Download PDF | Paul Stephenson - Byzantium's Balkan Frontier_ A Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900-1204-Cambridge University Press (2000).
366 Pages
Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier is the first narrative history in English of the northern Balkans in the tenth to twelfth centuries. Where previous histories have been concerned principally with the medieval history of distinct and autonomous Balkan nations, this study regards Byzantine political authority as a unifying factor in the various lands which formed the empire’s frontier in the north and west. It takes as its central concern Byzantine relations with all Slavic and non-Slavic peoples – including the Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians and Hungarians – in and beyond the Balkan Peninsula, and explores in detail imperial responses, first to the migrations of nomadic peoples, and subsequently to the expansion of Latin Christendom. It also examines the changing conception of the frontier in Byzantine thought and literature through the middle Byzantine period.
Preface
This book began as a refinement of my doctoral dissertation which I defended at the University of Cambridge in April . My thesis presents a distillation, in the form of four regional surveys, of the written and archaeological evidence pertaining to the Byzantine frontier in the northern Balkans in the period –. The refinement, I thought, should have a narrative structure, since no synthetic narrative political history of the northern Balkans exists in English for this period.
I also decided to increase its chronological and geographical range to allow a cursory treatment of Bulgaria before the imposition of the ‘Byzantine Yoke’, and a fuller exploration of how the ‘yoke’ was cast off by Bulgarians, Vlachs, Serbs and others. In the end the refinement bears no resemblance whatever to the thesis. It takes as its central concern Byzantine responses, first to the migrations of nomadic peoples, and subsequently to the expansion of Latin Christendom. It also examines the changing conception of the frontier in Byzantine thought and literature through the Middle Byzantine Period. In the course of writing the thesis and book I have enjoyed the support of a number of institutions. St John’s College, Cambridge awarded me a Benefactors’ Scholarship and travel funds sufficient to take me around Turkey and the Balkans more than once. The British Academy funded my Ph.D.
I was honoured to be appointed to a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship, and privileged to hold this at Keble College, Oxford. The Warden and Fellows of Keble have provided intellectual and other sustenance. I have benefited from the instruction, advice and criticism of many friends and scholars.
My greatest debt is to Jonathan Shepard, who supervised the thesis, read drafts of papers published separately and reworked for the book, read the book in two drafts, allowed me to make use of his forthcoming works, supplied me with offprints of his published papers, provided bibliographical information and assistance with trickyt exts, and saved me from many errors of fact and judgement. Simon Franklin and Elizabeth Jeffreys examined the thesis, and encouraged me to produce the refinement.
Elizabeth has continued to provide encouragement and advice during my time in Oxford. Averil Cameron brought me to Oxford, and provided a home at Keble where I have been able to complete this project, and begin another. As my ‘mentor’, appointed by the British Academy, she has supervised my fellowship, and as a friend and critic she has improved my scholarship considerably. Other Byzantinists have helped: James Howard-Johnston provided the most insightful historical instruction at an early stage; Michael Metcalf taught me numismatics; Cyril Mango taught me sigillography, and inspired with his wit and erudition; Paul Magdalino offered welcome advice at a late stage. Ned Goy taught me Serbo-Croat in Cambridge, and David Raeburn improved my Greek in Oxford.
Neven Budak and Mladen Ancˇic´ welcomed me in Zagreb and Zadar. Csanád Bálint and József Laslovszky welcomed me in Budapest. Despina Christodoulou argued with me in Cambridge and Athens. Dean Kolbas made me think about what I was doing and why I was doing it. My sisters and grandmother, Ian Stewart and Jennifer Lambert, Kristen Laakso and Brian Didier, Graham Stewart and Caroline Humfress have taken a keen and welcome interest. Clare lost interest years ago, but this book is still dedicated to her, and now also to Jack Jolly. Oxford, March 1999
A note on citation and transliteration In citation, more for reasons of length than style, I have employed a modified author-date system similar to that used in The New Cambridge Medieval History. Primary sources are referred to, according to common practice, by the name of the author, or by an abbreviation of the title of the work. Thus, I refer to Cinnamus (not The Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus), but the Alexiad (by Anna Comnena). Most abbreviated titles are self-evident, for example Codex Diplomaticus refers to the Codex Diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae.
However, some sources have a more cryptic abbreviation which is in common use, for example DAI, the De Administrando Imperio, or PVL, Povest’ Vremennykh Let (Russian Primary Chronicle). In each such case the work is listed in the bibliography after the abbreviation, and is also included in the list of abbreviations which precedes the text. Where an author has produced multiple works, both name and title are used, for example Theophylact [of Ohrid], Lettres, and Theophylact, Discours. Where a work exists, and is commonly cited, in more than one standard edition, the name of the editor has been included, for example Cecaumenus, ed.
Litavrin (not ed. Wassiliewsky and Jernstedt). Secondary works are cited in notes (and occasionally within the text) according to the simple formula author, date, page, and (where necessary), column (col.), ep. (letter), number (nr.) or note (n.). Thus Michael Angold, The Byzantine Empire, –: a Political History, nd edn., London and New York , page , note , is cited as: Angold : , n. . In transliterating from Cyrillic I have used, I hope consistently, the Library of Congress system. This has led to my occasionally emending an author’s chosen transliteration of a work, or even her or his own name. Thus, I refer to I. Dujcˇev as Duichev, and V. Sˇandrovskaya as Shandrovskaia.
I have been less consistent in my transliteration from Greek. On the various methods for transliterating Greek I refer the reader, for once, to Treadgold : xxi–xxiii, and to the criticism of Treadgold by George Dennis, in BMGS (): , ‘Latinisation . . . is contrary to th[e practice] of most serious Byzantinists today, and is especially unwarranted now that the Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium has provided writers in English with a standard system of representing Byzantine terminology. To continue with Latinisation is simply a foppish affectation, with a touch of arrogance.’ This is correct, and for specific Greek terms I have employed a Greek transliteration italicized, so strategos not strategus, and doux not dux or duke.
However, with just a hint of foppish affectation, I have employed a Latin transliteration for each proper name except where a common English variant exists, for example Alexius Comnenus not Alexios Komnenos, and John not Ioannes nor Ioannis. In my defence I cite precedent not principle, and skulk behind the authority of a serious Byzantinist: Angold : ix, ‘I have come to favour far more than in the past a Latin transliteration of Byzantine proper names: so Comnenus not Komnenos.
Introduction
Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier seems a straightforward title, but it is ambiguous: the meanings conveyed by the three words to a modern reader would not have been recognized in medieval south-eastern Europe. The Byzantines called themselves Rhomaioi, Romans, and their capital ‘New Rome’. Byzantium – from Byzantion, the site on the Bosphorus refounded as Constantinople – was a neologism of the sixteenth century, and its use was essentially pejorative, intended to distinguish the decadent Christian successor from its predecessor, the Enlightenment ideal of Rome. Balkan is a Turkish word for mountain, first applied by the Ottomans to the range known to classical and Byzantine authors as Haemus, and today as the Stara Planina.
Balkan was first applied to the whole mountainous peninsula in the nineteenth century.1 There was no Byzantine collective word for all the lands beween the Danube and the Mediterranean, except as part of a greater whole: Europe, as defined by Herodotus, or – in contexts we will explore further – oikoumene, ‘the civilized world’. The word ‘frontière’, from the Latin ‘frons’, emerged in French to signify the facade of a church, or the front line of troops disposed in battle formation.
It came to be used as an alternative to ‘limite’, from the Latin ‘limes’, and by the sixteenth century had absorbed the meaning of the latter; that is, it contained the notion of limitation. However, ‘frontière’ also retained its own connotations of facing and moving forward.2 The English derivation is still used in such contexts as ‘advancing (or pushing back) the frontiers of knowledge’, which while positing outward expansion at the same time implies a delimited, finite body
A full historical articulation of the concept of the frontier was integral to the creation of nation states with their profoundly politicized borders. The geopolitical developments of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries heralded, indeed required, the rise of cartography as a method for representing graphically the extent and limits of nations. It remains to be seen whether there existed an equivalent Byzantine conception of the frontier, but we can be fairly certain that they did not articulate the notion cartographically. Byzantium, an empire which endured for over a millennium, has left us no maps.3 Three Byzantine portolans have survived which list ports and the distances between them, but these were not accompanied by maps.4 Maritime charts of the twelfth century and later show the Dalmatian coast, but nothing of the peninsula’s interior.
The earliest known map of the whole of the northern Balkans was produced in Bulgaria between and , probably in . 5 This was a military map, and might lead us to suppose that Byzantine emperors and generals who fought so often in the northern Balkans between and would have benefited from the production of similar charts. But there is no indication that they ever did, and accounts of campaigns and journeys through the highlands and passes refer most often to local guides, for example the Vlachs, whose geographical knowledge gave them a remarkable advantage in dealings with the empire.
Nevertheless, historians of Byzantium frequently produce maps which show the extent of the empire at a stated point in time. Their maps will generally include clear indications of where they believe the empire’s borders, the political limits of imperial authority, should be located. Sequential maps might illustrate clearly, indeed far more clearly than text alone, how the empire’s limits, and by implication political fortunes, fluctuated through time. For example, the second edition of Michael Angold’s excellent political history of the empire between and , has maps with the straightforward titles ‘The Byzantine Empire c. ’, and ‘The Empire under the Comneni’.6 Such illustrations do not reveal that Byzantine authors rarely provide details to help a reader locate a place, and it has taken considerable effort on the part of modern scholars to locate some of the more familiar sites or regions in space and time.
Examples which we will encounter in the following chapters are Presthlavitza, ‘Little Preslav’ (a fortified town), Dendra (a region), and Paradounavon (a Byzantine administrative district). The maps which accompany this text, like all maps of the Byzantine Balkans, are the creation of a modern author which do not, since they cannot, illustrate medieval perceptions of the empire or of its frontiers. And to that extent they are little different from the text itself, which is a work of synthesis and interpretation with a particular perspective. Many historians now believe it is impossible to produce an objective historical narrative from the often highly subjective data with which they must work.
Historians of medieval Byzantium have better reason than many to despair of ever divining ‘truths’, for the limited written sources on which all interpretations rely are remarkably difficult to handle, still less decipher. The most eminent commentators have written of ‘distortion’ and condemned Byzantine literature as derivative. Prejudice in the selection and arrangement of information is ubiquitous, and the usual ‘solution’ – employing Rankean rules to compare contemporary sources – is frequently impossible: there are simply too few texts. Nevertheless, there are pertinent questions that we can ask of our texts and expect answers, starting with ‘How did Byzantines in the tenth to twelfth centuries conceive of the empire’s frontiers?’ The medieval Byzantine dictionary, the Souda, states that ‘the zones near the edges (termasi) of the lands are called eschatia’, which might be translated as ‘the extremities’, ‘the periphery’ or ‘the borders’.7
The Souda is a compilation of excerpts from earlier sources, and this definition appears to date from the third century.8 Further specific terms appear to have been formulated on the empire’s eastern front in the seventh and eighth centuries, a period of significant retrenchment.9 By the mid-tenth century, the De Administrando Imperio – a source to which I will devote considerable attention in chapter one – uses three terms. The first, sunoros, means ‘bordering on’.10 The second, akra, is most simply translated as ‘the extremity’, although it can also mean the top of a hill, and hence came to mean ‘citadel’.11 The third term, horos (alternatively horion or horismos) is a fixed linear border, often defined by the setting up of boundary stones: a process known as horothesia. 12 Documents preserved in the archives of monasteries on Mount Athos refer frequently to the horion or horismos of monastic lands, since it was imperative to establish the exact extent and limits of lands granted to or possessed by foundations which were subject to or exempt from taxation.13 The same principles and terms applied to the empire as a whole. In the twelfth century Anna Comnena uses horos, horion and horismos to refer to linear borders, for example to refer to a river established as the border in a peace treaty.14 Such fixed linear borders are often regarded as the empire’s natural frontiers, and for both medieval and modern authors the Danube is the empire’s natural frontier in the northern Balkans.15 But as with all natural frontiers, ‘nature only serves as a mask; it is the mask worn by long-standing historical and political facts, the memories of which men retained over centuries’ (Febvre : ).
The notion of the natural frontier is profoundly politicized, and culturally proscriptive: it marks the barrier and point of transition between ‘self ’ and ‘other’ in many historical contexts. In medieval Byzantium the frontier delimited the oikoumene, and marked the point of transition from the civilized world to the barbarian. The notion of the barbarian was an invention of fifth-century Athens.
The barbarian was the universal anti-Greek defined in opposition to Hellenic culture. The two identities were polarities and together were universal: all that was Greek was civilized; all that was barbarian was uncivilized.
Byzantine authors, through their classical education, inherited this way of seeing other peoples. Barbarism did not only threaten the political borders, it constantly circled the conceptual limits of the Christian Roman empire, and threatened to fall suddenly and swiftly upon those not standing vigilant guard. Thus, in the early s in his capacity of Master of Rhetors, Theophylact Hephaistus delivered an oration in which he praised the weather in Constantinople where ‘winter does not rebel, nor does he rush the frontiers and fall upon us in Scythian fashion, freezing the blood of living creatures and laying crystalline fetters upon the rivers’ (Theophylact, Discours, ed. Gautier: .–). His chosen subject is prophetic, for he would later write often and at length of his exile from Constantinople, and his choice of imagery is fascinating. The winter outside the most civilized of cities is personified as the archetypal barbarian, the Scythian, launching sudden raids across the limits of the oikoumene.
As we will see below (at pp. ‒, ) Byzantine authors refer to numerous northern peoples as Scythians, alluding both to their origins (as far as the Byzantines were concerned) in ancient Scythia, and to their way of life, which resembled that of Herodotus’ Scythians. The barbarian beyond the frontier has been a constant feature of attempts by various peoples to define their own brand of ‘civilization’. The seminal frontier thesis in modern historiography, expounded in by Frederick Jackson Turner, historian of the American west, considers the frontier as ‘the meeting point between savagery and civilization’.16 Turner saw the frontier as crucial to the creation of a distinctly American identity, where the American was self-reliant, innovative and ruggedly individualistic. This ‘pioneer spirit’ facilitated the westward expansion of a peculiar form of ‘civilization’ across lands previously occupied by native American ‘savages’.
Turner’s thoughts on the significance of the frontier were a statement of a prevailing ideology which we can now contextualize and criticize. Similarly, we can contextualize and criticize Byzantine perceptions of frontiers and barbarians. There can be no barbarian except in the mind of the self-consciously civilized person, and just as Turner’s Indians were savages in the minds of his European-American frontiersmen, so northern peoples were considered by Byzantine authors to be Scythians. Already it will be clear that few frontiers are purely political or military, and to place such emphasis on the linear border side-steps many concerns addressed in recent frontier studies.17
Wherever sufficient data allows, I will be concerned with the place of the frontier in Byzantine thought, rhetoric and ideology. However, and in spite of my earlier statements, the main body of my text will comprise a narrative of Byzantine activity in the northern Balkans through three centuries with emphasis on political and military matters. I believe this is still a valuable exercise, and one which will hopefully facilitate further discussion of the significance of the frontier in Byzantine history. Moreover, even a political approach raises interesting conceptual questions. First, for example, what did the political border signify for the peoples living on either side of it? Can we even know that they were aware of the border, or exactly
where it ran? Occasionally these questions can be answered, for example by the discovery of boundary stones. More frequently they cannot. Second, by drawing a simple line on a map we are obliged to consider the nature of political authority within and beyond that line. If we accept that Basil II extended the political borders of the empire as far as the Danube (see below at pp. ‒), we cannot assume that political authority in every region south of the Danube was exercised in the same way. Nor can we assume that this way was (or these ways were) different to those beyond the frontier. If, as I argue, Byzantine authority was almost always exercised through existing local power structures, how does Byzantine government in Rasˇka (in Serbia, within the frontier) differ from Byzantine influence in southern Hungary (beyond the frontier)? Or how do both differ from government in the highly developed thema (administrative district) of Thrace, or the new thema of Bulgaria established by Basil II? Can we identify both an internal and external frontier? And where then do we cross from domestic policy into foreign policy, or from provincial administration into frontier policy? In the following chapters we will explore the nature of Byzantine influence and authority in each of the frontier regions in the northern Balkans: Paristrion, the lands beside the Ister (Danube) in modern Romania and Bulgaria; Sirmium, from the Danube-Sava to Nisˇ (in Serbia); Dalmatia and Croatia; Dyrrachium and Duklja, Zahumlje and Travunija which comprise most of modern Albania, Montenegro and Hercegovina. We will also consider regions of the interior highlands: Bosna and Rasˇka, which stretched across the regions known today in English as Bosnia, Kosovo and the Sandzˇak; the thema of Bulgaria, with its centre in the modern Republic of Macedonia; and lands beyond the frontier, principally medieval Hungary (including modern Vojvodina), but also Italy. Each region was of interest to various Byzantine emperors between and , but certain areas were of greater interest at certain times. The chronological limits of this study were chosen with maps in mind. It begins when Bulgaria dominated the northern Balkans, and her political borders ran along the Danube to the north, in the south-west within miles of the great Byzantine cities of Thessalonica and Dyrrachium, and in the south stopped at the Great Fence of Thrace. A suitable modern illustration of this can be found in The Cambridge Medieval History
(CMH), or alternatively Dimitri Obolensky’s Byzantine Commonwealth, which is still the best analysis of Byzantine concerns in the northern Balkans and beyond.18 My text becomes fuller when the empire’s border is restored to the lower Danube by John I Tzimisces (–), and again by Basil II (–). However, the period – is treated as an introduction to lands, peoples, and themata which will be developed in considering the subsequent period. Thus the text becomes fuller still in the later eleventh century, and is at its fullest in the reign of Manuel I Comnenus (–) when the imperial frontier was advanced, for the first time in centuries, beyond the rivers Danube and Sava following the annexation of Sirmium and Dalmatia. The eleventh and twelfth centuries have received a great deal of scholarly attention in recent years, particularly in Britain and France, which has done much to revise the dominant interpretation established by George Ostrogorsky. Ostrogorsky’s political History of the Byzantine State posits the thesis that the empire achieved its medieval apogee under Basil II. One of the few maps in the second English edition of his book illustrates the extent of the First Bulgarian Empire, inviting the reader to consider the scale of the reconquest masterminded by the ‘military’ emperors of the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, and to contrast this with the ineffectual ‘civilian’ emperors of the mid-eleventh century.19 He states unambiguously: ‘The death of Basil II marked a turning point in Byzantine history. It was followed by a period of decline in which in its foreign policy Byzantium lived on the prestige won in the previous age and at home gave play to all the forces making for disintegration’ (Ostrogorsky : ). In the first chapter of this work I present my own interpretation of imperial foreign policy in ‘the previous age’, the tenth century. In chapter two I offer my assessment of John I’s and Basil II’s campaigns in the Balkans. It will be clear that my judgement of their achievements differs considerably from Ostrogorsky’s, and sets the scene for a fuller analysis of imperial foreign and frontier policy in the western half of the empire in the period after Basil II’s death. Paul Lemerle mounted the first powerful defence of imperial policy in the period of ‘civilian’ government. He called for Byzantine policy to be considered in relation to the wider historical picture, for attention to be paid to the forces and changes affecting northern and western Europe at this time, and for credit to be given for the enlightened and sensitive
manner with which successive emperors responded. Lemerle also demanded that less attention be paid to individual agency, and maintained that emphasis placed on the emperors and their personal roles obscured appreciation of processes. It led, he stressed, to the inevitable and obfuscatory juxtaposition of strong and weak, ‘civilian’ and ‘military’, good and bad. Nevertheless, Lemerle had his own champions. He praised Constantine IX Monomachus (–) for widening access to the senate, promoting education, and instituting a more meritocratic system of government. Another of his heroes was Nicephoritzes, chief minister in the reign of Michael VII Ducas (–), who attempted to restore central control over the empire’s economy and rebuild her armies, albeit with a great reliance on mercenaries.20 In effect Lemerle credited a ‘civilian’ emperor and chief minister with creating a ‘New Society’. Lemerle, with his French disciples and colleagues, took discussion of the eleventh century onto a different level, and his ideas have been embraced in Britain and the USA. As Angold (: –) put it: ‘The old notion . . . that the eleventh-century crisis received political expression in the shape of a struggle between the civil and military aristocracy . . . has been quietly shelved.’ However, Angold questioned Lemerle’s upbeat interpretation of the eleventh century, and his shifting all the blame onto Alexius I. He stressed the poisoned legacy of Basil II, which his successors struggled to master, but ultimately failed to control. For this reason, like Lemerle, he dealt more sympathetically with Constantine IX, who attempted to ‘face up to the state’s predicament’, ‘to put the empire on a peacetime footing’, and ‘to ease the state’s financial difficulties by cutting military expenditure’. Such an analysis has been made possible by the great advances in our understanding of the medieval Byzantine economy. Much of the seminal work was undertaken by Alexander Kazhdan, whose studies in Russian have gradually been made more widely accessible through his collaborative projects with Englishspeaking colleagues. Others have made substantial contributions, and there is now no doubt that the Byzantine economy was growing rapidly throughout the eleventh century and into the twelfth. An issue with which scholars now must grapple is how the imperial government managed the wealth, how it controlled and distributed resources. In chapters three and four I offer a particular perspective on the empire’s predicament as it was bequeathed by Basil II, on the methods employed to deal with subject
peoples and neighbours on a peacetime footing, and on the relations between centre and periphery and the flow of resources. I do not intend for these chapters to constitute a full political history of the northern Balkans in the eleventh century, still less solve the problems of the relationship between Byzantine orthodox culture and the nascent Slavic orthodox culture, or cultures, in the peninsula; so much will be apparent from the lack of attention I have devoted to the emergence of Slavic literary culture in exactly this period. However, I hope that my contribution adds something to a continuing discussion, and provides an impetus to further explorations of processes of cultural transmission and change in the medieval Balkans. The twelfth century, the age of the Comneni, has followed the eleventh into vogue, with corresponding criticism of Ostrogorsky’s approval for the revival of triumphal militarism. Once again Lemerle was in the vanguard of those who valued John Zonaras’ highly critical account of the reign of Alexius I Comnenus (–) more highly than the Alexiad, the biography produced by Alexius’ daughter Anna. A recent collection of essays restores the balance between the two accounts, and advances our knowledge of diverse aspects of Alexius’ reign, and of the government and society at the beginning of the twelfth century. The most valuable contribution for this work is Jonathan Shepard’s study of Alexius’ diplomacy, which, when placed alongside his many other detailed papers, establishes a new context for any analysis of relations between east and west.21 The rise of the Latin Christendom, and its most obvious confrontation with the eastern empire in the form of the First Crusade have deservedly received significant attention from Byzantine scholars, following the eloquent lead of Steven Runciman.22 Similarly, the Norman achievement has generated interest, but too few useful studies by Byzantinists. My brief contribution, in chapter five, must be read in this context. However, my emphasis, naturally, is on the frontier lands where Normans and Crusaders first entered the empire. The Norman invasion of Dyrrachium in gives the first, and best documented opportunity to study how the frontier system in the western Balkans functioned. The advent of the First Crusade, and its successes in the east, presages a new era when Byzantine eastern and western policy, always related, can no longer be regarded as wholly distinct. Venice played a central role in the Latin expansion into Outremer, and her merchant fleet was essential for supplying Frankish colonists trapped
between the Syrian frontier and the Mediterranean. Simultaneously Venice was expanding her interests in the west, most notably into Dalmatia. There she competed with the new sedentary Christian kingdom of Hungary. Some attention has been paid to Byzantine relations with Venice, although much has focused on the cultural rather than the political. Far less attention has been devoted to Byzantine dealings with Hungary. A notable exception is the enormously detailed study by Ferenc Makk of relations between The Árpáds and the Comneni (). In chapter six I address both Hungary and Venice in the appropriate context for this study: the eastern littoral of the northern Adriatic. The expansion of Venetian and Hungarian interests into the northern Balkans occurred without substantial Byzantine interference. Consequently it received very little coverage in Greek sources, and we are reliant on the written testimonies of Latin chroniclers. Fortunately, however, the maritime cities of Dalmatia, over whom the powers competed to extend their authority, have archives where many documents relating to the process have been preserved. The general neglect by Byzantine authors of the northern Balkans at this time relents only to allow an analysis of John II Comnenus’ (–) confrontation with the Hungarians in –. While it may appear odd to devote disproportionate space to an episode which, I argue, is inconsequential, I do so in order to highlight a common problem in the written sources on which we rely: the gulf between ‘rhetoric’ and ‘reality’ in Byzantine literature. I will not offer here any substantial comment on individual written sources, but will do so where appropriate in the body of the narrative. (The interested reader should also consult the introductory accounts offered by Angold and Magdalino in works already cited.) However, I will remark briefly on the nature of Byzantine historiography, and its intimate link with court panegyric (enkomia), in the era of the Comneni. All genres of Byzantine literature were written for and by a highly educated elite according to prescribed rules. The rules which governed the composition of enkomia make the extraction of reliable historical information a peculiarly difficult task. Panegyrists were concerned primarily with presenting those being praised in a certain manner, and saw mere historical events as opportunities to allude to familiar models and draw from a corpus of imagery and motifs that are only now being deciphered.23 Historians attributed greater import to recording events in the correct order – if not always the most appropriate context – and, for want of a better term, accurately. The objective of historiography, as Byzantine historians often remarked in their proemia, was the pursuit of ‘truth’ (or, alternatively, ‘plausibility’). However, they certainly did not strive for objectivity or clarity, and for the period under scrutiny they were obliged to compose in Attic Greek, which had been a dead language for over a millennium.24 The gulf between rhetoric and reality is at its widest in the reign of Manuel I Comnenus (–), when the fullest corpus of written material is court panegyric. Our understanding of the empire during the reign of Manuel I has been revolutionized by Paul Magdalino’s recent study, which makes the fullest use of panegyric. Tellingly, Magdalino chose to set the scene for his analysis of political culture and the imperial system with a lengthy treatment of Manuel’s foreign policy.25 We no longer believe that Manuel was, from the unexpected death of his father during a hunting expedition until his own death thirty-seven years later, driven by a desire to extend the limits of his empire to Justinianic proportions, and chapters seven and eight of this study reflect the view that Manuel’s reign must be divided into two distinct periods: pre- and post- . In the earlier period Manuel seemed set to pursue his father’s policy of controlled aggression in the east, facilitated by a solid alliance with Germany, which was based on a mutual antipathy towards the Normans who had established themselves in southern Italy and Sicily. Chapter seven traces Manuel’s early attempts to bolster the German alliance against the resurgence of the Norman threat to the Byzantine position in the western Balkans. This is the first instance of Manuel’s supposed preoccupation with western affairs, and there are clear indications that it stemmed from John II’s neglect of the west during a period of rapid development. John’s failure effectively to check the consolidation of Norman power, and, as importantly, to prevent the expansion of Venice and Hungary into the northern Balkans, was a result of his deal with Germany. The new powers expanded into the vacuum between the two ‘empires’, and, in the protracted aftermath of the Second Crusade, revealed quite how hollow and superficial the imperial entente had been. After Manuel was obliged to confront, and attempt to solve the problems he had inherited. He determined to consolidate his authority in the northern Balkans, and to annex the frontier regions that had fallen under Hungarian and Venetian influence: Sirmium and Dalmatia
Chapter eight is a close examination of this undertaking, which was successful but ephemeral. The end of Manuel’s reign signalled the collapse of Byzantine authority throughout the northern Balkans, and the emergence (or re-emergence) of autonomous polities in Serbia and Bulgaria. This will be the subject of chapter nine. Accessible and objective studies of this period are few. Charles Brand’s Byzantium Confronts the West – is still unsurpassed, thirty years after publication. He built on earlier work, still often cited, by Robert Lee Wolff, who went as far as was possible using the then published narrative and documentary sources.26 An alternative perspective on the lands and peoples here considered is offered by John Fine in his excellent critical surveys The Early Medieval Balkans (), and The Late Medieval Balkans (). Fine’s coverage considerably surpasses the chronological and geographical scope of the present study, and is the essential starting point for any English speaker interested in the medieval Balkans. However, Fine quite deliberately diminishes the role of Byzantium to balance studies which have treated the Balkan lands as a footnote to imperial history. He is similarly critical of the myriad histories which treat the Balkan lands as so many embryonic nation states.27 If one must criticize Fine’s approach, which he explains fully and honestly, his relegation of Byzantium leads to a type of fragmentation which, contrarily, supports the vision of the medieval Balkans offered by the nationally prescribed and ethnocentric texts he does so much to discredit. Fine is surely right to warn against drawing firm conclusions from the incredibly meagre written material that he surveys. The current work would have suffered similarly, and perhaps taken the format of a critical survey, had there not been a vast new body of evidence on which I was able to draw: the wealth of archaeological material uncovered by extensive programmes of excavations in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, former Yugoslavia, and Hungary. From the first chapter it will be apparent that material evidence can transform our interpretation of even the most familiar topics and themes. In chapter two it will be stressed that particular pieces of material evidence, Byzantine lead seals, can be used to provide information of a type and volume sufficient to revolutionize our understanding of the Byzantine occupation and reorganization of Bulgaria. In chapter three it will be apparent that an entirely novel hypothesis – that the ‘civilian’ successors of Basil II introduced an enlightened trade policy at the lower Danube to discourage nomad raids – can be formulated using numismatic and ceramic evidence where previously it was felt little could be said. In chapters four, five and six, excavation reports from towns and castles throughout the frontier lands will be used to illustrate and develop the narrative. Finally, in chapters seven, eight and nine, detailed treatment of the evidence from particular sites will demonstrate how and where resources were deployed in, or withdrawn from, the northern Balkans in the second half of the twelfth century. Very little of the information I utilize has been noticed, and even less remarked upon, by the majority of Byzantine historians, and I hope that my presentation is sufficiently plain so as to make this ‘new evidence’ more accessible. Therefore, it seems sensible here to offer some indications of how I have interpreted archaeological material, which may not always be apparent in the distilled form presented in the narrative. I have not been greatly concerned with Byzantine ecclesiastical architecture. This is a highly developed field of study with which I am familiar, but in which I am far from expert. Of more use for the present work has been recent research on Byzantine military architecture and fortifications. The seminal study by Foss and Winfield, Byzantine Fortifications (), has a vast chronological range, but a correspondingly narrow geographical focus: Asia Minor. The basic conclusions which Foss and Winfield advanced have been developed by British scholars who have conducted a survey of eleventh- and twelfth-century Byzantine castles, again in Asia Minor. I have used their insights in my study of the fortifications in the western part of the empire, and where appropriate I have made reference to construction and masonry techniques which are also found in contemporary fortifications in Asia Minor. I have made greater use of Byzantine coins and lead seals. The enormous potential of coins as a source for Byzantine history has long been known, but only recently has a coherent framework for the interpretation of numismatic evidence been constructed, principally by Cécile Morrisson, Philip Grierson, Michael Metcalf and Michael Hendy. Morrisson’s catalogue of the Byzantine coins in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris has provided a system of classification to replace the outdated British Museum scheme. Morrisson has made substantial contributions beyond classisfication which I will address at appropriate junctures in the text. Further work continues, not least the ongoing publication of the Dumbarton Oaks Collection in Washington under the guidance of Grierson. Metcalf has demonstrated that the Byzantine monetary system must be viewed in the wider context of south-eastern European systems which developed from and alongside the imperial model. Hendy has explained the developments in the imperial system of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, identifying the reformed coinage produced by Alexius I Comnenus, probably in or shortly after . Despite these advances, Byzantine historians, with few exceptions, have continued to neglect numismatic evidence. I have attempted to make full and appropriate use of coins, observing two of Hendy’s dicta. First, ‘the study of coins, while justified and necessary, is (or should be) merely a means to an end, and the end is the contribution they can make . . . towards the study of the civilization that produced and used them.’28 Second, ‘coinage was essentially a fiscal phenomenon: produced and distributed, that is, in order to provide the state with a standard medium in which to collect public revenue and distribute public expenditure. It would be absurd to suggest that it did not circulate freely and perform the function of mediating private exchange; but this was not its primary function, only its secondary.’29 While the introduction of a more flexible system of coinage after suggests a greater awareness of the importance of a range of values for private exchange, I will maintain that coinage remained essentially a fiscal phenomenon, and played a role in a series of initiatives of economic importance which were implemented for political reasons. Coins are found in three contexts: as stray losses (or casual finds), site finds (during excavations), and as deliberately concealed parcels (or hoards). Stray finds and site finds are generally low value coins, since these, if lost, are less likely to be missed, or if they are will not always inspire the user or others to search. Moreover, coins of low value are more likely to be lost, since they have a more vigorous currency than those of higher value; that is, they change hands more frequently. For the same reason they are likely to show greater signs of wear. Both the lack of reason or purpose for their loss, and their vigorous currency, make stray finds particularly valuable for assessing the numbers and types of coins in circulation at a given site, and during a particular period. Therefore, statistical differences in total numbers of stray finds between sites will in principle reflect varying intensities of coin use (provided the same level of effort has been spent in searching for them – for example
by conducting systematic excavations). This consideration has been of particular use in my exploration of trade and diplomacy at the lower Danube in the eleventh century (see below at pp. ‒, ‒). Hoards are more problematic; we can assume that a hoard was concealed for a purpose, and therefore that the owner of the coins intended to recover his parcel at a later date, but we cannot ever know completely the reasons for concealment or for non-recovery. The most likely reason for concealment is generally assumed to be the desire for security, and this desire is manifested most frequently at times of unrest. Thus a series of contemporary hoards can often be associated with a rebellion or an invasion. Such episodes also provide possible, or probable reasons for non-recovery: either a tragedy befalling the hoarder, or – a lesser tragedy – his or her forgetting where the hoard was concealed. Lead seals (or more properly sealings) have a variety of characteristics which resemble those of coins, but differentiate them from other artefacts. Like coins, they are material evidence but with a vital documentary component. However, unlike coins, which are struck only by emperors (or imitative authorities), seals are inscribed with information pertaining to individuals (including emperors), including their name and, very frequently, their imperial rank and office. The second characteristic that seals share with coins is their official nature. Seals not only gave a degree of security to despatches, but also seem to have conferred authority or legitimacy to the documents attached. It might be too bold to suggest that a document had no legal validity unless it bore an appropriate lead sealing. However, seals appear to have been struck most often, if not exclusively, by individuals operating in an official capacity. The survival of inscribed signet rings for all periods suggests that wax persisted as a means for sealing private communications. This is not to suggest that we can hope to distinguish entirely between private and public correspondence, still less to suggest that such a distinction would be helpful. Nevertheless, in the majority of cases the discovery of Byzantine lead seals can be taken to suggest a degree of official imperial interest in a particular site or area. They may also provide very significant details as to the nature of that interest. It would be of immense interest for studying the administration of Byzantium’s Balkan frontier if we could ascertain the direction and volume of sealed communications reaching particular sites. Unfortunately, most seals do not bear an indication of the location where they were struck. We can, however, narrow the range of possible provenances considerably by observing some simple rules. First, Constantinople was without question the source of and destination for the vast majority of sealed communications. The testimony of the letters themselves, and the contents of treatises and other works of literature is confirmed sigillographically: by far the greatest number of seals now in private and museum collections were discovered in Constantinople (Istanbul); and many seals discovered elsewhere were struck by officials known to have been resident in the capital. Second, most other sealed despatches remained within a region. Margaret Mullett’s study of the letters of Theophylact of Ohrid contains a map of the archbishop’s ‘letter network’, as well as a reproduction of his unpretentious seal.30 It is clear that this ecclesiastical prelate of the later eleventh century corresponded principally with his colleagues and friends in Constantinople, but also maintained a web of contacts in Bulgaria and the northern Balkans. The evidence for communication between Ohrid and Skopje, and Prespa and Debar, supports the hypothesis proposed by Cheynet and Morrisson that most seals discovered at provincial sites (and not from Constantinople) will have come from nearby.31 The ‘principle of territoriality’ rests on the entirely plausible premise that the majority of sealed documents will have circulated within the area of jurisdiction of the issuing authority. It is supported by the discovery of an archive of seals (but not the documents they once sealed) at Preslav, which further supports the notion that seals served the function of validating as well as securing documents. (Why else would archived copies bear seals?) These issues will be addressed, and the greatest use of seals will be made, in considering the Preslav archive and the numerous seals discovered at sites on the lower Danube (below at pp. ‒, , , ‒). And so back to the maps. If all has gone to plan, the diligent reader should find that by the end of this book she or he will have an idea – my idea, if it is sufficiently clear – of how and why the line of the Byzantine frontier in the northern Balkans changed so dramatically between and . She or he should also be familiar with the probable ramifications of those changes for the peoples settled beyond or within the shifting frontiers. The sensible scholar will then want to take a longer look at the eastern frontier, for the situation of the empire was ever a balancing act. The most obvious limitation of the present study is that it prioritizes one half of the empire: a flaw also attributed to the last great Byzantine emperor, Manuel Comnenus. And Manuel was great by default: Constantinople fell to the Latins just twenty-four years after his death. That is where I will end.
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