Download PDF | Sarah Kate Raphael, Climate And Political Climate. Environmental Disasters In The Medieval Levant, Brill ( 2013).
231 Pages
Introduction
In late November 2010 a small group of Muslim, Jewish and Christian clerics gathered at the spring of Ein Heniya between Jerusalem and Bethlehem and prayed for rain. A month later, the grand mufti Mohammed Rashid Kabbani conducted rain prayers at the Mohammed al-Amin Mosque in downtown Beirut, hundreds of people attended.1 Fluctuations in precipitation and severe droughts have been known to occur in the past. While modern western societies have learnt how to cope with long dry periods by using advanced technology, in the past, a succession of droughts left a trail of ruin: crop-failures, large-scale migration, famine, epidemics and high death tolls. The twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw a substantial rise in the number of droughts throughout the Levant.
This coincided with some of the most violent tectonic activity the region had witnessed. Nature, however, could conjure numerous other powerful and destructive calamities: flash floods, swarms of locusts, armies of mice and rats, scorching winds and thick dust storms. The data for this study was drawn from Arabic and Latin sources, which date from 1100 to the Black Plague (1346). Contemporary authors often include a short line or a passage that refer to extreme or unusual weather events and natural disasters. In some cases they give a clear and detailed picture, which allows one to grasp the full scale of environmental disasters and assess their impact on the local population and regional affairs. Medieval societies, like the population of developing countries in modern times, relied to a great extent on environmental resources.2
Many scholars argue that environmental scarcity often was and still is the main cause for violent conflicts. Reuveny sums this idea clearly: “Environmental scarcity can cause conflict through interrelated social, economic and political channels. A decline in the quality or quantity of natural resources may lead to economic decline. Another channel involves contests over scarce resources, particularly when they have no readily available substitutes.”3 In his article on civil war in the Sudan, Muhamed Suliman concludes: “Here we have an outstanding example of an ethniccultural conflict being gradually but firmly transformed through persistent ecological degradation into a resource conflict.”4 Molvaer defined environmental conflicts as those arising when the environment fails to supply people with what they expect from it. He then narrowed the definition: “Environmental conflicts are fought mainly for the fruits of the earth— namely food.”5
Tannehill saw an almost direct link between droughts, war, disease and famines.6 Similar opinions have been voiced by politicians. President Barack Obama said that climate change “will fuel more conflict for decades”7 The prime minister of Norway Gro Harlem Brundtland stated “The environmental problems of the poor will affect the rich, in the not too distant future, transmitted through political instability and turmoil.”8 A critical judgment and more complex study, opposing the above views is presented by Levy: “By the time one arrives at the end of the logical chain—violent conflict—so many intervening variables have been added that it is difficult to see the independent contribution of environmental degradation. There appear to be no interesting mechanisms that are purely and directly environmental. Therefore any research strategy aimed at deepening understanding of security problems by studying only environ- mental connections can never succeed.”9
Levy’s opinion is shared by a relatively small group. Most studies emphasize the links between scarcity of natural resources, environmental disasters and violence. Few studies survey and examine environmental disasters in the medieval Levant. Tucker published two articles on the environmental hazards in the Mamluk sultanate, “Miscellanea, natural disasters and the peasantry in Mamluk Egypt,” and “Environmental hazards, natural disasters, economic loss, and mortality in Mamluk Syria.”10 Little wrote a short paper listing earthquakes throughout the Mamluk period.11 Dols’ book published in 1977 on the Black Death is still one of the most important studies on this subject. A more recent work on the Black Death, written by Borsch, examines the economic repercussions of the plague in Egypt in comparison to England.12 An extraordinary Italian team of scholars, led by Guidoboni has assembled a catalogue recording all the earthquakes around the Mediterranean from the eleventh to the sixteenth-century.13 This work, based on a wide variety of sources in several languages, emphasizes the wider geological aspects, it rarely looks at the impact of severe earthquakes on contemporary societies. While the role of past climate and environmental disasters in Europe and Asia Minor has been studied by prominent historians,14 the study of past climate in the Levant has attracted little attention.15 Some historians briefly mention an event, but most ignore the subject. The development of a natural disaster into a full scale crisis depends on the size of the area afflicted, the severity and length of the event, the state of regional economics, the regional balance of power, the population’s strength and the abilities of the local rulers. In a few instances severe natural disasters changed the balance of power almost overnight, albeit usually for a short space of time. It is thus important to examine each casestudy independently in order to receive a balanced perspective of the role of environmental disasters in the regional affairs throughout this period.
Historical Background During much of the twelfth century the Franks16 dominated the political and military scene in the Levant. The unification of Egypt and Syria under the rule of Salaḥ al-Dīn (Saladin, d. 1193) gradually changed the balance of power in the region. Though the Franks had lost much of their military strength, Saladin’s successors could not maintain a firm united political or military front against the Crusader states. During the next sixty seven years (589/1193-658/1260) the Franks and the Ayyubids managed to maintain relatively long periods of calm. Although the two sides were engaged in raids and counter raids, the capture of hostages, and the building of fortresses, few large-scale open-field battles took place. The balance of power tilted in favor of the Franks only when a new Crusade arrived and the local armies received substantial reinforcements. The fall of the Ayyubid dynasty and the rise of the Mamluks to power stretched over a decade (1250-1260). The establishment of al-Muẓaffar Quṭuz (r. 1259-1260) as sultan coincided with the Mongol invasion of Syria led by Hülegü (1260). The first Mamluk-Mongol clash occurred in the Jezreel Valley, near the spring of ʿAyn Jalūt, on the 3 September 1260. The Mongols suffered a humiliating defeat. Their forces in Syria and those who survived the battle fled back east across the Euphrates.
During the next thirty one years (1260-1291) the Mamluks slowly eradicated the Frankish settlement and fought to prevent the Mongol-Īkhānids17 from crossing the Euphrates and invading Syria. The Crusaders, who had been the main political and military entity in the region during the Ayyubid period, played a lesser part in the politics of the thirteenth-century. After the fall the Crusader enclaves along the coast, the Mamluk sultanate ruled over the entire Levant. Although the Mongol invasion had been repelled, once the Īkhānid state was established it became the Mamluks’ chief opponent and remained the main threat to the sultanate’s existence until 1323 (the year the final Mamluk-Īlkhānid peace treaty was signed). The first half of the fourteenth century was dominated by the strong and centralized reign of the Mamluk sultan al-Nāṣīr Muḥamad (r.1310-1341). It was characterized by political stability and economic prosperity. His death, considered by many as a turning point in Mamluk history, ushered a period of weak rulers that were often subject to the power of high ranking officers. This study concludes with the outbreak of the Black Plague (1346), which reduced the population of the Levant by a quarter or a third. According to Dols the Levant’s economical and technological progress came to a halt soon after the plague.
The Geographical Framework Most of the data refers to Greater Syria, (Bilad al-Sham), which correlates with the modern state of Syria, south east Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Environmental disasters in Cairo and Baghdad have been incorporated in this study because of their political importance and prominant position as centers of government. While Baghdad was the seat of the caliphate until 1258 when it was conquered by the Mongols; Cairo served as the capital of both the Ayyubid and the Mamluk sultans. It was from Cairo that the sultans conroled and supervised the large grain growing regions of Egypt and the grain prices. The impact of poor crops in Egypt was often felt in many of the urban markets throughout the Levant. The manipulation of grain surpluses is best witnessed in the relations between north Africa and the Christian Kingdom of Sicily, I therefore decided to include both these region in the study.
Resources, Environmental Disasters and Conflict Did environmental disasters spur or hinder conflict? How if at all did the frequent droughts and earthquakes influence internal and international affairs in the Levant? How and what decisions did rulers make in times of crisis related to environmental disasters? Did the sedentary populations cope better than the nomads? Which political entity fared better, who fared worse and why? This research examines environmental disasters in a broader historical context. The aim of this study is to determine the long and short-term reprecussions of environmental disasters on the political, military and social affairs in the medieval Levant.
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