive citation of treaty documents. There are a number of other unique documents that appear in the text, such as correspondence with the Mongols, the Ethiopians, the ruler of Sri Lanka/Ceylon, and others. Ibn “Abd al-Zahir provides the view from the center (which is wherever the Sultan was physically located), and a sense of the stakes involved in a given situation at any one time. How the center was feeling about the Mongol menace, nuisance of the Crusaders, the importance of trade, and that the Mamluk Empire was the lynchpin to the Muslim world.
One problematic issue is the question of succession, always a fraught one for a ruler, but sometimes no less for a panegyrist. It would seem that Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir was a supporter of Qalawin’s elder son, al-Malik al-Salih, and perhaps wrote parts of his work in order to legitimize his upcoming rule. When al-Salih died early (in 1288), Ibn “Abd al-Zahir seems to have fallen out of favor (or perhaps was ill), and therefore his material on the last two years of Qalawiin’s life is lacking. This is a great pity, because during this lacunae the siege of Tripoli occurred.
If this theory is correct, then why was the panegyric to al-Malik al-Ashraf (text 1 (b)) composed? Al-Ashraf was one of several would-be successors to ruling Mamluks, who aspired to their fathers’ positions. None of these survived very long until the period of al-Malik al-Nasir Muhammad (709-42/1309-—41), and even he had to endure several periods of rule (when he was a child) before his power stabilized. It is clear that Qalawiin had significant doubts about al-Ashraf’s ability to succeed him.” What is not clear is the source of those doubts: Were they ones that Qalawiin felt personally, or were they ones communicated to him by courtiers, perhaps including Ibn “Abd al-Zahir himself? The fact that the Tashrif does not appear to have been “cleaned up” in order to give al-Ashraf a higher profile in retrospect does perhaps increase our confidence that it more or less dates from Qalawin’s lifetime.
Therefore, the panegyric to al-Ashraf (text 1 (b)) may have been Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s attempt to curry favor with a ruler he had not previously supported, or it may have been written out of loyalty to Qalawiin, who Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir clearly adulated. Whatever the reason, just like the Tashrif, the panegyric is fragmentary and lacks some of the sections that we could wish it did, such as a detailed account of the capture of Acre. Its principal point appears to have been to legitimize the shaky rule of al-Ashraf,
Because he made his conquests-of Acre and of Qal‘at al-Rim—the mainstay of his legitimacy, it is not clear why details of them were not included. As this was the very end of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s life, perhaps the panegyric is merely a series of notes—as it lacks a cogent beginning and ending— that were meant to be fleshed out at another time, or perhaps he did not feel comfortable writing about events he had not personally witnessed. Ibn “Abd al-Zahir died in 691/1292, a year before al-Ashraf.
Al-Ashraf and the historians
The attitude of historians towards Qalawiin’s middle son and successor, al-Malik al-Ashraf, is rather polarized.*° On one hand, it is possible to see him as the unworthy son of a great father, who succeeded because of his father’s accomplishments and completed his unfinished work. This work included important conquests such as that of Acre and Qal‘at al-Riim which rounded out the Mamluk frontiers in a way that neither Baybars al-Bunduqdari nor Qalawin were able to complete.
Another more petulant interpretation is that al-Ashraf cleaned up after Qalawin, and did his dirty work. Ibn al-Fuwati describes him as killing a number of emirs. Even sympathetic chroniclers, such as Baybars al-Mansiuri, note how he systematically killed or exiled those to whom his father showed clemency, such as Sunqur al-ashqar or the sons of Baybars, and others. Where Qalawin was clement, al-Ashraf tended to be capricious. (One practical reason for Qalawiin’s clemency might have been his shortage of men in the face of the Mongol menace; however this was also true with regard to al-Ashraf.)
Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s treatise on al-Ashraf, as previously noted, has been understudied. It portrays al-Ashraf through the eyes of Ibn “Abd al-Zahir in his failing years, and is exclusively focused upon affairs taking place in Egypt or upon citation of documents. This is in contradistinction to the other portrayals of al-Ashraf, which usually dwell upon his conquests, almost all of which happened in Syria and beyond. The texts on al-Ashraf
cite not a single treaty and very few documents (only Baydara’s wagf, untranslated, in text 1 (b)).*!
What is not clear is the picture Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir is trying to paint with the treatise. His is the only work in this entire anthology to focus extensively upon the ‘Abbasid caliph (who inside text 1 (b) remains unnamed), citing as he does several Friday sermons delivered by him during the middle of al-Ashraf’s reign. Probably this unusually high profile for the caliph is supposed to legitimize al-Ashraf, whose rule commenced with his father questioning his abilities to rule and refusing to sign his investiture, in addition to his inexperience and youth. Other descriptions in Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s text emphasize his justice, adherence to Islamic law, and charitable munificence.
Additionally, Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir uniquely among all the chroniclers noticed that al-Ashraf had a very strong interest in the sea, describing as he does the Venetian envoys appearing in the wake of Acre being conquered. More importantly, Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir gives us a picture of the Mamluk fleet exercises. These fleet exercises are not mentioned in any other source and raise questions about al-Ashraf’s long-term priorities. Having secured Syria from the Crusaders, was he thinking of Mediterranean conquest at that time? Or was he merely aware of the fact that Cyprus and the Italian maritime powers could still attack Egypt and Syria—as indeed they did throughout the following 70 some years—and it was necessary to be prepared?”
Muslim historical sources do not mention the treaty of friendship he concluded with Jaime II of Aragon in Jan. 1293. It is interesting that this, if the treaty dates are accurate, would have been almost exactly a year after the fleet exercises documented by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir for Feb. 1292. Perhaps al-Ashraf was considering a Mediterranean adventure? Or did he fear a new crusade to recover Acre?
Yet other descriptions of al-Ashraf detail his love of pleasure and especially of hunting, during the latter of which he was murdered. (One should note that Shafi’ in text 3 lauds Qalawiin for not hunting or ever visiting Alexandria.) These descriptions are common throughout the chronicles on
al-Ashraf, in addition to appearing in Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, and probably serve to emphasize his manliness and energy, but could also be a bit of a warning against indulgence. After all, one could say that it was due to this excessive hunting that he was distracted from the administration of Egypt, which led directly to his assassination.
Al-Ashraf definitely lacked the naturally conciliatory and clement side of Qalawiin, and appears to have liked to dress down the Mamluk elite, such as Baydara, his deputy and assassin, in semi-public situations. For such a military elite, insults and curses of this type would have been intolerable and may have led to the conspiracy that was fatal to him.
However, the proximate context of al-Ashraf’s assassination was even less favorable to him, as it involved his minister Ibn al-Sal’tis discovering financial irregularities linking Baydara (his assassin) to wholescale fraud. This type of fraud during al-Ashraf’s reign indicates a ruler detached from administration, and being used as a figurehead by more powerful emirs. When their fraud was in danger of being uncovered, it is understandable that they sought to protect themselves by assassinating the sultan.
Few of the historical works on Qalawin and his period seem to have considered the role of al-Ashraf’s assassination in solidifying the support behind his dynasty. For his assassins, there was a brief victory, but only until Qalawiin’s third son, al-Malik al-Nasir, became an adult. Much like the assassination of Julius Caesar led directly to the fall of the Roman Republic, the assassination of al-Ashraf because of fear of exposure appears to have been significant in the success of Qalawiin and his dynasty.
Other historical and literary works covering this period
One cannot say that the Mamluk period lacks historical attestation. Due to world histories, local chronicles, supplements to chronicles, collections of obituaries, travelers’ accounts, fragments of papyri and other original literary documents, coins, and inscriptions, in addition to non-historical literary works, the period is well-attested.
However, there are curious lacunae, and the period of the end of the Crusades is one of them. Although there are many historical sources, they do not always provide the level of detail desired. These sources can be divided into several categories, for the most part (but not always), corresponding to chronological sequence.
The first group includes Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir (d. 691/1292) and those who were contemporary and intimate with Qalawin and al-Ashraf. These are the Anatolian historian and hagiographer Ibn Brbi (d. 683/1285),* the Christian pro-Mongol Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286),*° pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwati (finished 700/1300), and Ibn al-Mughayzil (d. 701/1301),*’ who was the continuator of the Ayyubid historian Ibn Wasil (d. 697/1297).* The first two are problematic, as they are both inclined to be biased against the Mamluks, and were physically distant from them. None of them concentrate upon the later Crusaders in any case.
Pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwati’s Kitab al-hawdadith is an important contemporary corrective to the hagiography of the Mamluk historians,” as he was writing from Baghdad under the Mongols. The anonymous chronicler reveals himself to be primarily interested in Baghdad and central Iraq; he makes virtually no mention of the larger Mongol Empire or even the Iranian and Central Asian sections of the IIl-Khan Empire. However, he does describe Qalawin, at first with little respect, calling him Alfi (which also some of the Armenian and Crusader chroniclers did as well), but increasingly with approval. When Tripoli and Acre are conquered, he cites some triumphant poetry. He also appears to have admired al-Ashraf, dedicating a fairly lengthy poem in praise of him.
Ibn al-Mughayzil is different; he was pro-Mamluk in a general sense, but was the court historian for the rump Ayytibid dynasty of Hamah that is so frequently mentioned in Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir (text 1 (a)) below. While he gives us a more sympathetic viewpoint of Qalawitn, he does so from Syria rather than Egypt. By merely reading his materials one might get the mistaken impression that the two Malik al-Mansirs (Qalawtin and Muhammad, the ruler of Hamah) were actually on the same level, as Qalawiin is often referred to as “the ruler of Egypt” (with the implication: not of Syria). His perspective is local: for example, he appears to be one of the few who preserved Qalawiin’s letter on the conquest of Tripoli, which is not surprising, given the close proximity between Hamah and the coastlands.
A second group of sources includes those who were near contemporaries of Qalawin and al-Ashraf. These include Ibn al-Dawadari (d. 713/1313),°! who gives very little detail, the Persian vizier Rashid al-Din (d. 718/1318), the encyclopedist al-Nuwayri (d. 723/1323-4), who wrote the most complete
biography of Qalawiin,” and Baybars al-Mansiuri (d. 725/1325), whose three works on the period are invaluable for the historian,” and will be translated as text(s) no. 4, with their importance discussed at that point. Al-Nuwayri contains a great deal of interesting material about Egypt and Syria, but virtually nothing unique about the wars against the Mongols and the Crusaders. Baybars especially in his largest world-chronicle, the Zubdat al-fikra fi ta’rikh al-hijra, parallels the text of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, and enables historians to fill in missing material. All of his texts contain invaluable personal reminiscences and details.
One should note the limitations of Baybars. From his repeated notices of the Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir family, it is clear that he had a good deal of respect for their work and was not inclined to be critical of them. His frequent interpolations are a bit annoying and self-promoting. Additionally, Baybars’ intellectual horizons were not those of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir. He has little of the latter’s intricate material on European politics, and while he includes much material that touches upon the Crusaders, unlike Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, they are not portrayed intimately. They were an enemy that was not going to convert to Islam, and by the time of his writing were mostly destroyed (except for Cyprus), and are not given prominence.
His portraits of the Crusaders should be compared to the detailed descriptions of the various aspects of the Mongol Empire. These are not merely the Mamluks’ enemies, the Il-Khans, but also the Golden Horde, and even notices of Qubilai Khan, and his conflicts with his cousin Qaidu. All of these are much more important than the events taking place in Europe or even in Cyprus, which are geographically closer. For Baybars, the boundary of Islam vs. unbelief was extremely strong.
Baybars’ closest rival historian was Qutb al-Din Shirazi (d. 710/1311), whose rather abbreviated Akhbar-i Mughuldn gives an intimate and sympathetic portrait of the Mongols, and is quite frank about their military shortcomings with regard to the Mamluks.™ But he gives few details.
The Il-Khan vizier Rashid al-Din’s intellectual horizons were immeasurably broader than those of Baybars or Qutb al-Din. As both a political figure (ex. 718/1318) and a scholar, it was his job to exalt his Mongol patrons, which he did in the best tradition of al-Juwayni and others. In his Jami* al-tawarikh sections on Europe he provides good coverage, including a detailed list of the popes, and other rulers, as well in other books materials on India, Turks, various Mongol states, on top of the obligatory descriptions of Persian dynasties.
His coverage of the Mamluks, by contrast, is much weaker. None of his books are dedicated to the Mamluk dynasty or to Egypt per se. While he cannot help, during the course of his descriptions of the Mongol conquests, describing the key battles with the Mamluks, he never provides a systematic treatment of the rulers, as he does to other regions, or even a listing of them. His coverage of the Mongol defeat at the Battle of Hims, for example, is quite abbreviated. Again, this is in fairly sharp contrast to the treatment of Ibn al-Fuwati above, who covered roughly the same time-period, but focused much more upon Syria.
A somewhat later section of this category are those historians who wrote during the rule of Qalawiin’s family, during the middle 1300s, who sometimes personally participated in the battles with the Crusaders as youngsters, but were not close to power at that time. al- Yunint’s (d. 726/1326) continuation of al-Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi’s (d. 654/1256) world history falls into this category, it provides a wealth of documents, but few personal accounts.® Through the history of Qalawiin, he is almost never mentioned by name until the capture of Tripoli.
Al-Shafi’ b. “Alt (d. 730/1330), Ibn “Abd al-Zahir’s nephew, whose biography of Qalawin is partially translated as text no. 3, and the world historian Abii al-Fida’ (d. 732/1331)° make up for al-Yunin1’s lack of personal accounts: al-Shaff knew Qalawin personally, and Abii al-Fida’ participated in the conquests of Marqab and Tripoli (as a boy). Shaf1’s laudatory portrait of Qalawin, when taken together with the work of the other members of the Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir family, has tended to cement their hold over Mamluk historical recollection of him. It is beneficial to use other sources not dependent upon this family in order to round out a portrait of both Qalawitin and al-Ashraf.
The work of the Aleppan Ibn Habib al-Halabi (d. ca. 779/1377-8), which includes a monumental history of Qalawiin and his sons,” as well as a history of the Turkish Mamluk dynasty, is something of a disappointment. Although the perspective he has, as a Syrian (not necessarily located at the Cairene
center of events), is a refreshing one, for the Crusader period he adds very little that is new, other than the circular on the capture of Tripoli. His treatment of the capture of Marqab from the Hospitallers in 1285, for example, does not even mention the identity of the enemy.
By the middle of the 1300s, however, the material cited is mostly repetitive: Ibn al-Jazari (d. 738/1337-8),° whose account of the capture of Acre is mostly taken from al-Yiintni, but emphasizes the religious aspects of fighting more; Ibn al- Assal (d. 742/1341),” whose material as a Christian is a bit different, but unfortunately has a gap during the middle of Qalawin’s reign (skipping from years 682/1283 to 689/1290); Ibn Fadlallah (d. 749/1349),” who cites directly from Abi al-Fida’ and gives a good deal of detail. al-Dhahabi (d. 748/1347), in his great history of the Muslim world, 7a@’rikh al-Islam,” gives us virtually nothing new. The same is true for Ibn al-Wardi (d. 749/1348-9), who follows Abi al-Fida’,” Ibn Shakir al-Kutubi (d. 764/1363),” al-Yafi't (d. 768/1366—7),”> and Ibn Kathir (d. 774/1372-3).” Ibn Kathir and the biographer al-Safadi (d. 764/1363), however, are among the few historians who list a later Crusader figure in their obituaries—the last prince of Antioch, Bohemond VI (1251-75).”’ Al-Safadi especially provides a great deal of material about the individual emirs.
Although this period was dominated by the son, grandsons, and great-grandsons of Qalawin, who ruled until 784/1382, apparently on a popular level the memory of Qalawin’s accomplishments diminished. Already in the 1330s, Ibn Batttita (d. 779/1377-8, but traveling in Syria in 726/1326) noted that Baybars al-Bunduqdari was assumed to have been the one who conquered Tripoli.” That such misinformation would be current in the city of Tripoli only two generations after its conquest is testimony to the growth of the Baybars legend during this period.
A third category are the later Mamluk historians. Most of these writers use the early Mamluk period’s accomplishments in order to critique the failures of the later Mamluks of the 1400s. There is little sense of detail with regard to the Mamluks’ opponents, and most accounts are derivative. One who stands out is Ibn al-Furat (d. 808/1405), who not only bucks this trend, but gives specific names, and a great deal of detail and documents, including material (possibly) from the missing parts of Ibn “Abd al-Zahir, but mostly from his contemporary Ibn al-Mukarram. His account is translated separately as its own chronicle, and some of the characteristics of his writing are detailed in the introduction there.”
The world historian Ibn Khalditin (d. 808/1406) cites Ibn al-Furat, but while he gives details of the Battle of Hims against the Mongols, skips the taking of Marqab, and gives minimal material on the capture of Tripoli. The secretary al-Qalqashandi (d. 821/1418) gives us a great many documents from the period of Qalawiin, including ones that did not survive in earlier sources, the most important of which have been translated by Holt.
One has to say that the greatest of all Mamluk historians, al-Maqrizi (d. 845/1441—2), is the most disappointing. While his account is full of dates, and gives a chronographic exposition, virtually all the intimate details conveyed in earlier sources are absent from it.*° No details concerning Europe are present in his account. Similarly with al--Ayni (d. 855/1451), another great world historian, who merely cites previous authors (although this is useful for checking missing details in earlier sources),*! and adds nothing new, as does Ibn Taghribirdi (d. 874/1469-70),* who is very Egypt-centered in his presentation, and al-Suyuti (d. 911/1505), who uniquely cites Ibn “Abd al-Zahir by name (though with reference to his biography of Baybars).™
It is surprising how many details later Arabic and non-Arabic chroniclers list of this period, sometimes even rivaling the details given by the later Mamluk historians. Prominent ones are the Persian historians Mirkhvand (d. 903/1498),** Khvandamir (d. 942/1535?),® who lists Qalawin and al-Ashraf, and gives a comparatively detailed account of the conquest of Acre, and Tattavi (d. 996/1588),8° while the late Arab world historian al-Diyarbakri (d. 966/1558-9), who gives a reasonable description of the Battle of Hims in 1281, does not mention the Crusaders at all.*’
The local Syrian historian Ibn Sabat (d. 926/1520), cites Abu al-Fida’, but also gives some unique Arabic tribal materials. For example, he wrote that the Bedouin tribe of Banu Tanikh were loyal to their alliance with the Crusaders even at the very end of their occupation of Syria.** Local Christian historians such as the Maronite Istafan al-Duwayhi (d. 1704) are able to supply some details about the local Christian community’s relations with the last Crusaders.”
With the great chronicler and diarist Ibn Iyyas (d. 931/1524), it is interesting that by the 1500s, the Franks are not mentioned at all during the description of Qalawin’s reign. Although the individual sieges of Marqab, Tripoli, and Acre are featured, they are not differentiated from the sieges of Kerak and Sahytn; in no place are the enemies said to have been Frankish.°° Ottoman chroniclers usually mention Qalawin positively:*! the anonymous Ottoman eleventh/seventeenth century history of the Crusades A/-'lam wa-l-tabyin, while brief, accords Qalawtin the honor of having expelled the Crusaders, while completely ignoring al-Ashraf.*? Sometimes in later Ottoman works Qalawin receives the credit for all of al-Ashraf’s conquests; Ibn Abt al-Surir
(d. 1071/1661) lists Tripoli, Acre, Sidon and Beirut as his conquests, when, in fact, he conquered Tripoli alone of that number.”
The contemporary works are too many to list, but one that stands out is that of Sayyid ‘Ali al-Hariri (d. after 1317/1899), who wrote the first modern Arabic history of the Crusades. His presentation of Qalawin is very laudatory, and gives him all the credit for the expulsion of the Crusaders. Most of his account is copied word-for-word from Baybars.™
There are few surprises in this survey. The earlier sources are the most reliable, and include some personal accounts, although not as many as could have wished. Names and exact details swiftly disappear from the later accounts; what was remembered from Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s plethora of details about the Franks by later writers was usually his poetry not his prose. The later sources divide as to their interpretations of the Crusaders, polemical relation to the Mamluks, or attitude toward Qalawin personally in some cases, or as to how they want to present the overall flow of Muslim history.
Taking all of these sources together, it is possible to learn much of the period of Qalawin and al-Ashraf. While one could wish that there had been more of a local source-base available, especially for the Crusader finale, the sources do provide a wealth of original documents and letters. Some of these letters are bombastic and not terribly informative, and many cover the conquests not with prose but by poetry, but there is still a great deal of material. Thanks to this multiplicity of sources, we are able to view Qalawiin and al-Ashraf from a variety of viewpoints. There are, however, many basic questions that the sources do not answer for us.
What we can learn from the chronicles, and what is obscure
Muslim sources, especially those of the Mamluk period, have their limitations. These are especially glaring when one is aware of the Muslim Arabic and Farsi tradition of historical writing during the period until the Mongol conquest. Mamluk historiography is considerably less broadminded, and tends to be very ruler and capital-city focused. It pays especially heavy attention to obituaries, sometimes to the point where histories are little more than an excuse to list off those prominent people who have died during a given year. Because of the increased profile of religious scholars during this period, where the Mamluks relied heavily upon those scholars for their own political and religious legitimacy, religious figures are privileged over secular ones. Due to the viewpoint that the Mamluks were the sole preservers of Islam and Islamic learning, there was an increased interest in vast encyclopedias that purported to convey all useful knowledge. While these are incredibly interesting and valuable, they do obscure the fact that there is a great deal left out of them.
From a methodological point of view, most of the above historians subscribed to a cyclical view of history, and are interested in noting curious coincidences, or emphasizing rhetorical flourishes over simply relating what happened. Although the circulars sent out in the wake of major conquests are sometimes interesting, at least for their ideological focus, they are usually quite bombastic, and written in a rhymed style that is difficult to translate, and convey little useful information.
Above all, the Mamluk period lacks in the critical mass of other sourcebases available to test, confirm and disconfirm the Muslim historical material. The Jewish Cairo Geniza materials do not continue deep into the Mamluk period, which is greatly to be regretted, as they had supplied an invaluable control for earlier periods, especially for economic and social history. During the later Crusader period there are few non-Muslim travelers who have left their travelogues for us, until the period of Ibn Battuta (starting in 725/1325). After the fall of Acre there was a boycott mandated by the papacy which lasted almost a century,” although the boycott was never very effective and the popes issued licenses to circumvent their prohibition. Western pilgrims were visiting the Holy Land by the 1330s but we continue to have little sense from outsiders’ accounts of what was happening in Egypt or Syria.”
Economic basis
The historical texts translated are not concerned with economic history.” Most of what we can learn of this vital subject is incidental. Treaties and lists of items to be obtained in tribute are our major source for the weaknesses in the Mamluk economy. These weaknesses were slaves (for the next generation of Mamluks), iron, especially for nails and horseshoes, and wood,” for the construction of ships and other war implements like mangonels. It appears that Qalawin did not feel much pressure for precious metals, unlike Europe of that time.
For purely trading purposes, we can start with geography. Caravans traveling from Armenia to Seljuq Rim transported sugar, soap, pistachios, lead, and cotton. From Egypt, fabrics and cloth are consistently listed, so it is clear that such products were a mainstay of the economy. The sheer number and variety of different types of fabrics and clothing, many of which are unidentifiable, itself tells us that cloth and fabric production was a major basis for the Mediterranean economy. Sugarcane is mentioned in the treaty of Tyre.” Together with wood products it was hoarded by the unfortunate Taqi al-Din Tawba, whose goods were confiscated in 1289. But important products such as glassware from Damascus!” are not mentioned at all. There were caravans going between Baghdad and Damascus; one is attested for 682/1283, but there is no mention of what it contained.!!
Most intriguing is the description of one Misa b. al-Shawbaki, with the nickname of al--Afif, a Christian (who the historian al-Yunini ritually curses), described as “the Sultan’s merchant.” He is said to have worked for the Franks’ interests, and “importing forbidden items.”' While al- Yanin1’s anti-Christian prejudices get in the way of telling us exactly what it was that he imported, it is clear that it was of a military nature. Several anecdotes about him give us this hint: he would regularly visit with Qalawtin’s powerful deputy al-Turuntay privately, and even senior mamluks such as Lajin (deputy in Damascus) were kept waiting outside. Leaving no accounts— which annoyed the mamluk administrators—and having continual access to the highest level Mamluks, Misa is said to have brought substantial amounts of wealth from the Frankish kings,'” presumably in return for trading privileges.
Exotica came from Africa and the south, as well as the Indian Ocean. African exotica included elephants, sometimes for war purposes, a giraffe, cheetahs, lions, and a rhinoceros (both the latter from Nubia). Monkeys do not appear to qualify as exotic. For the most part, Mamluk Egypt was a waystation for animals and products that came through it from destinations further to the south and east. In 687/1288 Qalawin is said to have sent out letters
to “Sind, Hind [India], China and Yemen” saying that Egypt wanted to cultivate trade ties.! This seems to be a sign that Qalawiin was thinking in a grandiose manner economically.
One of the more interesting documents inside Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir (cited verbatim also by Baybars in 4 (a)) is the interlude on the Indian Ocean merchants coming from Sri Lanka/Ceylon. The letter from the ruler, presumed to be Buvanekabahu above, specifies possible interest in elephants (perhaps their ivory?), red dye, silk, cinnamon, and gems. It is surprising that spices do not seem to have had a higher profile in this nascent trade. Spears are also mentioned, although why Sri Lankan spears would be prized is a mystery.
However, even more interesting is the circuitous route the merchants take in coming to Egypt. It is not always possible to trace the sites they list, but it appears that they sailed from Ceylon westwards to Oman, and then up the coast to the Persian Gulf coast of Iran, followed the coast with brief trips inland, did a rather complicated route through Khuzistan, and then an even more complicated route through southern Iraq before arriving in Baghdad.
It is not at all clear why this route was chosen by the merchants, or what Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir is trying to demonstrate by including it. The two obvious possibilities for the route are that there was some commodity in which they were trading, most likely pearls (although pearl diving was more closely associated with the southern coast of the Persian Gulf, not the Persian coast), and/or they were seeking to avoid the Mongol authorities by taking such a circuitous route that involved so many small towns and villages (some of which are not identifiable). Probably Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir included it because of its intelligence value, as he appears to have been developing any sources about the Il-Khans that he could. Baybars and al-’ Ayni are the major historians which reproduce the itinerary, and both of them have conflicting renditions of the place names.
From the Yemen and the Red Sea area, the envoys brought ambergris, red Indian silk, and Qana spears.'® Likely this latter gift was not incidental; from the attitude of the Sri Lankan ruler, we should understand that there was a trade war between the two Indian Ocean regions as to which was going to supply the Mamluks (and the Europeans beyond them) with luxury items from the Orient, and also high-quality weapons. Traditionally, Yemeni swords had a high reputation throughout the Muslim world, and a number of them were by-words (e.g., Mashrafi swords).
Agriculture was fundamental to the Mamluk economy, but there is little that is not connected to large-scale projects, such as the construction of canals, dams, dikes, etc. Ibn al-Furat (translated separately) is the most conscientious of all the historians translated of the Nile inundation. He provides a number of measurements about good yearly inundations. Some of the endowments accorded to locations or certain scholars provide a sense of the connection between produce and city life.
Slavery of boys and girls is well described in the chronicles. Treaties and agreements, or even friendship gambits, with non-European states or entities invariably mentioned slaves. None of the treaties with the Crusaders, Genoa, or Aragon mentions this category (although they do have provisions for runaways). But the treaties with the Byzantines and the Armenians do, and the embassies from the Nubians, the Ethiopians, and the Golden Horde all specifically mention slaves as gifts.
One of the most important trades was the basis for the Mamluk Empire itself: the trade in Turkish slave boys. This problem was of critical concern, as the hostility of the Il-Khans blocked the free importation of new Mamluks.!°° The Genoese were the mainstays for this trade, and relied upon their bases in the Crimea, at Caffa, or Sudaq (mentioned in the treaty with the Byzantines) for supply. To that end, the goodwill of the Mongols of the Golden Horde was vital.!°’ Additionally, the way through the Byzantine Empire, transporting the slaves to Syria and Egypt, had to be maintained. It seems obvious that the treaties with the Byzantines and the Genoans, and the frequent embassies to the Golden Horde described in the texts below, were driven by these imperatives.
Overall, the early Mamluks seemed to have been highly realistic and flexible in their trading policies, seeking to maintain as many options as possible, and to play competitors off against each other (Genoa versus Venice, for example). One of the reasons for the delay in expelling the Crusaders was due to their economic usefulness.
Unfortunately, there is nothing like Benjamin of Tudela’s thumbnail portrait of the products of prominent cities (from the 1180s), and so we have to pick from the incidental allusions inside the texts. This lacuna in the economic history of the Mamluks can only be overcome by a great deal of reading.
Military tactics and conquests
It is greatly to be regretted that there are few extant Arabic military treatises from the later thirteenth century, other than that of Ibn al-Rammah,'®* who does not give many details about the key weapons and siege engines described in the sources below as they were at that time. Of course, there is more material from the fourteenth and especially the fifteenth centuries, but it is difficult to extrapolate backwards.'® There are a number of military terms which were undergoing rapid transition during this period which are obfuscated by the absence of detail.
For the period of Qalawtin we have one very in-detail battle, the Battle of Hims (October 29, 1281), which occupies a substantial section of most of the texts, and a number of siege accounts. These sieges, some bloodless, of Kakhta and Qatina, of Marqab, of Tripoli, of Acre, and of Qal‘at al-Rtm, are varied in their descriptions. The descriptions of the first two fortresses are valuable because they are so in-depth, and most probably were described in this manner in order to have a good source available for intelligence purposes in case the Mamluks ended up losing them.
The siege of Marqab, as Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir describes it, is probably his best work. Preparations and advance are all given realistically, down to the point where the men even debate as to where they are headed. The doubts on the Muslim side—because of the minor, but sharp defeat, inflicted upon the Mamluk forces in 1281—are given in a realistic manner and the siege is described with a reasonable level of detail. Although it is doubtful that Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir was physically present at this siege, his sources must have been very close to the action, and the narrative written down quite soon afterwards. It is significant that none of the other authors give anything like this level of attention to the siege of Marqab, of which the fall is usually presented as inevitable (Ibn al-Furat barely accords it a paragraph).
Such detail is not the case for Tripoli and Acre. While in other sources, such as that of Abu al-Fida’,!!° there are eye-witness accounts of the siege of Tripoli, what we have in both cases is more of a set narrative.
For Tripoli,!!! the accounts follow the pattern: listing the number of mangonels (between 13 and 19 usually), the fortifications of the city, the final rush, the looting of the city, the escape of the Franks to Palm Island, the pursuit of the Mamluk forces out to the island and the consequent slaughter and captivity that followed. There is no sense of the ups and downs of an actual siege. It is almost an anti-climax when we are told that the siege lasted 34 days (according to Ibn al-Furat), because one has no sense of time actually passing.
The same is true of the siege of Acre.!’ There are some eye-witness accounts, such as that of Baybars (text 4 (a)), and then of the aftermath. In the standard Acre narrative, the sultan gives the orders to assemble the siege machines in Damascus, there is a listing of all the emirs and allies who participated, then their arrival and setting up the camp, and accompanied usually by a description of the Franks’ preparation and fortifications.
There is no indication of what al-Ashraf was doing, or thinking; all the sources appear to have been outside of the sultan’s immediate circle. The only visual that we are given is that of Baybars, who tells us that he was the one whose cleverness virtually single-handedly conquered Acre. His descriptions, personal aggrandizement aside, are realistic, but his description once again serves to demonstrate how distant the sultan was. There is no sense of what the army as a whole is doing on land, let alone what happened at sea.
It is interesting that the chronicles are much more detailed about the slaughter, rapine and looting after the fall of Acre, and the holdout of the Templars, and others, than about the siege itself. Capitulations of the other Crusader cities, Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut, however, are given realistically and with a good level of detail. al-Ashraf’s conquest of Qal‘at al-Riim is, other than Acre, the center-piece of his conquests, and in the account left by Baybars appears realistic.
Summing up military tactics—although the historical accounts leave much to be desired in terms of intimate detail, and many unanswered questions about various small issues—tt is possible to come to some conclusions. Since the time of Baybars al-Bunduqdari there is no question that the Mamluks had perfected the art of siege. With the exception of the initial failure at Marqab early in Qalawin’s reign (which was more to punish the Hospitallers than to actually conquer the fortress), every single fortress besieged by the Mamluks either capitulates or falls violently. Even cities and fortresses abutting the sea, such as those of the Crusaders, or those located in extremely difficult terrain, such as Qatina and Qal‘at al-Rtim, could not stand up to Mamluk siege tactics during this period.
The Mamluk abilities in open warfare are more in doubt. All of the minor raids, such as those into Nubia, Armenia, and the frontier region of the Il-Khan Empire, are described in the sources as successful. But this is more likely to have been propaganda, and there must have been unrecorded failures to the north against the Mongols. The Battle of Hims was an absolute victory for the Mamluks, similar in scope to the Battle of ‘Ayn Jalit, but it was clearly a Close call. All the sources agree that while both sides defeated parts of the other, it was the Mongol belief that they could relax and loot the Mamluk camp which settled the issue, as the Mamluks did not relax. Even after this point, had there been a Mongol commander with initiative, it is possible that the Mongols could have slain Qalawiin, as he was virtually unprotected when the victorious Mongol right flank returned to the field, and still have achieved victory.
There is no doubt as to the importance of conquest for the legitimacy of the Mamluks; this importance is apparent all through the historical texts. In all the treaties new conquests are highlighted and listed. It must have been galling for the crusaders to have to see all the territories that were once theirs listed in the treaties in this manner.
It is equally obvious that the final Crusaders were not of critical concern to the Mamluks. Their primary interest was the Mongols, an interest that is reflected in the intense need for information about them, the religious polemics with those Muslim rulers (such as of Mardin) who collaborated with them, and the use to which fear of the Mongols was put as a basis for Mamluk political legitimacy.
Themes of dynasty and ruling
Ceremony was important to the Mamluks, and much of the source material deals with court ceremony, presentation of honors to emirs, gifts to delegations and visitors, and wowing the local population through processions.
Symbols of rulership are apparent in the “seat” of the Sultan, which is described as being a sarir (seat), as opposed to the general use of takht (throne) by the Mongols.'? Consistent with later Ottoman practice, the Sultan’s authority is designated by his “gates” (abwab) when he is in a major city—either Cairo or Damascus—or by the “royal tent” (dih/iz) of his tent, if he is on the move.
It is unfortunate there are so few literary portraits of either Qalawitn’s or al-Ashraf’s appearance, so we cannot be certain what they were wearing other than on a few official presentations.!!* But their other personal markings, such as flags, and other symbols such as seals are sometimes preserved. The title that is given in the contemporary Mamluk texts is invariably mawldnd al-sultan, “our master, the sultan,” which appears even on treaties signed by other nations or groups. In the Byzantine treaty the phrase is ‘izz sultanihi “his mighty sultanate.” Mamluk seals and coins from Qalawiin’s period do not appear to be remarkable, other than the note that for a short while his coins appeared with his face on one side, with his predecessor Salamish’s face on the other.!!°
However, the legitimacy conferred upon a ruler by the Friday sermon (khutba) is mentioned frequently, especially with regard to al-Ashraf.'!° As previously noted the caliph does not appear in the texts with a few exceptions, and even then merely as one of the court retinue. There does not seem to have been any effort by Qalawin to utilize him for legitimacy.
Public proclamations, and circular letters were quite important for presenting the ruler’s achievements. Proclamations, such as the investiture of al-Malik al-Salih, detail the ruler’s philosophy and self-perception. It appears that any theme that might be useful was used. For example, it is quite startling to find that al-Salih, whose given name was ‘Alt, received a number of aphorisms that were originally directed at the fourth caliph (and imam of the Shiites), ‘All b. Abt Talib, such as the well-known “to whosoever I am master, ‘Ali will be master,” associated with Ghadir Khiim (where the original ‘Alt is believed by Shiites to have been named Muhammad’s successor).
Circular letters about conquests are usually quite florid and do not contain much usable historical data. They are meant to be read in front of the prayers at prominent mosques for the purposes of mass communication. In one text or another circulars have been preserved concerning every single major battle or conquest associated with Qalawin and al-Ashraf.
Part of the communication process was the quick conveyance of these proclamations and circulars. This was achieved either through pigeon post or through horse courier (barid), or if it was from abroad, by ship. Dating the tidings of the Battle of the Gulf of Naples on June 5, 1284, which arrived in Alexandria on June 21, and was in the hands of the Sultan by June 27, 1284, gives us a sense of how fast these materials could travel.
Another form of proclamation was the poem, of which there are a fairly large number preserved in these texts. Ibn “Abd al-Zahir receives a good deal of credit from later historians for his poetry, but a large number of courtiers and others contributed. Much poetry does not remotely approach the standards of the early Islamic or the ‘Abbasid periods. Baybars is quite merciless to one Rukn al-Din Baybars al-Fariqani, a Turk, whose simple poem in Arabic he had to correct. Even as it stands now, after his correction, the poem does not require much effort to understand.
A major legitimating factor is the virility of the ruler. The early Mamluks were mostly one-generational military rulers, who were trying by fits and starts to found dynasties. Qalawiin was the one who succeeded. His three male children (and one daughter) are all celebrated, and are obviously the focus, even from a very early age, of aspirations that they would succeed.
It is rather surprising, however, that Qalawiin and al-Ashraf do not seem to have had more children. Sexual opportunities for the both of them must have been virtually unlimited, yet we do not hear of concubines or partners other than their wives. Most probably the fact that they were constantly on the move, and frequently in battle left little time for uxoriousness.
The Mamluk-ulama’ nexus
The Mamluk ruling aristocracy was an alliance between the “masters of the sword” and the “masters of the pen,” which are listed frequently in the texts. Taken in the aggregate (including those in Ibn al-Furat, trans. separately), there are approximately 420 names, other than dynasts and those appearing solely in the obituaries, listed in the texts. Of these, some 320 are Mamluk emirs (some may overlap), while some 98 are officials, judges and bureaucrats. Others do not easily fit into categories.
From a social point of view, the dominant identifiable ethnicities are obviously Turk (approximately 161, judging from their names). Mongols—who had defected to the Mamluks—were also prominent (at least 5), together with Georgians (3), and some others (Persians, Khwarizmians). Bedouin (at least 7) and Arabs also appear, although the latter appear to have been relegated to the non-front line governates. There appear to have been substantial defections from the Mongols during the Qalawiin and al-Ashraf periods, especially as the Mongol rulership swung back and forth between conversion to Islam and adherence to traditional belief systems, there were bound to be those who wanted to join the Muslim side.
Qalawiin appears to have kept power by having a powerful second, Husim al-Din Turuntay, whom he trusted completely, and by continually rotating the lower ranking emirs. If Baybars’ account is to be believed, junior emirs appear to have been quite grateful upon their promotions. al-Ashraf, as an inheriting Mamluk dynast, was less successful in this regard, and appears to have been viewed by the senior emirs with some level of fear and disdain, rather than respect.
Although one would like that these lists represent the upper levels of the military at the time of Qalawin and al-Ashraf, the likelihood is that there are significant numbers unattested in these sources.!!” Since the primary focus of the texts is upon regions in which there combat or disorder, mainly Syria, it is only natural that those regions are better attested in the sources. Even in Syria there are regions that are simply not mentioned. Jerusalem is referred to some 18 times, but almost all of these times are either citations in treaties, references to pilgrimage by Christians, or when discussing the historical circumstances of the Crusaders. Only Ibn al-Furat gives more details. Neither Qalawtin nor al-Ashraf appears to have visited the city.!"®
The same is true of large sections of Egypt. Alexandria, from an administrative point of view, is hardly mentioned. Again, Ibn al-Furat is a bit of an exception, as he gives a number of appointments to cities and governates. But there are virtually no internal details of these localities. One assumes that perhaps up to a third of the senior leadership is simply not listed in the sources, because of their capital-centered-ness, focusing as they do on events in either Cairo or Damascus (or wherever the Sultan happens to be located).
The religious leadership is somewhat better attested, if only because they also composed the various tabaqdat (classes) or wafaydt (obituaries) literature which have come down to us. A large number are listed inside the translated texts, and a surprising percentage of those are accorded obituaries.!”
That is not to say that the information about the personalities of this time is particularly copious. However, one can get a feel for these major second-tier personalities, such as Sunqur a/-ashgar, Husam al-Din Turuntay, and even for the author Baybars al-Mansiri, who never had any real political or military importance. Their offices are listed dutifully, and sometimes personality characteristics or words associated with them are recorded.
For third-tier personalities, we have little beyond their titles and sometimes assessments of their successes or failures. It is also sometimes possible to deduce, from the willingness of the Sultan to transfer various figures, what he truly thought of them—whether they were perceived as competent or incompetent, or threats to the regime. To some extent, then, reading the material gives us a hazy picture of the military—religious aristocracy.
Themes of the other, politically and religiously
There is probably no text that paints a better picture of the role of intelligence than Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir. Continually and obliquely, he provides the sense of being at the center of a network of intelligence sources. Ultimately, this may be one of the goals of the author: not only to demonstrate the centrality of Qalawin, but also his all-knowing quality.
For the Mamluks the Franks and the Mongols were both the ultimate “others.” The Mamluks were clearly more comfortable with the Franks, who were the enemy they knew. Religiously, they despised Christians and Christianity, but they seem to have mastered the ability, at least in treaties and in official delegations, to communicate across religious boundaries. The treaties represent one of the few times in Muslim Arabic literature where Christian beliefs are represented accurately, in a way that Christians themselves would accept.
Frequently the Franks are described as untrustworthy, and causing “corruption in the land” (Q5:32, 11:116, 28:77). Unlike earlier Muslim—Crusader interactions, such as the embassies recollected by Usama b. Mungqidh (d. 584/1188), there does not seem to be any negative descriptions of the Crusaders’ hygiene. Additionally they are not always ritually cursed, the way that Ibn al-Athir (d. 630/1232) or other earlier Muslim chroniclers did. However, there does not seem to have been much respect for them. Nowhere are the Crusaders’ military qualities extolled, or any positive characteristics about them mentioned, while they are frequently described as conniving and untrustworthy.
The Mongols were the enemy that the Mamluks did not know, and feared immeasurably more than the Crusaders. The former are frequently described as “the abandoned (by God) enemy” (makhdhil, cf. Q17:22) or other terms. Although in general Qalawitn and al-Ashraf were militarily successful against the Mongols or at least held them to a draw, the sources, especially those of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, always have an air about them that the Mamluks expected to suffer a reversal at any moment. When they fight the Mongols, the tone is of a child picking a fight with an adult, who seems amazed that he could get away with what he did.
One quality Mamluk historians emphasize with regard to the Mongols is cowardice. At every point, effort is made to point out the Mongols’ weaknesses, cowardice on the battlefield, inability to protect their own allies, and general disorganization. This emphasis upon cowardice should not be tak at face value; it was most probably the Mamluk historians’ attempt to counteract the widespread fear of the Mongols.
The raid on Armenia in June 1284 is an excellent example, where the Mamluk raiders are said to have taken the fortress of al-Tini by storm, as presented by both Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir and Baybars, when Armenians and Mongols happened upon the raiders. This force was then annihilated or taken prisoner, and the Mamluk raiders returned safely for the most part (one was killed). Probably the goal with anecdotes like this was to reinforce the idea that the Mongols were not invincible.
The religious minorities are almost invisible in these texts. Non-Frankish Christians and Jews do not appear to have had a place at the court or access to the Sultan (with the exception of “the sultan’s merchant” listed above). Among the exceptions to this rule are the mention of (Christian) witnesses who attest various treaties with Europeans. The Coptic Orthodox Patriarch St. John VII (1271—93)!° makes no appearances, nor does the nagid of the Jewish community, Rabbi Abraham (II) b. David (I) b. Abraham (I) Maimonides (d. 1313).!7! In general, the early Mamluk period for non-Muslims was one of continual harassment on the part of Muslims.!”
Religious polemics are not mentioned in the texts, but there are extant tracts against the Christians from this time period.'* The major exception to this rule are the proclamations of al-Ashraf, who appears to have strongly disliked or despised Christians and Christianity. But even Qalawin is said to have banned the employment of Christian or Jewish officials—a theme that is typical. Polemical texts usually mention resentment against the employment of Jewish and Christian officials, the absence of the Pact of ‘Umar’s application upon the religious minorities, and persecution of both Christians and sometimes Jews as a result of military setbacks.
It may be that this heightened level of religious polemics was in response to the danger of the Crusaders, or it may have been part of the Mamluk attempt to win legitimacy from the Muslim population.!* One cannot reasonably doubt that religious persecutions of “the other” have been popular throughout history; Edward I of England’s forbidding the Jews from usury (1275), and expulsion of the Jews from England (1290) at this time are similar in kind.
Qalawiin and the common people
As previously stated, Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir’s presentation of Qalawin is that of a paternalistic ruler. Whenever he discovers an injustice he makes sure to rectify it, and takes their interests—such as the digging of the canal—into hand personally, not hesitating to utilize his own royal mamluks for this menial task.
While Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir and other historians translated here usually laud Qalawin for the beauty of the Manstri complex Qalawin constructed in Cairo, most probably it was the functionality of its hospital that was genuinely noticed by the masses.!% Most of his generosity seems to have been directed towards the Mamluk elites, but there are a number of times when Qalawin is said to have distributed wealth or clothes to the common people.
Another popular protection was the hajj pilgrimage, which by the early Mamluk period had acquired a ritualistic character involving the camelbearing (mahmal), and a caravan procession, guarded by the ruling dynasty, taking the pilgrims to Medina and Mecca. Most of the chronicles note the pilgrimage each year, and one can be certain that the fact it was not (usually) threatened during this period was played up by Mamluk propaganda.
Another propaganda method was to refer to the cities and regions of the Mamluk Empire as “protected” (such as in “protected” Damascus). This adjective added on to a given name probably served to emphasize the fact that the Mamluks did protect the Muslim community from outside invaders, and the safety that they conferred upon the population was one of the principal benefits of their rule.
During this period Sufism was expanding through Syria and Egypt,'”° and the texts are filled with descriptions of Sufi residences, activities associated with Sufism, and even utilization of Sufis as spies (see the first Anmad— Qalawiin exchange of letters). One should note themes of mystical Sufi participation in battles, such as that recorded in text 4 (a) for the year 687/1288
concerning ‘Uthman b. Khidr b. Sa‘d al-Kurdi al-Azkashi al-- Adawi, who is said to have had a vision concerning one of Baybars’ battles.!””
Qalawin and al-Ashraf do not seem to have participated in Sufi rites at all, but neither do they seem to have limited them. The major case of interaction between Qalawiin and a Sufi figure happens at the time of his elder son al-Salih’s untimely passing in 687/1288. During this sad interval, one Shaykh ‘Umar, said to have been the khalifa to Shaykh Abi al-Su ‘id, is said to have approached the Sultan, and told him that the Sufi poor would pray for him if he distributed charity. Qalawiin gave him 5000 dirhams, but shortly afterwards al-Salih died. When Qalawiin next saw Shaykh ‘Umar he reproached the latter, saying that his prayers did not work. But ‘Umar hastily answered that on the contrary they did work, as al-Salih had gone to heaven instead of hell.'”8
It is not easy to isolate Qalawiin’s level of religiosity; he did everything required of a medieval Muslim ruler, but does not seem to have gone beyond what was necessary.!” In Ibn al-Furat there is one example of him receiving the conversion of a mamluk to Islam, although this appears to be pro forma. On the other hand, there is also no evidence that he flouted any Muslim norms in terms of excessive drinking.
Probably for the common people the most significant thing that Qalawin did was to defeat the Mongols. It would seem that the celebrations in the wake of the Battle of Hims were genuinely popular in nature, as were those after the expulsion of the Crusaders in 1291. So while for the most part the Sultan was a distant figure, he fulfilled their expectations of a good ruler.
Qalawin and the historical record
In general, Qalawin has fared well with Muslim historians. Although he never achieved anything like the star status of Baybars al-Bunduqdari, he was lauded for his victory over the Mongols,!*° and for his careful consolidation over the Crusader territories, even though this was completed by al-Ashraf after his death. Although one cannot say that his time was prosperous, when looking at Qalawiin’s reign from the perspective of the middle of the 1300s or the 1400s, it probably looked quite appealing. Unlike the comparative period in Iraq, there are no descriptions of mass famines,'*! earthquakes,'” or plagues,'*? comparatively few pogroms against the Jews or the Christians, plus an almost continuous series of military victories.
This success, comparatively speaking, was one of the driving forces behind the establishment of a long-term (for the Mamluks) Qalawiin dynasty, which lasted, after a number of breaks immediately following al-Ashraf’s assassination, until 784/1382. It is interesting to compare the portrayals of the two major early Mamluk sultan’s, Baybars and Qalawiin. Both were closely connected with defeating the Mongols, both were conquerors and builders, and moreover dynamic figures. Both of them died natural deaths, unlike most Mamluk rulers up till that period.
However, while Baybars has been immortalized by the growth of a series of popular tales that continue to lionize him on a scale only comparable to that of Salah al-Din,'* his immediate descendants were feckless. Two of them indeed became sultans, but neither lasted long, and ultimately they both were exiled to Constantinople. Baybars himself might have been a great man, but Qalawiin was much better at portraying himself as a man of stability (through his propaganda and the chronicles translated below) and raising a family that would continue his legacy. As Ibn Battiita noted, when describing Baybars as the conqueror of Tripoli, when in actuality this achievement belonged to Qalawin, the common people apparently remembered the former as the conqueror, but preferred to be ruled by the latter’s descendants.
Texts translated here and their sources
All of the texts translated below are taken from standard editions, but of varying qualities. The language of each text differs, as some are written in a florid manner, while others are quite simple and direct. Citations from the Qur’an are taken from A. Droge (trans.), The Qur’an: A New Annotated Translation.
The standard edition of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, Tashrif (text 1 (a)) is the 1961 edition of Murad Kamil and ‘Ali al-Naggar, is reasonably good for its time, although there are significant problems with names (many of which were pointed out by Holt), and the editor did not have access to many comparative texts, other than Ibn al-Furat. The edition is based upon Paris Bibliothéque Nationale Ar 1704, and its language is middle Arabic.
Text 1 (b) was edited by Axel Moberg, Ur ‘Abd Allah Ibn ‘Abd ez-Zahir’s Biografi 6ver Sultanen el-Malik Asraf Halil, and is taken from the Hof-und Staatsbibliothek, Munich, arabisch 405. The edition is so-so, as it appears to be based upon a single surviving manuscript, and the editor did not use enough comparative historical texts in order to solve the textual problems. In all fairness to Moberg, the text does not seem to have been utilized by any later Mamluk historians. Consequently there are a number of difficulties in the translation. The language is also middle Arabic, although not quite as florid as that of | (a).
Text 2 is a treaty text taken from Maximiliano Alarcon y Santon and Ramon Garcia de Linares (eds.), Los Documentos Arabes Diplomaticos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragon (Madrid-Granada: Publicaciones de las Escuelas de Estudios Arabes de Madrid y Granada, 1940), pp. 335-8 (no. 145), Spanish trans. pp. 338-44 is a good, scientific edition, although one lacking in any notes.
Text 3, which is taken from MS Bodleian Marsh 424, is an excellent scientific edition by Paulina Lewicka with copious notes to the Arabic text. The writing style is more comprehensible than that of Ibn “Abd al-Zahir, but only just barely, as the author uses rather obscure language.
Works of Baybars al-Mansiri are uneven in their quality. Baybars, Zubda (text 4 (a)) is an excellent scientific edition by D.S. Richards, which is based upon British Library Ms. Add. 23325. The Zubda is written for the most part in clear classical Arabic, with some rhetorical flourishes. '*°
Baybars’ two smaller texts were both edited by ‘Abd al-Hamid Salih: The Tuhfa al-mulikiyya (text 4 (b)) survives only in a manuscript found in the Vienna Public Library (arabisch 904), while Mukhtar (text 4 (c)) is based upon Ambrosiana A-11 in Florence (which had been previously misidentified). The writing style is much simpler than that of the Zubda, with comparatively minimal poetry or documents.
In general, I have tried for readability in the translation, so some, especially of the poetry, is free. Most of the prose is quite literal, although I have allowed some expressions to appear as equivalents for the sake of better comprehension.
A note on names and transliterations
Arabic and Farsi are transliterated in accord with the standard transliteration in International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. Arabic and Persian names are also transliterated in this fashion (I have usually followed Northrup and Mazor for Turkish names in Arabic); Mongol and Turkish names if they are known are transliterated as in Jackson, Mongols and the Islamic World; if unknown, then according to what the Arabic necessitates. When I have felt that the Arabic b. = “son of” should be translated, especially inside Turkish and Mongol names, then I have done so. Titles and nicknames are given in Arabic, Farsi, and Turkish, with a translation the first time they occur. For other places in the text, the reader should refer to the glossary where all such words are translated. Standard place names (Cairo, Damascus, Gaza, Mecca) are given as known popularly; local place names are given in their Arabic form or the Arabic form of a Turkish or other place name when this cannot be identified. The term mansiir “victorious” or even “made victorious by God” continually appears throughout the texts, and has usually been translated when it is not obviously the name of the ruler, but for the original readers would have further emphasized his regnal title.
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